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The Battle of the Eurymedon was a double
battle, taking place both on water and land, between the Delian League of
Athens and her Allies, and the Persian Empire of Xerxes I. It took place in
either 469 or 466, in the vicinity of the mouth of the Eurymedon River (now the
Köprüçay) in Pamphylia, Asia Minor. It forms part of the Wars
of the Delian League, itself part of the larger Greco-Persian Wars. The Delian
League had been formed between Athens and many of the city-states of the Aegean
to continue the war with Persia, which had begun with the first and second
Persian invasions of Greece (492–490 and 480–479, respectively).
In the aftermath of the Battles of Plataea
and Mycale, which had ended the second
invasion, the Greek Allies had taken the offensive, besieging the cities of
Sestos and Byzantium. The Delian League then took over responsibility for the
war, and continued to attack Persian bases in the Aegean throughout the next
decade. In either 469 or 466, the Persians began assembling a large army and
navy for a major offensive against the Greeks. Gathering near the Eurymedon
River, it is possible that the expedition aimed to move up the coast of Asia
Minor, capturing each city in turn. This would bring the Asiatic Greek regions
back under Persian control, and give the Persians naval bases from which to
launch further expeditions into the Aegean. Hearing of the Persian
preparations, the Athenian general Cimon took 200 triremes and sailed to
Phaselis in Pamphylia, which eventually agreed to join the Delian League. This
effectively blocked the Persian strategy at its first objective. Cimon then
moved to pre-emptively attack the Persian forces near the Eurymedon. Sailing
into the mouth of the river, Cimon quickly routed the Persian fleet gathered
there. Most of the Persian fleet made landfall, and the sailors fled to the
shelter of the Persian army. Cimon then landed the Greek marines and proceeded
to attack the Persian army, which was also routed. The Greeks captured the
Persian camp, taking many prisoners, and were able to destroy 200 beached
Persian triremes. This stunning double victory seems to have greatly
demoralised the Persians, and prevented any further Persian campaigning in the
Aegean until at least 451. However, the Delian League do not appear to have
pressed home their advantage, probably because of other events in the Greek
world that required their attention.
Opponents: Delian League
versus Achaemenid
Empire
Commanders and leaders:
Delian - Cimon
Persians - Tithraustes, Pherendatis †
Strength:
Delians - 200 ships
Persians -200–350 ships
Casualties and losses:
Delians - Unknown
Persians - 200 ships captured and destroyed
Sources and chronology:
Thucydides, whose history provides many of the details of this period
Unfortunately, the military history of Greece between the end of the second
Persian invasion of Greece and the Peloponnesian War (431-404) is poorly
attested by surviving ancient sources. This period, sometimes referred to as
the pentekontaetia by ancient scholars, was a period of relative peace and
prosperity within Greece. The richest source for the period, and also the most
contemporary with it, is Thucydides's History of the Peloponnesian War, which
is generally considered by modern historians to be a reliable primary account.
Thucydides only mentions this period in a digression on the growth of Athenian
power in the run up to the Peloponnesian War, and the account is brief,
probably selective and lacks any dates. Nevertheless, Thucydides's account can
be, and is used by historians to draw up a skeleton chronology for the period,
on to which details from archaeological records and other writers can be
superimposed. Much extra detail for the period is provided by Plutarch, in his
biographies of Aristides and especially Cimon. Plutarch was writing some 600
years after the events in question, and is therefore very much a secondary
source, but he often explicitly names his sources, which allows some degree of
verification of his statements. In his biographies, he explicitly draws on many
ancient histories that have not survived, and thus often preserves details of
the period that Thucydides's brief account omits. The final major extant source
for the period is the universal history (Bibliotheca historica) of the 1st
century Sicilian, Diodorus Siculus. Much of Diodorus's writing concerning this
period seems to be derived from the much earlier Greek historian Ephorus, who
also wrote a universal history. However, from what little we know of Ephorus,
historians are generally disparaging towards his history. Diodorus, who has
often been dismissed by modern historians, is therefore not a particularly good
source for this period. Indeed, one of his translators, Oldfather, says of
Diodorus's account of the Eurymedon campaign that "...the three preceding
chapters reveal Diodorus in the worst light...". There is also a
reasonable body of archaeological evidence for the period, of which
inscriptions detailing probable tribute lists of the Delian League are
particularly important.
Chronology:
Thucydides provides a succinct list of the main events occurring between the
end of the second Persian invasion and the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War,
but almost no chronological information. Various attempts have been made to
reassemble the chronology, but there is no definitive answer. The assumption
central to these attempts is that Thucydides is describing the events in the
appropriate chronological order. The one firmly accepted date is 465 for the
beginning of the Siege of Thasos. This is based on an ancient scholiast's
annotation of a copy of Aeschines's works. The scholiast notes that the
Athenians met disaster at the 'Nine-Ways' in the archonship of Lysitheus (known
to be 465/464. Thucydides mentions this attack on the 'Nine-Ways' in connection
with the beginning of the Siege of Thasos, and since Thucydides says that the
siege ended in its third year, the Siege of Thasos therefore dates to
c.465–463. The Battle of Eurymedon has been dated to 469 by Plutarch's
anecdote about the Archon Apsephion (469/468) choosing Cimon and his fellow
generals as judges in a competition. The implication is that Cimon had recently
achieved a great victory, and the most likely candidate is Eurymedon. However,
since the Battle of Eurymedon seems to have occurred after the Athenian siege
of Naxos (but before the Siege of Thasos), the date of Eurymedon is clearly
constrained by the date of Naxos. Whilst some accept a date of 469 or earlier
for this Naxos, another school of thought places it as late as 467.
Since the Battle of Eurymedon seems to have occurred before Thasos, the
alternative date for this battle would therefore be 466 BC.[19] Modern
historians are split, some supporting 469 as the most likely date, and others
opting for 466.
Background:
Main articles: Greco-Persian Wars,
Delian League, and Wars of the
Delian League
The Greco-Persian Wars had their roots in the conquest of the Greek cities of
Asia Minor, and in particular Ionia, by the Persian Empire of Cyrus the Great
shortly after 550. The Persians found the Ionians difficult to rule, eventually
settling for sponsoring a tyrant in each Ionian city. While Greek states had in
the past often been ruled by tyrants, this was a form of government on the
decline. By 500, Ionia appears to have been ripe for rebellion against these
Persian place-men. The simmering tension finally broke into open revolt due to
the actions of the tyrant of Miletus, Aristagoras. Attempting to save himself
after a disastrous Persian-sponsored expedition in 499, Aristagoras chose to
declare Miletus a democracy. This triggered similar revolutions across Ionia,
and indeed Doris and Aeolis, beginning the Ionian Revolt. The Greek states of
Athens and Eretria allowed themselves to be drawn into this conflict by
Aristagoras, and during their only campaigning season (498) they contributed to
the capture and burning of the Persian regional capital of Sardis. After this,
the Ionian Revolt carried on (without further outside aid) for a further 5
years, until it was finally completely crushed by the Persians. However, in a
decision of great historic significance, the Persian king Darius the Great
decided that, despite successfully subduing the revolt, there remained the
unfinished business of exacting punishment on Athens and Eretria for supporting
the revolt.
The Ionian Revolt had
severely threatened the stability of Darius's empire, and the states of
mainland Greece would continue to threaten that stability unless dealt with.
Darius thus began to contemplate the complete conquest of Greece, beginning
with the destruction of Athens and Eretria. In the next two decades there would
be two Persian invasions of Greece, including some of the most famous battles
in history. During the first invasion, Thrace, Macedon and the Aegean islands
were added to the Persian Empire, and Eretria was duly destroyed. However, the
invasion ended in 490 with the decisive Athenian victory at the Battle of
Marathon. Between the two invasions, Darius
died, and responsibility for the war passed to his son Xerxes I. Xerxes then
led the second invasion personally in 480, taking an enormous (although
oft-exaggerated) army and navy to Greece. Those Greeks who chose to resist (the
'Allies') were defeated in the twin battles of Thermopylae and
Artemisium on land and at sea
respectively. All of Greece except the Peloponnesus thus fell into Persian
hands, but then seeking to finally destroy the Allied navy, the Persians
suffered a decisive defeat at the Battle of Salamis. The following year, 479, the Allies
assembled the largest Greek army yet seen and defeated the Persian invasion
force at the Battle of Plataea, ending the
invasion and the threat to Greece. According to tradition, on the same day as
Plataea, the Allied fleet defeated the demoralised remnants of the Persian
fleet in the Battle of Mycale. This action
marks the end of the Persian invasion, and the beginning of the next phase in
the Greco-Persian wars, the Greek counterattack.[38] After Mycale, the Greek
cities of Asia Minor again revolted, with the Persians now powerless to stop
them. The Allied fleet then sailed to the Chersonesos, still held by the
Persians, and besieged and captured the town of Sestos. The following year,
478, the Allies sent a force to capture the city of Byzantium (modern day
Istanbul). The siege was successful, but the behaviour of the Spartan general
Pausanias alienated many of the Allies, and resulted in Pausanias's recall. The
siege of Byzantium was the last action of the Hellenic alliance that defeated
the Persian invasion.
After Byzantium, Sparta was eager to end her involvement in the war. The
Spartans were of the view that, with the liberation of mainland Greece, and the
Greek cities of Asia Minor, the war's purpose had already been reached. There
was also perhaps a feeling that securing long-term security for the Asian
Greeks would prove impossible. The loose alliance of city states that fought
against Xerxes's invasion was dominated by Sparta and the Peloponnesian league.
With the Spartan withdrawal, the leadership of the Greeks now explicitly passed
to the Athenians. A congress was called on the holy island of Delos to
institute a new alliance to continue the fight against the Persians. This
alliance, now including many of the Aegean islands, was formally constituted as
the 'First Athenian Alliance', commonly known as the Delian League. According
to Thucydides, the official aim of the League was to "avenge the wrongs
they suffered by ravaging the territory of the king." Forces of the Delian
League spent much of the next decade expelling the remaining Persian garrisons
from Thrace, and expanding the Aegean territory controlled by the League.
Prelude:
Once the Persian forces in Europe had largely been neutralised, the Athenians
seem to have gone about starting to extend the League in Asia Minor. The
islands of Samos, Chios and Lesbos seem to have become members of the original
Hellenic alliance after Mycale, and presumably were also therefore original
members of the Delian League. However, it is unclear exactly when the other
Ionian cities, or indeed the other Greek cities of Asia Minor, joined the
league, though they certainly did at some point. Thucydides attests the
presence of Ionians at Byzantium in 478, so it is possible that at least some
of the Ionian cities joined the league in early 478. The Athenian politician
Aristides was said to have died in Pontus (c. 468) whilst on public business.
Given that Aristides was responsible for organising the financial contributions
of each League member, this trip may have been connected with expansion of the
League into Asia Minor. Cimon's Eurymedon campaign itself seems to have begun
in response to the assembly of a large Persian fleet and army at Aspendos, near
the mouth of the Eurymedon River. It is usually argued that the Persians were
the would-be aggressors, and that Cimon's campaign was launched to deal with
this new threat. Cawkwell suggests that the Persian build-up was the first
concerted attempt to counter the activity of the Greeks since the failure of
the second invasion. It is possible that internal strife within the Persian
empire had contributed to the length of time it took to launch this campaign.
Cawkwell outlines the Persian strategic problems:
"Persia was a land power which used its naval forces in close conjunction
with its armies, not free ranging in enemy waters. In any case, secure naval
bases were necessary. In the Ionian Revolt with land forces already operating
in Ionia and elsewhere along the Aegean seaboard, it was easy for a Royal army
and navy to deal with the revolt, but in view of the general revolt of the
[Ionian] cities in 479 BC and the subsequent successes of the Greek navies the
only way for Persia must have seemed to be to move along the coast restoring
order in city after city, with fleet and army moving together."
The nature of naval warfare in the Ancient world, dependent as it was on large
teams of rowers, meant that ships would have to make landfall every few days to
resupply with food and water. This severely limited the range of an Ancient
fleet, and essentially meant that navies could only operate in the vicinity of
secure naval bases. Cawkwell therefore suggests that the Persian forces
gathered at Aspendos were aiming to move along the southern coast of Asia
Minor, capturing each city, until eventually the Persian navy could begin
operating in Ionia again. Alexander the Great would employ this strategy in
reverse in winter of 333. Lacking a navy with which to take on the Persians,
Alexander settled instead for denying the Persian navy suitable bases, by
capturing the ports of southern Asia Minor. Plutarch says that upon hearing
that the Persian forces were gathering at Aspendos, Cimon sailed from Cnidus
(in Caria) with 200 triremes. It is highly likely that Cimon had assembled this
force because the Athenians had had some warning of a forthcoming Persian
campaign to re-subjugate the Asiatic Greeks. Certainly, no other league
business would have required such a great force. Cimon may have been waiting in
Caria because he expected the Persians to march straight into Ionia, along the
Royal road from Sardis. According to Plutarch, Cimon sailed with these 200
triremes to the Greek city of Phaselis (in Lycia) but was refused admittance.
He therefore began ravaging the lands of Phaselis, but with the mediation of
the Chian contingent of his fleet, the people of Phaselis agreed to join the
league. They were to contribute troops to the expedition, and to pay the
Athenians ten talents. The fact that Cimon pre-emptively sailed to and captured
Phaselis suggests that he anticipated a Persian campaign to capture the coastal
cities (as outlined above). The presence of both army and navy at Aspendos may
have persuaded him that there was to be no immediate assault on Ionia. By
capturing Phaselis, the furthest east Greek city in Asia Minor (and just to the
west of the Eurymedon), he effectively blocked the Persian campaign before it
had begun, denying them the first naval base they needed to control. Taking
further initiative, Cimon then moved to directly attack the Persian fleet at
Aspendos.
Opposing forces:
According to Plutarch, the League fleet consisted of 200 triremes. These were
of the sleek Athenian aphract (deckless) design, originally developed by
Themistocles primarily for ramming actions, although they had been modified by
Cimon to improve their suitability for boarding actions. The standard
complement of a trireme was 200 men, including 14 marines. In the second
Persian invasion of Greece, each Persian ship had carried thirty extra marines,
and this was probably very true in the first invasion when the whole invasion
force was apparently carried in triremes. Furthermore, the Chian ships at the
Battle of Lade also carried 40 marines each.
This suggests that a trireme could probably carry a maximum of 40–45
soldiers—triremes seem to have been easily destabilised by extra weight.
There were therefore probably around 5,000 hoplite marines with the League
fleet. Persian Several different estimates for the size of the Persian fleet
are given. Thucydides says that there was a fleet of 200 Phoenician ships, and
is generally considered the most reliable source.
Plutarch gives numbers of 350 from Ephorus and 600 from Phanodemus.
Furthermore, Plutarch says that the Persian fleet was awaiting 80 Phoenician
ships sailing from Cyprus. Although Thucydides's account is generally to be
favoured, there may an element of truth in Plutarch's assertion that the
Persians were awaiting further reinforcements; this would explain why Cimon was
able to launch a pre-emptive assault on them. There are no estimates in the
ancient sources for the size of the Persian land army. However, the number of
Persian marines accompanying the fleet was presumably in the same range as the
number of Greek marines (c. 5,000), since the Persian ships carried the same
complement of troops. Plutarch quotes Ephorus as saying that Tithraustes was
commander of the royal fleet, and Pherendatis of the infantry, but says that
Callisthenes named Ariomandes as overall commander.
Battle:
Thucydides gives only the barest of details for this battle; the most reliable
detailed account is given by Plutarch. According to Plutarch, the Persian fleet
was anchored off the mouth of the Eurymedon, awaiting the arrival of 80
Phoenician ships from Cyprus. Cimon, sailing from Phaselis, made to attack the
Persians before the reinforcements arrived, whereupon the Persian fleet, eager
to avoid fighting, retreated into the river itself. However, when Cimon
continued to bear down on the Persians, they accepted battle. Regardless of
their numbers, the Persian battle line was quickly breached, and the Persian
ships then turned about, and made for the river bank. Grounding their ships,
the crews sought sanctuary with the army waiting nearby. Some ships may have
been captured or destroyed during the naval battle, but it seems likely that
most were able to land. The Persian army now began to move towards the Greek
fleet, which had presumably also grounded itself in order to capture the
Persian ships. Despite the weariness of his troops after this first battle,
Cimon, seeing "that his men were exalted by the impetus and pride of their
victory, and eager to come to close quarters with the Barbarians", landed
the marines and proceeded to attack the Persian army. Initially the Persian
line held the Athenian assault, but eventually, as at the Battle of Mycale, the
heavily armoured hoplites proved superior, and routed the Persian army. Fleeing
back to their camp, the Persians were then captured, along with their camp, by
the victorious Greeks. Thucydides says that 200 Phoenician ships were captured
and destroyed. It is highly unlikely that this occurred during the apparently
brief naval battle, so these were probably grounded ships captured after the
battle and destroyed with fire, as has been the case at Mycale.
Plutarch says that 200 ships were captured, in addition to those that were
destroyed or fled. It is possible that 'destroyed' in this context means sunk
during the battle, since the Greeks would almost certainly have destroyed the
ships that they captured as well (as Thucydides indeed implies). Since
Thucydides only explicitly gives the number of ships destroyed, it is possible
to reconcile Plutarch's and Thucydides's numbers, but it is not clear that this
is the best approach. There are no estimates in the ancient sources for
casualties amongst the troops of either side. Plutarch says that, following his
double victory, "though like a powerful athlete he had brought down two
contests in one day...Cimon still went on competing with his own
victories." Cimon supposedly sailed with the Greek fleet as quickly as
possible to intercept the fleet of 80 Phoenician ships the Persians had
expected. Taking them by surprise, he captured or destroyed the entire fleet.
However, Thucydides does not mention this subsidiary action, and some have cast
doubt on whether it actually happened.
Aftermath:
Main article: Wars of the Delian League:
According to Plutarch, one tradition had it that the Persian king (who at the
time would still have been Xerxes) agreed a humiliating peace treaty in the
aftermath of the Eurymedon. However, as Plutarch admits, other authors denied
that such a peace was made at this time, and the more logical date for any
peace treaty would have been after the Cyprus campaign of 450. The alternative
suggested by Plutarch is that the Persian king acted as if he had made a
humiliating peace with the Greeks, because he was so fearful of engaging in
battle with them again. It is generally considered unlikely by modern
historians that a peace treaty was made in the aftermath of Eurymedon. The
Eurymedon was a highly significant victory for the Delian League, which
probably ended once and for all the threat of another Persian invasion of
Greece. It also seems to have prevented any Persian attempt to reconquer the
Asiatic Greeks until at least 451. The accession of further cities of Asia
Minor to the Delian league, particularly from Caria, probably followed Cimon's
campaign there. Despite Cimon's massive victory, something of a stalemate
developed between Persia and the League. The Greeks do not appear to have
pressed their advantage home in a meaningful way. If the later date of 466 for
the Eurymedon campaign is accepted, this might be because the revolt in Thasos
meant that resources were diverted away from Asia Minor to prevent the Thasians
seceding from the League. Conversely, as Plutarch suggests, the Persians
adopted a very defensive strategy in the Aegean for the next decade and a half.
The Persian fleet was effectively absent from the Aegean until 451, and Greek
ships were able to ply the coasts of Asia Minor with impunity.
The next major Delian League campaign against the Persians would only occur in
460 BC, when the Athenians decided to support a revolt in the Egyptian satrapy
of the Persian empire. This campaign would last 6 years, before eventually
ending in disaster for the Greeks.
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