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ON THE QUESTION OF THE MILITARY REFORMS
OF PETER THE GREAT

by

Epifanov, P. P.

 

Here we provide notes compiled from the title article published in Voprosii Istoria The translation was done in the early 1970's and unfortunately we don't have the original acticle now. The author shows strong Russian claims typical of the type of writing of the period. Even so, the article contains interesting information about Peter's role in the tranformation of the Russian army at the beginning of the 18th century.
See also for another work on Peter the Great by Epifanov, P. P. _Sbornik Dokumentov-Voyennie Ustavi Petra Velikogo_, (The Military Regulations of Peter the Great), Moscow, 1946. This small booklet contains reprints of five of the basic military regulations or orders pertaining thereto, issued by Peter I from 1700 to 1714. The author's introductory article is unusually (for its era) free from ideological arguments that Russian military science was entirely self-developed. He does not hesitate to show that Peter sought military experience from foreign sources. This approach enhances his evaluation of the purely Russian elements in Peter's military regulations. It is unfortunate that the author - editor did not republish the other military documents pertaining to this subject, especially the report by A. Weide given to Peter on Weide's return from study of and service in foreign armies in the 1690's.

 
pg 34

The military reorganization of Peter occupies a large place in the history of he Russian Army and military art. Peer created the permanent regular army enabled led the development of military industry and completely rearmed the army with modern types of infantry and artillery weapons. He made major changes in the tactics employed by the army. He promulgated new and original military regulations, printed in the Russian language books on artillery and fortifications, founded military schools and laid the beginnings of special military education in Russia and made a wide military prepared ness of the Russian officer corps, and educated the army from privates to generals in the spirit of the new more elevated regular discipline. Its not difficult to note that the military reforms of Peter are the border between the period of unsuccessful Russian military action with weak enemies in the second half of the 17th century (Turks and Tatars) and the period of great successes in the 18th century against the best armies of western Europe.
The direct results of the reforms Peter himself noted in the forward to his regulations of 1716 in commenting on the successes of the Russian army against regular opponents. But the historical meaning of the reformation is not only the immediate results. under Peter the foundations of the regular organization of the military forces of Russia were laid.

 
pg 35

Peter was the real leader of the reforms. He was involved in all the details and conducted the reformation of the army. he was able to learn lessons from mistakes and strengthened the new ways and forms. The military ideas of Peter formed the basis for the new army. Its practices determined the final structure of the army, the development of its tactics and brought its technical capacity up to date. Directing the path of the reforms, Peter first of all took care of the rearmament of the army with the newest weapons and technology, of its training in formations and tactics, and of the education in the spirit of patriotism and defense of the state. Striving to overcome the military lag of the country, Peter widely used the most advanced western military methods, converting them for the special needs of the Russian army. Pete brought up a while Pleidies of Russian military leaders and specialists such as B. Sheremetev, A. Menshikov, M. Golitzin, A Weide, J. Bruce B. Korchmin, G. Skornyakov-Pisarev, V. Suvorov and others. Looking at the condition of the birth of the regular army in Russia military historians usually use the darkest colors to paint the picture of the army before the reforms. From these conditions came the necessity to reform the army. The decay of discipline, lag of weapons and low military quality of the pomestnik-dvoriani force was noted by contemporaries and confirmed by the fact of military history. "Thank God if we can serve the Tsar without drawing a saber"
The mass shirking of military service by dvoriani and the growth of 'evaders' are phenomena of the 2nd half of the 17th century. The formation of the pomestie service system, creation of the streltzi, and powerful artillery of the 15th - 16th centuries were a progressive step in the development of the Russian army. In the wars of that epoch the forces of Muscovy had a high military quality. In its basic tactics the Russian army of that time resembled the tactics of western Europe, (the active operation of cavalry et cetera)., however it also used a series of unique methods which distinguished it from the other armies of Europe.
The army was divided into Polks, - Main, Right, left, storozhevoi, zasadni, and advance guard (Ertoul) The Russian artillery employed original tactics during sieges and in the field of battle it used strong artillery fire and the moveable canon-armed fortress (Gulyai Gorod). Especially artful was the organization of the defense of the southern border with the wide use of natural and artificial barriers. In 1572 Prince M. Vorotinski, by command of Ivan IV, formed the "Regulations on Guard, Station and Field Service.".

 
pg. 36

This army was still in essence a feudal army consisting of nine tenths pomestnik-dvoriani and their men. The separate udels and princedoms had their own forces. The dvoriani came on service with horse, men and arms and after the campaign they separated and went home. By its organization the main forces of Moscow, the dvoriani cavalry, represented a temporary militia formed only during time of military operations.
In the 17th century began the crisis of military pomestnik system. Social economic progress in Muscovy in the 16th and 17th centuries brought on a gradual change in the form of landowning conditions and in strengthening of the pomestnik's property in land and in the serfs. The more the pomestniks were involved in the circle of domestic interests the more persistently they declined to fulfill their heavy military obligations.
On the other side, rising dvoriani families numbered groups of small landowners, half pomestniks, deti-boyars who lost the possibility to serve in the army on the old basis. In the conditions of almost continual war of the 17th century the the small landowners could not remain in condition to serve with all the equipment etcetera of the service person. From this rose the numbers (netchikov) "evaders" from this also the attempts of the government to organize supply of the dvoriani force with weapons, ammunition and food from the state treasury. In the 17th century the deti-boyars who had no land all the more often signed up in the infantry service since they could not qualify for the lancer or reiter cavalry service.
The pomestnik-dvoriani system of organization of force gradually shifted to another side. The modernization of the hand firearms and artillery in the 17th century led to the main arm of service in this period becoming the infantry to which shifted the decisive role in battle. The cavalry having received firearms also shifted to a regular basis and changed its tactics. From the purely military point of view the untrained, armed-with-an-ill-assortment-of-weapons, dvoriani cavalry lost its military significance and despite the military technical backwardness Russia in the 17th century with surprising rapidity developed infantry regiments.
The pomestnik dvoriani force by its very character could not develop into a correctly organized regular force.
One must not call the streltzi the embryo of the regular army. It was a special form of organization. Service of the streltzi as in various other categories of the Russian forces in the 16th - 17th centuries - (pushkari, vorotnikov, kuznitsov, zatinshchikov, town cossacks and others) - was supported by money and land payments and was hereditary.
Into the strettzi force were recruited mainly "from father - children, and from brother-brother, and from uncle-nephews". Another peculiarity of the streltzi was the combination by them of military service with civil professions. The lack of systematic, military training hindered the streltzi development of their service capabilities. All this resulted in that Peter had to start the reformation of the Russian army with the complete liquidation of the streltzi infantry and then also the dvoriani cavalry.

 
pg 37

The necessity of military reforms became immanent also in connection with great progress in military affairs and military structure of Muscovy in the 17th century in connection with the growing role of Russia in the international relations.
The growth of native industry and production of artillery and firearms especially noted in the middle 17th century and the increased import of arms from western Europe gradually supplied the army with fire arms and raised the importance of infantry. In 1668 in the Russian army there were 40,000 cavalry and 24,000 infantry. In 1681 there were 45,000 cavalry and 81,000 infantry. In the 2nd Crimean campaign 28 cavalry regiments (37,000) and 46 infantry regiments (58,000) participated.
The change in composition of the army by arm of weapon led to a fundamental change in its social structure, in as much as the depressed mass of infantry and part of the cavalry was recruited now from peasants and suburb population. The dvoriani had to secure its leadership position over the peasants in the army. But for this it was essential to overcome the traditional aversion of the dvoriani to infantry service and enter them into schools of the new military practice within the regular army.
Another characteristic event in the development of the Russian army in the 17th century was the displacement of the dvoriani cavalry and streltzi by regiments of "foreign formation' By the end of the 17th century the pomestnik cavalry remained only a quarter of the cavalry and the streltzi were only a tenth part of the infantry.
Some historians have begun to look at the creation of the 'foreign formation' regiments as a damaging retreat from a national principle. of the old Russian military organization and tactics. "The practice of hiring foreigners regiments' writes Professor Korobkov, "beginning with the reign of Ivan the Terrible and receiving greater development during the reign of Alexis Mickialovich, signified the retreat from the aforesaid principle". This remark is based on the annoying misunderstanding since the Russian government never used the practice of hiring entire regiments and in the composition of the regiments of "foreign formation' were Russians (deti boyars, volunteers ,and datochnki). The first regiments of "foreign formation" were formed by Michael Feodorovich. In the 17th century there were in total two occurrences of hiring an entire regiment for a very short time.
The Russian government hired foreign officers, the influx of which was especially strengthened after the 30 Years' War. However among the officers in the regiments of "foreign formation" Russians predominated. In the 2nd Chgirinski campaign in the composition of the regiments in the officers above major there were 42 foreigners and 24 Russians, and in the junior officers - (captain, Lieutenant, Rotmiester) there were 268 Russians and 58 foreigners. The element of mercenaries in the Russian army in the 17th century appeared as a result of the military-technical and cultural retardation of Russia. They were not quickly eliminated during Peter's reign.
(Thus it should be clear that the term regiment of 'foreign formation" refers to the organization, formation and tactics of the unit rather than to its national composition.)
Likewise ungroundedly Professor Korobkov called the "foreign formation" regiments the "Regular units" of the Russian forces in the 17th century. The reiter regiments of "foreign formation" represented nothing of the kind, as more that modernized pomestnik cavalry. These regiments after a campaign also dispersed to home, just like the soldier regiments. Peter could not form his army on the model of these regiments specifically because he armed his army with the new military technology (flintlock musket and bayonet) which demanded another organization and tactics.

 
pg. 38

One must not agree with the negative evaluation which some historians give the ":foreign formation" regiments. The striving of Russia to move along the general European path of development in military force, writes professor Korobkov, "fortunately did not obscure from herself her special national principle of military organization, and in the future was discarded". Creation of the "foreign formation" regiments was without question a step forward in the history of the Russian army, the number of them grew also after Aleksis Mikhailovich, and not by accident did V. V. Golitsin attempt to reform on the foreign model the streltzi infantry and the dvoriani cavalry. The efforts of the Russian military leaders to master the foreign formation and to strengthen military cultural connections with Europe, recruit foreign officers, weapons and artillery masters, import weapons, translate specialist military literature and regulations - all this played a big role in the preparation for the military reforms of Peter.
If the reactionary circles protested against the reorganization of the army and explained the failure of the Crimean campaign as the punishment of its leader because Golitsin assigned commanding posts in the army to foreigners, then Peter sharply turned the face of the army to the west. Peter found in the methods of organization and operations of the best Russian regiments of "foreign formation" (the so-called select) the very progressive elements which he could use in undertaking the formation of the army.
In the very development of the Russian army in the 17th century there took place significant progress which directly prepared the way for Peter's reforms. From the middle 17th century were conducted periodic required recruitments (conscriptions) into the army of "datochnki people".
A not less importance had the rudiments of training in formations of the cavalry and infantry in the 2nd half of the 17th century. It is known, that the "foreign formation" regiments usually in the course of one month per year trained in the reformations and elements of tactical maneuvers.
According to the evidence of Patrick Gordon, the "select" soldier regiments in Moscow trained in front of the tsars inspection daily. The first instructors for his "playmate" regiments Peter obtained from the select soldier regiments which were commanded by General Lt. Patrick Gordon.
True, the training in formations before the reorganization of Peter were not systematic and were conducted not according to a unified regulation for formations, but on the basis of the "military Custom" that is actually according to the desires of the foreign instructors .Peter at the very beginning of his reforms used the organizational and military administrative experience of the foreign formation regiments creatively and with wisdom. The out of date elements of the experience Peter gradually discarded and the other elements he put into one system for the regular army.
The circumstance that the basic composition of the officers - foreigners - remained in the 17th century in the cadre of the army, was used by Peter in the interests of reorganizing the army.

 
pg. 39

Many of these foreigners were so Russianized that Peter could not relate to them with full trust which they, it is to the point to say, fully proved (Paul Menzies, Patrick Gordon, F. Lefort, I. Chambers, A. Weide, and others.) The most important element of the regularity of the Russian army in the 17th century was the supply of the regiments of "foreign formation" with weapons, ammunition, and part of the mounted regiments with horses at the state expense, from the tsar's weapons treasury. The principle of state supply of the regular army and the first step on this direction was done before Peter. However, only as a result of the military reorganization of Peter was this principle carried out completely and was accomplished in full measure, so that the Petrine soldier received from the state his weapon, and uniform and boots and supply of prepared cartridges.
The practice of attracting landless deti boyars and dvoriani into the infantry service and "datochnki people" into some units of cavalry service delt the first blow to the dvoriani privileges - to serve only in the cavalry. This helped Peter to make service in the infantry usual for the dvoriani and to appoint recruits from the peasantry as privates in the cavalry. However the privilege was so traditional that Peter in the first years of the reforms had to employ severe punishments to the dvoriani who avoided infantry service.
Working out in the course of many years his Miliary Regulations of 1716 Peter used the experience of the Russian Regulations created in the 17th century. Already in the Regulations for Military Affairs of 1621 (of Onisim Mikhailov) which demanded intelligence and advocated winning a victory with the least loss of life on both sides. The idea of the Regulations of 1647 found their reflection in the articles of the Petrine Regulations for guard duty and campaign order. One must note that the Regulations of 1647 by the end of the 17th century were completely out of date and the formations given in them were not used by the units at that time.
Thus despite the military technical backwardness of the country in the 17th century the Russian army displayed surprising capacity for progressive development. The more strong became that lagging, the more bitter were the military failures at the end of the 17th century, the more decisive and wide became the problem of reorganization of the armed forces. The measures of the commission of V. Golitsin for reformation of the army (discard of Mestnichistvo, reformation of pomesti cavalry, and streltsi into infantry) turned out to be insufficient although they helped the way for the reforms of Peter. The Russian army on the eve of the Petrine reorganization slowly but steadfastly moved forward.
For the history of the Petrine military reforms great importance has the circumstance that its creator and leader in his childhood and youth had a full course in military science which included study of all arms of contemporary firearms and cold weapons, military "foreign formation" infantry and cavalry, artillery affairs, elements of military engineering art.

 
pg. 40

A great importance in the military upbringing of Peter was the practical school of his "playmates". It is not by accident that Peter for many years was given the high title of "first Russian soldier" by C. Bukhvostov. The "playmate" units were commanded by Colonel Ivan Chambers. In the infantry, artillery and cavalry Peter went through the ranks from bombardier, soldier, etc. Peter only in 1691 gave himself the rank of sergeant and wore the sergeant's kaftan. But for the "Playmates" occupation of Peter it was characteristic not only that he was attracted by the exercises, but also he had a great interest in the technical and scientific side of military affairs. From 1684 Peter studied the joiners', turners' and armorer's work. In 1685 he went to the state armaments factory and from then on continued to return two or three times a year. There he selected the best weapons especially unusual ones such as ones with rifled barrels, special firing mechanisms, or double barrels. In 1686 Peter took part in a grandiose Factory accuracy registration of tens of thousands of firearms, undertaken in connection with preparations for the Crimean Campaign. In the same year Peter went to the Artillery Factory and generously rewarded the artillery master artisans.
In 1685 Peter read, probably for the first time in his life, a secular book . This was the "Book of Artillery fire from the library of his father, Alexis Michailovich. Peter in his school years learned about other military books, in particular the ":Regulations of 1647", the so-called "Uchenie i hitrost ratnovo stroyeniya pexotnix ludie".
As a youth Peter already could give an intelligent criticism of this book. From 1687 Peter studied the beginning of ballistics and fortifications under the guidance of F. Timmerman, and from 1689 his tutor in military science was Patrick Gordon. In military training Peer had the services of the talented and well-educated Scottish officer, Paul Menzies.
The failure of the two Crimean campaigns of Golitsin had a big impression on Peter and strengthened his interest in military affairs, and his critical view of the old military organization and tactics.
On coming to power Peter increased the dimensions of his playmate forces. In 1690-94 a large organizational work was conducted on the manning, arming and training of 4 select soldier regiments. This work was under the command of Patrick Gordon and F. Lefort, in the two old regiments, Butirski and A. Shepelev. Parallel with this was the creation of two new regiments; the Preobrazhenski and Semynovski, which were to become the kernel of the regular army. The Preobrazhenski office and the Preobrazhenski staff were headed by "generalissimus" F. Romodanovski with the general clerk I Inekhov. The officers of these regiments were picked individuals who received marksmanship and tactical training. There were two bombardier companies formed in the regiments. In 1692 the Swedish military engineer, C. Roll entered service.

 
pg. 41

In this year Peter conducted extensive artillery firing practice and went to the Artillery Factory and decorated the artillerists who had proved their expertise by hitting the "bull's eye". The first regular regiments received their baptism of fire in the "playmates campaign" of 1691-94. Peter's often quoted words about the jokes at Koshukhovskii and the elements of masquerade involved need not conceal from us the significance of these maneuvers. Peter had a serious purpose and did not want the joke at Koshukovski to be continued on the Azov Campaign. In is clear that Peter's jokes and masquerades had their serious purposes in his system. In reality the "playmate campaign" was the first attempt at practical testing of the new ideas which had not been proven as yet, including the study of the significance in battle of the new military science, new forms of organization and new tactics and manual of arms. The "Playmates campaigns" were the first step in the restructuring of the army on a regular basis. They brought into practice the principles of systematic marksmanship and field training of the army. They were a direct preparation for the Azov Campaign. The "playmates campaigns" were characterized first of all by the not accidental way in which the new army regiments were formed against the "enemy" regiments of streltzi. In the maneuvers tens of thousands of soldiers took part and all arms and services participated. It is known that the form of maneuvers were close to the real thing and the fiercer violence reached extreme limits. In these conditions it was not accidental that "our" forces won over the "enemy" forces as Peter put it. Contemporary witnesses reported that "our" regiments formed before the battle in battle order as generally practiced at that time in the West, that is the infantry in the center and the cavalry on the flanks. They maintained excellent battle discipline and supported the main force with the reserve, etc.' whereas the streltzi were without order or formation. The witnesses criticized the "enemy" forces for their disorder and tactical mistakes.
The "friendly" side on the other hand showed not only the results of the experience of the "foreign formation" regiments but also the new military organization and tactics; the first military council of the army, the participation in the battle of the bombardier companies, the companies of sailors, and the use of river transportation and newly designed river craft with the armament with bayonets although only one company of the Lefort regiment had them. Fortifications and methods of siege were practiced. All this shows that Peter was not merely mechanically copying the model of the "Foreign formation" regiments of Alexis Mikhailovich. The commander of the Russian army was F. Romodanovski and the "enemy" army commander was I. I Buturlin. Peter fought on the "new" side in the bombardiers and as a rotmiester in the reiter regiment and as commander of a company of sailors and finally as a miner. In reality the idea of the first-in-history of modern armies large scale field maneuvers but also the governing outcome of the study belonged to Peter.

 
pg. 42

B. Kurakin, who participated in the Kozhukhoivski maneuvers wrote that no monarch in Europe could conduct better training than that. In 1695 Peter opened the first campaign for his new units with the siege of Azov. The experience of this campaign added further experience for the reorganization of the army. Already on the first campaign we can note a series of new developments in organization and tactics.
The 1695 campaign followed a predetermined strategic plan. The main attack was at Azov, and a secondary attack to distract the attention of the Tatars was on the lower Dnieper. Peter discussed this plan along with all other details not in the old fashion with the clerks of the Razrayd and Boyar prikazes, but in his council of leading generals.
The kernel of the main army was the new regular regiments including the bombardier company and the engineers; Roll, Weide and Timmerman. Peter decisively broke away from the old method of formation in the traditional polks. He also created a powerful river flotilla to transport the forces and most of the supplies. He made intelligent use of the river transport system. This greatly increased the mobility of the forces. The failure at Azov did not make Peter despair. He set about correcting the deficiencies that were shown by the campaign. While still under the walls of Azov in 1695 he made the first changes and began preparations for the next campaign. He sent for experienced engineers from the Austrian (Holy Roman Empire) and for ship building masters via Arkhangelsk in order to build a new fleet on the Don. Upon his return to Moscow in the military council Peter took upon himself the most difficult part of the preparations, the creation of the new flotilla. He appointed F. M. Apraksin as supervisor of this operation.
For the 2nd campaign Peter strengthened the siege corps and appointed A. S. Shein as commander-in-chief. He employed military engineering methods in the siege in coordination with a naval blockade of the fort. Success in this campaign did not conceal from Peter the need to make further improvements. In fact it showed him more than ever the organizational deficiencies of the old military organization. Especially obvious was the indiscipline of the streltzi and the dvoriani cavalry. 22 percent of the dvoriani "Moscow ranks" did not show up for the campaign and also the insufficient military knowledge and lack of military specialists was apparent. In the campaign and after it Peter made the beginning plan for reorganization of the military forces. In 1696 and 1697 he proceeded to carry this out.

 
pg. 43

The major part of the streltzi force was left at Azov after the campaign and also at other southern garrisons. This was the beginning of their destruction. The later streltzi uprising of 1698 was brought on by their complaints at being away from home and by their attempts to regain their old privileges in Moscow as guards. Preparing to create the regular army, Peter in 1697 - 1698 greatly increased the number of men in the "select soldier" regiments. Preparing to go abroad he left A. M. Golovin in charge with thorough instructions to train and inspect the men and officers.
One must not agree with the view of Professor Korobkov that Peter only conceived his plan for reorganization after being on his trip abroad and that the plan was just a result of this trip, as he says in "Voenniya Misl No 2-3, 1944.
From the moment of the return from Azov the officer complement of the Preobrazhenski and Semenovsksi regiments was increased two to three times in order to use them as a training grounds for future officers of other regiments. A second group of preparatory measures was connected with the sending of "volunteers" abroad to study the European measures and with Peter's personal trip abroad for the same purpose. Decisively breaking with the traditions of the Muscovite tsars raised contacts with the West to a new high level. Western influences had penetrated Russia before Peter, but were received quite passively and not deeply. The volunteers sent abroad in 1697 according to their instructions personally devised by Peter, had to study naval affairs and military science. In January of 1697 A. A. Weide from the Preobrazhenski Regiment was sent abroad. Peter himself was accompanied by Menshikov, Korchmin, James Bruce, Kikin, Ovtsin, Buzhenknov, Aleksander Archilovich and others. They attentively and successfully studied the organization and tactics of the western armies and each arm of service such as artillery and armament techniques and theory and military engineering etc.

Peter studied and gathered and compared the military culture of all the Western European countries and took what he considered advantageous and rejected what was not (such as the principle of mercenary forces, excessive parade ground 'spit and polish', the great gulf between officers and men, the principle of classical linear tactics, etc.) Striving from the very start of the reforms to obtain for his forces a cadre of Russian specialists, Peter at the same time hired abroad hundreds of line officers, armaments experts, artillerists, military engineers, bombardiers, miners, sappers, etc. according to the witness, A. Zhelyabuzhskii. In course of the summer of 1698 there came to Moscow 700 foreign officers and military specialists.
Preparing also the technical basis of the reforms, the great embassy sent from abroad tens of thousands of flintlock muskets with bayonets, a large collection of cannon, mortars, and howitzers.

 
pg. 44

On order of Peter, while abroad, they prepared drawings of artillery weapons by caliber, recipes for artillery powder, studied military administration and tactics and tactical organization of each separate arm of service. For example V. Korchmin on Peter's orders went to Berlin and made a list of all the ranks in the army from field-marshal to ensign, how much each received in pay and what uniforms and allowances the soldiers received. James Bruce sent Peter from England a description of the English ranks in the artillery in war and peace and how much they were paid. The preparations concerned themselves with all aspects of military affairs.
Peter began the army reforms with reorganization of the main arm of the forces, the infantry. New publications and archival material show how well thought out and solidly grounded was the decision made by Peter. In 1698-99 Peter, Weide, and A. Golovin worked out on the basis of Russian experience the rules of the so-called "Regulations of Weide", the first manual of field formations for the regular infantry. In this manner into the army was introduced a unified regulation for formations. This was an important step on the way to train the regular army.
The "Regulations of Weide" of 1696 was never adopted for the training of the army and was actually a wide ranging report of Weide to Peter on the military customs of various states of Europe with critical observations of the author. This regulation document was printed in 1841. The materials of Weide were used in the preparation of the first regulations.
Discarding the complicated manual of arms and formation drills of the western European states described in the report of Weide, Peter adopted for the Russian infantry only those drill rules that were essential for the preparation of officers and men for battle; a simple doubling by ranks and by files, a manual of arms for the musket and with the bayonet, and a manual for the grenade. All these manuals of arms, drill maneuvers, and commands for the Russian army were simple and clear. They envisaged two levels of instruction of the soldiers, the recruit and the old soldier. Thus for instance loading was accomplished in 12 movements, but for those in training there were provided a 'quick load' method of three movements, , "load', 'aim' 'fire' .
The drill manual of 1699 disproves the legend that the Russian infantry under Peter was armed until 1721 with pikes. It not only envisaged action with the bayonet but carried out a deep change in the existing European rule of passive, only for defense from cavalry, user of the bayonet, demanding an active employment of the bayonet in hand-to-hand battle. This at first glance in an unimportant circumstance in reality it reflects the belief of Peter in the soldiers and in their initiative and energy in battle.
Peter adopted the newest methods of battlefield firing by the infantry, only just adopted by the best armies in Europe, in the line formations in six ranks. The obsolete formation of the streltzi of deep mass in twelve or more ranks was discarded.
Widespread preparation of the line infantry officers from the dvoriani preceded the recruitment of the regular infantry at the end of 1699. At least half the foreign officers turned out to be unsuitable for service. many did no know how to use the musket. General Golovin complained to Peter about them when he was trying to train the officers in the new drills. In connection with this Golovin threw out 150 of them and kept 150 in training.
The drill regulations of Peter's army were worked out in final form and twice printed in Moscow in 1700. The complete text including Peter's personal additions is collated in the notebook of Captain P. Petrov 1714 in the Department of Manuscripts of the Lenin Library. In the spring of 1699 in the training of the infantry formations about 300 Russian dvoriani were enlisted who took a course of training according to the new articles and were spread out among the officers of the three infantry divisions; A. Golovin, N. Repnin and A. Weide.

 
pg. 45

At the same time for the training of the officers in fundamentals there was created the first group of "sergeants in young years", "Young dragoons" in the first two dragoon regiments and for the preparation of artillerists - a bombardier school in the Preobrazhenski Regiment. Peter personally attended to the education of the officers and taught the bombardiers theory and practice. The young officer corps sergeants, privates 1st class, junior ensigns, corporals, quartermaster sergeants, et cetera were selected from the ranks of the privates. The regiments of the regular army being formed in 1699 - 1700 consisted of 12 companies each; they were equipped and armed completely at the expense of the government with fusils with bayonets.
Contrary to the assertions of military historians, the recruit system was not in use in 1699. In the first direct regular force in 1699 Peter recruited 10,727 "datochnki people" and 11,787 volunteers of all ranks. In it the owners were allowed to substitute for a "datochnki person" a money tax of 11 rubles per man. This gave Peter 50,055 rubles. The cavalry was formed in the old way of the dvoriani, who could exchange their personal service for a money payment also. However the centralized recruitment for infantry in 1699-1700 for permanent service in the army prepared the way for the change over to the recruit system put into practice in 1705.
Peter understood that for the formation of a new army it was insufficient only to train and arm soldiers, one had to instill in them the spirit of the "regular" discipline. With this objective in mind he in 1700 put into the regulations brief guiding rules and duties for the soldier and officer; this "infantry company ranks" and "Articles on how the soldier must live and conduct himself in formation and in camp" "Company ranks" (that means junior officers who were in the companies) demanded of the officers that "they teach the soldiers in ranks on foot, and marksmanship, and have concern for the soldiers and study military affairs and be models for the subordinates - be good life and brave heart." In battle the officers "must quickly be cut to pieces rather than let anyone take the flag and never leave the flag because the entire company acts according to the flag". "Company ranks" were brought up in the feeling of responsibility of "commanding personnel" for their subunits. "Company ranks" delivered a blow to the old traditions of the feudal hierarchy. Only trained and experienced people could obtain higher ranks. A sergeant had to serve first as a private and know the private's duties. Later, Peter forbade the promotion of dvoriani to officers if they didn't know the enlisted men's jobs and had not served as EM in the guards.

 
pg. 46

The war was not only the greatest test of all the strength of the Russian state, but also a battle school of its young regular army. In the Northern War the Russian army confronted an army that was regular, and tested in battle, having long traditions of being "regulars" and the honor of being undefeated, and headed by talented leaders and experienced generals. At the same time the Russian army was going through the reorganization and had not yet formed itself as a regular army. Peter himself considered the basic reason for the defeat at Narva on 19 November, 1700 to be "lack of skill" of his regiments, which until Narva had never seen the field of battle or contested with regular forces. Setting himself the mission of giving the troops skill in regular battle, Peter in the years just after Narva decided a series of large military-organizational questions, which day by day made the organizational structure more modern and improved the technical and tactical skill of the army. Peter used to the maximum in this the favorable international and military circumstances of the period. In the summer of 1702 Peter wrote Boris Sheremetev that the War of the Spanish Succession was giving them the opportunity to prepare while the Swedes were in Poland and could not return.
Soon after Narva the pomestie-dvoriani cavalry was eliminated. It had yet again shown its military unfitness in the battle. Instead of it the regular cavalry of dragoon model was created. In the course of the winter 1700-1701 the Golden Palace, headed by B. A. Golitsin, conducted in 88 towns an enrollment of lancers, reiters and igkhormuses collecting 11,147 for service and by spring of 1710 they had formed 9 dragoon regiments of 10 companies each. The dragoons were supplied with horses and equipment at state expense and armed with fusils with bayonets, a pair of pistols with holsters, and sabers.
From 1702 the dragoon regiments were filled with "datochnki people" and from 1705 with recruits also. This led to a fundamental change in the social composition of the mass of privates in the cavalry. The officer corps of the dragoon regiments was almost exclusively Russian; in 1702 in the 10 dragoon regiments commanders there were only two foreigners and of 10 majors one foreigner, all company officers (329) and sergeants (901) were Russians. The dragoons only gradually possessed the skill of line tactics in battle. Still in 1704 in an unlucky incident at Mur-miri according to the words of Peter..... Peter forbad until the victory at Kalisha in 1706 the mounted attack with cold weapons, adopting in the first time musket fire from the mounted formation, and trained his dragoons in action "front to front" demanding that they not approach the enemy too closely until the enemy was broken and retreating, and they were to advance slowly step by step to prevent disorder and counter attack.


 
pg. 47

In their first performance in battle the dragoons revealed a higher level of quality than that of the old dvoriani horse. The systematic accumulation of military experience in battles with the regular cavalry of the enemy led to the sharp change in the tactics of the Russian dragoons after 1706. The dragoons combined a pistol and fusil fire with a decisive attack with cold weapons. In 1701-02 in the dragoon regiments were formed the first in military history light horse artillery and in 1704 one grenadier company was formed per regiment. Thus, by means of manning and support, by character of armament and tactics the Russian cavalry became during Peter's reign a regular cavalry.
At Narva the Swedes captured all the Russian artillery. The greater part of this armament was cast in the middle 17th century and some of it even by Ivan IV. The military situation required a rapid reformation of the artillery. Peter wrote Vinius on 8 April, 1701 to make new artillery as fast as possible. Thanks to the preparatory measures of 1697-1700 the mission of supply of the army with artillery and ammunition was accomplished amazingly fast. This was not simply a renewal but a complete reconstruction of the artillery on a new technical and organizational basis.
Peter appreciated the great importance of artillery. It is well known that already in 1697 he went to Konigsberg and took the theoretical and practical course in artillery and received an official diploma - "artillery master and artist". Peter gave the artillery engineers working in the Artillery Office special technical instructions. In constructing the new artillery Peter used the technical experience of the Russian artillery industry. Then new cannon were made generally by the Russian masters such as Jacob Dubin, Karl Osipovich, Ivan Matorin, Simon Leonteev, and Login Zhakharev.
At the head of the artillery production Peter placed technically educated people, A. Vinius and James Bruce. Foreign engineers were also employed. In May 1701 Peter told Vinius that the engineers would be in the artillery In the same year in Moscow was founded the first in Russia artillery school in which there were 180 participants and then an artillery laboratory in the Preobrazhenski village, where J. Goshke and V. Korchmin and others worked.

 
pg. 48

As a result of these measures the technical data was obtained and production of three types of artillery was begun (cannon, mortars and howitzers). They were of specified calibers. By the end of 1701 they had cast 243 cannon, 12 mortars and 13 howitzers. In 1702 they cast light field howitzers for the dragoon regiments. On 6 February 1702 Boris Sheremetev said that all dragoon regiments should have their howitzers.
Peter said do it. In the following year for the armament of 9 dragoon regiments there were 24 howitzers and a small collection of small mortars. At this time the Russian artillery began to use canister. From 1702 the regimental and field artillery was supplied with "quick firing" ammunition wagons (caissons). All this many times improved the fire power and mobility of the Russian artillery and placed it at the end of the reforms on a higher level than the artillery of any other European power.
Mastering the achievements of the leading western artillery technique Peter did not form, however, his artillery on the western model, but creatively decided the problem of technical reconstruction, reorganization, and improvement of the tactical art of the artillery. In Peter's notebooks for 1701-02 one meets laconic notes illuminating the creation of new ideas in the area of tactical employment of artillery. He concerned himself with training artillerists in achieving more rapid fire with means of moving guns forward more rapidly; to fire accurately, quickly, to use the maneuverability of the cannon, in mutually coordinated action with the infantry and cavalry, and for this to speed up its mobility, all these were the ideas of Peter accomplished by him in the course of the reforms.
The further success of the Russian artillery is connected with the rapid growth of the iron-making industry. The iron industry was located in the Urals, Lipetski and Olonetski regions, and had a high quality iron. It conducted a complete revolution in artillery production in Russia and predetermined the success of the Petrine military reforms. Under Peter disappeared the dependence of artillery production on the presence of deposits of copper and dependence on imported artillery pieces from western Europe. In the fall of 1702 the first cannon made of Ural iron were cast. Thus began a massive production of "Siberian" iron cannon, mortars and howitzers which already by 1703 received a general recognition. At the Olonetski factory in 1703 were prepared 100 cannon with thousands of cannon balls and canisters. In this year the war in Ingermandland, Peter noted in his book of the models of Russian cannon made in Siberia like those of the Pushkari yard and of models of canister 24 and 12. In the first year of the war the artillery was divided into light regimental, field, siege, and garrison. In 1701 the first artillery regiment was formed with companies of cannoneers, bombardiers, pioneers and engineer-sappers, and with groups of cannon, gun carriage and other masters. Finally, in 1705 the servants in the artillery supply trains were changed from residents in the areas, on order of Peter, to soldiers from the recruits. The analogous measure in the West was accomplished only in the middle 18th century.

 
pg 49.

The new artillery achieved its excellent quality in the first field battle with the Swedes. At the siege of Noteburg the artillery according to Peter, fulfilled all its missions excellently. In 1705 Ch. Witworth told the English government that the artillery in Russia is at the present time notably well formed.... At the siege of Narva they had performed with cannon and mortars so knowledgably that field marshal Ogilive said he had not met any so good in any other people.
In the first period of the reforms 1700 - 1705, was laid the beginning of the formation of the general staff of the Russian army. After the victory at Eristfere, Boris Sheremetev was promoted to field marshal. In 1702 into the army were appointed general-quartermaster Prince A. Shakhovskii, general-auditor C. M. Khroshchov, general-gevaldieger K. S. Titov, general-clerk and 3 general adjutants. Into the army came a new system of encouragement, rewarding with orders and medals, and promotion in rank for battle service. In 1704 the infantry regiments were reformed into 9 company units (8 fusiler companies and 1 grenadier). Collecting the companies into a battalion raised maneuverability and the creation of the grenadier company strengthened the firepower of the infantry.
In the same years Peter systematically inculcated the army in the rudiments of correct "regular" tactics; the line of battle formation of infantry and cavalry, designation of reserves, etc. He especially strengthened discipline and increased tactical mutual action of the arms of service. Realizing the necessity to find the enemy and have good reconnaissance, Peter already in those years had the idea of the "korvolanta" According to the Regulations of 1716 the "korvolant" was a light horse corps created out of the dragoons, mounted infantry and light artillery. The classical model for the organization and action of the 'korvolant" in Peter's army was the operation which destroyed the Swedes at Lesna in 1708. He organized in 1702-04 raiding detachments and later a brigade of dragoon cavalry strengthened with mounted infantry and light artillery. In siege operations in 1701-05 at Noteburg, Nienshants, Dorpat, and Narva the Russian army learned military engineering art (skill) connecting engineer methods with ;powerful artillery preparations and decisive assaults. Thus step by step the organizations , armament, and tactics of the regular army were made more modern.
In 1705-06 the war entered a new phase. If until then the main successes of the Russians had been achieved at sieges and the operations of the field army were limited by the mission of covering and supporting siege operations, then the remaining main mission of the war had to be to decide the tactical skill of the field army. This period conclusively was determined in connection with the fundamental change in the strategic situation, with the conclusion of the Altranshtadski peace between Charles and Avgustus. The new situation did not come as a surprise. The victory of Menshikov at Kalishe showed Charles the strength of the Russian army.

 
pg. 50

In the 5 years since the start of the war the regular organization had been strengthened, the first achievements had been achieved in rearming the army with modern artillery and firearms. All three arms of service had obtained some experience in military cooperation. In the military operations of 1700-1705 the army laid the foundation for using the line tactics, the growth of mobility and its technical and transport capability (pontoon park, river flotilla, engineer-sappers), strengthening of discipline and moral status. The danger of an invasion by Charles made the order of the day the mission of increasing the army and deciding the problem of the manning of the army.
The extraordinary methods of obtaining replacements put in operation in 1700 (calling up "datochnki", volunteers, polovovniki) were reflected in the army and placed additional load on the military apparatus. In 1704 the government tried to conduct a general registration and induction of dvoriani and peasants but in the conditions of war time these large measures turned out unsuccessfully. In 1705 a new military situation demanded rapid change over to a system of periodic required conscripttion into the army in order to prepare the trained reserves. According to the Ukase of 20 Feb. 1705 the first conscription of recruits was conducted in all towns and useds on the basis of one man per 20 households.
The change over to recruit conscriptions gave a sharp increase to the number of conscripts. On the average each conscription netted 30-35,000 men and a total in the years 1705-1709 of 167,895 men and fully met the requirements of the army for enlisted men.
The conscription of recruits was in quantity a new phenomena in comparison with the recruitment of "datochnki people" in the 17th century. In distinction from the latter the recruit system was a method of periodically replacement for the regular army for permanent (lifetime) service. The recruits arrived at the stations as soldiers and left them as privates first class or corporals. In this manner in the course of recruitment already before they reached their units the recruits received the beginnings of a military organization (squad) and an elementary training in drill, etc.
The change over to the recruit system had a huge importance for the strengthening of the Russian army and was of the most important factor determining its success in the 18th century. Not one state in Europe before the Napoleonic wars was able to create this radical and successful answer to the problem of replacements for the army on the principle of national military required service as Peter was able to do. More complex was the supply of the army with officers. After Narva Peter by manifesto of 1702 invited foreigners with a wide open door to enter the Russian army. The expense of this article in 1703-4 was about 60,000 rubles. However this call was made due to the requirements of the military situation and turned out in essence to be the last in the history of the Russian army. The training of officers in military schools and in the guards regiments, the growth of the number of cadre officers on active service already in 1705-06 actually enabled the army to drop the system of hiring foreigners as officers.
In February 1705 Peter issued an ukase sharply increasing the demands placed on foreigners and limiting the hiring of foreign officers. When General Hunter offered his services to Russia, Peter demanded that .

 
pg, 51

in case of his coming on duty in the Russian army he would subordinate himself to the Russian commander-in-chief and not act like in his time Ogilive had, who did not want to take advice but desired like a teacher to his pupils to act toward the Russians. Peter canceled the special legal articles governing foreigners and made general ones for the entire army. During the years of the war the Russian generals and military commanders grew; field marshal Boris Sheremetev; commander of the dragoon army, A. Menshikov, division commanders N. Repnin, M. Golitsin , C. Kropotov, A. Golovin, A. Apraksin, Igiateva and others. In 1706 besides Alart, in the Russian army there was not left a single hired general. To Peter and the Russian general staff belonged the strategic and tactical plan of conduct of the war in connection with the invasion of Charles and the brilliant accomplishment of the plan, ending with the defeat of the Swedes. As the table of the divisions of 1708 witnesses the army was fully staffed with officers notwithstanding that by that time its numbers had greatly increased. The Ukases of Peter in 1707 and 1714 established the order for promotion of officers grade by grade according to the observation of senior officers. The basis for promotions could be long time correct service, or military education and battle service. Dvoriani in order to receive officer's rank had to serve as soldiers in the guards. The custom of some large states of promoting officers not by capability but by seniority of service, Peter considered not good and damaging to the state's interests.. According to the military regulations of 1716 officers having received military education would be promoted ahead. In one of his personal ukases Peter demanded from officers that they study military engineer science, to this ukase was included the program he devised of engineer needs which included the construction of field entrenchments. Peter in a series of personal ukases demanded of the senior commanders that they test the knowledge and experience of the officers in the field. Peter's ukases determined the place of the officers in battle and demanded of them to show initiative and finally, Peter demanded of the officer that they have skill.

 
pg. 52

Not in another army in Europe was there such so persistently and decisively the new relation to the soldiers as the bearers of military force and traditions of the army as was now done in the ukazes of Peter and his Military Regulations. Peter had the idea that the training of the recruit must be different from the training of the old soldier. Peter gave a program for this training which was accomplished already in the difficult conditions of 1707-08, when he conducted inspections and training of entire divisions. In 1706-09 the rearmament of the army was accomplished, giving them flintlock weapons and at Peter's initiative the bayonet was replaced. In these years native production of firearms with bayonets in Tula, Ustuzhn, Pavlov, and Olonts reached 15-20,000 a year. In 1710-11 production increased to 40,000 a year. Major reforms in armaments affairs was a change to production of artillery of only specified calibers. Peter complained that the artillery made at Moscow and Tula varied in caliber and did not match the ammunition bought in Holland resulting in many cannon exploding. For this reason he demanded attention to standardization of calibers and quality control of production. Production of ammunition was also increased to reduce dependence on foreign supplies, to insure matching of ammunition and cannon, and because of Swedish attempts to blockade imports.
By 1708 the army was fully supplied with muskets with bayonets and socket bayonets. In the 20 regiment army of Sheremetev in the fall of 1708 they had 21,9801 fusils with 17,359 bayonets and socket bayonets. Some regiments such as the Preobrazhenski, Shlisselburgski, Moscovski and Belogorodski were completely armed with socket bayonets. (The first models of bayonet were placed in the barrel of the fusil preventing it from firing - the later models or socket bayonet fitted outside the barrel).
Peter tested various forms of bayonet and used the three-sided model. In these years the artillery reforms were also completed. A new type of field and regimental weapons according to the designs of Peter and V. Korchmin were made. Peter strove to lighten the cannon. In his personal cabinet papers are copies of drawings, sketches, and specifications that he personally made up.
The picture of military technical reorganization under Peter would not be complete without mentioning his attempts at many inventions such as rifled barrels, breach loading cannon, cannon with pointed cylindrical shells, a system of rapid firing cannon, cannon with two mortars mounted on one carriage, incendiary shells, and illuminating rockets, hand mortars and cartridges for fusils etc.
The Russian military engineers and technicians under Peter obtained independent and original answers to a series of difficult problems on military technics. The development of military industry and growth of military technical culture were decisive factors in determining the successful reorganization of the army. During the period before Poltava the army received its final administrative and tactical organization, strengthened in the military Ustav of 1716 which fully matched contemporary military art. In 1706 - 1707 the grenadier companies were united into grenadier battalions. The line regiments then had 8 fusilier companies. The dragoon regiments were divided into 5 squadrons of 200 men each. The grenadier companies in the dragoon regiments were united into three separate horse grenadier regiments. In 1708 from the separate infantry grenadier battalions were created 3 grenadier regiments, one per division. According to the ukase of Peter's the grenadiers were selected from among the vary best recruits. New for the Russian army type of infantry was organized armed and trained in 2 or 3 years. By its firepower and shock action the grenadier brought greater power to the battle order and gave Peter in battle a strong weapon. Each grenadier was armed with the fusil with socket bayonet, hand grenades and some had hand mortars. The grenadier regiments has also light regimental artillery (for example the grenadier regiment in Repnin's division had 12 rifled cannon.)
Beginning in 1705-6 the infantry and dragoons regiments were united into brigades and into divisions. The infantry changed from 6 ranks - the formation used at the beginning of the reform - to the more effective and greater firepower producing 4 rank formation. This change was accomplished on the personal order of Peter. There is a direct reference of this in the manuscript of the Military relations in the Cabinet papers. The dragoon regiments were united into a separate mounted army commanded by Menshikov. This was done due to considerations of the tactical and strategic mobility of this arm of service.

 
pg. 53

Leadership in the army was according to the principle of unity of command. In 1706 Peter made Field Marshal Boris Sheremetev the supreme commander. Ogilive was ordered to be under the command of the first Russian field marshal. The dislike of Ogilive to subordinate himself to the field marshal was one of the reasons for separating him from the army after the Grodnin operation. Similar demands Peter made on the brigade commanders. Thus in July 1707 he wrote Baurer that although he had a special corps he had to listen to the advice of General Repnin.

 
pg. 54

Strengthening of unity of command demanded without question subordination of the junior commanders to the senior. Peter considered it essential for the working out of plans and separate operations to convene a military council. Decision of the council at Zholkiev at the end of 1706 and at Chashinkakh, summer 1708, showed in all its brilliance the growth of the Russian military art. The councils were permanent consultative organs under the commander and not binding on the initiative of the generals and officers in the solving of military problems. Peter not once told the generals that military affairs don't bind in one single level order, and therefor in military practice it is necessary to lead according to the circumstances and times and not be bound to predetermined solutions. Advising the generals to take some military action or other Peter usually finished his ukases with the words.....
In the circumstance of the strengthening of the army the demands on the commanders were sharply increased. For the unsuccessful action at Golovchin the division commander, N. Repnin, was called before a military court and sentenced to death for his actions. Repnin was accused because in his division there was no discipline, there was confusion and disorder in the withdrawal of the division. Repnin turned out to be insufficiently prudent, lacking foresight. He did not conduct fire correctly by ranks and platoons but improperly he did not command the pickets, and did not make entrenchments in the position occupied by the division and he deserted his post. The
Repnin affair has a huge educational significance and played a great role in strengthening discipline and in the raising of the feeling of responsibility of the generals and officers for conduct of military operations.
The regular order gradually penetrated all the internal life of the army. In 1708 at Lesna and Poltava the Russian army showed itself to be formed and disciplined, organized with correctly functioning general staff, a finalized tactical and administrative organization with coordinated conduct of all arms and services. For the first time in its history the Russian army was controlled by a system of daily commands. The commands designated inspections and training of units, meetings from one unit to another, designated the composition and commanders of separate units for operations. The orders also gave it tactical dispositions such as "in a battle between each battalion there should be a place to implace two cannon".

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pg. 55

The daily orders announced throughout the entire army had a great educational and disciplining influence on the officers as well as the enlisted men. Besides the orders issued from above there was instituted a daily report of commanders of units to their higher commander from the company, battalion, regiment, division, et cetera. These reports and tables of attendance from 1708 day by day show that in the period of the invasion of Charles the young Russian army, retiring into the depth of the country, kept its order and discipline. Peter demanded that the commanders instill in the soldiers a spirit of defense of the country and discipline and he paid attention to morale. After the failure of Sheremetev in the battle of Murmiz, Peter wrote the field marshal to not lose spirit, but keep up morale of the men. In case of success Peter rewarded the outstanding men with medals and rewards but at the same time he punished deserters and cowards. The latter could only regain favor by outstanding conduct in battle.
The military regulations demanded of the commanders that they draw to themselves the hearts of the entire army, officers and men. They must look after the men, before battle they must personally check the troops and instill bravery. The commanding generals must be demanding of the subordinates and nothing is worse than a weak command. The importance of strict discipline, Peter explained, in his regulations with the example of children 'without punishment and fear of their elders, who habitually....
On the morale of the army on the eve of the Poltava battle we can judge from the tables of 1708 which show the numbers of deserters at a minimum. According to the data the number of deserters was very low. This was not accidental. Confidence was strengthened and supported by a series of measures especially the idea of military duty for the fatherland and feelings of military comradeship. In 1708 Peter found a successful form of uniting these ideas with the strongly developing in the Russian soldiers feeling of territory, the regiments were renamed according to the provinces and the personal complement of each was selected from the inhabitants of one locality.
The system of reward, the personal attention of Peter before battle, the training and inspections, popularity of commanders, in the army feeling of military duty, and parallel with this the strict demands of discipline based not on pedantic and incomprehensible parade ground formations, developing in soldiers all feelings of humanity, ideas of military comradeship, and confidence and belief in duty to the country; all this created a special atmosphere in the army and without doubt strengthened its ranks.

 
pg. 56

The existing regular organization developed in the course of the war was strengthened by the military regulations of 1716. The ideas of Bobrovski and others that the regulation was just a copy of foreign regulations is not correct. Peter made use of the military regulations and rules of other countries. But the manuscript copy of the regulations kept in the Cabinet records shows that Peter was the author of the basic part of the regulations, books on duties of the generals, and book 3 on exercises. The regulations of 1716 shows the peculiarity of the Russian regular military art and the military ideas of Peter himself; he used the military experience of the Russian regular army obtained by it in the course of the war. The basic sources of the regulations of 1716 are the first drill formations and regulations issued by Peter in 1699 - 1709, the "Ulozhenia" of Sheremetev, the "articles short" of Menshikov, the "regulations" of 1707, the drill regulations of 1700, and even the personal orders and instructions of Peter.

 
pg. 57

The organizational and tactical situation of the regulations enhanced the idea of tactical cooperation of the three arms of service. The basis aspect of the strategic and tactical ideas of Peter, realism, subordination of tactical rules to the demands of the real situation "events and time" in the characteristic of his leadership.

 
     
     
     

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