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Edgar F. Raines Jr.


Subtitle: "U. S. Army Operational Logistics in Grenada 1983."Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington D.C. 2010, 649 pgs., excellent maps and list of map symbols, Index, Glossary of Abbreviations, huge bibliography including primary and secondary sources, a 34-page index, detailed footnotes, excellent illustrations, tables and charts.


Reviewer Comments - Each of the chapters listed below is further subdivided into clearly organized sections. Dr. Raines has accomplished a huge amount of research incorporating numerous, varied sources to create an integrated and detailed account focused on the logistics support for the Grenada Operation (Operation Urgent Fury) , but also including sufficient detail on the tactical operations to provide both context and a basis for evaluating the success of the logistics in supporting operations. In other words, while logistics in all its dimensions is the subject of the study, it is its contribution to the success in the accomplishment of the combat mission which is the basis for evaluation. The study covers the entire spectrum of activities from minute by minute actions of named tactical level individuals to the highest echelons of interservice and national planning, command, and control. The bibliography of sources and their disparate locations is enormous. The voluminous footnoting in detailed academic scholarly format is overwhelming. By judicious summarization of this mass of original and already copious secondary literature Dr. Raines has created a reference work that will enable the student today to gain a full appreciation of the subject without attempting the impossible task of consulting all these sources now. And students today should study this reference, first to gain an appreciation for how well off they are today in the modern resources available to perform their missions and second to recognize that many of the problems generated by the 'fog of war' and 'friction', nevertheless, remain and will remain. The book should be required reading in senior officer courses, for instance at Leavenworth, Carlisle and NDU.
The author has greatly assisted the reader by including 10 excellent organizational charts, two tables, and three diagrams that show the intricate relationships between the many individual units and headquarters. The nine maps are greatly superior to what one finds in a typical military history book. And the over 170 illustrations are interspersed directly with the relevant topic on same pages rather than relegated to separate sections. Another very valuable (and unusual) aid for which the reader is very grateful, is Dr. Raines' descriptions of the many units (including small and temporary ones) with inclusion of the names of their commanders (or staff principals) at every occasion. The interactions of these units and officers are described over and over again as the operation continues day by day. It would not be possible for the reader to keep all these individuals straight if their roles and positions were not explicitly mentioned each time they appear. Another fine service the author has provided is definitions and explanations. The text is full not only of Army terminology but even more arcane logistical jargon necessary for the professional reader, but Dr. Raines has gone the extra mile to provide clarity for the wider audience. And there is an extensive list of abbreviations appended. The index is exceptional as well. If the reader wants to understand a specific topic, for instance, "Green Ramp" as it figures throughout the operation, the index is essential. Or one wonders about an individual, say Lt. Col. Jack Hamilton, the index lists him on nearly 50 different pages. Concepts also are included, such as "Joint Doctrine" or Casualties.
As author, Dr. Raines has an, if not unique, at least unusual background and experience. He was present at Army headquarters as an official historian during the operation taking notes and conducting interviews of participants immediately afterwards. Yet, he has written a definitive book nearly 30 years later. Thus, in a way we have two individuals with separate sets of knowledge and expertise combined into one author. The result is that he has been able to tell a story with all the immediacy of a first hand witness, yet also with the ability to evaluate the events and actions from a perspective gained from knowledge of the enormous changes in all aspects of Army operations in the many years since 1983. Plus, as he notes, he has had access to archives and literature not available to any author at the time.
The text is in a very readable font and the book is printed on high quality paper. The production values are first rate.-
Standard disclaimer: Dr. Raines is a very long time colleague and friend in the Military Classics Seminar. And General Ed Trobaugh and I are classmates.


This is Dr. Raines' personal account of his process in doing the copious research and writing this book. In following his description we observe in another way the extent of the research required. First, one has to be amazed that such a huge volume of primary and secondary material was produced and saved in relation to a very brief and minor military operation. Then one is amazed at the wide spread and complex web of locations at which the material is now stored. This complexity in turn alerts the reader to the complexity of the operation, since these repositories are mostly linked to the organizations that participated in the operation and its logistical support. Well, we can presume that there may be records at the National Archives at College Park, MD. But don't forget the Reagan Presidential Library at Simi Valley, CA. Of course the Department of State has its contribution, including documents from Grenadian government and other Caribbean nations. Naturally, the U. S. Army Center of Military History (CMH) has its archives as well. In connection with discussing this in the Bibliography section Dr. Raines notes that he was active as an Army historian during the operation itself in 1983, and thus obtained personal material as an eye-witness at Army Headquarters. But the CMH archives also contain records relating to the careers of many senior officers in 1983 when they were participating in the Vietnam War and subsequently. One finds, as expected, archives from the Departments of Air Force and Navy. Another amazing reference source is the personal records, and interviews of a huge number of individual participants. Collecting and organizing the mass of secondary literature on this operation was itself a major undertaking. In the pages on which he records his appreciation for the assistance of specific individuals one finds another vast list of those whose locations and affiliations indicate the scope of the operation about which they have knowledge.


Chapter 1 - Behind the Scenes -
The chapter is divided into sections on: On the Island, Grenadian Armed Forces and Cuban Workers, Eastern Caribbean Neighbors, U. S. Policy Shifts, Chain of Command Complexities, Caribbean Concept Plan, XVIII Airborne Corps, Corps Logistics System, Contingency Forces, and 82d Airborne Division; Divisional Logistics; Training; Morale; Heavy Drop Rig site;
Dr. Raines knows how to tell a story. The fundamental subject matter of a study of logistics involves analysis of minutia essential for the professional student, which might overwhelm the average non-professional. But Dr. Raines writes with such an interesting style, incorporating this detail into a compelling account of real, well-described individuals making decisions, performing actions, and facing huge uncertainty as to create a 'page-turner' that creates interest for the reader as if this were an 'historical novel'.
Thus, he begins the narration with a quick look at actions taking place on the runway of Point Salines partially completed airfield as the first supplies are being unloaded from Air Force C-141 and C-130 aircraft. It is afternoon of 25 October and the 'war' has been underway for some hours. We are thrust right into the middle of a hectic, ad-hoc, scene in which experienced, dedicated individuals are making do with what they have. It is a real 'come as you are' war.
Next, he digresses for the reader with an explanation of just what 'logistics' means.
From this he proceeds to describe the locale, Grenada, its terrain, its recent political history, its leadership, the structure of its armed forces, and its relations with other Caribbean nations as well as the United States.
This last, then, requires an exposition of the U. S. political and military command structure. With excellent diagrams of organizations from the President down through each echelon to the battalion level in the 82d Airborne Division the relationship of the many units to each other is clearly shown, another great tutorial for the reader. In fact these pages on the structure of the American Army in mid-1983 are worth study in themselves. Dr. Raines provides brief biographical background on the principal commanders. Since it turns out later in the story that it is the 2d Airborne Brigade of the 82d Airborne Division which will lead the operation, Dr. Raines organizes his narrative around the actions of the newly arrived brigade commander, Colonel Stephen Silvasy Jr., another example of his use of personalities to humanize a technical study. I am impressed with the way in which Dr. Raines makes clear the very complex interrelations between the tactical combat units (and their commanders ) and the Combat Service and Support units (and their commanders). And these interrelations exist not only within the 82d Division, but also within its subordinate brigades and battalions and between the Division and XVIII Airborne Corps and even higher headquarters plus the Air Force, Marines, Joint Special Operations Command and Navy.
The author discusses training and morale. His description of the typical, standard contingency training exercises that division elements were performing (without any expectation of real events to come) right up to the actual alert is quite revealing. In the process he makes a point of noting the restraints created by budget limitations and some times difference in priorities between the Army units and the Air Force units that will be a team when the real war comes. Actually the 82d Division was required to continue operations in entirely other theaters throughout the Urgent Fury Operation.
All this is background, but essential for understanding of what comes when the real 'whistle blows' and the 82d Airborne goes into action in Grenada.


Chapter 2 - Policy and Initial Planning, 13-24 October 1983
The chapter is divided into sections on: Washington and Norfolk, 13-19 October; Death by Revolution 19-20 October; Reaction in the United States, 19-20 October; Washington, Norfolk, and the Caribbean, 21-22 October; XVIII Airborne Corps and 82d Airborne Division 19-22 October; A 75-Percent Solution; Atlantic Command and Army Planning, 22 October; Presidential Party afternoon-evening 22 October; A concept of Operations; Special Operations Forces and Ranger Planning, 21-24 October; Ranger Logistical Plans and Preparations, 22 October; Washington and the Caribbean, 23 October.
The chapter is critical because it discusses the development of the plans for Urgent Fury that determined so much of the problems that were the result. The chapter opens in Grenada where there is infighting between supporters of Maurice Bishop and Bernard Coard, that is between a leftist and a far-leftist. The scene then shifts on 13 October to the Restricted Interagency Group (RIG) in Washington D.C. The in-fighting there is less violent. But the issue at the top of the agenda was Nicaragua. Grenada was below anyone's horizon. That changed on 14 October. While the increasingly apparent drift leftward in the Grenadian government was of some concern, by pure coincidence there was a medical college on the island that catered to American students. Their safety became the focus of attention. Of course there already existed a detailed contingency plan for possible American action in the Caribbean, Concept Plan 2360, but it was quickly discarded by Atlantic Command. The RIG convened again on 17 October. Also coincidently a U. S. Navy Amphibious Squadron Four was loading the 22nd Marine Amphibious Unit in North Carolina for duty in Lebanon, and it sailed on 19 October. That same day the struggle in Grenada culminated with Bishop being shot, Coard disappearing, and General Hudson Autin naming himself president. That quickly brought Grenada to the attention of President Reagan and everyone below him in all the chains of command and support. Also, there were several Caribbean governments (especially Barbados and Jamaica) so concerned they advocated intervention. Dr. Raines devotes the rest of this chapter to a very clear exposition of events and the personalities making the decisions at all levels from the President down to logistics sub-units in the 82d Airborne and XVIII Corps. Only highlights can be mentioned here.

Well, what is the situation? We have a tiny Caribbean island with limited and barely trained military forces who are confronting each other. But there is also a Cuban military presence of unknown size or quality. We have a large number of Americans and other nationals on the island, so far unbothered but who potentially could be made hostage. Fortunately, or unfortunately we coincidentally have a Marine amphibious task force with Naval units at sea that could reach the island in 3-4 days. We have an Army airborne division that can launch a parachute battalion within 18 hours of alert and a full brigade shortly after than. Plus we have two Ranger Battalions that can do likewise (but one of these is at Ft. Lewis Washington) plus unspecified 'special operations' units that can react even more quickly. So what to do? Simple, right? Not so fast, there are many 'higher level' considerations involved, like Cold War posture vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and Cuba, international relations in the Caribbean, public perceptions of America pro and con throughout the world, American public reactions including with anti-war groups, the power relationships within the President's own policy making organization, and of course Interservice Rivalries over roles and missions - meaning budgets.
It is obvious that all this planning had to be rushed given the extremely short time between start of planning and execution. The JCS sent its first 'warning order' to Atlantic Command near mid-night on 19 October. Despite being specifically left out of the chain of command, Army Forces Command first learned about the potential operation on 19 October, as did XVIII Airborne Corps and 82d Airborne Division through separate channels. The first real alert from JCS was sent on 22 October, but the Corps and Division had begun planning already. The president made his final decision the evening of 23 October. The troops landed in Grenada at dawn on 25 October. The preparatory difficulties were greatly compounded by the necessity of extreme secrecy imposed on all due to the obvious desire not to alert the Grenadians, but also to avoid public objections from anti-war elements in the U.S. public. Many elements and individuals whose participation once the operation commenced would be essential were excluded, while others were asked hypothetical questions or 'alerted' under a cover story of a pending routine readiness exercise.
The JCS designated Atlantic Command, the Naval- led joint headquarters at Norfolk VA, to conduct the operation, and its commander, Admiral McDonald, sent his estimate of the situation and suggested specific options back to JCS on 20 October. The Chairman, General Vessey, then visited him. Naturally Admiral McDonald preferred using a Marine unit to conduct an amphibious landing, but did note the possibility of using an airborne battalion (which could reach Grenada much sooner. General Vessey suggested using the Army Ranger Regiment, special operations hostage rescue teams, and the 82d Airborne as backup. Logistics were not considered. Dr. Raines notes that, since Naval units were self contained with their logistics, it was natural for the Admiral to presume any Army units would have their logistics as well.
On 21 October, after General Vessey had alerted and tasked Major General Scholtes, Commander of Joint Special Operations Command, to prepare a plan, in which JSOC would be assisting Atlantic Command, General Scholtes was directed to go to Norfolk and brief Admiral McDonald. The plan was for the 'special forces' to enter Grenada at 0230 to take advantage of their night vision capability, something Admiral McDonald was surprised to learn about. But he approved the plan. However, staff conflict began immediately since JSOC was used to direct subordination to Washington and not to a theater joint command such as Atlantic Command, and Atlantic Command presumed to exercise its authority as the command authority for the operation. Also on the 21st General Vessey alerted Readiness Command, Military Airlift Command and JSOC that they would support Atlantic Command. But U.S. Caribbean Command was left out. Unfortunately this resulted in unavailability to the operation planners of the extensive knowledge of Grenada this headquarters had compiled over the years. And Atlantic Command, although theoretically a 'joint' command failed to activate its own Army and Air Force staffs.
Despite all the demand for secrecy, CBS quickly learned about and broadcast that the Independence battle group and the Marine task force had moved to the Caribbean, nice info for the Grenadians and Cubans.
Detailed discussion about alternatives took place at Admiral McDonald's headquarters on 22 October with Army representatives from both JSOC and 82d Airborne. But no final decision was reached. It was clear, however, that the JSOC and airborne division could execute much sooner than the Marines. However, this meeting at least gave the Army planners several potential options on which to start preliminary planning.
Unfortunately, decisions about the entire concept of the operation changed. On Sunday, 23 October the JCS meet with Admiral McDonald and General Scholtes. They had agreed that JSOC would conduct the ground operation with its own forces. But at that the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Kelley, passionately insisted, (begged or pleaded) "The Marines must land on the island of Grenada or you will have destroyed the Marine Corps." General Scholtes was startled when General Vessey acceded. This changed the entire structure and timing of the operation. Dr. Raines provides various rationales for the change. The new plan was for the Marines to assault at two places while the Army rangers captured the two airfields and inserted 'special operators' into critical locations into the capital, St. George's. General Vessey insisted on establishing a clear tactical line to separate the Marine and Army units. This had logistical implications. But the worst result was on the timing. The Marines had to land during daylight, but the JSOC units wanted to land during darkness. The final result, described in following chapters, resulted in significant failure for the 'special forces' when they had to arrive in daylight. The participation of the Marines also drastically changed the command and control organization, since General Scholtes could not be subordinated to a Marine Colonel, but the Marines could not be subordinated to an Army general. Admiral McDonald had to find a Navy three-star to become commander of the entire operation and place him on the command ship (The Guam) off shore, which he did, but without an Army general as at least advisor. Complications, complications.
Meanwhile the JSOC staff and its two Ranger battalions had begun work. At least these officers knew how critical timing always is and were moving at the first hint of anything. This was especially important since one Ranger Battalion was at Ft. Lewis, Washington. But it was preparing to go when it received the official order at 0900 on 22 October and the first of 11 C-141's departed at 0300 on Sunday, 23 October; Impressive indeed. At that point, however, the Rangers were making plans for conducting an operation that turned out to be much different from what they anticipated. Multiple changes intervened. The 'special forces' unit likewise found its plan to insert at 0230 changed to dawn.
Dr. Raines devotes most of the remainder of the chapter to descriptions of Ranger planning and JCS and Presidential decisions. He also discusses the preparation of the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force composed of troops from Jamaica and Barbados and police from other islands.


Chapter 3 - Final Planning, 22-25 October 1983
The chapter sections are: Mackmull and the Corps Weigh In, 23-24 October; Atlantic Command Final Preparations, 23-24 October; Division Support Command, 23-24 October; Engineers, 22-24 October; Division Artillery, 22-25 October; Division Aviation, 22-24 October; Communications, 22-24 October; Medical, 22-24 October; Service Support Annex; Corps Support Command, 23-25 October; President Reagan Decides, 24 October; An Intelligence Problem; Cuba and Grenada, 23-25 October.
The chapter begins with the news that the JCS subordinated the 82d Airborne directly to Atlantic Command, thus cutting the XVIII Airborne Corps out of the chain of command. This placed its commander, Lt. General Mackmull, in a very difficult position. The airborne division required much support from its parent corps, but the corps must refrain from even appearing to butt into the Atlantic Command prerogatives. Dr. Raines shows that General Mackmull, as a commander, personally, accomplished both requirements very well, but that the organizational limitations thus created generated very significant difficulties for all the officers and units concerned.
The 23rd and 24th of October were filled with hectic, detailed discussion and planning, which Dr. Raines describes in detail. Right away it becomes clear in his narrative that he is focused on depicting how dedicated individual officers, using initiative and experience, managed to overcome significant, practical organizational problems both inherent in contemporary doctrine and the fractured command and control procedures mandated by higher headquarters.
During this period the mission of the 82d Airborne changed from a strictly follow on support element to an immediate tactical combat role right behind the two Ranger Battalions in southern Grenada. The Marines would assume the mission of conducting an amphibious landing in northern Grenada, while the JSOC special forces were delayed in their mission to seize various targets in the capital. Another change was the assignment of Maj. General Schwarzkopf, Commander of 24th Infantry Division, as an Army advisor for Admiral Metcalf, on the Guam. The Admiral wanted to appoint him as commander of all Army units and operations on the island, but the generals objected. Admiral Metcalf had his confrontations with General Scholtes as well. The listing above of section topics must suffice to give the reader some idea of the complexity of the story which Dr. Raines describes in extraordinary detail. Gaps between planning and execution of logistics are already becoming evident. Probably the most obvious to the experienced reader is the future problem that will develop for medical support.
Amid all this American preparation Dr. Raines inserts a valuable section describing what is taking place on Grenada with the Grenadian and Cuban forces.
Then he offers a real bomb with this appraisal. "The decision to cut the XVIII Airborne Corps from the chain of command had possibly even more adverse consequences for the Army than the president's preoccupation with security." Neither the JCS nor Atlantic Command activated its component commands. Nor did they activate Forces Command. And Readiness Command was out of the picture as well. Admiral McDonald also discarded the standing operational plan for action in the Caribbean. "However formulated, the decision had major consequences. It tore apart all the working relationships defined by doctrine and developed by years of practice in both garrison and field exercises. It ignored the post-Vietnam evolution of the corps headquarters into an important component of the army logistical system and the diminution of the ability of divisions to act independently of a corps base. "The more interesting question is why no one in the Army recognized the problem before Operation URGENT FURY began." He offers the conclusion that the very senior generals simply did not consider the logistical implications while they focused on the combat aspects at the operational level. "...however, Admiral McDonald's most controversial and perhaps most consequential decision was his change in the timing of the operation. The special operations forces would be facing combat in daylight. The 0500 start time produced a subtle shift in emphasis from unconventional to conventual forces. With this change went an increasing role for logistics in determining the final outcome."


Chapter 4 -Loading the Force, N-Hour to N + 3:30
The chapter sections are: Ranger Battalions; 82d Airborne Division, N-hour to N+2; N+2 Briefing and Concerns; Brigade/Battalion Staffs, N+2:30 to N+ 3:30; 82d Airborne Division, N+2:30 to 3:30
The subject matter in this chapter becomes even more detailed and complex. Dr. Raines' descriptions, explanations, and narratives are models of clarity and expository writing. Again, I note the constant effort to stress the practical results on human actors of the theoretical and doctrinal (even bureaucratic) decisions of individuals often far removed from the actual scene. And also he devotes attention to the professional and above and beyond commitment of those junior officers and enlisted troops whose initiatives found ways to overcome these problems.
The author describes the elaborate standing procedures developed for minute by minute control of the complex series of actions required to load paratroops and their equipment onto aircraft. The ballet chorography of the many staffs, offices, and small units were governed by a standing procedure based on a start at N-Hour and proceeding minute by minute (according to plans up to N + 18 but for this one N+ 10) Of course these procedures immediately fell afoul of the realities imposed by the abrupt changes imposed and the ad hoc nature of the organization which resulted from absence of the XVIII Corps from much of its contribution to the standard procedure. One obvious problem was that infantry battalions could not simultaneously move and board aircraft and also be delivering vehicles and supplies to the same aircraft.
"In contrast to the ranger battalions, the effort to load the 82d Airborne Division proved problematic, if only because the force was so large with many elements to coordinate but also because information on Grenada was less readily available with the XVIII Airborne Corps removed from the chain of command. Division logisticians became involved relatively late in the planning, and the division's understanding of its mission oscillated between a combat assault to seize an airhead and a follow-on force to maintain the peace." But the loading of the two ranger battalions from a different airfield, Hunter Army Airfield rather than Pope Air base from which the 82d departed, which was designed to load one battalion at a time, was not that simple either.


Chapter 5 - The Force Sorties, N + 3:30 to Liftoff
The chapter sections are: 82d Airborne Division, N + 3:30 to N + 8; Aviation Task Force; Communications preparations: Medical planning; Decision to Airdrop; Corps Liaison; Green Ramp Operations
The activities described in this chapter moved into higher gear. "Preparations to deploy the division assault command post and the first brigade task force (a reinforced battalion) proceeded at high speed following the N+2 briefing ."The loading procedure had to be completed in 10 rather than the standard 18 hours. Dr. Raines provides a diagram depicting the loading sequence which required the troops to assemble in their units, then proceed to an assembly area where they were issued supplies and ammunition at two different places. Unit officers had to decide how much ammunition to issue, while logistics officers sought to requisition more ammunition from ammo dumps. Officers also had to decide what standard issue individual gear to discard and how much other gear to requisition based on the climate and terrain of Grenada. Meanwhile other material and vehicles went directly from warehouses to the airfield to a location called 'Green Ramp'. Pope Air Base had a perimeter gate that quickly became a bottleneck. Once past it each load had to be weighted and recorded so as to match the carrying capacity of the assigned aircraft. The C-141 could carry twice the load of a C-130. The unit being loaded could not simultaneously perform all the back-breaking work required to move material from storage onto an aircraft, so plans called for the employment of other battalions for this work. Likewise the record keeping paperwork was performed by other staffs. And there was also the complex liaison required between the Army and Air Force at levels from the small unit and individual aircraft pilots and load masters to the higher echelons that controlled the assignment and arrival of individual aircraft to the mission.
Moving the aviation task force, helicopters, to Grenada required special methods. An initial concept to fly via a series of island hopping across the Caribbean was discarded. This mean each helicopter had to be partially disassembled to fit in a C-5A, then flown to Barbados and reassembled before flying on to Grenada. The division would be without its helicopters for some time. Communications also required special actions. And, again, Dr. Raines notes that "medical preparations lagged."
Still there was no decision on whether to air drop - that is parachute - or air land - that is exit from aircraft already on the air field. General Trobaugh was still undecided while already in the air enroute Grenada, communicating out an aircraft window by satellite radio for last minute information. An airdrop required a different configuration inside the aircraft from an air landing. In-flight rigging was commenced.
One simply has to read Dr. Raines' vivid descriptions to appreciate what was going on during this frantic effort. Even the question of what to do with grenades posed problems that somehow found various solutions. His comment, "This flexibility was possible because all the members of the division and supporting elements from XVIII Airborne Corps and the Fort Bragg installation were so well drilled in the normal procedures. Improvisation with a logistical team less well prepared might have produced total chaos." But once again Atlantic Command intervened with its own concepts. Dr. Raines again, "Once more this predominately naval headquarters proved that it was ill-prepared to direct the operations of an airborne division." He provides many more descriptions of problems and assessment of their results. For instance, while the troops were rigging the aircraft in flight to target for air drop it was discovered that the haste of the loading had resulted in no inclusion of life vests or rubber boats, which meant that a parachute drop on a tiny bit of land surrounded by water was much to be avoided. His final remark, "General Trobaugh and his men had entered Atlantic Command's zone of operation, where no communications plan was in effect and where logistical problems could metastasize out of control without any one able to implement a timely solution."


Chapter 6 - Area of Operations, 25-26 October 1983 -
The chapter sections are: Initial Assaults; Point Salines Airhead; The Division arrives; General Trobaugh Takes Charge; Intermediate Staging Base on Barbados; Point Salines Airfield Operations; Evacuees, Detainees, and Refugees; Medical Reinforcements
Enough of preparations, now we are in combat. Dr. Raines describes the combat operations in sufficient detail to high light its interrelation with logistics.
Now the reader learns about the efforts of the 'small special forces' teams to be inserted with individual missions by the experts of the 160th Aviation Battalion. These are the incredible helicopter pilots who fly into the jaws of death on a regular basis. Still they didn't appreciate it when they learned at the last minute on Barbados that they would be flying, not at night, but in broad daylight into the face of Grenadian - Cuban anti- aircraft guns. And their premonitions were well taken. Dr. Raines describes what happened to the special forces when their helicopters were shot down or forced to abandon their ground teams. Nothing went right. Several dedicated men were killed needlessly. Likewise the two battalions of the 75th Rangers faced considerable anti-aircraft fire. General Scholtes had prepared for eventualities by assigning Air Force AC-130 Spectre gun ships, familiar to readers who are veterans of Vietnam, and these were able to suppress some of the anti-aircraft fire. The two Marine landing forces were successful in capturing the Pearls Airport well north of Salines. Of course they came fully organized and equipped with their own attack helicopters and Naval air support. Despite the intense anti-aircraft fire (apparently more intense than accurate) both Ranger battalions managed to parachute in without losses and clear the airfield area by 0735. Clearance of the obstacles off the runway was aided by the fact Cuban construction workers had left considerable engineer equipment including bulldozers and rollers. Dr. Raines provides several excellent maps to enable the reader to learn what was going on.
A small surprise for the reader comes next when the elements of the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force land already at 1115, well ahead of the 82d Airborne Division. And they were immediately set to work guarding the growing numbers of Cubans and Grenadians that otherwise would have diverted the Rangers.
General Trobaugh and his lead element of the 82d Airborne Division arrived at 1400. He had decided that, although a parachute landing would enable a larger combat force to enter quickly, there was too much risk of losing troops into the adjacent water. Therefore the division had to arrive one aircraft at a time over many hours and with many interruptions.
From then on, if not long before, everything is going on at once all over the place, with standard units, sub-units, temporary units, individuals of all three services interacting, 'getting the job done', forgoing sleep for days, overcoming minor disputes, solving unexpected problems, constantly focusing on the mission. It is clearly too much to summarize here. But somehow Dr. Raines manages to make it all clear and inserts his own comments as necessary. Well, it took this reader three times through the narrative with continual reference to the maps and organizational diagrams, but I wanted to get everything completely in mind before writing a review.
Dr. Raines' conclusions and appraisal are the same as a reader gathers from the text. 1- the special operations largely failed due to the insertion during daylight. Otherwise the main operation was largely successful on its first day. 2- Intelligence had greatly underestimated the resistance encountered from Cuban and Grenadian defenders. 3 - The logistical results were 'mixed' but generally successful, especially so due to Major Cleary's foresight and Colonel Izzo's initiatives. 4 - There was a serious breakdown in medical support. 5 - The stress on operational security resulted in an overly complex command organizational structure and resulting lack of knowledge by participants in what the status and activities of others were.


Chapter 7 - Division-Rear Support
The chapter sections are: Division Control and Security; Managing the Airflow; Green Ramp Congestion; Yellow Ramp Activities; 3d Brigade Deploys; Green Ramp Solutions; Hunter Army Airfield
Meanwhile what was going on in the division rear back at Ft. Polk and the Ranger's rear at Hunter Air Field? This chapter tells us. The list of sub-headings gives some idea. Again, Dr. Raines comes through with both a narrative and his analysis. At this point this reader realizes that one potential aid that is missing is a sheet with a list of all these players and their organizations. (You can't tell the players without a program fits this situation). Dr. Raines divides the events into three major phases: 1 - 'attempts of the 82d Airborne Division-Rear at Fort Bragg to control the movement of supplies and units to Grenada.' 2 - exertions by the XVIII Airborne Corps to facilitate and guide the division's work.' 3 - a disparate collection of logistical activities facilitated the overall success of the mission.'
The complexity of the story makes it too difficult to summarize in a short space. Suffice it to note that it was just as hectic as the activities on the island.
Dr. Raines' gives his clear assessment. "While the 82d Airborne Division-Rear grappled with the airflow problems, it received no assistance from Atlantic Command. Admittedly, Admiral McDonald and his staff were neither trained nor equipped to conduct major ground operations. If time constraints had permitted, the Joint Chiefs of Staff could have augmented the admiral's staff with the needed expertise, but the rush to stage Urgent Fury meant that his headquarters lacked the tools and insight he needed to exercise effective control. Atlantic Command's decision that the act of asking for air transportation to the island would automatically validate the request represented not the exercise of command but its abdication. Even so, whatever the appearances, the operations of the 82d Airborne Division -rear must be judged a success. In the absence of positive control, mid-level and junior officers made estimates of the situation and then exercised initiative.... The sum total of all these decisions was highly positive."


Chapter 8 - Area of Operations, 26-27 October 1983
The chapter sections are: General Trobaugh's Plan; Point Salines Combat and Support, 26 October; Intermediate Staging Base on Barbados; Processing Americans and Third-Country nationals; Processing Detainees and Refuges; Processing Casualties; Engineer Operations; Point Salines Airhead, 26 October; Division G-4 Oversight, 26-27 October
We are transported once again to Grenada and Barbados. Dr. Raines notes that conditions for the American forces greatly improved. He opens the chapter with news that the 'special forces' elements were often surrounded but surviving and self-extracting. Simultaneously the Marines conducted another combination amphibious and heliborne operation just north of the capital, St George's, not far north of the Army front lines. And the Marines had their big amphibious tractors and M60 tanks. At this point this reader considers that the Marines and 'special forces' could have accomplished this entire mission alone with less confusion and loss of life. Granted the small Marine force that was already afloat before being redirected to Grenada might not have sufficed to capture the whole island, but it could have been rapidly augmented by other Marine units flown into the captured airfields. Of course there is bound to be a SNAFU (was Murphy living on Grenada?) - the Marine tanks had no 105mm ammunition. Nevertheless, their appearance sufficed to eliminate Grenadian interest in resisting. The Marines proceeded to rescue the British governor general and the 'special force' unit that had been surrounded at his residence. They also occupied St. George's.
Well, what about the Army rangers and 82d Airborne at their airfield south of St. George's?
The most exciting action of the day was a text book combined one. The mission was to rescue the large number of American students at the Grand Anse Campus well north of the Army front lines but south of the day's Marine occupation north of St George's. Their existence had previously been unknown. General Trobaugh selected one of the Ranger battalions and General Schwarzkopf on board the Guam got Admiral Metcalf to assign Marine helicopters to provide lift. And the Navy supplied A-7s to cover while the Air Force supplied its mighty AC-130 Spectre. The operation was executed with the loss of only one Marine helicopter that hit a palm tree.
But the logistics units on and around the Point Salines Airfield were still nearly overwhelmed with changing requirements.


Chapter 9 - Corps Support
The chapter sections are: Managing the Airflow; Augmenting the Division; Augmenting Army Communications; Airflow Requirements Shift; Sea Line of Communications; Medical Dilemmas; Supply System Management; Green Ramp Hand-off
The author shifts from chronology to function in order to consider in one chapter the increasing involvement of the XVIII Airborne Corps in the operation. This aids analysis of the Corps' actions but means that the last part of the chapter gets ahead of some of the actions at Salines described in subsequent chapters. This method is helpful because the Corps expanded not only its own direct participation with men and units, but also brought in a wider cast of players at national level. For instance the concept of sea-borne line of supply enters the picture and this involves the Military Transport Management Command and the Military Traffic Management Command. Plus two different ships are involved, each tasked separately by different headquarters unknown to each other, duhh. The reader is likely to be as confused as were the participants in 1983, but Dr. Raines manages to clarify what was going on.
Another major 'conflict' or confusion was in the medical support activity. As noted in previous chapters the medical support within the division already suffered from lack of prior planning which reduced the amount of medical supply and personnel. Also, there was a disdain on the part of many infantry men for the medical support in the sense that the infantry always wanted to go first on the next aircraft resulting in fragmentation of the medical units and supplies. With the addition of XVIII Airborne medical commanders and their units the confusion and outright conflict increased. For one thing the medical organization created a problem. For instance, at Corps level there would be an engineer brigade with commander and a separate Corps Engineer officer - likewise with Signal and Artillery. These officers are in the same branches respectively - the engineer brigade is commanded by an Engineer Corps Colonel and the Corps Engineer officer is a staff officer also an Engineer. But at the time the medical units including the Corps' Medical Brigade were commanded by Medical Service Corps officers while the Corps Surgeon was a Medical Corps officer. Upon entry into combat the doctrine stated that it was the surgeon who would now be the commander. Much pain resulted. Another problem came from the procedure to shift doctors and nurses from duty in the large post hospital into the field units as augmentation. They wanted to take over command and to bring their highly technical medical equipment with them but there was no room for it in the basic loads of the medical units.
There were also coordination problems in the communications field, and in who would be in charge of controlling the dispatch of men and materials on specific aircraft, which of course were controlled by the Air Force. The 'airflow' meaning the actual movement of individual loads on individual air craft had suffered immediately on the first day. Many loads were sent on AC 141, which could hold twice as much as a AC-130. Problems on the Salines limited airfield resulted in large back ups of aircraft circling overhead while waiting for an opportunity to land. Many of these soon ran low of fuel and had to divert to Barbados or elsewhere. On Barbados frequently the load would be transferred to two AC-130's for return flight to Grenada, which required complete reconfiguration of the loads. The ultimate result of all this was that items and men arrived at Salines field in a helter-skelter order of partial units or partial sets of equipment. The already undermanned logistics temporary forward team had one heck of a time sorting all this out. Fortunately the Air Force did establish its own forward control commander at Barbados and so did the XVIII Corps (but unofficially since it was left out of the chain of command.)
There were two incidents in communications (which I believe I recall from reading in the news at the time.) Faced with inability to call for air support at the governor's mansion in St. George's the surrounded special forces individual used his telephone credit card to call home in the US and tell his wife whom to call at Ft. Bragg who in tern could contact the Navy on board the Guam to send Naval air to suppress the Grenadian attackers. It worked. And another individual ( a transiting aviator), on Barbados opened a commercial telephone line with a credit card at a pay phone to his support command and kept it open for days, but the existence of this link was not known to most officers. Not good planning, but excellent initiative. Dr. Raines provides extensive personal comment and evaluation of this whole congeries of activities. He credits Generals Cavazos and Mackmull with much responsibility for the 'success of Army logistics during the operation.' He writes, "Throughout the intervention, General Mackmull set the highest possible standards of conduct: focusing on the success of the mission and laying aside any personal feelings about how he had been treated." (Specifically referring to the way the general and his staff had been peremptorily excluded from participation). There were so many other initiatives by lower ranks that they fill pages of the narrative. For instance, when General Mackmull was to fly to Grenada, Colonel Kelly cleverly loaded important material that otherwise most likely would get delayed on the aircraft knowing that no one would divert the Commanding General's aircraft. And so it went.
Dr. Raines has many more comments about both successes and failures.


Chapter 10 - Area of Operations, 27 October 1983
The sections are: Intermediate Staging Base on Barbados; Point Salines Airhead, Morning; Combat and Support; Point Salines Airhead, Afternoon/Evening; Processing Casualties; Processing Americans and Third-Country Nationals; Processing Detainees and Refugees; Maintenance Issues
Back to the third day of the operation to learn how the combat tactics and logistical support were faring. Dr. Raines notes that the logistical effort was improving thanks to Air Force and 82d Division initiatives to establish ad-hoc air traffic control elements. The creation of the intermediate staging base on Barbados was critical. For one immediate issue, the 82d Airborne Division helicopters had to be disassembled and flown on C-141 to Barbados where they were reassembled for flight to Grenada. The divisions lack of its helicopters was a detrimental impact on its tactical operations. As we will find out later, when the UH-60 Black Hawks finally arrived they were put to immediate use, but the continued absence of the AH-1 Cobras caused serious loss of life. In the initial special forces operation its helicopters had been put out of commission by anti-aircraft fire thanks to the daylight insertion. The division then was able to obtain support for command needs from the Marine helicopters on board the Guam. Dr. Raines provides many other examples of close cooperation between Army and Air Force officers at the scene. both on Barbados and Grenada. But the advent of increased helicopter activities on the Salines airfield caused a different problem. In the interests of safety (well reasoned) the Air Force local airfield control officer would close the field to Air Force traffic whenever the Army helicopters had to move. This would automatically increase the stack of waiting transport aircraft circling overhead and cause more diversions to other fields. Another problem 'solved' was the delay in delivery of aircraft fuel by 'bladder birds'. The tiny division fuel supply team then would attempt to siphon some fuel from the wing tanks of what ever C-130 might be available, but this also closed the field for other landings as it took place. The communications link between Lt. Katz, the fuel impresario near the field, ran back by radios clear to Atlantic Command before continuing on to the Air Force to order up more 'bladder birds'.
Then there was the problem of sorting out responsibility for aeromedical evacuation.
Turning to the tactical combat actions, Dr. Raines tells us about the infantry capture of a huge Cuban supply dump warehouse complex full of vehicles the division immediately put to good use, but also weapons and ammunition that 'higher' wanted sent to the U. S. ASAP. So the small division forward logistics guys had to start organizing evacuation of stuff as well as trying to sort out the incoming stuff.
Considering evacuation, Dr. Raines also describes the complex process involved in clearing the American students (the ostensible purpose of the whole drill) for flight home.
But the American and other foreign nationals were not the only individual requiring special treatments outside the usual combat or logistic activities. As the operation continued thousands of Cubans (both combat troops and civilian construction workers) and Grenadian refugees accumulated in the 82d Airborne Division rear areas. And they had to be taken care of with great care indeed (meaning food, water, and temporary housing) because International Red Cross folks arrived quickly to see to it.
The major tactical incident of the day occurred when a Marine air controller from the 2d Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison company, attached to the 3d of the 325th Airborne Infantry mistakenly vectored an A-7 onto a white building that happened to be the 2nd Brigade forward headquarters. Serious casualties resulted. (SNAFU)
But that was not at all the most serious event. The really 'higher' - the 'higher higher' namely the JCS and chairman General Vessey (so it was claimed in the order received) demanded by direct order that the 82d immediately - immediately - seize the Grenadian Calivigny Barracks located on a peninsula north-east of the divisions front lines. The division planned on an orderly advance to occupy that area the following day. Generals Trobaugh and Schwarzkopf and Admiral Metcalf urgently protested to Atlantic Command but were over ruled. This was a direct order from the all-knowing JCS. General Trobaugh had no one from his three Airborne battalions in contact available. Fortunately, actually unfortunately, the 75th Rangers were still on the island. And the division's UH-60's had arrived, but not the Cobras. With no alternative available General Trobaugh had to rush an air assault without preliminary planning or evaluation of contingencies or even study of the terrain. (FUBAR) Of course the potential defenders were completely unknown as well. A mixed assault force was cobbled together from 2nd Bn, 75th Rangers, Company C of the 1st Rangers, the Task Force B of the division UH-60 battalion (with untrained door gunners attached) and some division artillery batteries all under supervision of the 3rd Brigade, 82d Division commander, Colonel Scott. The Marines on this occasion refused to supply gun ships since they had already suffered serious damage from other daylight assaults and were already preparing to depart for Lebanon. Lets skip the gruesome details. The result was a fiasco with the three leading helicopters crashing and killing or maiming rangers. (Lets hope they at least were not among those patriotic rangers who had volunteered for the Grenada operation when they were already out processing.)


Chapter 11 - A Period of Transition
The chapter sections are: Intermediate Staging Base on Barbados; Point Salines Airfield and Pearls Airport; Final Operations and Departures; A New Phase; Evolving Policies in Washington; Soviet and Cuban Embassy Personnel; Refugees and Detainees; Graves Registration; Transition to Corps Control; Medical Support; Removing Captured Equipment; General Farris Takes Command; The Shift to Peacekeeping; Nation Building and Peacekeeping
Combat operations were diminishing on 27 October and had practically ceased on the 28th. The 29th was mostly a time of searching houses and buildings in the division forward areas. The Marines captured most of the Grenadian high command. On the 30th they captured the northern end of the island and then the Carriacou Island part of the Grenadian state. The Urgent Fury Operation was declared completed on 2 November, at which time the Navy and Marines began to depart and General Trobaugh became Commander of U. S. Forces, Grenada. The 2d Brigade began to fly home on 4 November. But logistics actually increased. Among the vexatious issues was frisking the Cuban and Russian personnel and sending them off the island. Dr. Raines describes all these activities well. General Farris replaced General Trobaugh on 9 November as XVIII Corps took over from the 82d Division. Among the further vexations was clean up of the detrius of war all over Point Salines and into the towns. Soon 'peace keeping and nation building' became the mission and civilian agencies flooded into the island. The military command shifted to headquarters of U. S. Forces, Caribbean. And the U. S. Army Depot System Command began more direct assignments. (Its depots had been supporting by sending material on priority basis throughout the operation.) The last contingent of the XVIII Airborne Corps didn't return home until 11 June 1985, but 25 men from U. S. Forces Caribbean remained until 30 September. Dr. Raines' assessment of the logistical aspects of this phase is very positive..


Chapter 12 - Grenada in Perspective
The Chapter sections are: Military and Policy Consequences; A historical Overview; Institutional Refinements; Operational Logistics; Military Success, Logistical Excess
Dr. Raines, as I have noted, includes many comments and appraisals throughout his narration. In this chapter he offers more evaluations. He also evaluates the criticisms that immediately appeared by 'arm chair' experts immediately following the operation. He begins with discussion and comment about the Army's own after action reporting, giving General Trobaugh great credit for initiating a 'wide-open, far-ranging critique'. "As a result, the unit's logistical, communications, and medical problems received detailed examination." The XVIII Airborne Corps also conducted a thorough examination. And General Mackmull "resolved that he would never again permit the kind of confusion that had dogged Urgent Fury." If he could not take action as Commander of the XVIII Airborne Corps, then he would do so with his hat as Commander of the Ft. Bragg post. He was also determined to find out who had ordered the disastrous Ranger assault on Calivigny. But he was unsuccessful in this effort. No one would admit responsibility and no paperwork could be found. He also fully supported General Trobaugh's plans and execution. General Mackmull's overall assessment was that higher headquarters far removed from the scene of combat operations could not know enough to try to micromanage rapidly developing actions. However, General Vessey not only denied issuing the fateful order but faulted General Trobaugh for not protesting more strongly to headquarters even above Atlantic Command. (Talk about CYA) The JCS and Department of the Army also initiated their own studies. The Army effort engaged the Combat Studies Institute at the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. U. S. Army Forces Command also initiated work by the 44th Military History Detachment. All of this resulted in the assembly of a huge volume of documents, both original and secondary. The Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State voiced their own appraisals. And the Senate Armed Services Committee prepared its own report.
Dr. Raines provides his own wide ranging assessments. To this reviewer all of them are fully based and even obvious from reading the narrative of the operation itself. Some of these include. "Logistical problems in Urgent Fury started at the top of the chain of command." "Because of the security restriction, most commanders excluded logisticians from the early preparations, with the two ranger battalion commanders being the only notable exceptions." "The result was that unexamined assumptions about logistics permeated both joint and Army planning." "Although time was pressing, the real problem in preparing the intervention was not the lack of planning time but the lack of quality planning." "For Urgent Fury, the most serious lapse was the intelligence failure to identify that St. George's University School of Medicine had more than one campus and that a large number of Americans lived off campus." "Next to the intelligence failure, Atlantic Command's inability to coordinate planning by all the disparate ground force elements involved in the operation was the most striking flaw in this phase." "The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a night time raid by a small highly trained force, but the concern over the status of the airfield at Point Salines caused Admiral McDonald to twice slip the time for beginning the operation to scant minutes before daylight." "In deleting the corps echelon, General Vessey, the Joint Staff, and Admiral McDonald apparently misunderstood the role of corps headquarters in post- Vietnam Army organization." "By cutting the corps, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Atlantic Command appeared to validate the arguments of critics who claimed that during the late Cold War the U. S. miltary command-and-control structure was too bureaucratized." "In comparison with the two ranger battalions, the 82d Airborne Division, for example, failed to use its planning time efficiently. Its logisticians suffered from a major handicap. With the XVIII Airborne Corps headquarters removed from the chain of command, they had to spend considerable time trying to understand what its replacement - the predominantly naval Atlantic Command - wanted." "In contrast, the ranger commanders and their staffs worked directly with the Joint Special Operations Command, a true joint headquarters, and all concerned shared a common language and common assumptions."
Dr. Raines' critique continues step by step and echelon by echelon down to the small operating units we have encountered in previous chapters. He offers a positive over all assessment. "This overall operational success rested upon a considerable logistical achievement that was all the more notable because of the difficulties that the Army had to overcome in pulling it together. How it happened can be summed up under five headings: planning, training, initiative, professionalism and hard work" He gives examples of each of these categories.
The author provides a table listing the total casualties during the operation. The Army had 12 KIA and 108 WIA (mostly Rangers); the Marines had 3 KIA (all officers) and 15 WIA; the Navy had 4 KIA and 0 MIA; the Air Force had 2 WIA. Any possible losses to the secret 'special forces' are not mentioned.
One positive result of the thorough after action study, which Dr. Raines notes, is that significant reforms were undertaken. Hopefully, another positive result may come from the lessons military students will absorb when they read this book today.


Reviewer comment -
The reviewer's task is to evaluate the book both in its form and content. This study is a masterpiece in both form and content. I discussed the form already. The content may be considered with three questions. 1 Does the author describe the subject matter fully and fairly. 2 Does he provide the reader with enough detail so he can form his own conclusions about the successes and possible failures. 3 Does the author state his own evaluations for the reader to compare with his own based on the text. This reviewer's opinion is yes to all three questions.
The book may also be evaluated in terms of its importance and potential value to make it worth reading by its intended audience. Rucksack War should be studied and then referred to by all professional military officers. Indications now are that Urgent Fury may be the kind of operation the military will be called upon to conduct in future, rather than big, multi-divisional, set-piece invasions. Yes, we (hopefully) will retain the very small, specific type forces such as SEALS and Delta force to conduct clandestine raids against limited targets and for limited objectives. But this study shows that even for a successful operation on the scale of a small island with a very small military capability an American force of significant strength will be required. And the generation of such a force automatically means it will be a Joint force involving all the services. Such a force must be composed of many, many 'small' individual units each of which provides its particular technical expertise and capability to the whole. But 'small' also means ''big' - big because, if that unit is missing or something goes wrong with its technical contribution, then a very large part of the whole will suffer and troops will die. And the more military forces and successful operations include and rely on 'technology' - narrow technical factors - the more critical it will be for the generalists in higher commands to have a firm grasp on what might happen to their large-scale plans if one of these 'small' contributions fails. And of great importance also, the leaders must recognize that not only will the force deploying to execute the mission include such 'small' special units, but also even the process required to get that force out of the U.S. and to its designated target requires the participation of other 'small' technical units that must be on hand and ready to perform.
In the case of Operation Urgent Fury, it seems to this reviewer that the two most critical problems that resulted from mistakes in prior planning were lack of adequate communications and shortage of medical support. This seems clear from reading the text. But Dr. Raines also reaches the same conclusion.
In the Preface Dr. Raines refers to Clausewitz. He writes that Clausewitz served in the Prussian army, an army confined to the constricted geography of Prussia. Yes, but he also served with the Russian army throughout the 1812 campaign and certainly understood operations over vast spaces, at least as vast and in terms of its logistic and transportation infrastructure greatly more difficult than the early United States. Further, he comments about Clausewitz. "Given this backdrop, it is easy to understand why he essentially dismissed logistics and turned to other matters." But Clausewitz was well aware of the critical nature of logistics at the operational level. Napoleon's campaign in Russia hinged on logistics, which Napoleon did his best to provide, but failed. Moreover the campaigns in the 18th century 'cabinet wars' hinged around logistics as well with supply dumps in fortified cities critical. And Marlborough and Eugene's campaign to Blenheim also hinged on logistics, as did most of the operations in the War of Spanish Succession. But On War was focused on political/military strategy. Yet, the very passage Dr. Raines quotes from On War does stress the strategic importance of logistics. What the passage means is that once on the battlefield issues of logistics have already passed by and it that respect logistics today is much different, as the book will show.
We may consider the book in terms of its description (without specific terminology) of two other Clausewitzian concepts.

The concept "fog of war" refers to the inability of the participants to acquire sufficient knowledge of the reality surrounding them. They never have enough intelligence information and are operating and making decisions with only a hazy understanding of their own or opposing forces. Inadequate communications plays a part in this. Failure in prior planning to establish a clearly understood command structure and provide it with redundant means of communications will increase this 'fog'.
In his study of this operation Dr. Raines has clearly demonstrated that the 'fog' enveloping all echelons of participants was dense. And he has provided his views on why this occurred and what some of the changes were that might have alleviated the 'fog' as much as possible. The 'fog' was certainly increased by the organizational complexity of the force structure. Planners should presume from the outset that involvement of multi services having different structures and operational procedures and doctrines will require extensive and specific measures to reduce the 'fog' that will enclose everyone. And then 'fog' was ensured by the inadequate organization of the communications structure and its inadequate signal equipment.

The concept of "friction" refers to the fact that every task requires decisions and actions by many individuals. And each individual has his own personality and prior assumptions that will influence his concept of what he has been ordered to do, how to do it, and what will be the value for him of the results. Each participant is guided by his own 'will' so it is essential from the earliest considerations to create an organizational structure that will insure or at least foster a convergence of 'wills'. Then active measures must be taken throughout rigorous training to see to it that everyone is exerting his own 'will' in unison. For this extensive training is the start, but creation of a professional attitude that will subordinate each actor's personal preferences to accomplishing the mission is critical.
In his detailed descriptions of what so many participants at all levels were thinking and doing, he illuminates multiple examples of 'friction' causing increased problems, and also the general lack of 'friction' achieved by the good training and the good graces of so many actors, particularly at the lower levels of command. Dr. Raines provides examples of increased 'friction' that range from the understandable, valid, desire of many actors to demand that third party decision makers prioritize their own needs over those of others to the personal demands of various officers to be in Grenada or have a higher visibility in order to enhance their own careers. Of course 'friction' is inherent when several competing military services are required to act together and must be accounted for in the earliest planning.

Finally, the reviewer's thought. Each brigade of the 82d Airborne Division had three Airborne Infantry battalions. But one of those in the 2nd Brigade was already committed elsewhere. Therefor General Trobaugh committed a battalion from the 3rd Brigade. But I do not understand why he did not simply attach that battalion to the 2d Brigade for the operation rather than send in that battalion's brigade command as well. Such cross attachment was routine and the 2d Brigade could have easily controlled it with less overall confusion than having two brigade commands. Moreover, the 2d Brigade was very short on its own personnel due to the constricted airflow. Eliminating the commitment of so much of the 3d Brigade headquarters and support would have opened more space for more of the 2d Brigade support elements. In a somewhat similar fashion, I wonder why, when the XVIII Corps was excluded from the chain of command, General Mackmull did not simply attach augmentation teams or elements from Corps to the Division to provide the division with essential manpower and expertise.


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