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Subtitle: Systemic Risk and the Failure of Regulation, Univ. Of
Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, 2011, 272 pgs., index, references, notes
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Reviewer comment The authors carefully examine many of the theoretical
claims as to what caused the financial crisis of 2008 and discount either
completly or in part most of the more proment ideas. They examine the
interaction of a number of separate decisions and actions by different agencies
to show how these worked unpredicted to create the crisis. Chief among these
were the vary policies instituted by the official regulators - especially those
titled Basil I and II.
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Chapter 1 - Bonuses, Irrationality, and Two-Bigness: The Conventional
Wisdom About the Financial Crisis and Its Theoretical Implications
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Chapter 2 - Capital Adequacy Regulations and the Financial Crisis:
Bankers' and Regulators' Errors
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Chapter 3 - The Interaction of Regulations and the Great Recession:
Fetishing Market Prices
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Chapter 4 - Capitalism and Regulation: Ignorance, Hetrogeneity, and
Systemic Risk
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Conclusion -
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Appendix I: Sclolarship About the Corporate-Compensation Hypothesis
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Appendix II - The Basel Rules off the Balance Sheet
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