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The Battle of Plataea was the final land battle during the second
Persian invasion of Greece. It took place in 479 near the city of Plataea in
Boeotia, and was fought between an alliance of the Greek city-states (including
Sparta, Athens, Corinth and Megara), and the Persian Empire of Xerxes I (allied
with Boeotians, Thessalians, and Macedonians). The previous year the Persian
invasion force, led by the Persian king in person, had scored victories at the
battles of Thermopylae and Artemisium and conquered Thessaly, Phocis, Boeotia,
Euboea and Attica. However, at the ensuing Battle of Salamis, the Allied Greek
navy had won an unlikely but decisive victory, preventing the conquest of the
Peloponnesus. Xerxes then retreated with much of his army, leaving his general
Mardonius to finish off the Greeks the following year. In the summer of 479 the
Greeks assembled a huge (by ancient standards) army and marched out of the
Peloponnesus. The Persians retreated to Boeotia and built a fortified camp near
Plataea. The Greeks, however, refused to be drawn into the prime cavalry
terrain around the Persian camp, resulting in a stalemate that lasted 11 days.
While attempting a retreat after their supply lines were disrupted, the Greek
battle line fragmented. Thinking the Greeks in full retreat, Mardonius ordered
his forces to pursue them, but the Greeks (particularly the Spartans, Tegeans
and Athenians) halted and gave battle, routing the lightly armed Persian
infantry and killing Mardonius. A large portion of the Persian army was trapped
in its camp and slaughtered. The destruction of this army, and the remnants of
the Persian navy allegedly on the same day at the Battle of Mycale, decisively
ended the invasion. After Plataea and Mycale the Greek allies would take the
offensive against the Persians, marking a new phase of the Greco-Persian Wars.
Although Plataea was in every sense a resounding victory, it does not seem to
have been attributed the same significance (even at the time) as, for example,
the Athenian victory at the Battle of Marathon or the Spartan defeat at
Thermopylae.
Opponents: Greek city-states versus Achaemenid Empire
Commanders and leaders
Greeks - Pausanias
Persians - Mardonius † Artabazos
- Strength:
Greeks - 110,000 (Herodotus) 100,000 (Diodorus) 100,000 (Trogus
Persians ~80,000 (modern consensus) 300,000 (Herodotus) plus 50,000 (estimation
by Herodotus) Greek allies 500,000 (Diodorus) 70,000–120,000 (modern
consensus, including Greek allies and non-combatants such as camp followers)
Casualties and losses:
Greeks - 10,000+ (Ephorus and Diodorus) 1,360 (Plutarch) 159 (Herodotus)
Persians - 257,000 (Herodotus) 100,000 (Diodorus) 50,000–90,000 (modern
consensus)
Background:
Main articles: First Persian invasion of Greece and Second Persian invasion of
Greece
The Greek city-states of Athens and Eretria had supported the unsuccessful
Ionian Revolt against the Persian Empire of Darius I in 499–494 . The
Persian Empire was still relatively young and prone to revolts by its subject
peoples. Moreover, Darius was a usurper and had to spend considerable time
putting down revolts against his rule. The Ionian Revolt threatened the
integrity of his empire, and he thus vowed to punish those involved (especially
those not already part of the empire). Darius also saw the opportunity to
expand his empire into the fractious world of Ancient Greece. A preliminary
expedition under Mardonius, in 492 , to secure the land approaches to Greece
ended with the re-conquest of Thrace and forced Macedon to become a fully
subordinate client kingdom of Persia, the latter which had been a Persian
vassal as early as the late 6th century . An amphibious task force was then
sent out under Datis and Artaphernes in 490 , using Delos as an intermediate
base at, successfully sacking Karystos and Eretria, before moving to attack
Athens. However, at the ensuing Battle of Marathon, the Athenians won a
remarkable victory, resulting in the withdrawal of the Persian army to Asia.
A map showing the Greek world at the time of the battle
Darius therefore began raising a huge new army with which he meant to
completely subjugate Greece. However, he died before the invasion could begin.
The throne of Persia passed to his son Xerxes I, who quickly restarted the
preparations for the invasion of Greece, including building two pontoon bridges
across the Hellespont. In 481 , Xerxes sent ambassadors around Greece asking
for earth and water as a gesture of their submission, but making the very
deliberate omission of Athens and Sparta (both of whom were at open war with
Persia). Support thus began to coalesce around these two leading states. A
congress of city states met at Corinth in the late autumn of 481 , and a
confederate alliance of Greek city-states was formed (hereafter referred to as
"the Allies"). This was remarkable for the disjointed Greek world,
especially since many of the city-states in attendance were still technically
at war with each other. The Allies initially adopted a strategy of blocking
land and sea approaches to southern Greece. Thus, in August 480 , after hearing
of Xerxes' approach, a small Allied army led by Spartan King Leonidas I blocked
the Pass of Thermopylae, while an Athenian-dominated navy sailed to the Straits
of Artemisium. Famously, the massively outnumbered Greek army held Thermopylae
for three days before being outflanked by the Persians, who used a little-known
mountain path. Although much of the Greek army retreated, the rearguard, formed
of the Spartan and Thespian contingents, was surrounded and annihilated. The
simultaneous Battle of Artemisium, consisting of a series of naval encounters,
was up to that point a stalemate; however, when news of Thermopylae reached
them, the Greeks also retreated, since holding the straits was now a moot
point.
Following Thermopylae, the Persian army proceeded to burn and sack the Boeotian
cities that had not surrendered, Plataea and Thespiae, before taking possession
of the now-evacuated city of Athens. The Allied army, meanwhile, prepared to
defend the Isthmus of Corinth. Xerxes wished for a final crushing defeat of the
Allies to finish the conquest of Greece in that campaigning season; conversely,
the Allies sought a decisive victory over the Persian navy that would guarantee
the security of the Peloponnese. The ensuing naval Battle of Salamis ended in a
decisive victory for the Allies, marking a turning point in the conflict.
Following the defeat of his navy at Salamis, Xerxes retreated to Asia with the
bulk of his army. According to Herodotus, this was because he feared the Greeks
would sail to the Hellespont and destroy the pontoon bridges, thereby trapping
his army in Europe. He left Mardonius, with hand-picked troops, to complete the
conquest of Greece the following year. Mardonius evacuated Attica and wintered
in Thessaly; the Athenians then reoccupied their destroyed city. Over the
winter, there seems to have been some tension among the Allies. The Athenians
in particular, who were not protected by the Isthmus but whose fleet was the
key to the security of the Peloponnese, felt hard done by and demanded that an
Allied army march north the following year. When the Allies failed to commit to
this, the Athenian fleet refused to join the Allied navy in the spring. The
navy, now under the command of the Spartan king Leotychides, stationed itself
off Delos, while the remnants of the Persian fleet remained off Samos, both
sides unwilling to risk battle.
Similarly, Mardonius remained in Thessaly, knowing an attack on the Isthmus was
pointless, while the Allies refused to send an army outside the Peloponnese.
Mardonius moved to break the stalemate by trying to win over the Athenians and
their fleet through the mediation of Alexander I of Macedon, offering peace,
self-government and territorial expansion. The Athenians made sure that a
Spartan delegation was also on hand to hear the offer, and rejected it: The
degree to which we are put in the shadow by the Medes' strength is hardly
something you need to bring to our attention. We are already well aware of it.
But even so, such is our love of liberty, that we will never surrender. Upon
this refusal, the Persians marched south again. Athens was again evacuated and
left to the enemy, leading to the second phase of the Destruction of Athens.
Mardonius now repeated his offer of peace to the Athenian refugees on Salamis.
Athens, along with Megara and Plataea, sent emissaries to Sparta demanding
assistance and threatening to accept the Persian terms if it was not given.
According to Herodotus, the Spartans, who were at that time celebrating the
festival of Hyacinthus, delayed making a decision until they were persuaded by
a guest, Chileos of Tegea, who pointed out the danger to all of Greece if the
Athenians surrendered. When the Athenian emissaries delivered an ultimatum to
the Spartans the next day, they were amazed to hear that a task force was in
fact already en route; the Spartan army was marching to meet the Persians.
When Mardonius learned of the Spartan force, he completed the destruction of
Athens, tearing down whatever was left standing. He then retreated towards
Thebes, hoping to lure the Greek army into territory that would be suitable for
the Persian cavalry. Mardonius created a fortified encampment on the north bank
of the Asopus river in Boeotia covering the ground from Erythrae past Hysiae
and up to the lands of Plataea. The Athenians sent 8,000 hoplites, led by
Aristides, along with 600 Plataean exiles to join the Allied army. The army
then marched in Boeotia across the passes of Mount Cithaeron, arriving near
Plataea, and above the Persian position on the Asopus. Under the guidance of
the commanding general, Pausanias, the Greeks took up position opposite the
Persian lines but remained on high ground. Knowing that he had little hope of
successfully attacking the Greek positions, Mardonius sought to either sow
dissension among the Allies or lure them down into the plain.
Plutarch reports that a conspiracy was discovered among some prominent
Athenians, who were planning to betray the Allied cause; although this account
is not universally accepted, it may indicate Mardonius' attempts of intrigue
within the Greek ranks. The Greek line moves forward to the Asopus ridge.
Mardonius also initiated hit-and-run cavalry attacks against the Greek lines,
possibly trying to lure the Greeks down to the plain in pursuit. Although
having some initial success, this strategy backfired when the Persian cavalry
commander Masistius was killed; with his death, the cavalry retreated. Their
morale boosted by this small victory, the Greeks moved forward, still remaining
on higher ground, to a new position more suited for encampment and better
watered. The Spartans and Tegeans were on a ridge to the right of the line, the
Athenians on a hillock on the left and the other contingents on the slightly
lower ground between. In response, Mardonius brought his men up to the Asopus
and arrayed them for battle;
However, neither the Persians nor the Greeks would attack; Herodotus claims
this is because both sides received bad omens during sacrificial rituals. The
armies thus stayed camped in their locations for eight days, during which new
Greek troops arrived. Mardonius then sought to break the stalemate by sending
his cavalry to attack the passes of Mount Cithaeron; this raid resulted in the
capture of a convoy of provisions intended for the Greeks. Two more days
passed, during which time the supply lines of the Greeks continued to be
menaced. Mardonius then launched another cavalry raid on the Greek lines, which
succeeded in blocking the Gargaphian Spring, which had been the only source of
water for the Greek army (they could not use the Asopus due to the threat posed
by Persian archers). Coupled with the lack of food, the restriction of the
water supply made the Greek position untenable, so they decided to retreat to a
position in front of Plataea, from where they could guard the passes and have
access to fresh water. To prevent the Persian cavalry from attacking during the
retreat, it was to be performed that night. However, the retreat went awry. The
Allied contingents in the centre missed their appointed position and ended up
scattered in front of Plataea itself.
The Athenians, Tegeans and Spartans, who had been guarding the rear of the
retreat, had not even begun to retreat by daybreak. A single Spartan division
was thus left on the ridge to guard the rear, while the Spartans and Tegeans
retreated uphill; Pausanias also instructed the Athenians to begin the retreat
and if possible join up with the Spartans. However, the Athenians at first
retreated directly towards Plataea, and thus the Allied battle line remained
fragmented as the Persian camp began to stir.
Opposing forces:
Greeks According to Herodotus, the Spartans sent 45,000 men – 5,000
Spartiates (full citizen soldiers), 5,000 other Lacodaemonian hoplites
(perioeci) and 35,000 helots (seven per Spartiate). This was probably the
largest Spartan force ever assembled. The Greek army had been reinforced by
contingents of hoplites from the other Allied city-states, as shown in the
table. Diodorus Siculus claims in his Bibliotheca historica that the number of
the Greek troops approached one hundred thousand.
City Number of hoplites:
Sparta 10,000 -Athens 8,000 -Corinth 5,000 -Megara 3,000 -Sicyon 3,000 -Tegea
1,500 -Phlius 1,000 -Troezen 1,000 -Anactorion & Leukas 800 - Epidaurus -
800 - Arcadian Orchomenans Arcadians[ 600 - Eretria & Styra 600 - Plataea
600 - Aegina 500 - Ambracia 500 - Chalcis 400 - Mycenae & Tiryns 400 -
Hermione 300 - Potidaea 300 - Cephalonia 200 - Lepreum 200 - Total 38,700
The Spartan general Pausanias commanded the Allied Greek troops. According to
Herodotus, there were a total of 69,500 lightly armed troops – 35,000
helots and 34,500 troops from the rest of Greece; roughly one per hoplite. The
number of 34,500 has been suggested to represent one light skirmisher
supporting each non-Spartan hoplite (33,700), together with 800 Athenian
archers, whose presence in the battle Herodotus later notes. Herodotus tells us
that there were also 1,800 Thespians (but does not say how they were equipped),
giving a total strength of 108,200 men. The number of hoplites is accepted as
reasonable (and possible); the Athenians alone had fielded 10,000 hoplites at
the Battle of Marathon. Some historians have accepted the number of light
troops and used them as a population census of Greece at the time. Certainly
these numbers are theoretically possible. Athens, for instance, allegedly
fielded a fleet of 180 triremes at Salamis, manned by approximately 36,000
rowers and fighters. Thus 69,500 light troops could easily have been sent to
Plataea. Nevertheless, the number of light troops is often rejected as
exaggerated, especially in view of the ratio of seven helots to one Spartiate.
For instance, Lazenby accepts that hoplites from other Greek cities might have
been accompanied by one lightly armoured retainer each, but rejects the number
of seven helots per Spartiate. He further speculates that each Spartiate was
accompanied by one armed helot, and that the remaining helots were employed in
the logistical effort, transporting food for the army. Both Lazenby and Holland
deem the lightly armed troops, whatever their number, as essentially irrelevant
to the outcome of battle. A further complication is that a certain proportion
of the Allied manpower was needed to man the fleet, which amounted to at least
110 triremes, and thus approximately 22,000 men. Since the Battle of Mycale was
fought at least near-simultaneously with the Battle of Plataea, then this was a
pool of manpower which could not have contributed to Plataea, and further
reduces the likelihood that 110,000 Greeks assembled before Plataea.
Achaemenids:
Main troops of Achaemenid General Mardonius, according to Herodotus: Persians,
Medians, Sakas, Bactrians and Indians, Smaller contingents included Greek
allies: Boeotians, Locrians, Malians, Thessalians, Phocians (1000 men), and
Macedonians. There were also troops from the Black Sea and Asia Minor:
Phrygians, Thracians, Mysians, Paeonians, as well as African troops:
"Ethiopians" and Egyptians. According to Herodotus, the Persians
numbered 300,000 and were accompanied by troops from Greek city states that
supported the Persian cause (including Macedonia, Thessaly and Thebes).
Herodotus admits that no one counted the Greek allies of the Achaemenids, but
he guesses that there were about 50,000 of them. Mardonius' troops consisted of
not only Persians and Medes, but also Bactrians, Scythians, Indians, Boeotians,
Locrians, Malians, Thessalians, Macedonians, Thracians, and 1,000 Phocians.
Herodotus described the composition of the principal troops of Mardonius:
Mardonius there chose out first all the Persians called Immortals, save only
Hydarnes their general, who said that he would not quit the king's person; and
next, the Persian cuirassiers, and the thousand horse, and the Medes and Sacae
and Bactrians and Indians, alike their footmen and the rest of the horsemen. He
chose these nations entire; of the rest of his allies he picked out a few from
each people, the goodliest men and those that he knew to have done some good
service... Thereby the whole number, with the horsemen, grew to three hundred
thousand men. —?Herodotus VIII, 113.
Diodorus Siculus claims in his Bibliotheca historica that the number of the
Persian troops was some five hundred thousand.
Nations under the Achaemenids at Plataea Number Persians 40,000 Bactrians,
Indians, Sakae 20,000 - Greek allies: Boeotians (Thebans), Locrians, Malians,
Thessalians, Phocians (1000 men), Macedonians 20,000 Phrygians, Thracians,
Mysians, Paeonians, Ethiopians, Egyptians. Smaller contingents
Cavalry: Persians, Bactrians, Indians, Sakae 5,000
Total 100,000 The figure of 300,000 has been doubted, along with many of
Herodotus' numbers, by many historians; modern consensus estimates the total
number of troops for the Persian invasion at around 250,000. According to this
consensus, Herodotus' 300,000 Persians at Plataea would self-evidently be
impossible. One approach to estimating the size of the Persian army has been to
estimate how many men might feasibly have been accommodated within the Persian
camp; this approach gives figures of between 70,000 and 120,000 men.
Lazenby, for instance, by comparison with later Roman military camps,
calculates the number of troops at 70,000, including 10,000 cavalry. Meanwhile,
Connolly derives a number of 120,000 from the same-sized camp. Indeed, most
estimates for the total Persian force are generally in this range. For
instance, Delbrück, based on the distance the Persians marched in a day
when Athens was attacked, concluded that 75,000 was the upper limit for the
size of the Persian army, including the supply personnel and other
non-combatants. In his battle account of Plataea, Delbrück estimated the
Persian army, including allied Greeks, as amounting to 40,000.
Composition and order of battle:
According to modern estimates based on the order of battle described by
Herodotus, the detailed composition of the Achaemenid army consisted in about
40,000 Persian troops on the left of the battle line, facing the Spartans,
about 20,000 Bactrians, Indians and Sakae in the centre, facing various Greek
states, and about 20,000 Greek allies of the Persians (Macedonians,
Thessalians, Beotians, Thebeans), positioned on the right wing facing the
Athenians. The cavalry, which also consisted of Persians, Bactrians, Indians
and Sakae, would total about 5,000. Herodotus described in detail the
dispositions of the two armies:
Disposition of Achaemenid troops beyond the Asopos river at the beginning of
the Battle of Plataea. From left to right: Greek allies, Sacae, Indians,
Bactrians, Medes and Persians. He posted the Persians facing the
Lacedaemonians... Next to the Persians he posted the Medes, fronting the men of
Corinth and Potidaea and Orchomenus and Sicyon; next to the Medes, the
Bactrians, fronting men of Epidaurus, Troezen, Lepreum, Tiryns, Mycenae, and
Phlius. After the Bactrians he set the Indians, fronting the men of Hermione
and Eretria and Styra and Chalcis. Next to the Indians he posted the Sacae,
fronting the Ampraciots, Anactorians, Leucadians, Paleans, and Aeginetans; next
to the Sacae, and over against the Athenians and Plataeans and Megarians, the
Boeotian and Locrians and Malians and Thessalians and the thousand that came
from Phocis... Besides these, he arrayed against the Athenians Macedonians also
and the dwellers about Thessaly. These that I have named were the greatest of
the nations set in array by Mardonius that were of most note and account; but
there was also in the army a mixed multitude of Phrygians, Thracians, Mysians,
Paeonians, and the rest, besides Ethiopians and the Egyptian swordsmen.
—?Herodotus IX-31/32.
Ctesias, who wrote a history of Persia based on Persian archives, claimed there
were 120,000 Persian and 7,000 Greek soldiers, but his account is generally
garbled (for instance, placing this battle before Salamis, he also says there
were only 300 Spartans, 1000 perioeci and 6000 from the other cities at
Plataea, perhaps confusing it with Thermopylae).
Strategic and tactical considerations:
Aristides, commander of the Athenians, informed by Alexander I of Macedon (a
nominal ally of the Achaemenids) that delaying the encounter with the Persians
would help further diminish their already low supplies.
Battle of Plataea, 479:
In some ways the run-up to Plataea resembled that at the Battle of Marathon;
there was a prolonged stalemate in which neither side risked attacking the
other. The reasons for this stalemate were primarily tactical, and similar to
the situation at Marathon; the Greek hoplites did not want to risk being
outflanked by the Persian cavalry and the lightly armed Persian infantry could
not hope to assault well-defended positions. The battlefield of Plataea from
the Achaemenid (northern) side. According to Herodotus, both sides wished for a
decisive battle that would tip the war in their favor However, Lazenby believed
that Mardonius' actions during the Plataea campaign were not consistent with an
aggressive policy. He interprets the Persian operations during the prelude not
as attempts to force the Allies into battle but as attempts to force the Allies
into retreat (which indeed became the case). Mardonius may have felt he had
little to gain in battle and that he could simply wait for the Greek alliance
to fall apart (as it had nearly done over the winter).
There can be little doubt from Herodotus' account that Mardonius was prepared
to accept battle on his own terms, however. Regardless of the exact motives,
the initial strategic situation allowed both sides to procrastinate, since food
supplies were ample for both armies. Under these conditions, the tactical
considerations outweighed the strategic need for action. When Mardonius' raids
disrupted the Allied supply chain, it forced the Allies to rethink their
strategy. Rather than now moving to attack, however, they instead looked to
retreat and secure their lines of communication. Despite this defensive move by
the Greeks, it was in fact the chaos resulting from this retreat that finally
ended the stalemate. Mardonius perceived this as a full-on retreat, in effect
thinking that the battle was already over, and sought to pursue the Greeks.
Since he did not expect the Greeks to fight, the tactical problems were no
longer an issue and he tried to take advantage of the altered strategic
situation he thought he had produced. Conversely, the Greeks had,
inadvertently, lured Mardonius into attacking them on the higher ground and,
despite being outnumbered, were thus at a tactical advantage.
Battle:
Once the Persians discovered that the Greeks had abandoned their positions and
appeared to be in retreat, Mardonius decided to set off in immediate pursuit
with the elite Persian infantry. As he did so, the rest of the Persian army,
unbidden, began to move forward. The Spartans and Tegeans had by now reached
the Temple of Demeter. The rearguard under Amompharetus began to withdraw from
the ridge, under pressure from Persian cavalry, to join them. Pausanias sent a
messenger to the Athenians, asking them to join up with the Spartans. However,
the Athenians had been engaged by the Theban phalanx and were unable to assist
Pausanias. The Spartans and Tegeans were first assaulted by the Persian
cavalry, while the Persian infantry made their way forward. They then planted
their shields and began shooting arrows at the Greeks, while the cavalry
withdrew. According to Herodotus, Pausanias refused to advance because good
omens were not divined in the goat sacrifices that were performed. At this
point, as Greek soldiers began to fall under the barrage of arrows, the Tegeans
started to run at the Persian lines. Offering one last sacrifice and a prayer
to the heavens in front of the Temple of Hera, Pausanias finally received
favourable omens and gave the command for the Spartans to advance, whereupon
they also charged the Persian lines.
The main phase of the battle at Plataea:
The Greek retreat becomes disorganised, and the Persians cross the Asopus to
attack. The numerically superior Persian infantry were of the heavy (by Persian
standards) sparabara formation, but this was still much lighter than the Greek
phalanx. The Persian defensive weapon was a large wicker shield and they used
short spears; by contrast, the hoplites were armoured in bronze, with a bronze
shield and a long spear. As shown at Marathon, it was a severe mismatch. The
fight was fierce and long, but the Greeks (Spartans and Tegeans) continued to
push into the Persian lines. The Persians tried to break the Greeks' spears by
grabbing hold of them, but the Greeks responded by switching to swords.
Mardonius was present at the scene, riding a white horse, and surrounded by a
bodyguard of 1,000 men; while he remained, the Persians stood their ground.
However, the Spartans closed in on Mardonius and a Spartan soldier named
Arimnestus killed him. According to Plutarch, Arimnestus killed him by a blow
to the head with a stone, a form of death which had been foretold to Mardonius
by an oracle; some modern historians have called it unlikely that a Spartan
would use such a weapon. With Mardonius dead, the Persians began to flee;
although his bodyguard remained, they were annihilated. Herodotus claims that
the reason for their discomfort was a lack of armour. Quickly the rout became
general, with many Persians fleeing in disorder to their camp. However,
Artabazus (who had earlier commanded the Sieges of Olynthus and Potidea), had
disagreed with Mardonius about attacking the Greeks, and he had not fully
engaged the forces under his command. As the rout commenced, he led these men
(40,000, according to Herodotus) away from the battlefield, on the road to
Thessaly, hoping to escape eventually to the Hellespont.
On the opposite side of the battlefield the Athenians had triumphed in a tough
battle against the Thebans. The other Greeks fighting for the Persians had
deliberately fought badly, according to Herodotus. The Thebans retreated from
the battle, but in a different direction from the Persians, allowing them to
escape without further losses. The Greeks, reinforced by the contingents who
had not taken part in the main battle, then stormed the Persian camp. Although
the Persians initially defended the wall vigorously, it was eventually
breached; the Persians, packed tightly together in the camp, were slaughtered
by the Greeks. Of the Persians who had retreated to the camp, scarcely 3,000
were left alive.
According to Herodotus, only 43,000 Persians survived the battle. The number
who died, of course, depends on how many there were in the first place; there
would be 257,000 dead by Herodotus' reckoning. Herodotus claims that the Greeks
as a whole lost only 159 men. Furthermore, he claims that only Spartans,
Tegeans and Athenians died, since they were the only ones who fought. Plutarch,
who had access to other sources, gives 1,360 Greek casualties, while both
Ephorus and Diodorus Siculus tally the Greek casualties to over 10,000.
Aftermath:
Main articles: Battle of Mycale and Second Persian invasion of Greece:
According to Herodotus, the Battle of Mycale occurred on the same afternoon as
Plataea. A Greek fleet under the Spartan king Leotychides had sailed to Samos
to challenge the remnants of the Persian fleet. The Persians, whose ships were
in a poor state of repair, had decided not to risk fighting and instead drew
their ships up on the beach at the feet of Mount Mycale in Ionia. An army of
60,000 men had been left there by Xerxes and the fleet joined with them,
building a palisade around the camp to protect the ships. However, Leotychides
decided to attack the camp with the Allied fleet's marines. Seeing the small
size of the Greek force, the Persians emerged from the camp but the Greek
hoplites again proved superior and destroyed much of the Persian force. The
ships were abandoned to the Greeks, who burned them, crippling Xerxes' sea
power and marking the ascendancy of the Greek fleet. With the twin victories of
Plataea and Mycale, the second Persian invasion of Greece was over. Moreover,
the threat of future invasion was abated; although the Greeks remained worried
that Xerxes would try again, over time it became apparent that the Persian
desire to conquer Greece was much diminished. The remnants of the Persian army,
under the command of Artabazus, tried to retreat back to Asia Minor. Travelling
through the lands of Thessaly, Macedonia and Thrace by the shortest road,
Artabazus eventually made it back to Byzantium, though losing many men to
Thracian attacks, weariness and hunger. After the victory at Mycale, the Allied
fleet sailed to the Hellespont to break down the pontoon bridges, but found
that this had already been done. The Peloponnesians sailed home, but the
Athenians remained to attack the Chersonesos, still held by the Persians. The
Persians in the region, and their allies, made for Sestos, the strongest town
in the region, and the Athenians laid siege to them there. After a protracted
siege Sestos fell to the Athenians, marking the beginning of a new phase in the
Greco-Persian Wars, the Greek counter-attack. Herodotus ended his Histories
after the Siege of Sestos. Over the next 30 years the Greeks, primarily the
Athenian-dominated Delian League, would expel (or help expel) the Persians from
Macedon, Thrace, the Aegean islands and Ionia.
Peace with Persia came in 449 with the Peace of Callias, finally ending a
half-century of warfare.
Significance:
Plataea and Mycale have great significance in ancient history as the battles
that decisively ended the second Persian invasion of Greece, thereby swinging
the balance of the Greco-Persian Wars in favour of the Greeks. They kept Persia
from conquering all of Greece, although they paid a high price by losing many
of their men The Battle of Marathon showed that the Persians could be defeated,
and the Battle of Salamis saved Greece from immediate conquest, but it was
Plataea and Mycale that effectively ended that threat. However, neither of
these battles is nearly as well known as Thermopylae, Salamis or Marathon.The
reason for this discrepancy is not entirely clear; it might, however, be a
result of the circumstances in which the battle was fought. The fame of
Thermopylae certainly lies in the doomed heroism of the Greeks in the face of
overwhelming numbers; and Marathon and Salamis perhaps because they were both
fought against the odds, and in dire strategic situations. Conversely, the
Battles of Plataea and Mycale were both fought from a relative position of
Greek strength, and against lesser odds; the Greeks, in fact, sought out battle
on both occasions. Militarily, the major lesson of both Plataea and Mycale
(since both were fought on land) was to re-emphasise the superiority of the
hoplite over the more lightly armed Persian infantry, as had first been
demonstrated at Marathon. Taking on this lesson, after the Greco-Persian Wars
the Persian empire started recruiting and relying on Greek mercenaries. One
such mercenary expedition, the "Anabasis of the 10,000" as narrated
by Xenophon, further proved to the Greeks that the Persians were militarily
vulnerable even well within their own territory, and paved the way for the
destruction of the Persian Empire by Alexander the Great some decades later.
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