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Sub-title: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Demoracy - Univ of
Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1962, 361 pgs., notes, paperback
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Reviewer comment:
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Preface:
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Chapter 1 - Introduction:
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Chapter 2 - The Individualistic Postulate
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Chapter 3 - Politics and the Economic Nexus
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Chapter 4 - Individual Rationality in Social Choice
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Chapter 5 - The Organization of Human Activity
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Chapter 6 - A Generalized Economic Theory of Constitutions
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Chapter 7 - The Rule of Unanimity
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Chapter 8 - The Costs of Decision-Making
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Chapter 9 - The Structure of the Models
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Chapter 10 - Simple Majority Voting
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Chapter 11 - Simple Majority Voting and the Theory of Games
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Chapter 12 - Majority Rule, Game Theory, and Pareto Optimality
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Chapter 13 - Pareto Optimality, External Costs, and Income
Redistribution
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Chapter14 - The Range and Extent of Collective Action
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Chapter 15 - Qualified Majority Voting Rules, Representation, and
Interdependence of Constitutional Variables
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Chapter 16 - The Bicameral Legislature
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Chapter 17 - The Orthodox Model of Majority Rule
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Chapter 18 - Democratic Ethics and Economic Efficiency
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Chapter 19 - Pressure Groups, Special Inerests, and the Constitution
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Chapter 20 - The Politics of the Good Society
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Appendix I - The Marginal Noes on Reading Political Philosophy
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Appendix 2 - Theoretical Forerunners
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