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THE RUCKSACK
WAR
Edgar F. Raines Jr.
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Subtitle: "U. S. Army
Operational Logistics in Grenada 1983."Center of Military History, United
States Army, Washington D.C. 2010, 649 pgs., excellent maps and list of map
symbols, Index, Glossary of Abbreviations, huge bibliography including primary
and secondary sources, a 34-page index, detailed footnotes, excellent
illustrations, tables and charts.
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Reviewer Comments - Each of the chapters listed below is
further subdivided into clearly organized sections. Dr. Raines has accomplished
a huge amount of research incorporating numerous, varied sources to create an
integrated and detailed account focused on the logistics support for the
Grenada Operation (Operation Urgent Fury) , but also including sufficient
detail on the tactical operations to provide both context and a basis for
evaluating the success of the logistics in supporting operations. In other
words, while logistics in all its dimensions is the subject of the study, it is
its contribution to the success in the accomplishment of the combat mission
which is the basis for evaluation. The study covers the entire spectrum of
activities from minute by minute actions of named tactical level individuals to
the highest echelons of interservice and national planning, command, and
control. The bibliography of sources and their disparate locations is enormous.
The voluminous footnoting in detailed academic scholarly format is
overwhelming. By judicious summarization of this mass of original and already
copious secondary literature Dr. Raines has created a reference work that will
enable the student today to gain a full appreciation of the subject without
attempting the impossible task of consulting all these sources now. And
students today should study this reference, first to gain an appreciation for
how well off they are today in the modern resources available to perform their
missions and second to recognize that many of the problems generated by the
'fog of war' and 'friction', nevertheless, remain and will remain. The book
should be required reading in senior officer courses, for instance at
Leavenworth, Carlisle and NDU.
The author has greatly assisted the reader by including 10 excellent
organizational charts, two tables, and three diagrams that show the intricate
relationships between the many individual units and headquarters. The nine maps
are greatly superior to what one finds in a typical military history book. And
the over 170 illustrations are interspersed directly with the relevant topic on
same pages rather than relegated to separate sections. Another very valuable
(and unusual) aid for which the reader is very grateful, is Dr. Raines'
descriptions of the many units (including small and temporary ones) with
inclusion of the names of their commanders (or staff principals) at every
occasion. The interactions of these units and officers are described over and
over again as the operation continues day by day. It would not be possible for
the reader to keep all these individuals straight if their roles and positions
were not explicitly mentioned each time they appear. Another fine service the
author has provided is definitions and explanations. The text is full not only
of Army terminology but even more arcane logistical jargon necessary for the
professional reader, but Dr. Raines has gone the extra mile to provide clarity
for the wider audience. And there is an extensive list of abbreviations
appended. The index is exceptional as well. If the reader wants to understand a
specific topic, for instance, "Green Ramp" as it figures throughout
the operation, the index is essential. Or one wonders about an individual, say
Lt. Col. Jack Hamilton, the index lists him on nearly 50 different pages.
Concepts also are included, such as "Joint Doctrine" or Casualties.
As author, Dr. Raines has an, if not unique, at least unusual background and
experience. He was present at Army headquarters as an official historian during
the operation taking notes and conducting interviews of participants
immediately afterwards. Yet, he has written a definitive book nearly 30 years
later. Thus, in a way we have two individuals with separate sets of knowledge
and expertise combined into one author. The result is that he has been able to
tell a story with all the immediacy of a first hand witness, yet also with the
ability to evaluate the events and actions from a perspective gained from
knowledge of the enormous changes in all aspects of Army operations in the many
years since 1983. Plus, as he notes, he has had access to archives and
literature not available to any author at the time.
The text is in a very readable font and the book is printed on high quality
paper. The production values are first rate.-
Standard disclaimer: Dr. Raines is a very long time colleague and friend in the
Military Classics Seminar. And General Ed Trobaugh and I are
classmates.
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Preface
This is Dr. Raines' personal account of his process in doing the copious
research and writing this book. In following his description we observe in
another way the extent of the research required. First, one has to be amazed
that such a huge volume of primary and secondary material was produced and
saved in relation to a very brief and minor military operation. Then one is
amazed at the wide spread and complex web of locations at which the material is
now stored. This complexity in turn alerts the reader to the complexity of the
operation, since these repositories are mostly linked to the organizations that
participated in the operation and its logistical support. Well, we can presume
that there may be records at the National Archives at College Park, MD. But
don't forget the Reagan Presidential Library at Simi Valley, CA. Of course the
Department of State has its contribution, including documents from Grenadian
government and other Caribbean nations. Naturally, the U. S. Army Center of
Military History (CMH) has its archives as well. In connection with discussing
this in the Bibliography section Dr. Raines notes that he was active as an Army
historian during the operation itself in 1983, and thus obtained personal
material as an eye-witness at Army Headquarters. But the CMH archives also
contain records relating to the careers of many senior officers in 1983 when
they were participating in the Vietnam War and subsequently. One finds, as
expected, archives from the Departments of Air Force and Navy. Another amazing
reference source is the personal records, and interviews of a huge number of
individual participants. Collecting and organizing the mass of secondary
literature on this operation was itself a major undertaking. In the pages on
which he records his appreciation for the assistance of specific individuals
one finds another vast list of those whose locations and affiliations indicate
the scope of the operation about which they have knowledge.
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Chapter 1 - Behind the Scenes -
The chapter is divided into sections on: On the Island, Grenadian Armed Forces
and Cuban Workers, Eastern Caribbean Neighbors, U. S. Policy Shifts, Chain of
Command Complexities, Caribbean Concept Plan, XVIII Airborne Corps, Corps
Logistics System, Contingency Forces, and 82d Airborne Division; Divisional
Logistics; Training; Morale; Heavy Drop Rig site;
Dr. Raines knows how to tell a story. The fundamental subject matter of a study
of logistics involves analysis of minutia essential for the professional
student, which might overwhelm the average non-professional. But Dr. Raines
writes with such an interesting style, incorporating this detail into a
compelling account of real, well-described individuals making decisions,
performing actions, and facing huge uncertainty as to create a 'page-turner'
that creates interest for the reader as if this were an 'historical novel'.
Thus, he begins the narration with a quick look at actions taking place on the
runway of Point Salines partially completed airfield as the first supplies are
being unloaded from Air Force C-141 and C-130 aircraft. It is afternoon of 25
October and the 'war' has been underway for some hours. We are thrust right
into the middle of a hectic, ad-hoc, scene in which experienced, dedicated
individuals are making do with what they have. It is a real 'come as you are'
war.
Next, he digresses for the reader with an explanation of just what 'logistics'
means.
From this he proceeds to describe the locale, Grenada, its terrain, its recent
political history, its leadership, the structure of its armed forces, and its
relations with other Caribbean nations as well as the United States.
This last, then, requires an exposition of the U. S. political and military
command structure. With excellent diagrams of organizations from the President
down through each echelon to the battalion level in the 82d Airborne Division
the relationship of the many units to each other is clearly shown, another
great tutorial for the reader. In fact these pages on the structure of the
American Army in mid-1983 are worth study in themselves. Dr. Raines provides
brief biographical background on the principal commanders. Since it turns out
later in the story that it is the 2d Airborne Brigade of the 82d Airborne
Division which will lead the operation, Dr. Raines organizes his narrative
around the actions of the newly arrived brigade commander, Colonel Stephen
Silvasy Jr., another example of his use of personalities to humanize a
technical study. I am impressed with the way in which Dr. Raines makes clear
the very complex interrelations between the tactical combat units (and their
commanders ) and the Combat Service and Support units (and their commanders).
And these interrelations exist not only within the 82d Division, but also
within its subordinate brigades and battalions and between the Division and
XVIII Airborne Corps and even higher headquarters plus the Air Force, Marines,
Joint Special Operations Command and Navy.
The author discusses training and morale. His description of the typical,
standard contingency training exercises that division elements were performing
(without any expectation of real events to come) right up to the actual alert
is quite revealing. In the process he makes a point of noting the restraints
created by budget limitations and some times difference in priorities between
the Army units and the Air Force units that will be a team when the real war
comes. Actually the 82d Division was required to continue operations in
entirely other theaters throughout the Urgent Fury Operation.
All this is background, but essential for understanding of what comes when the
real 'whistle blows' and the 82d Airborne goes into action in Grenada.
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Chapter 2 - Policy and Initial Planning, 13-24 October 1983
The chapter is divided into sections on: Washington and Norfolk, 13-19 October;
Death by Revolution 19-20 October; Reaction in the United States, 19-20
October; Washington, Norfolk, and the Caribbean, 21-22 October; XVIII Airborne
Corps and 82d Airborne Division 19-22 October; A 75-Percent Solution; Atlantic
Command and Army Planning, 22 October; Presidential Party afternoon-evening 22
October; A concept of Operations; Special Operations Forces and Ranger
Planning, 21-24 October; Ranger Logistical Plans and Preparations, 22 October;
Washington and the Caribbean, 23 October.
The chapter is critical because it discusses the development of the plans for
Urgent Fury that determined so much of the problems that were the result. The
chapter opens in Grenada where there is infighting between supporters of
Maurice Bishop and Bernard Coard, that is between a leftist and a far-leftist.
The scene then shifts on 13 October to the Restricted Interagency Group (RIG)
in Washington D.C. The in-fighting there is less violent. But the issue at the
top of the agenda was Nicaragua. Grenada was below anyone's horizon. That
changed on 14 October. While the increasingly apparent drift leftward in the
Grenadian government was of some concern, by pure coincidence there was a
medical college on the island that catered to American students. Their safety
became the focus of attention. Of course there already existed a detailed
contingency plan for possible American action in the Caribbean, Concept Plan
2360, but it was quickly discarded by Atlantic Command. The RIG convened again
on 17 October. Also coincidently a U. S. Navy Amphibious Squadron Four was
loading the 22nd Marine Amphibious Unit in North Carolina for duty in Lebanon,
and it sailed on 19 October. That same day the struggle in Grenada culminated
with Bishop being shot, Coard disappearing, and General Hudson Autin naming
himself president. That quickly brought Grenada to the attention of President
Reagan and everyone below him in all the chains of command and support. Also,
there were several Caribbean governments (especially Barbados and Jamaica) so
concerned they advocated intervention. Dr. Raines devotes the rest of this
chapter to a very clear exposition of events and the personalities making the
decisions at all levels from the President down to logistics sub-units in the
82d Airborne and XVIII Corps. Only highlights can be mentioned here.
Well, what is the situation? We have a tiny Caribbean island with limited
and barely trained military forces who are confronting each other. But there is
also a Cuban military presence of unknown size or quality. We have a large
number of Americans and other nationals on the island, so far unbothered but
who potentially could be made hostage. Fortunately, or unfortunately we
coincidentally have a Marine amphibious task force with Naval units at sea that
could reach the island in 3-4 days. We have an Army airborne division that can
launch a parachute battalion within 18 hours of alert and a full brigade
shortly after than. Plus we have two Ranger Battalions that can do likewise
(but one of these is at Ft. Lewis Washington) plus unspecified 'special
operations' units that can react even more quickly. So what to do? Simple,
right? Not so fast, there are many 'higher level' considerations involved, like
Cold War posture vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and Cuba, international relations
in the Caribbean, public perceptions of America pro and con throughout the
world, American public reactions including with anti-war groups, the power
relationships within the President's own policy making organization, and of
course Interservice Rivalries over roles and missions - meaning budgets.
It is obvious that all this planning had to be rushed given the extremely short
time between start of planning and execution. The JCS sent its first 'warning
order' to Atlantic Command near mid-night on 19 October. Despite being
specifically left out of the chain of command, Army Forces Command first
learned about the potential operation on 19 October, as did XVIII Airborne
Corps and 82d Airborne Division through separate channels. The first real alert
from JCS was sent on 22 October, but the Corps and Division had begun planning
already. The president made his final decision the evening of 23 October. The
troops landed in Grenada at dawn on 25 October. The preparatory difficulties
were greatly compounded by the necessity of extreme secrecy imposed on all due
to the obvious desire not to alert the Grenadians, but also to avoid public
objections from anti-war elements in the U.S. public. Many elements and
individuals whose participation once the operation commenced would be essential
were excluded, while others were asked hypothetical questions or 'alerted'
under a cover story of a pending routine readiness exercise.
The JCS designated Atlantic Command, the Naval- led joint headquarters at
Norfolk VA, to conduct the operation, and its commander, Admiral McDonald, sent
his estimate of the situation and suggested specific options back to JCS on 20
October. The Chairman, General Vessey, then visited him. Naturally Admiral
McDonald preferred using a Marine unit to conduct an amphibious landing, but
did note the possibility of using an airborne battalion (which could reach
Grenada much sooner. General Vessey suggested using the Army Ranger Regiment,
special operations hostage rescue teams, and the 82d Airborne as backup.
Logistics were not considered. Dr. Raines notes that, since Naval units were
self contained with their logistics, it was natural for the Admiral to presume
any Army units would have their logistics as well.
On 21 October, after General Vessey had alerted and tasked Major General
Scholtes, Commander of Joint Special Operations Command, to prepare a plan, in
which JSOC would be assisting Atlantic Command, General Scholtes was directed
to go to Norfolk and brief Admiral McDonald. The plan was for the 'special
forces' to enter Grenada at 0230 to take advantage of their night vision
capability, something Admiral McDonald was surprised to learn about. But he
approved the plan. However, staff conflict began immediately since JSOC was
used to direct subordination to Washington and not to a theater joint command
such as Atlantic Command, and Atlantic Command presumed to exercise its
authority as the command authority for the operation. Also on the 21st General
Vessey alerted Readiness Command, Military Airlift Command and JSOC that they
would support Atlantic Command. But U.S. Caribbean Command was left out.
Unfortunately this resulted in unavailability to the operation planners of the
extensive knowledge of Grenada this headquarters had compiled over the years.
And Atlantic Command, although theoretically a 'joint' command failed to
activate its own Army and Air Force staffs.
Despite all the demand for secrecy, CBS quickly learned about and broadcast
that the Independence battle group and the Marine task force had moved
to the Caribbean, nice info for the Grenadians and Cubans.
Detailed discussion about alternatives took place at Admiral McDonald's
headquarters on 22 October with Army representatives from both JSOC and 82d
Airborne. But no final decision was reached. It was clear, however, that the
JSOC and airborne division could execute much sooner than the Marines. However,
this meeting at least gave the Army planners several potential options on which
to start preliminary planning.
Unfortunately, decisions about the entire concept of the operation changed. On
Sunday, 23 October the JCS meet with Admiral McDonald and General Scholtes.
They had agreed that JSOC would conduct the ground operation with its own
forces. But at that the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Kelley,
passionately insisted, (begged or pleaded) "The Marines must land on the
island of Grenada or you will have destroyed the Marine Corps." General
Scholtes was startled when General Vessey acceded. This changed the entire
structure and timing of the operation. Dr. Raines provides various rationales
for the change. The new plan was for the Marines to assault at two places while
the Army rangers captured the two airfields and inserted 'special operators'
into critical locations into the capital, St. George's. General Vessey insisted
on establishing a clear tactical line to separate the Marine and Army units.
This had logistical implications. But the worst result was on the timing. The
Marines had to land during daylight, but the JSOC units wanted to land during
darkness. The final result, described in following chapters, resulted in
significant failure for the 'special forces' when they had to arrive in
daylight. The participation of the Marines also drastically changed the command
and control organization, since General Scholtes could not be subordinated to a
Marine Colonel, but the Marines could not be subordinated to an Army general.
Admiral McDonald had to find a Navy three-star to become commander of the
entire operation and place him on the command ship (The Guam) off shore,
which he did, but without an Army general as at least advisor. Complications,
complications.
Meanwhile the JSOC staff and its two Ranger battalions had begun work. At least
these officers knew how critical timing always is and were moving at the first
hint of anything. This was especially important since one Ranger Battalion was
at Ft. Lewis, Washington. But it was preparing to go when it received the
official order at 0900 on 22 October and the first of 11 C-141's departed at
0300 on Sunday, 23 October; Impressive indeed. At that point, however, the
Rangers were making plans for conducting an operation that turned out to be
much different from what they anticipated. Multiple changes intervened. The
'special forces' unit likewise found its plan to insert at 0230 changed to
dawn.
Dr. Raines devotes most of the remainder of the chapter to descriptions of
Ranger planning and JCS and Presidential decisions. He also discusses the
preparation of the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force composed of troops from Jamaica
and Barbados and police from other islands.
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Chapter 3 - Final Planning, 22-25 October 1983
The chapter sections are: Mackmull and the Corps Weigh In, 23-24 October;
Atlantic Command Final Preparations, 23-24 October; Division Support Command,
23-24 October; Engineers, 22-24 October; Division Artillery, 22-25 October;
Division Aviation, 22-24 October; Communications, 22-24 October; Medical, 22-24
October; Service Support Annex; Corps Support Command, 23-25 October; President
Reagan Decides, 24 October; An Intelligence Problem; Cuba and Grenada, 23-25
October.
The chapter begins with the news that the JCS subordinated the 82d Airborne
directly to Atlantic Command, thus cutting the XVIII Airborne Corps out of the
chain of command. This placed its commander, Lt. General Mackmull, in a very
difficult position. The airborne division required much support from its parent
corps, but the corps must refrain from even appearing to butt into the Atlantic
Command prerogatives. Dr. Raines shows that General Mackmull, as a commander,
personally, accomplished both requirements very well, but that the
organizational limitations thus created generated very significant difficulties
for all the officers and units concerned.
The 23rd and 24th of October were filled with hectic, detailed discussion and
planning, which Dr. Raines describes in detail. Right away it becomes clear in
his narrative that he is focused on depicting how dedicated individual
officers, using initiative and experience, managed to overcome significant,
practical organizational problems both inherent in contemporary doctrine and
the fractured command and control procedures mandated by higher headquarters.
During this period the mission of the 82d Airborne changed from a strictly
follow on support element to an immediate tactical combat role right behind the
two Ranger Battalions in southern Grenada. The Marines would assume the mission
of conducting an amphibious landing in northern Grenada, while the JSOC special
forces were delayed in their mission to seize various targets in the capital.
Another change was the assignment of Maj. General Schwarzkopf, Commander of
24th Infantry Division, as an Army advisor for Admiral Metcalf, on the
Guam. The Admiral wanted to appoint him as commander of all Army units and
operations on the island, but the generals objected. Admiral Metcalf had his
confrontations with General Scholtes as well. The listing above of section
topics must suffice to give the reader some idea of the complexity of the story
which Dr. Raines describes in extraordinary detail. Gaps between planning and
execution of logistics are already becoming evident. Probably the most obvious
to the experienced reader is the future problem that will develop for medical
support.
Amid all this American preparation Dr. Raines inserts a valuable section
describing what is taking place on Grenada with the Grenadian and Cuban forces.
Then he offers a real bomb with this appraisal. "The decision to cut the
XVIII Airborne Corps from the chain of command had possibly even more adverse
consequences for the Army than the president's preoccupation with
security." Neither the JCS nor Atlantic Command activated its component
commands. Nor did they activate Forces Command. And Readiness Command was out
of the picture as well. Admiral McDonald also discarded the standing
operational plan for action in the Caribbean. "However formulated, the
decision had major consequences. It tore apart all the working relationships
defined by doctrine and developed by years of practice in both garrison and
field exercises. It ignored the post-Vietnam evolution of the corps
headquarters into an important component of the army logistical system and the
diminution of the ability of divisions to act independently of a corps base.
"The more interesting question is why no one in the Army recognized the
problem before Operation URGENT FURY began." He offers the conclusion that
the very senior generals simply did not consider the logistical implications
while they focused on the combat aspects at the operational level.
"...however, Admiral McDonald's most controversial and perhaps most
consequential decision was his change in the timing of the operation. The
special operations forces would be facing combat in daylight. The 0500 start
time produced a subtle shift in emphasis from unconventional to conventual
forces. With this change went an increasing role for logistics in determining
the final outcome."
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Chapter 4 -Loading the Force, N-Hour to N + 3:30
The chapter sections are: Ranger Battalions; 82d Airborne Division, N-hour to
N+2; N+2 Briefing and Concerns; Brigade/Battalion Staffs, N+2:30 to N+ 3:30;
82d Airborne Division, N+2:30 to 3:30
The subject matter in this chapter becomes even more detailed and complex. Dr.
Raines' descriptions, explanations, and narratives are models of clarity and
expository writing. Again, I note the constant effort to stress the practical
results on human actors of the theoretical and doctrinal (even bureaucratic)
decisions of individuals often far removed from the actual scene. And also he
devotes attention to the professional and above and beyond commitment of those
junior officers and enlisted troops whose initiatives found ways to overcome
these problems.
The author describes the elaborate standing procedures developed for minute by
minute control of the complex series of actions required to load paratroops and
their equipment onto aircraft. The ballet chorography of the many staffs,
offices, and small units were governed by a standing procedure based on a start
at N-Hour and proceeding minute by minute (according to plans up to N + 18 but
for this one N+ 10) Of course these procedures immediately fell afoul of the
realities imposed by the abrupt changes imposed and the ad hoc nature of the
organization which resulted from absence of the XVIII Corps from much of its
contribution to the standard procedure. One obvious problem was that infantry
battalions could not simultaneously move and board aircraft and also be
delivering vehicles and supplies to the same aircraft.
"In contrast to the ranger battalions, the effort to load the 82d Airborne
Division proved problematic, if only because the force was so large with many
elements to coordinate but also because information on Grenada was less readily
available with the XVIII Airborne Corps removed from the chain of command.
Division logisticians became involved relatively late in the planning, and the
division's understanding of its mission oscillated between a combat assault to
seize an airhead and a follow-on force to maintain the peace." But the
loading of the two ranger battalions from a different airfield, Hunter Army
Airfield rather than Pope Air base from which the 82d departed, which was
designed to load one battalion at a time, was not that simple either.
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Chapter 5 - The Force Sorties, N + 3:30 to Liftoff
The chapter sections are: 82d Airborne Division, N + 3:30 to N + 8; Aviation
Task Force; Communications preparations: Medical planning; Decision to Airdrop;
Corps Liaison; Green Ramp Operations
The activities described in this chapter moved into higher gear.
"Preparations to deploy the division assault command post and the first
brigade task force (a reinforced battalion) proceeded at high speed following
the N+2 briefing ."The loading procedure had to be completed in 10 rather
than the standard 18 hours. Dr. Raines provides a diagram depicting the loading
sequence which required the troops to assemble in their units, then proceed to
an assembly area where they were issued supplies and ammunition at two
different places. Unit officers had to decide how much ammunition to issue,
while logistics officers sought to requisition more ammunition from ammo dumps.
Officers also had to decide what standard issue individual gear to discard and
how much other gear to requisition based on the climate and terrain of Grenada.
Meanwhile other material and vehicles went directly from warehouses to the
airfield to a location called 'Green Ramp'. Pope Air Base had a perimeter gate
that quickly became a bottleneck. Once past it each load had to be weighted and
recorded so as to match the carrying capacity of the assigned aircraft. The
C-141 could carry twice the load of a C-130. The unit being loaded could not
simultaneously perform all the back-breaking work required to move material
from storage onto an aircraft, so plans called for the employment of other
battalions for this work. Likewise the record keeping paperwork was performed
by other staffs. And there was also the complex liaison required between the
Army and Air Force at levels from the small unit and individual aircraft pilots
and load masters to the higher echelons that controlled the assignment and
arrival of individual aircraft to the mission.
Moving the aviation task force, helicopters, to Grenada required special
methods. An initial concept to fly via a series of island hopping across the
Caribbean was discarded. This mean each helicopter had to be partially
disassembled to fit in a C-5A, then flown to Barbados and reassembled before
flying on to Grenada. The division would be without its helicopters for some
time. Communications also required special actions. And, again, Dr. Raines
notes that "medical preparations lagged."
Still there was no decision on whether to air drop - that is parachute - or air
land - that is exit from aircraft already on the air field. General Trobaugh
was still undecided while already in the air enroute Grenada, communicating out
an aircraft window by satellite radio for last minute information. An airdrop
required a different configuration inside the aircraft from an air landing.
In-flight rigging was commenced.
One simply has to read Dr. Raines' vivid descriptions to appreciate what was
going on during this frantic effort. Even the question of what to do with
grenades posed problems that somehow found various solutions. His comment,
"This flexibility was possible because all the members of the division and
supporting elements from XVIII Airborne Corps and the Fort Bragg installation
were so well drilled in the normal procedures. Improvisation with a logistical
team less well prepared might have produced total chaos." But once again
Atlantic Command intervened with its own concepts. Dr. Raines again, "Once
more this predominately naval headquarters proved that it was ill-prepared to
direct the operations of an airborne division." He provides many more
descriptions of problems and assessment of their results. For instance, while
the troops were rigging the aircraft in flight to target for air drop it was
discovered that the haste of the loading had resulted in no inclusion of life
vests or rubber boats, which meant that a parachute drop on a tiny bit of land
surrounded by water was much to be avoided. His final remark, "General
Trobaugh and his men had entered Atlantic Command's zone of operation, where no
communications plan was in effect and where logistical problems could
metastasize out of control without any one able to implement a timely
solution."
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Chapter 6 - Area of Operations, 25-26 October 1983 -
The chapter sections are: Initial Assaults; Point Salines Airhead; The Division
arrives; General Trobaugh Takes Charge; Intermediate Staging Base on Barbados;
Point Salines Airfield Operations; Evacuees, Detainees, and Refugees; Medical
Reinforcements
Enough of preparations, now we are in combat. Dr. Raines describes the combat
operations in sufficient detail to high light its interrelation with logistics.
Now the reader learns about the efforts of the 'small special forces' teams to
be inserted with individual missions by the experts of the 160th Aviation
Battalion. These are the incredible helicopter pilots who fly into the jaws of
death on a regular basis. Still they didn't appreciate it when they learned at
the last minute on Barbados that they would be flying, not at night, but in
broad daylight into the face of Grenadian - Cuban anti- aircraft guns. And
their premonitions were well taken. Dr. Raines describes what happened to the
special forces when their helicopters were shot down or forced to abandon their
ground teams. Nothing went right. Several dedicated men were killed needlessly.
Likewise the two battalions of the 75th Rangers faced considerable
anti-aircraft fire. General Scholtes had prepared for eventualities by
assigning Air Force AC-130 Spectre gun ships, familiar to readers who are
veterans of Vietnam, and these were able to suppress some of the anti-aircraft
fire. The two Marine landing forces were successful in capturing the Pearls
Airport well north of Salines. Of course they came fully organized and equipped
with their own attack helicopters and Naval air support. Despite the intense
anti-aircraft fire (apparently more intense than accurate) both Ranger
battalions managed to parachute in without losses and clear the airfield area
by 0735. Clearance of the obstacles off the runway was aided by the fact Cuban
construction workers had left considerable engineer equipment including
bulldozers and rollers. Dr. Raines provides several excellent maps to enable
the reader to learn what was going on.
A small surprise for the reader comes next when the elements of the Caribbean
Peacekeeping Force land already at 1115, well ahead of the 82d Airborne
Division. And they were immediately set to work guarding the growing numbers of
Cubans and Grenadians that otherwise would have diverted the Rangers.
General Trobaugh and his lead element of the 82d Airborne Division arrived at
1400. He had decided that, although a parachute landing would enable a larger
combat force to enter quickly, there was too much risk of losing troops into
the adjacent water. Therefore the division had to arrive one aircraft at a time
over many hours and with many interruptions.
From then on, if not long before, everything is going on at once all over the
place, with standard units, sub-units, temporary units, individuals of all
three services interacting, 'getting the job done', forgoing sleep for days,
overcoming minor disputes, solving unexpected problems, constantly focusing on
the mission. It is clearly too much to summarize here. But somehow Dr. Raines
manages to make it all clear and inserts his own comments as necessary. Well,
it took this reader three times through the narrative with continual reference
to the maps and organizational diagrams, but I wanted to get everything
completely in mind before writing a review.
Dr. Raines' conclusions and appraisal are the same as a reader gathers from the
text. 1- the special operations largely failed due to the insertion during
daylight. Otherwise the main operation was largely successful on its first day.
2- Intelligence had greatly underestimated the resistance encountered from
Cuban and Grenadian defenders. 3 - The logistical results were 'mixed' but
generally successful, especially so due to Major Cleary's foresight and Colonel
Izzo's initiatives. 4 - There was a serious breakdown in medical support. 5 -
The stress on operational security resulted in an overly complex command
organizational structure and resulting lack of knowledge by participants in
what the status and activities of others were.
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Chapter 7 - Division-Rear Support
The chapter sections are: Division Control and Security; Managing the Airflow;
Green Ramp Congestion; Yellow Ramp Activities; 3d Brigade Deploys; Green Ramp
Solutions; Hunter Army Airfield
Meanwhile what was going on in the division rear back at Ft. Polk and the
Ranger's rear at Hunter Air Field? This chapter tells us. The list of
sub-headings gives some idea. Again, Dr. Raines comes through with both a
narrative and his analysis. At this point this reader realizes that one
potential aid that is missing is a sheet with a list of all these players and
their organizations. (You can't tell the players without a program fits this
situation). Dr. Raines divides the events into three major phases: 1 -
'attempts of the 82d Airborne Division-Rear at Fort Bragg to control the
movement of supplies and units to Grenada.' 2 - exertions by the XVIII Airborne
Corps to facilitate and guide the division's work.' 3 - a disparate collection
of logistical activities facilitated the overall success of the mission.'
The complexity of the story makes it too difficult to summarize in a short
space. Suffice it to note that it was just as hectic as the activities on the
island.
Dr. Raines' gives his clear assessment. "While the 82d Airborne
Division-Rear grappled with the airflow problems, it received no assistance
from Atlantic Command. Admittedly, Admiral McDonald and his staff were neither
trained nor equipped to conduct major ground operations. If time constraints
had permitted, the Joint Chiefs of Staff could have augmented the admiral's
staff with the needed expertise, but the rush to stage Urgent Fury meant that
his headquarters lacked the tools and insight he needed to exercise effective
control. Atlantic Command's decision that the act of asking for air
transportation to the island would automatically validate the request
represented not the exercise of command but its abdication. Even so, whatever
the appearances, the operations of the 82d Airborne Division -rear must be
judged a success. In the absence of positive control, mid-level and junior
officers made estimates of the situation and then exercised initiative.... The
sum total of all these decisions was highly positive."
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Chapter 8 - Area of Operations, 26-27 October 1983
The chapter sections are: General Trobaugh's Plan; Point Salines Combat and
Support, 26 October; Intermediate Staging Base on Barbados; Processing
Americans and Third-Country nationals; Processing Detainees and Refuges;
Processing Casualties; Engineer Operations; Point Salines Airhead, 26 October;
Division G-4 Oversight, 26-27 October
We are transported once again to Grenada and Barbados. Dr. Raines notes that
conditions for the American forces greatly improved. He opens the chapter with
news that the 'special forces' elements were often surrounded but surviving and
self-extracting. Simultaneously the Marines conducted another combination
amphibious and heliborne operation just north of the capital, St George's, not
far north of the Army front lines. And the Marines had their big amphibious
tractors and M60 tanks. At this point this reader considers that the Marines
and 'special forces' could have accomplished this entire mission alone with
less confusion and loss of life. Granted the small Marine force that was
already afloat before being redirected to Grenada might not have sufficed to
capture the whole island, but it could have been rapidly augmented by other
Marine units flown into the captured airfields. Of course there is bound to be
a SNAFU (was Murphy living on Grenada?) - the Marine tanks had no 105mm
ammunition. Nevertheless, their appearance sufficed to eliminate Grenadian
interest in resisting. The Marines proceeded to rescue the British governor
general and the 'special force' unit that had been surrounded at his residence.
They also occupied St. George's.
Well, what about the Army rangers and 82d Airborne at their airfield south of
St. George's?
The most exciting action of the day was a text book combined one. The mission
was to rescue the large number of American students at the Grand Anse Campus
well north of the Army front lines but south of the day's Marine occupation
north of St George's. Their existence had previously been unknown. General
Trobaugh selected one of the Ranger battalions and General Schwarzkopf on board
the Guam got Admiral Metcalf to assign Marine helicopters to provide
lift. And the Navy supplied A-7s to cover while the Air Force supplied its
mighty AC-130 Spectre. The operation was executed with the loss of only one
Marine helicopter that hit a palm tree.
But the logistics units on and around the Point Salines Airfield were still
nearly overwhelmed with changing requirements.
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Chapter 9 - Corps Support
The chapter sections are: Managing the Airflow; Augmenting the Division;
Augmenting Army Communications; Airflow Requirements Shift; Sea Line of
Communications; Medical Dilemmas; Supply System Management; Green Ramp Hand-off
The author shifts from chronology to function in order to consider in one
chapter the increasing involvement of the XVIII Airborne Corps in the
operation. This aids analysis of the Corps' actions but means that the last
part of the chapter gets ahead of some of the actions at Salines described in
subsequent chapters. This method is helpful because the Corps expanded not only
its own direct participation with men and units, but also brought in a wider
cast of players at national level. For instance the concept of sea-borne line
of supply enters the picture and this involves the Military Transport
Management Command and the Military Traffic Management Command. Plus two
different ships are involved, each tasked separately by different headquarters
unknown to each other, duhh. The reader is likely to be as confused as were the
participants in 1983, but Dr. Raines manages to clarify what was going on.
Another major 'conflict' or confusion was in the medical support activity. As
noted in previous chapters the medical support within the division already
suffered from lack of prior planning which reduced the amount of medical supply
and personnel. Also, there was a disdain on the part of many infantry men for
the medical support in the sense that the infantry always wanted to go first on
the next aircraft resulting in fragmentation of the medical units and supplies.
With the addition of XVIII Airborne medical commanders and their units the
confusion and outright conflict increased. For one thing the medical
organization created a problem. For instance, at Corps level there would be an
engineer brigade with commander and a separate Corps Engineer officer -
likewise with Signal and Artillery. These officers are in the same branches
respectively - the engineer brigade is commanded by an Engineer Corps Colonel
and the Corps Engineer officer is a staff officer also an Engineer. But at the
time the medical units including the Corps' Medical Brigade were commanded by
Medical Service Corps officers while the Corps Surgeon was a Medical Corps
officer. Upon entry into combat the doctrine stated that it was the surgeon who
would now be the commander. Much pain resulted. Another problem came from the
procedure to shift doctors and nurses from duty in the large post hospital into
the field units as augmentation. They wanted to take over command and to bring
their highly technical medical equipment with them but there was no room for it
in the basic loads of the medical units.
There were also coordination problems in the communications field, and in who
would be in charge of controlling the dispatch of men and materials on specific
aircraft, which of course were controlled by the Air Force. The 'airflow'
meaning the actual movement of individual loads on individual air craft had
suffered immediately on the first day. Many loads were sent on AC 141, which
could hold twice as much as a AC-130. Problems on the Salines limited airfield
resulted in large back ups of aircraft circling overhead while waiting for an
opportunity to land. Many of these soon ran low of fuel and had to divert to
Barbados or elsewhere. On Barbados frequently the load would be transferred to
two AC-130's for return flight to Grenada, which required complete
reconfiguration of the loads. The ultimate result of all this was that items
and men arrived at Salines field in a helter-skelter order of partial units or
partial sets of equipment. The already undermanned logistics temporary forward
team had one heck of a time sorting all this out. Fortunately the Air Force did
establish its own forward control commander at Barbados and so did the XVIII
Corps (but unofficially since it was left out of the chain of command.)
There were two incidents in communications (which I believe I recall from
reading in the news at the time.) Faced with inability to call for air support
at the governor's mansion in St. George's the surrounded special forces
individual used his telephone credit card to call home in the US and tell his
wife whom to call at Ft. Bragg who in tern could contact the Navy on board the
Guam to send Naval air to suppress the Grenadian attackers. It worked.
And another individual ( a transiting aviator), on Barbados opened a commercial
telephone line with a credit card at a pay phone to his support command and
kept it open for days, but the existence of this link was not known to most
officers. Not good planning, but excellent initiative. Dr. Raines provides
extensive personal comment and evaluation of this whole congeries of
activities. He credits Generals Cavazos and Mackmull with much responsibility
for the 'success of Army logistics during the operation.' He writes,
"Throughout the intervention, General Mackmull set the highest possible
standards of conduct: focusing on the success of the mission and laying aside
any personal feelings about how he had been treated." (Specifically
referring to the way the general and his staff had been peremptorily excluded
from participation). There were so many other initiatives by lower ranks that
they fill pages of the narrative. For instance, when General Mackmull was to
fly to Grenada, Colonel Kelly cleverly loaded important material that otherwise
most likely would get delayed on the aircraft knowing that no one would divert
the Commanding General's aircraft. And so it went.
Dr. Raines has many more comments about both successes and failures.
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Chapter 10 - Area of Operations, 27 October 1983
The sections are: Intermediate Staging Base on Barbados; Point Salines Airhead,
Morning; Combat and Support; Point Salines Airhead, Afternoon/Evening;
Processing Casualties; Processing Americans and Third-Country Nationals;
Processing Detainees and Refugees; Maintenance Issues
Back to the third day of the operation to learn how the combat tactics and
logistical support were faring. Dr. Raines notes that the logistical effort was
improving thanks to Air Force and 82d Division initiatives to establish ad-hoc
air traffic control elements. The creation of the intermediate staging base on
Barbados was critical. For one immediate issue, the 82d Airborne Division
helicopters had to be disassembled and flown on C-141 to Barbados where they
were reassembled for flight to Grenada. The divisions lack of its helicopters
was a detrimental impact on its tactical operations. As we will find out later,
when the UH-60 Black Hawks finally arrived they were put to immediate use, but
the continued absence of the AH-1 Cobras caused serious loss of life. In the
initial special forces operation its helicopters had been put out of commission
by anti-aircraft fire thanks to the daylight insertion. The division then was
able to obtain support for command needs from the Marine helicopters on board
the Guam. Dr. Raines provides many other examples of close cooperation
between Army and Air Force officers at the scene. both on Barbados and Grenada.
But the advent of increased helicopter activities on the Salines airfield
caused a different problem. In the interests of safety (well reasoned) the Air
Force local airfield control officer would close the field to Air Force traffic
whenever the Army helicopters had to move. This would automatically increase
the stack of waiting transport aircraft circling overhead and cause more
diversions to other fields. Another problem 'solved' was the delay in delivery
of aircraft fuel by 'bladder birds'. The tiny division fuel supply team then
would attempt to siphon some fuel from the wing tanks of what ever C-130 might
be available, but this also closed the field for other landings as it took
place. The communications link between Lt. Katz, the fuel impresario near the
field, ran back by radios clear to Atlantic Command before continuing on to the
Air Force to order up more 'bladder birds'.
Then there was the problem of sorting out responsibility for aeromedical
evacuation.
Turning to the tactical combat actions, Dr. Raines tells us about the infantry
capture of a huge Cuban supply dump warehouse complex full of vehicles the
division immediately put to good use, but also weapons and ammunition that
'higher' wanted sent to the U. S. ASAP. So the small division forward logistics
guys had to start organizing evacuation of stuff as well as trying to sort out
the incoming stuff.
Considering evacuation, Dr. Raines also describes the complex process involved
in clearing the American students (the ostensible purpose of the whole drill)
for flight home.
But the American and other foreign nationals were not the only individual
requiring special treatments outside the usual combat or logistic activities.
As the operation continued thousands of Cubans (both combat troops and civilian
construction workers) and Grenadian refugees accumulated in the 82d Airborne
Division rear areas. And they had to be taken care of with great care indeed
(meaning food, water, and temporary housing) because International Red Cross
folks arrived quickly to see to it.
The major tactical incident of the day occurred when a Marine air controller
from the 2d Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison company, attached to the 3d of the
325th Airborne Infantry mistakenly vectored an A-7 onto a white building that
happened to be the 2nd Brigade forward headquarters. Serious casualties
resulted. (SNAFU)
But that was not at all the most serious event. The really 'higher' - the
'higher higher' namely the JCS and chairman General Vessey (so it was claimed
in the order received) demanded by direct order that the 82d immediately -
immediately - seize the Grenadian Calivigny Barracks located on a peninsula
north-east of the divisions front lines. The division planned on an orderly
advance to occupy that area the following day. Generals Trobaugh and
Schwarzkopf and Admiral Metcalf urgently protested to Atlantic Command but were
over ruled. This was a direct order from the all-knowing JCS. General Trobaugh
had no one from his three Airborne battalions in contact available.
Fortunately, actually unfortunately, the 75th Rangers were still on the island.
And the division's UH-60's had arrived, but not the Cobras. With no alternative
available General Trobaugh had to rush an air assault without preliminary
planning or evaluation of contingencies or even study of the terrain. (FUBAR)
Of course the potential defenders were completely unknown as well. A mixed
assault force was cobbled together from 2nd Bn, 75th Rangers, Company C of the
1st Rangers, the Task Force B of the division UH-60 battalion (with untrained
door gunners attached) and some division artillery batteries all under
supervision of the 3rd Brigade, 82d Division commander, Colonel Scott. The
Marines on this occasion refused to supply gun ships since they had already
suffered serious damage from other daylight assaults and were already preparing
to depart for Lebanon. Lets skip the gruesome details. The result was a fiasco
with the three leading helicopters crashing and killing or maiming rangers.
(Lets hope they at least were not among those patriotic rangers who had
volunteered for the Grenada operation when they were already out processing.)
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Chapter 11 - A Period of Transition
The chapter sections are: Intermediate Staging Base on Barbados; Point Salines
Airfield and Pearls Airport; Final Operations and Departures; A New Phase;
Evolving Policies in Washington; Soviet and Cuban Embassy Personnel; Refugees
and Detainees; Graves Registration; Transition to Corps Control; Medical
Support; Removing Captured Equipment; General Farris Takes Command; The Shift
to Peacekeeping; Nation Building and Peacekeeping
Combat operations were diminishing on 27 October and had practically ceased on
the 28th. The 29th was mostly a time of searching houses and buildings in the
division forward areas. The Marines captured most of the Grenadian high
command. On the 30th they captured the northern end of the island and then the
Carriacou Island part of the Grenadian state. The Urgent Fury Operation was
declared completed on 2 November, at which time the Navy and Marines began to
depart and General Trobaugh became Commander of U. S. Forces, Grenada. The 2d
Brigade began to fly home on 4 November. But logistics actually increased.
Among the vexatious issues was frisking the Cuban and Russian personnel and
sending them off the island. Dr. Raines describes all these activities well.
General Farris replaced General Trobaugh on 9 November as XVIII Corps took over
from the 82d Division. Among the further vexations was clean up of the detrius
of war all over Point Salines and into the towns. Soon 'peace keeping and
nation building' became the mission and civilian agencies flooded into the
island. The military command shifted to headquarters of U. S. Forces,
Caribbean. And the U. S. Army Depot System Command began more direct
assignments. (Its depots had been supporting by sending material on priority
basis throughout the operation.) The last contingent of the XVIII Airborne
Corps didn't return home until 11 June 1985, but 25 men from U. S. Forces
Caribbean remained until 30 September. Dr. Raines' assessment of the logistical
aspects of this phase is very positive..
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Chapter 12 - Grenada in Perspective
The Chapter sections are: Military and Policy Consequences; A historical
Overview; Institutional Refinements; Operational Logistics; Military Success,
Logistical Excess
Dr. Raines, as I have noted, includes many comments and appraisals throughout
his narration. In this chapter he offers more evaluations. He also evaluates
the criticisms that immediately appeared by 'arm chair' experts immediately
following the operation. He begins with discussion and comment about the Army's
own after action reporting, giving General Trobaugh great credit for initiating
a 'wide-open, far-ranging critique'. "As a result, the unit's logistical,
communications, and medical problems received detailed examination." The
XVIII Airborne Corps also conducted a thorough examination. And General
Mackmull "resolved that he would never again permit the kind of confusion
that had dogged Urgent Fury." If he could not take action as Commander of
the XVIII Airborne Corps, then he would do so with his hat as Commander of the
Ft. Bragg post. He was also determined to find out who had ordered the
disastrous Ranger assault on Calivigny. But he was unsuccessful in this effort.
No one would admit responsibility and no paperwork could be found. He also
fully supported General Trobaugh's plans and execution. General Mackmull's
overall assessment was that higher headquarters far removed from the scene of
combat operations could not know enough to try to micromanage rapidly
developing actions. However, General Vessey not only denied issuing the fateful
order but faulted General Trobaugh for not protesting more strongly to
headquarters even above Atlantic Command. (Talk about CYA) The JCS and
Department of the Army also initiated their own studies. The Army effort
engaged the Combat Studies Institute at the Combined Arms Center at Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas. U. S. Army Forces Command also initiated work by the 44th
Military History Detachment. All of this resulted in the assembly of a huge
volume of documents, both original and secondary. The Secretary of Defense and
Secretary of State voiced their own appraisals. And the Senate Armed Services
Committee prepared its own report.
Dr. Raines provides his own wide ranging assessments. To this reviewer all of
them are fully based and even obvious from reading the narrative of the
operation itself. Some of these include. "Logistical problems in Urgent
Fury started at the top of the chain of command." "Because of the
security restriction, most commanders excluded logisticians from the early
preparations, with the two ranger battalion commanders being the only notable
exceptions." "The result was that unexamined assumptions about
logistics permeated both joint and Army planning." "Although time was
pressing, the real problem in preparing the intervention was not the lack of
planning time but the lack of quality planning." "For Urgent Fury,
the most serious lapse was the intelligence failure to identify that St.
George's University School of Medicine had more than one campus and that a
large number of Americans lived off campus." "Next to the
intelligence failure, Atlantic Command's inability to coordinate planning by
all the disparate ground force elements involved in the operation was the most
striking flaw in this phase." "The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a
night time raid by a small highly trained force, but the concern over the
status of the airfield at Point Salines caused Admiral McDonald to twice slip
the time for beginning the operation to scant minutes before daylight."
"In deleting the corps echelon, General Vessey, the Joint Staff, and
Admiral McDonald apparently misunderstood the role of corps headquarters in
post- Vietnam Army organization." "By cutting the corps, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and Atlantic Command appeared to validate the arguments of
critics who claimed that during the late Cold War the U. S. miltary
command-and-control structure was too bureaucratized." "In comparison
with the two ranger battalions, the 82d Airborne Division, for example, failed
to use its planning time efficiently. Its logisticians suffered from a major
handicap. With the XVIII Airborne Corps headquarters removed from the chain of
command, they had to spend considerable time trying to understand what its
replacement - the predominantly naval Atlantic Command - wanted." "In
contrast, the ranger commanders and their staffs worked directly with the Joint
Special Operations Command, a true joint headquarters, and all concerned shared
a common language and common assumptions."
Dr. Raines' critique continues step by step and echelon by echelon down to the
small operating units we have encountered in previous chapters. He offers a
positive over all assessment. "This overall operational success rested
upon a considerable logistical achievement that was all the more notable
because of the difficulties that the Army had to overcome in pulling it
together. How it happened can be summed up under five headings: planning,
training, initiative, professionalism and hard work" He gives examples of
each of these categories.
The author provides a table listing the total casualties during the operation.
The Army had 12 KIA and 108 WIA (mostly Rangers); the Marines had 3 KIA (all
officers) and 15 WIA; the Navy had 4 KIA and 0 MIA; the Air Force had 2 WIA.
Any possible losses to the secret 'special forces' are not mentioned.
One positive result of the thorough after action study, which Dr. Raines notes,
is that significant reforms were undertaken. Hopefully, another positive result
may come from the lessons military students will absorb when they read this
book today.
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Reviewer comment -
The reviewer's task is to evaluate the book both in its form and content. This
study is a masterpiece in both form and content. I discussed the form already.
The content may be considered with three questions. 1 Does the author describe
the subject matter fully and fairly. 2 Does he provide the reader with enough
detail so he can form his own conclusions about the successes and possible
failures. 3 Does the author state his own evaluations for the reader to compare
with his own based on the text. This reviewer's opinion is yes to all three
questions.
The book may also be evaluated in terms of its importance and potential value
to make it worth reading by its intended audience. Rucksack War should
be studied and then referred to by all professional military officers.
Indications now are that Urgent Fury may be the kind of operation the military
will be called upon to conduct in future, rather than big, multi-divisional,
set-piece invasions. Yes, we (hopefully) will retain the very small, specific
type forces such as SEALS and Delta force to conduct clandestine raids against
limited targets and for limited objectives. But this study shows that even for
a successful operation on the scale of a small island with a very small
military capability an American force of significant strength will be required.
And the generation of such a force automatically means it will be a Joint force
involving all the services. Such a force must be composed of many, many 'small'
individual units each of which provides its particular technical expertise and
capability to the whole. But 'small' also means ''big' - big because, if that
unit is missing or something goes wrong with its technical contribution, then a
very large part of the whole will suffer and troops will die. And the more
military forces and successful operations include and rely on 'technology' -
narrow technical factors - the more critical it will be for the generalists in
higher commands to have a firm grasp on what might happen to their large-scale
plans if one of these 'small' contributions fails. And of great importance
also, the leaders must recognize that not only will the force deploying to
execute the mission include such 'small' special units, but also even the
process required to get that force out of the U.S. and to its designated target
requires the participation of other 'small' technical units that must be on
hand and ready to perform.
In the case of Operation Urgent Fury, it seems to this reviewer that the two
most critical problems that resulted from mistakes in prior planning were lack
of adequate communications and shortage of medical support. This seems clear
from reading the text. But Dr. Raines also reaches the same conclusion.
In the Preface Dr. Raines refers to Clausewitz. He writes that Clausewitz
served in the Prussian army, an army confined to the constricted geography of
Prussia. Yes, but he also served with the Russian army throughout the 1812
campaign and certainly understood operations over vast spaces, at least as vast
and in terms of its logistic and transportation infrastructure greatly more
difficult than the early United States. Further, he comments about Clausewitz.
"Given this backdrop, it is easy to understand why he essentially
dismissed logistics and turned to other matters." But Clausewitz was well
aware of the critical nature of logistics at the operational level. Napoleon's
campaign in Russia hinged on logistics, which Napoleon did his best to provide,
but failed. Moreover the campaigns in the 18th century 'cabinet wars' hinged
around logistics as well with supply dumps in fortified cities critical. And
Marlborough and Eugene's campaign to Blenheim also hinged on logistics, as did
most of the operations in the War of Spanish Succession. But On War was
focused on political/military strategy. Yet, the very passage Dr. Raines quotes
from On War does stress the strategic importance of logistics. What the
passage means is that once on the battlefield issues of logistics have already
passed by and it that respect logistics today is much different, as the book
will show.
We may consider the book in terms of its description (without specific
terminology) of two other Clausewitzian concepts.
The concept "fog of war" refers to the inability of the participants
to acquire sufficient knowledge of the reality surrounding them. They never
have enough intelligence information and are operating and making decisions
with only a hazy understanding of their own or opposing forces. Inadequate
communications plays a part in this. Failure in prior planning to establish a
clearly understood command structure and provide it with redundant means of
communications will increase this 'fog'.
In his study of this operation Dr. Raines has clearly demonstrated that the
'fog' enveloping all echelons of participants was dense. And he has provided
his views on why this occurred and what some of the changes were that might
have alleviated the 'fog' as much as possible. The 'fog' was certainly
increased by the organizational complexity of the force structure. Planners
should presume from the outset that involvement of multi services having
different structures and operational procedures and doctrines will require
extensive and specific measures to reduce the 'fog' that will enclose everyone.
And then 'fog' was ensured by the inadequate organization of the communications
structure and its inadequate signal equipment.
The concept of "friction" refers to the fact that every task requires
decisions and actions by many individuals. And each individual has his own
personality and prior assumptions that will influence his concept of what he
has been ordered to do, how to do it, and what will be the value for him of the
results. Each participant is guided by his own 'will' so it is essential from
the earliest considerations to create an organizational structure that will
insure or at least foster a convergence of 'wills'. Then active measures must
be taken throughout rigorous training to see to it that everyone is exerting
his own 'will' in unison. For this extensive training is the start, but
creation of a professional attitude that will subordinate each actor's personal
preferences to accomplishing the mission is critical.
In his detailed descriptions of what so many participants at all levels were
thinking and doing, he illuminates multiple examples of 'friction' causing
increased problems, and also the general lack of 'friction' achieved by the
good training and the good graces of so many actors, particularly at the lower
levels of command. Dr. Raines provides examples of increased 'friction' that
range from the understandable, valid, desire of many actors to demand that
third party decision makers prioritize their own needs over those of others to
the personal demands of various officers to be in Grenada or have a higher
visibility in order to enhance their own careers. Of course 'friction' is
inherent when several competing military services are required to act together
and must be accounted for in the earliest planning.
Finally, the reviewer's thought. Each brigade of the 82d Airborne Division had
three Airborne Infantry battalions. But one of those in the 2nd Brigade was
already committed elsewhere. Therefor General Trobaugh committed a battalion
from the 3rd Brigade. But I do not understand why he did not simply attach that
battalion to the 2d Brigade for the operation rather than send in that
battalion's brigade command as well. Such cross attachment was routine and the
2d Brigade could have easily controlled it with less overall confusion than
having two brigade commands. Moreover, the 2d Brigade was very short on its own
personnel due to the constricted airflow. Eliminating the commitment of so much
of the 3d Brigade headquarters and support would have opened more space for
more of the 2d Brigade support elements. In a somewhat similar fashion, I
wonder why, when the XVIII Corps was excluded from the chain of command,
General Mackmull did not simply attach augmentation teams or elements from
Corps to the Division to provide the division with essential manpower and
expertise.
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