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PLEVNA
11th Edition, Encyclopedia Britannica
vol. 21 pp. 838-840
John Henry Verrinder Crowe
(Bulgarian Pleven), the chief town of the department of Plevna,
Bulgaria; 85 m. N. E. of Sofia, on the Tutchinitza, an affluent of Vid, which
flows north into the Danube and off the Sofia-Varna railway (opened in 1899).
Pop. (1906) 21,208. A branch line 25 m. long, connects Plevna with Samovit on
the Danube, where a port has been formed. After the events of 1877, it was
almost entirely forsaken by the Turks and most of the mosques have gone to
ruin; but, peopled now mainly by Bulgarians, it has quite recovered its
prosperity, and has a large commerce in cattle and wine.
Battles of 1877.
Plevna, prior to the Russo-Turkish War of 1877 (see
RUSSO-
TURKISH WARS) a small and unknown town without fortifications became
celebrated throughout the world as the scene of Osman Pasha's victories and his
five month's defence of the entrenched camp which he constructed around the
town, a defence which upset the Russians' plans and induced them to devote
their whole energies to its capture. (See plevenmap
for overall view from Encyclopedia Britannica map. Osman Pasha left Widin on
the 13th of July with a column consisting of 19 battalions, 6 squadrons and 9
batteries, a total of 12,000 men and 54 guns. Hearing that he was too late to
relieve Nikopol, he pushed on to Plevna. where there was a garrison of 3
battalions and 4 guns, under Atouf Pasha.
Passing through Plevna on the afternoon of the 19th of July he at once took up
a position, previously selected by Pasha, on the hills covering the town to the
north and east. The column had been joined en route by 3 battalions from
the banks of the Danube, so that Osman's command now consisted of 25
battalions. He was none too soon. General Schilder Schuldner, commanding the
5th division of the IX. corps, which had just captured Nikopol, had been
ordered to occupy Plevna, and his guns were already in action. The Turkish
batteries came into action as soon as they arrived and returned the fire. A
desultory artillery duel was carried on till nightfall, but no attack was made
by the Russians on the 19th. Osman distributed his troops in three sections: on
the Janik Bair, facing north, were 13 battalions and 4 batteries, with advanced
posts of 2 battalions and 1 battery each, at Opanetz and Bukova, facing east
and northeast, 5 battalions and 10 guns were posted on the eastern end of the
Janik Bair; to the hills south of the Bulgareni road 4 battalions and 2
batteries were allotted, and on either side of the road, under cover, in rear
of them, most of the cavalry was placed. The remaining troops formed a general
reserve, which was posted on the hill just east of the town. The hills to the
north and east of Plevna were perfectly bare. The Turks had covered the 115 m.
from Widin in seven days, in trying heat and were exhausted, but a few trenches
were thrown up. On the 20th of July at 5 a.m., having made no preliminary
reconnaissance, the Russian commander brought his guns into action, and, after
a short bombardment, advanced his infantry in four separate columns. See
Plevna1s for map of this action from Beskrovni's
atlas of Russian militar history. On the north flank they pressed into Bukova,
and also succeeded in driving back the Turkish right wing; but in both cases
Turkish reinforcements arrived and with vigorous counter-attacks pressed back
the Russians, with the result that by noon they were in full retreat, having
lost 2,800 men out of a total of 8,000. The Turks lost 2,000. Osman made no
attempt to reap the fruits of his victory by pursuit. He at once drew up plans
for the fortification of the position, and the troops were employed night and
day constructing redoubts and entrenchments. A plentiful supply of tools and
daily convoys of stores reached Plevna from Orchanie, and on the 24th of July
Osman's strength was increased by 14 battalions and a battery from Sofia. In
order to secure his line of communications, on the 25th of July he sent a force
of 6 battalions and 1 battery under Rifaat Pasha to occupy Lovcha (Lovatz),
where they entrenched themselves.
The Plevna garrison now numbered 20,000 (35 battalions, 8 squadron, 57 guns and
400 mounted irregulars), who were organized in two wings with a general
reserve. Adil Pasha commanded the left wing consisting of 12 battalions, 3
batteries and 2 squadrons, and held the ground from the Vid bridge to Grivitza,
Hassan Sabri Pasha commanded the right wing, of equal strength, covering from
Grivitza to the south. The remainder, as general reserve, was posted on the
crest and slopes of the hill east of the town, with one battalion in Plevna
itself. The west front was not fortified till October. Trenches were 4 ft. deep
and the redoubts had a command of 10 to 16 ft., with parapets about 14 ft.
thick. In addition to the trenches to the flanks, there were in some cases two
lines of trench to the front, thus giving three tiers of fire.
In accordance with orders from the Russian headquarters at Tirnova, a fresh
attack was made by General Krudener on the 30th of July. See
Plevna2s for map of this action from Beskrovni
atlas. He had been reinforced by three brigades of infantry and one of cavalry
under General Shakovskoi, and his force numbered over 30,000 with 176 guns.
After a preliminary cannonade the infantry advanced at 3 p.m., as before in
widely spread columns. The columns attacking from the north and north-east were
repulsed with heavy loss. Shakovskoi advancing from Radischevo, his left flank
safeguarded by Skobelev from the neighbourhood of Krishin, temporarily occupied
two redoubts, but a heavy counter-stroke by the Turkish reserves forced him
back with severe loss. The Russians retreated, the northern column to Tristenik
and Karagakh, the southern to Poradim. Their losses amounted to 7,300, while
the Turkish losses exceeded 2,000. Had the Turkish garrison of Lovcha been
called in, the result would have been still more disastrous to the Russians.
The victory was decisive, but Osman again failed to pursue. His troops were
elated by success, the moral of the enemy severely shaken, the undefended
Russian bridge over the Danube was within 40 m. of him, but he lost his
opportunity, and contented himself with strengthening his defensive works. It
is said that he was tied down to Plevna by orders from Constantinople.
The Russians now concentrated all their available forces against Plevna and
called in the aid of the Rumanians. By the end of August they had assembled a
force of 74,000 infantry, 10,000 cavalry and 440 guns, including 24 siege guns,
about 100,000 men in all. On the 30th of August Osman moved out of Plevna with
all his cavalry, 3 batteries of artillery and 19 battalions of infantry, and on
the 31st attacked the Russians about Pelishat. He returned to Plevna the same
evening. The Turks lost 1,300 and the Russians 1,000 men. The Russians
determined to occupy Lovcha, and so cut Osman's communications before again
attacking Plevna. After three days' fighting this was accomplished by Skobelev,
acting under Imeretinski, with a force of 20,000 men, on the 3rd of September.
Osman moved out to the relief of the garrison that day with a strong column,
but, finding he was too late, returned to Plevna on the 6th. The survivors from
Lovcha were reformed into 3 battalions, including which Osman had been
reinforced by 13 battalions, 2.5 batteries of artillery and 11 squadrons of
cavalry. His strength was now 30,000, with 72 guns, 46 battalions, 19 squadrons
and 12 batteries. This force was organized in 4 approximately equal commands,
the northern, south-eastern and southern, and a general reserve. The Russians
moved to their preliminary positions on the night of September 6th-7th. Their
plan was for the Rumanians, the IX. and IV. corps and Imeretinski's column to
attack the north-east, south-east and south fronts simultaneously. An artillery
bombardment began at 6 a.m. on the 7th of September, was carried on till 3 p.m.
on the 11th, when the infantry advanced. The Rumanians took one Grivitza
redoubt. Skobelev occupied two redoubts on the south front, but the centre
attack on the Radishevo front failed. On the 12th the Turks recaptured the
southern redoubts, the Rumanians remained in possession of the Grivitza
redoubt, but the Russian losses already amounted to 18,000 and they withdrew,
and entrenched themselves on a line Verbitza-Radishevo, with cavalry on either
flank to the Vid. The Turkish losses totaled 5,000, of which only a few hundred
were caused by the artillery fire of the first few days. There was no question
of pursuit. The Russians were greatly superior in numbers and the Turks were
completely exhausted. See Plevna3s for map of this
action.
Several causes contributed to the Russian defeat. The Russian bombardment, at
ranges beyond the powers of their guns and lacking the co-operation of the
infantry to give them a target, had been useless. No reconnaissance had been
made of the position. The infantry attacks were not simultaneous, and were
beaten in detail, besides which, they were spread over the whole of a strongly
fortified front in equal strength, instead of being pressed home at definite
points. The lack of unity of command, in that the commander-in-chief interfered
with the dispositions and conduct of the operations as arranged by the
commander of the Plevna forces also militated against the Russian success.
This was the last open-force attack on Osman's lines. General Todleben, the
defender of Sevastopol, was now entrusted with the conduct of the siege, and he
determined to complete the investment, which was accomplished by the 24th of
October, Osman's request to retire from Plevna having been refused by
Constantinople. Supplies eventually gave out and a sortie on the night of the
9th-l0th. of December failed, with the result that he and his army capitulated.
Plevna is a striking example of the futility of the purely passive defence,
which is doomed to failure however tenaciously carried out. Osman Pasha
repelled three Russian attacks and practically held the whole Russian army. It
remained for the other Turkish forces in the field to take the offensive and by
a vigorous counterstroke to reap the fruits of his successes. Victories which
are not followed up are useless. War without strategy is mere butchery. The
position of Plevna, threatening the Russian bridge and communications, was
strategically important, but there was no necessity for the Russians to attack
the position. On the eastern flank was an army stronger than, Osman's and the
fortress of Rustchuk was nearer the bridge than Plevna, but they did not
consider it necessary to attack there. They might have contained Osman's force
as they did the army under Mehemet Ali and either awaited his attack or
attacked when he evacuated the position. They failed to realize the resisting
force of improvised fortifications and the strength conferred by extensive and
well-placed entrenchments and despising their adversary made direct frontal
attacks on a well fortified position, instead of aiming at a flank or the rear.
The part played by Plevna in the war was due in the first place to the
imaginary importance set by the Russians on its capture and later to their
faulty procedure in attack on the one hand and to the skill evidenced by the
Turks in fortifying and defending the position on the other. (J H y C)
See W. V. Herbert, The Defence of Plevna, 1877 (London 1895);
F. V. Greene, The Russian. Army and its Campaign in Turkey (London,
1880); General Kuropatkin (Ger. trans. by Krahmer, Kritische ruckblicke auf
den russisch-turkischen Krieg; Mouzaffer Pacha and Talaat Bey, Defense
de Plevna; Krahmer's German translation of the Russian Official History;
General H. Langlois, Lessons of Two Recent Wars (Eng. trans., War
Office, 1910); Th. von Trotha, Kampf um Plewna (Berlin, 1878);
Vararesco (Ger. trans.), Rumaniens Antheil am Kriege, 1877-1878
(Leipzig, 1888).
The author, John Henry Verrinder Crowe, Lt Colonel, Royal Artillery was
Commandant of the Royal Military College of Canada and previously Chief
Instructor in Military Topography and Military History and Tactics at the Royal
Military Academy, Woolwich. He was author of Epitome of the Russo-Turkish
War, 1877-1878. and the encyclopedia entry on the war.
