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The Battle of Salamis was a naval battle
fought between an alliance of Greek city-states under Themistocles, and the
Persian Empire under King Xerxes in 480. It resulted in a decisive victory for
the outnumbered Greeks. The battle was fought in the straits between the
mainland and Salamis, an island in the Saronic Gulf near Athens, and marked the
high point of the second Persian invasion of Greece. To block the Persian
advance, a small force of Greeks blocked the pass of Thermopylae, while an
Athenian-dominated Allied navy engaged the Persian fleet in the nearby straits
of Artemisium. In the resulting Battle of Thermopylae, the rearguard of the
Greek force was annihilated, whilst in the Battle of Artemisium the Greeks had
heavy losses and retreated after the loss at Thermopylae.
This allowed the Persians to conquer Phocis, Boeotia, Attica, and Euboea. The
Allies prepared to defend the Isthmus of Corinth while the fleet was withdrawn
to nearby Salamis Island. Although heavily outnumbered, the Greek Allies were
persuaded by the Athenian general Themistocles to bring the Persian fleet to
battle again, in the hope that a victory would prevent naval operations against
the Peloponnese.
The Persian king Xerxes was also eager for a decisive battle. As a result of
subterfuge on the part of Themistocles, the Persian navy rowed into the Straits
of Salamis and tried to block both entrances. In the cramped conditions of the
Straits, the great Persian numbers were an active hindrance, as ships struggled
to maneuver and became disorganized. Seizing the opportunity, the Greek fleet
formed in line and scored a decisive victory. Xerxes retreated to Asia with
much of his army, leaving Mardonius to complete the conquest of Greece.
However, the following year, the remainder of the Persian army was decisively
beaten at the Battle of Plataea and the Persian navy at the Battle of Mycale.
The Persians made no further attempts to conquer the Greek mainland. These
battles of Salamis and Plataea thus mark a turning point in the course of the
Greco-Persian wars as a whole; from then onward, the Greek poleis would take
the offensive
Opponents:Greek city-states versus the Achaemenid Empire
Commanders and leaders:
Greeks - Eurybiades Themistocles
Persians - Xerxes I of Persia Artemisia I of Caria Achaemenes Ariabignes †
Damasithymos †
Strength:
Greeks - 371–378 ships
Persians - ~900–1207 ships or 600–800 ships oe 400–700 ships
Casualties and losses:
Greeks - 40 ships
Persians - 200–300? ships
Herodotus gives 378 ships of the alliance, but his numbers add up to 371. As
suggested by several ancient sources
Modern estimates
Background:
Main articles: Greco-Persian Wars, Second Persian invasion of Greece, Battle of
Thermopylae, and Battle of Artemisium
The Greek city-states of Athens and Eretria had supported the unsuccessful
Ionian Revolt against the Persian Empire of Darius I in 499-494, led by the
satrap of Miletus, Aristagoras. The Persian Empire was still relatively young,
and prone to revolts amongst its subject peoples.[7][8] Moreover, Darius was a
usurper, and had spent considerable time extinguishing revolts against his
rule.[7] The Ionian revolt threatened the integrity of his empire, and Darius
thus vowed to punish those involved (especially those not already part of the
empire).[9][10] Darius also saw the opportunity to expand his empire into the
fractious world of Ancient Greece.[10] A preliminary expedition under
Mardonius, in 492 BC, to secure the land approaches to Greece ended with the
conquest of Thrace and forced Macedon to become a client kingdom of Persia.[11]
In 491 BC, Darius sent emissaries to all the Greek city-states, asking for a
gift of 'earth and water' in token of their submission to him.[12] Having had a
demonstration of his power the previous year, the majority of the Greek cities
duly obliged. In Athens, however, the ambassadors were put on trial and then
executed; in Sparta, they were simply thrown down a well.[12] This meant that
Sparta was also now effectively at war with Persia.[12] Darius thus put
together an amphibious task force under Datis and Artaphernes in 490 BC, which
attacked Naxos, before receiving the submission of the other Cycladic Islands.
The task force then moved on Eretria, which it besieged and destroyed.[13]
Finally, it moved to attack Athens, landing at the bay of Marathon, where it
was met by a heavily outnumbered Athenian army. At the ensuing Battle of
Marathon, the Athenians won a remarkable victory, which resulted in the
withdrawal of the Persian army to Asia.[14]
Darius therefore began raising a huge new army with which he meant to
completely subjugate Greece; however, in 486 BC, his Egyptian subjects
revolted, indefinitely postponing any Greek expedition.[8] Darius then died
whilst preparing to march on Egypt, and the throne of Persia passed to his son
Xerxes I.[15] Xerxes crushed the Egyptian revolt, and very quickly restarted
the preparations for the invasion of Greece.[16] Since this was to be a
full-scale invasion, it required long-term planning, stock-piling and
conscription.[16] Xerxes decided that the Hellespont would be bridged to allow
his army to cross to Europe, and that a canal should be dug across the isthmus
of Mount Athos (rounding which headland, a Persian fleet had been destroyed in
492 BC).[17] These were both feats of exceptional ambition, which would have
been beyond any other contemporary state.[17] By early 480 BC, the preparations
were complete, and the army which Xerxes had mustered at Sardis marched towards
Europe, crossing the Hellespont on two pontoon bridges.[18] The Athenians had
also been preparing for war with the Persians since the mid-480s BC, and in 482
BC the decision was taken, under the guidance of the Athenian politician
Themistocles, to build a massive fleet of triremes that would be necessary for
the Greeks to fight the Persians.[19] However, the Athenians did not have the
manpower to fight on land and sea; and therefore combatting the Persians would
require an alliance of Greek city states. In 481 BC, Xerxes sent ambassadors
around Greece asking for earth and water, but made the very deliberate omission
of Athens and Sparta.[20] Support thus began to coalesce around these two
leading states. A congress of city states met at Corinth in late autumn of 481
BC,[21] and a confederate alliance of Greek city-states was formed. It had the
power to send envoys asking for assistance and to dispatch troops from the
member states to defensive points after joint consultation. This was remarkable
for the disjointed Greek world, especially since many of the city-states in
attendance were still technically at war with each other.[22] Initially the
'congress' agreed to defend the narrow Vale of Tempe, on the borders of
Thessaly, and thereby block Xerxes's advance.[23] However, once there, they
were warned by Alexander I of Macedon that the vale could be bypassed through
the pass by the modern village of Sarantaporo, and that the army of Xerxes was
overwhelming. So the Greeks retreated.[24] Shortly afterwards, they received
the news that Xerxes had crossed the Hellespont. A second strategy was
therefore adopted by the allies. The route to southern Greece (Boeotia, Attica
and the Peloponnese) would require the army of Xerxes to travel through the
very narrow pass of Thermopylae. This could easily be blocked by the Greek
hoplites, despite the overwhelming numbers of Persians. Furthermore, to prevent
the Persians bypassing Thermopylae by sea, the Athenian and allied navies could
block the straits of Artemisium. This dual strategy was adopted by the
congress.[25] However, the Peloponnesian cities made fall-back plans to defend
the Isthmus of Corinth should it come to it, whilst the women and children of
Athens had been evacuated en masse to the Peloponnesian city of Troezen.[26]
Famously, the much smaller Greek army held the pass of Thermopylae against the
Persians for three days before being outflanked by a mountain path. Much of the
Greek army retreated, before the Spartans and Thespians who had continued to
block the pass were surrounded and killed.[27] The simultaneous Battle of
Artemisium was up to that point a stalemate;[28] however, when news of
Thermopylae reached them, the Allied fleet also retreated, since holding the
straits of Artemisium was now a moot point.[29]
Prelude Battle of Salamis, 1785 engraving Modern view of the strait of Salamis,
where the battle took place. Seen from the south. Battle order. The Achaemenid
fleet (in red) entered from the east (right) and confronted the Greek fleet (in
blue) within the confines of the strait. The Allied fleet now rowed from
Artemisium to Salamis to assist with the final evacuation of Athens. En route
Themistocles left inscriptions addressed to the Ionian Greek crews of the
Persian fleet on all springs of water that they might stop at, asking them to
defect to the Allied cause.[30] Following Thermopylae, the Persian army
proceeded to burn and sack the Boeotian cities that had not surrendered,
Plataea and Thespiae, before marching on the now evacuated city of Athens.[31]
The Allies (mostly Peloponnesian) prepared to defend the Isthmus of Corinth,
demolishing the single road that led through it, and building a wall across
it.[32] This strategy was flawed, however, unless the Allied fleet was able to
prevent the Persian fleet from transporting troops across the Saronic Gulf. In
a council-of-war called once the evacuation of Athens was complete, the
Corinthian naval commander Adeimantus argued that the fleet should assemble off
the coast of the Isthmus in order to achieve such a blockade.[33] However,
Themistocles argued in favour of an offensive strategy, aimed at decisively
destroying the Persians' naval superiority. He drew on the lessons of
Artemisium, pointing out that "battle in close conditions works to our
advantage".[33] He eventually won through, and the Allied navy remained
off the coast of Salamis.[34] The time-line for Salamis is difficult to
establish with any certainty.[35] Herodotus presents the battle as though it
occurred directly after the capture of Athens, but nowhere explicitly states as
much. If Thermopylae/Artemisium occurred in September, then this may be the
case, but it is probably more likely that the Persians spent two or three weeks
capturing Athens, refitting the fleet, and resupplying.[35] Clearly though, at
some point after capturing Athens, Xerxes held a council of war with the
Persian fleet; Herodotus says this occurred at Phalerum.[36] Artemisia, queen
of Halicarnassus and commander of its naval squadron in Xerxes's fleet, tried
to convince him to wait for the Allies to surrender believing that battle in
the straits of Salamis was an unnecessary risk.[36] Nevertheless, Xerxes and
his chief advisor Mardonius pressed for an attack.[37] It is difficult to
explain exactly what eventually brought about the battle, assuming that neither
side simply attacked without forethought.[35] Clearly though, at some point
just before the battle, new information began to reach Xerxes of rifts in the
allied command; the Peloponnesians wished to evacuate from Salamis while they
still could.[38] This alleged rift amongst the Allies may have simply been a
ruse, in order to lure the Persians to battle.[39] Alternatively, this change
in attitude amongst the Allies (who had waited patiently off the coast of
Salamis for at least a week while Athens was captured) may have been in
response to Persian offensive maneuvers.[35] Possibly, a Persian army had been
sent to march against the Isthmus in order to test the nerve of the
fleet.[35][39]
Either way, when Xerxes received this news, he ordered his fleet to go out on
patrol off the coast of Salamis, blocking the southern exit.[39] Then, at dusk,
he ordered them to withdraw, possibly in order to tempt the Allies into a hasty
evacuation.[39] That evening Themistocles attempted what appears to have been a
spectacularly successful use of disinformation. He sent a servant, Sicinnus, to
Xerxes, with a message proclaiming that Themistocles was "on the king's
side and prefers that your affairs prevail, not the Hellenes".[40]
Themistocles claimed that the Allied command was in-fighting, that the
Peloponnesians were planning to evacuate that very night, and that to gain
victory all the Persians needed to do was to block the straits.[40] In
performing this subterfuge, Themistocles seems to have been trying to bring
about exactly the opposite; to lure the Persian fleet into the Straits.[39]
This was exactly the kind of news that Xerxes wanted to hear; that the
Athenians might be willing to submit to him, and that he would be able to
destroy the rest of the Allied fleet.[39] Xerxes evidently took the bait, and
the Persian fleet was sent out that evening to effect this block.[41] Xerxes
ordered a throne to be set up on the slopes of Mount Aigaleo (overlooking the
straits), in order to watch the battle from a clear vantage point, and so as to
record the names of commanders who performed particularly well.[42] According
to Herodotus, the Allies spent the evening heatedly debating their course of
action.[43] The Peloponnesians were in favour of evacuating,[44] and at this
point Themistocles attempted his ruse with Xerxes.[40] It was only when
Aristides, the exiled Athenian general arrived that night, followed by some
deserters from the Persians, with news of the deployment of the Persian
fleet,[45][46] that the Peloponnesians accepted that they could not escape, and
so would fight.[47] However, the Peloponnesians may have been party to
Themistocles's stratagem, so serenely did they accept that they would now have
to fight at Salamis.[48] The Allied navy was thus able to prepare properly for
battle the forthcoming day, whilst the Persians spent the night fruitlessly at
sea, searching for the alleged Greek evacuation. The next morning, the Persians
rowed into the straits to attack the Greek fleet; it is not clear when, why or
how this decision was made, but it is clear that they did take the battle to
the Allies.[42]
The opposing forces The Greek fleet Greek trireme. Fleet of triremes based on
the full-sized replica Olympias Herodotus reports that there were 378 triremes
in the Allied fleet, and then breaks the numbers down by city state (as
indicated in the table).[49] However, his numbers for the individual
contingents only add up to 371. He does not explicitly say that all 378 fought
at Salamis ("All of these came to the war providing triremes...The total
number of ships...was three hundred and seventy-eight"),[1] and he also
says that the Aeginetans "had other manned ships, but they guarded their
own land with these and fought at Salamis with the thirty most
seaworthy".[50] Thus it has been supposed that the difference between the
numbers is accounted for by a garrison of 12 ships left at Aegina.[51]
According to Herodotus, two more ships defected from the Persians to the
Greeks, one before Artemisium and one before Salamis, so the total complement
at Salamis would have been 373 (or 380).[52] According to the Athenian
playwright Aeschylus, who actually fought at Salamis, the Greek fleet numbered
310 triremes (the difference being the number of Athenian ships).[53] Ctesias
claims that the Athenian fleet numbered only 110 triremes, which ties in with
Aeschylus's numbers.[54] According to Hyperides, the Greek fleet numbered only
220.[55] The fleet was effectively under the command of Themistocles, but
nominally led by the Spartan nobleman Eurybiades, as had been agreed at the
congress in 481 BC.[56] Although Themistocles had tried to claim leadership of
the fleet, the other city states with navies objected, and so Sparta (which had
no naval tradition) was given command of the fleet as a compromise.[56]
fleet, the other city states with navies objected, and so Sparta (which had no
naval tradition) was given command of the fleet as a compromise.[56] City
Number of ships City Number of ships City Number of ships Athens[57] 180
Corinth[58][59] 40 Aegina[50] 30 Chalcis[50][58] 20 Megara[58][60] 20
Sparta[59] 16 Sicyon[59] 15 Epidaurus[59] 10 Eretria[50] 7 Ambracia[60] 7
Troezen[59] 5 Naxos[50] 4 Leucas[60] 3 Hermione[59] 3 Styra[50] 2 Cythnus[50] 1
(1) Ceos[50] 2 Melos[1][50] (2) Siphnus[1][50] (1) Serifos[1][50] (1)
Croton[61] 1 Total 371 or 378[1] (5) Plain numbers represent triremes; those
indicated in parentheses are penteconters (fifty-oared galleys)
The Achemenid fleet The Lycian dynast Kybernis (520-480 BCE) led 50 Lycian
ships in the Achaemenid fleet. The Ionian fleet, here seen joining with Persian
forces at the Bosphorus in preparation of the European Scythian campaign of
Darius I in 513 BC, was part of the Achaemenid fleet at Salamis. 19th century
illustration. According to Herodotus, the Persian fleet initially numbered
1,207 triremes.[62] However, by his reckoning they lost approximately a third
of these ships in a storm off the coast of Magnesia,[63] 200 more in a storm
off the coast of Euboea,[64] and at least 50 ships to Allied action at the
Battle of Artemisium.[64][65] Herodotus claims that these losses were replaced
in full,[66] but only mentions 120 ships from the Greeks of Thrace and nearby
islands as reinforcements.[67] Aeschylus, who fought at Salamis, also claims
that he faced 1,207 warships there, of which 207 were "fast
ships".[68] Diodorus[69] and Lysias[70] independently claim there were
1,200 ships in the Persian fleet assembled at Doriskos in the spring of 480 BC.
The number of 1,207 (for the outset only) is also given by Ephorus,[71] while
his teacher Isocrates claims there were 1,300 at Doriskos and 1,200 at
Salamis.[72][73] Ctesias gives another number, 1,000 ships,[54] while Plato,
speaking in general terms refers to 1,000 ships and more.[74] Herodotus gives a
precise list of the ships of the various nations that composed the Achaemenid
fleet:[75]
Herodotus gives a precise list of the ships of the various nations that
composed the Achaemenid fleet:[75] Nation Number of ships Nation Number of
ships Nation Number of ships Phoenicia 300 Egypt 200 Cyprus 150 Cilicia 100
Ionia 100 Hellespontine Phrygia 100 Caria 70 Aeolia 60 Lycia 50 Pamphylia 30
Doria 30 Cyclades 17 Total 1207
The number 1,207 appears very early in the historical record (472 BC), and the
Greeks appear to have genuinely believed they faced that many ships. Because of
the consistency in the ancient sources, some modern historians are inclined to
accept 1,207 as the size of the initial Persian fleet;[76][77][78] others
reject this number, with 1,207 being seen as more of a reference to the
combined Greek fleet in the Iliad, and generally claim that the Persians could
have launched no more than around 600 warships into the Aegean.[78][79][80]
However, very few appear to accept that there were this many ships at Salamis:
most favour a number in the range 600-800.[2][3][4] This is also the range
given by adding the approximate number of Persian ships after Artemisium (~550)
to the reinforcements (120) quantified by Herodotus.[67]
Strategic and tactical considerations The battle of Salamis, 19th century
illustration. The overall Persian strategy for the invasion of 480 BC was to
overwhelm the Greeks with a massive invasion force, and complete the conquest
of Greece in a single campaigning season.[81] Conversely, the Greeks sought to
make the best use of their numbers by defending restricted locations and to
keep the Persians in the field for as long as possible. Xerxes had obviously
not anticipated such resistance, or he would have arrived earlier in the
campaigning season (and not waited 4 days at Thermopylae for the Greeks to
disperse).[82] Time was now of the essence for the Persians – the huge
invasion force could not be reasonably supported indefinitely, nor probably did
Xerxes wish to be at the fringe of his empire for so long.[83] Thermopylae had
shown that a frontal assault against a well defended Greek position was
useless; with the Allies now dug in across the narrow Isthmus, there was little
chance of conquering the rest of Greece by land.[84] However, as equally
demonstrated by Thermopylae, if the Greeks could be outflanked, their smaller
numbers of troops could be destroyed.[85] Such an outflanking of the Isthmus
required the use of the Persian navy, and thus the destruction of the Allied
navy. Therefore, if Xerxes could destroy the Allied navy, he would be in a
strong position to force a Greek surrender; this seemed the only hope of
concluding the campaign in that season.[83] Conversely by avoiding destruction,
or as Themistocles hoped, by crippling the Persian fleet, the Greeks could
effectively thwart the invasion.[86] However, it was strategically not
necessary for the Persians to actually fight this battle at Salamis.[85]
According to Herodotus, Queen Artemisia of Caria pointed this out to Xerxes in
the run-up to Salamis. Artemisia suggested that fighting at sea was an
unnecessary risk, recommending instead:
If you do not hurry to fight at sea, but keep your ships here and stay near
land, or even advance into the Peloponnese, then, my lord, you will easily
accomplish what you had in mind on coming here. The Hellenes are not able to
hold out against you for a long time, but you will scatter them, and they will
each flee to their own cities.[87]
The Persian fleet was still large enough to both bottle up the Allied navy in
the straits of Salamis, and send ships to land troops in the Peloponnese.[85]
However, in the final reckoning, both sides were prepared to stake everything
on a naval battle, in the hope of decisively altering the course of the
war.[86] The Persians were at a significant tactical advantage, outnumbering
the Allies, and also having "better sailing" ships.[88] The
"better sailing" that Herodotus mentions was probably due to the
superior seamanship of the crews;[88] most of the Athenian ships (and therefore
the majority of the fleet) were newly built as according to Themistocles'
request to the Athenians to build a fleet of 200 triremes in 483 BC, and had
inexperienced crews. It is important to note that despite the inexperienced
crew on part of the Athenians, these newly constructed triremes would
ultimately prove crucial in the forthcoming conflict with Persia.[89] The most
common naval tactics in the Mediterranean area at the time were ramming
(triremes being equipped with a ram at the bows), or boarding by ship-borne
marines (which essentially turned a sea battle into a land one).[90] The
Persians and Asiatic Greeks had by this time begun to use a manoeuver known as
diekplous. It is not entirely clear what this was, but it probably involved
rowing into gaps between enemy ships and then ramming them in the side.[90]
This maneuver would have required skilled crews, and therefore the Persians
would have been more likely to employ it; the Allies however, developed tactics
specifically to counter this.[90] There has been much debate as to the nature
of the Allied fleet compared to the Persian fleet. Much of this centres on the
suggestion, from Herodotus, that the Allied ships were heavier, and by
implication less maneuverable.[91] The source of this heaviness is uncertain;
possibly the Allied ships were bulkier in construction, or that the ships were
waterlogged since they had not been dried out in the winter (though there is no
real evidence for either suggestion).[90] Another suggestion is that the
heaviness was caused by the weight of fully armored hoplite marines (20 fully
armored hoplites would have weighed 2 tons).[90] This 'heaviness', whatever its
cause, would further reduce the likelihood of them employing the diekplous.[90]
It is therefore probable that the Allies had extra marines on board if their
ships were less maneuverable, since boarding would then be the main tactic
available to them (at the cost of making the ships even heavier).[90] Indeed,
Herodotus refers to the Greeks capturing ships at Artemisium, rather than
sinking them.[65] It has been suggested that the weight of the Allied ships may
also have made them more stable in the winds off the coast of Salamis, and made
them less susceptible to ramming (or rather, less liable to sustain damage when
rammed).[92]
The Persians preferred a battle in the open sea, where they could better
utilize their superior seamanship and numbers.[42] For the Greeks, the only
realistic hope of a decisive victory was to draw the Persians into a
constricted area, where their numbers would count for little.[33] The battle at
Artemisium had seen attempts to negate the Persian advantage in numbers, but
ultimately the Allies may have realised that they needed an even more
constricted channel in order to defeat the Persians.[93] Therefore, by rowing
into the Straits of Salamis to attack the Greeks, the Persians were playing
into the Allies' hands. It seems probable that the Persians would not have
attempted this unless they had been confident of the collapse of the Allied
navy, and thus Themistocles's subterfuge appears to have played a key role in
tipping the balance in the favor of the Greeks.[42] Salamis was, for the
Persians, an unnecessary battle and a strategic mistake.[85]
The battle Battle of salamis.png The actual battle of Salamis is not well
described by the ancient sources, and it is unlikely that anyone (other than
perhaps Xerxes) involved in the battle had a clear idea what was happening
across the width of the straits.[39][94] What follows is more of a discussion
than a definitive account. Dispositions
Dispositions In the Allied fleet, the Athenians were on the left, and on the
right were probably the Spartans (although Diodorus says it was the Megareans
and Aeginetians); the other contingents were in the center.[95][96] The Allied
fleet probably formed into two ranks, since the straits would have been too
narrow for a single line of ships.[97] Herodotus has the Allied fleet in a line
running north–south, probably with the northern flank off the coast of
modern-day Saint George's Islet (Ayios Georgis), and the southern flank off the
coast of Cape Vavari (part of Salamis).[98] Diodorus suggests the Allied fleet
was aligned east–west, spanning the straits between Salamis and Mount
Aigaleo; however, it is unlikely that the Allies would have rested one of their
flanks against Persian occupied territory.[98] It seems relatively certain that
the Persian fleet was sent out to block the exit from the Straits the evening
before the battle. Herodotus clearly believed that the Persian fleet actually
entered the Straits at nightfall, planning to catch the Allies as they
fled.[99] However, modern historians have greatly debated this point, with some
pointing out the difficulties of maneuvering in this confined space by night,
and others accepting Herodotus's version.[100][101] There are thus two
possibilities; that during the night the Persians simply blocked the exit to
the Straits, and then entered the straits in daylight; or that they entered the
straits and positioned themselves for battle during the night.[100][101]
Regardless of when they attempted it, it seems likely that the Persians pivoted
their fleet off the tip of Cape Vavari, so that from an initial east–west
alignment (blocking the exit), they came round to a north–south alignment
(see diagram).[102] The Persian fleet seems to have been formed into three
ranks of ships (according to Aeschylus);[39] with the powerful Phoenician fleet
on the right flank next to Mount Aigaleo, the Ionian contingent on the left
flank and the other contingents in the centre.[95] Diodorus says that the
Egyptian fleet was sent to circumnavigate Salamis, and block the northern exit
from the Straits.[103] If Xerxes wanted to trap the Allies completely, this
maneuver would have made sense (especially if he was not expecting the Allies
to fight).[39] However, Herodotus does not mention this (and possibly alludes
to the Egyptian presence in the main battle), leading some modern historians to
dismiss it;[102] though again, others accept it as a possibility.[39] Xerxes
had also positioned around 400 troops on the island known as Psyttaleia, in the
middle of the exit from the straits, in order to kill or capture any Greeks who
ended up there (as a result of shipwreck or grounding).[42]
The opening phase Greek triremes at Salamis. Regardless of what time they
entered the straits, the Persians did not move to attack the Allies until
daylight. Since they were not planning to flee after all, the Allies would have
been able to spend the night preparing for battle, and after a speech by
Themistocles, the marines boarded and the ships made ready to sail.[47]
According to Herodotus, this was dawn, and as the Allies "were putting out
to sea the barbarians immediately attacked them".[47][104] If the Persians
only entered the straits at dawn, then the Allies would have had the time to
take up their station in a more orderly fashion.[100] Aeschylus claims that as
the Persians approached (possibly implying that they were not already in the
Straits at dawn), they heard the Greeks singing their battle hymn (paean)
before they saw the Allied fleet:
O sons of the Greeks, go, Liberate your country,
liberate Your children, your women, the seats of your fathers' gods,
And the tombs of your forebears: now is the struggle for all things.
Herodotus recounts that, according to the Athenians, as the battle began the
Corinthians hoisted their sails and began sailing away from the battle,
northwards up the straits. However, he also says that other Greeks denied this
story.[106] If this did in fact occur, one possible interpretation is that
these ships had been a decoy sent to reconnoitre the northern exit from the
straits, in case the arrival of the encircling Egyptian detachment was imminent
(if indeed this also occurred).[100] Another possibility (not exclusive of the
former) is that the departure of the Corinthians triggered the final approach
of the Persians, suggesting as it did that the Allied fleet was
disintegrating.[100] At any rate, if they indeed ever left, the Corinthians
soon returned to the battle.[106] Approaching the Allied fleet in the crowded
Straits, the Persians appear to have become disorganised and cramped in the
narrow waters.[96][100] Moreover, it would have become apparent that, far from
disintegrating, the Greek fleet was lined up, ready to attack them.[97][100]
However, rather than attacking immediately, the Allies initially appeared to
back their ships away as if in fear.[104] According to Plutarch, this was to
gain better position, and also in order to gain time until the early morning
wind.[107] Herodotus recounts the legend that as the fleet had backed away,
they had seen an apparition of a woman, asking them "Madmen, how far will
ye yet back your ships?"[108] However, he more plausibly suggests that
whilst the Allies were backing water, a single ship shot forward to ram the
nearest Persian vessel. The Athenians would claim that this was the ship of the
Athenian Ameinias of Pallene; the Aeginetans would claim it as one of their
ships.[104] The whole Greek line then followed suit and made straight for the
disordered Persian battle line.[109]
The main battle Death of the Persian admiral Ariabignes (a brother of Xerxes)
early in the battle; illustration from Plutarch's Lives for Boys and Girls c.
1910 The details of the rest of the battle are generally sketchy, and no one
involved would have had a view of the entire battlefield.[100] Triremes were
generally armed with a large ram at the front, with which it was possible to
sink an enemy ship, or at least disable it by shearing off the banks of oars on
one side.[90][110] If the initial ramming was not successful, marines boarded
the enemy ship and something similar to a land battle ensued.[90] Both sides
had marines on their ships for this eventuality; the Greeks with fully armed
hoplites;[100] the Persians probably with more lightly armed infantry.[111] A
king sate on the rocky brow Which looks o'er sea-born Salamis And ships, by
thousands, lay below, And men in nations;—all were his! He counted them at
break of day— And when the sun set where were they? — the philhellene
Lord Byron in Don Juan [112] Across the battlefield, as the first line of
Persian ships was pushed back by the Greeks, they became fouled in the
advancing second and third lines of their own ships.[113] On the Greek left,
the Persian admiral Ariabignes (a brother of Xerxes)[113] was killed early in
the battle; left disorganised and leaderless, the Phoenician squadrons appear
to have been pushed back against the coast, many vessels running aground.[100]
In the centre, a wedge of Greek ships pushed through the Persians lines,
splitting the fleet in two.[100] According to Plutarch, Ariabignes was killed
by Ameinias and Socles (Greek: S?????) of Pallene. When Ariabignes attempted to
board on their ship, they hit him with their spears, and thrust him into the
sea.[114] Plutarch also mentions that it was Artemisia who recognized
Ariabignes' body floating among the shipwrecks and brought it back to
Xerxes.[115] Artemisia, Queen of Halicarnassus, and commander of the Carian
contingent of the Achaemenid fleet, at the Battle of Salamis, shooting arrows
at the Greeks. Wilhelm von Kaulbach (detail).[116] Herodotus recounts that
Artemisia, the Queen of Halicarnassus, and commander of the Carian contingent,
found herself pursued by the ship of Ameinias of Pallene. In her desire to
escape, she attacked and rammed another Persian vessel, thereby convincing the
Athenian captain that the ship was an ally; Ameinias accordingly abandoned the
chase.[117] However, Xerxes, looking on, thought that she had successfully
attacked an Allied ship, and seeing the poor performance of his other captains
commented that "My men have become women, and my women men".[118] The
friendly ship she sank was a Calyndian ship and the king of the Calyndians,
Damasithymos (Greek: ?aµas???µ??) was on it.[119][120] None of the
crew of the Calyndian ship survived.[121]
The Persian fleet began to retreat towards Phalerum, but according to
Herodotus, the Aeginetans ambushed them as they tried to leave the
Straits.[122] The remaining Persian ships limped back to the harbour of
Phalerum and the shelter of the Persian army.[123] The Athenian general
Aristides then took a detachment of men across to Psyttaleia to slaughter the
garrison that Xerxes had left there.[124] The exact Persian casualties are not
mentioned by Herodotus. However, he writes that the next year, the Persian
fleet numbered 300 triremes.[125] The number of losses then depends on the
number of ships the Persian had to begin with; something in the range of
200–300 seems likely, based on the above estimates for the size of the
Persian fleet. According to Herodotus, the Persians suffered many more
casualties than the Greeks because most Persians did not know how to swim.[113]
Xerxes, sitting on Mount Aigaleo on his throne, witnessed the carnage.[126]
Some ship-wrecked Phoenician captains tried to blame the Ionians for cowardice
before the end of the battle.[126] Xerxes, in a foul mood, and having just
witnessed an Ionian ship capture an Aeginetan ship, had the Phoenicians
beheaded for slandering "more noble men".[126] According to Diodorus,
Xerxes "put to death those Phoenicians who were chiefly responsible for
beginning the flight, and threatened to visit upon the rest the punishment they
deserved", causing the Phoenicians to sail to Asia when night fell.[127]
Aftermath:
Main article: Second Persian invasion of Greece The triumph of Themistocles
after Salamis.
In the immediate aftermath of Salamis, Xerxes attempted to build a pontoon
bridge or causeway across the straits, in order to use his army to attack the
Athenians; however, with the Greek fleet now confidently patrolling the
straits, this proved futile.[82] Herodotus tells us that Xerxes held a council
of war, at which the Persian general Mardonius tried to make light of the
defeat: Sire, be not grieved nor greatly distressed because of what has
befallen us. It is not on things of wood that the issue hangs for us, but on
men and horses...If then you so desire, let us straightway attack the
Peloponnese, or if it pleases you to wait, that also we can do...It is best
then that you should do as I have said, but if you have resolved to lead your
army away, even then I have another plan. Do not, O king, make the Persians the
laughing-stock of the Greeks, for if you have suffered harm, it is by no fault
of the Persians. Nor can you say that we have anywhere done less than brave men
should, and if Phoenicians and Egyptians and Cyprians and Cilicians have so
done, it is not the Persians who have any part in this disaster. Therefore,
since the Persians are in no way to blame, be guided by me; if you are resolved
not to remain, march homewards with the greater part of your army. It is for
me, however, to enslave and deliver Hellas to you with three hundred thousand
of your host whom I will choose.[128] The wrath of Xerxes looking at the Battle
of Salamis from his promontory, by Wilhelm von Kaulbach (detail). Fearing that
the Greeks might attack the bridges across the Hellespont and trap his army in
Europe, Xerxes resolved to do this, taking the greater part of the army with
him.[129] Mardonius handpicked the troops who were to remain with him in
Greece, taking the elite infantry units and cavalry, to complete the conquest
of Greece.[82] All of the Persian forces abandoned Attica, however, with
Mardonius overwintering in Boeotia and Thessaly; the Athenians were thus able
to return to their burnt city for the winter.[82] The following year, 479 BC,
Mardonius recaptured Athens and led the second Achaemenid destruction of Athens
(the Allied army still preferring to guard the Isthmus). However, the Allies,
under Spartan leadership, eventually agreed to try to force Mardonius to
battle, and marched on Attica.[130] Mardonius retreated to Boeotia to lure the
Greeks into open terrain and the two sides eventually met near the city of
Plataea (which had been razed the previous year).[130] There, at the Battle of
Plataea, the Greek army won a decisive victory, destroying much of the Persian
army and ending the invasion of Greece; whilst at the near-simultaneous Battle
of Mycale the Allied fleet destroyed much of the remaining Persian fleet.[1
Significance:
The Battle of Salamis marked the turning point in the Greco-Persian wars.[84]
After Salamis, the Peloponnese, and by extension Greece as an entity, was safe
from conquest; and the Persians suffered a major blow to their prestige and
morale (as well as severe material losses).[131] At the following battles of
Plataea and Mycale, the threat of conquest was removed, and the Allies were
able to go on the counter-offensive.[132] The Greek victory allowed Macedon to
revolt against Persian rule; and over the next 30 years, Thrace, the Aegean
Islands and finally Ionia would be removed from Persian control by the Allies,
or by the Athenian-dominated successor, the Delian League.[133] Salamis started
a decisive swing in the balance of power toward the Greeks, which would
culminate in an eventual Greek victory, severely reducing Persian power in the
Aegean.[134] Serpent Column, a monument to their alliance, dedicated by the
victorious Allies in the aftermath of Plataea; now at the Hippodrome of
Constantinople Like the Battles of Marathon and Thermopylae, Salamis has gained
something of a 'legendary' status (unlike, for instance, the more decisive
Battle of Plataea), perhaps because of the desperate circumstances and the
unlikely odds.[135] A significant number of historians have stated that Salamis
is one of the most significant battles in human history (though the same is
often stated of Marathon).[136][3][92][94] In a more extreme form of this
argument, some historians argue that if the Greeks had lost at Salamis, the
ensuing conquest of Greece by the Persians would have effectively stifled the
growth of Western Civilization as we know it.[137] This view is based on the
premise that much of modern Western society, such as philosophy, science,
personal freedom and democracy are rooted in the legacy of Ancient Greece.[135]
Thus, this school of thought argues that, given the domination of much of
modern history by Western Civilization, Persian domination of Greece might have
changed the whole trajectory of human history.[136] It is also worth mentioning
that the celebrated blossoming of hugely influential Athenian culture occurred
only after the Persian wars were won.[138][139][140] Militarily, it is
difficult to draw many lessons from Salamis, because of the uncertainty about
what actually happened. Once again the Allies chose their ground well in order
to negate Persian numbers, but this time (unlike Thermopylae) had to rely on
the Persians launching an unnecessary attack for their position to count.[85]
(Hale, John R.). Since it brought about that attack, perhaps the most important
military lesson is to be found in the use of deception by Themistocles to bring
about the desired response from the enemy.[85] According to Plutarch, the
previously undistinguished Cimon "obtained great repute among the
Athenians" due to his courage in battle; this reputation later enabled him
to launch his political career.[141]
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