REPORT OF THE GENERAL BOARD
UNITED STATES FORCES, EUROPEAN THEATER

ORGANIZATION, EQUIPMENT, AND TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF THE ARMORED DIVISION
ARMORED SECTION STUDY NUMBER 48

THE GENERAL BOARD
United States Forces, European Theater

ORGANIZATION, EQUIPMENT AND TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF THE ARMORED DIVISION

MISSION; Prepare Report and Recommendations on Organization, Equipment and Tactical Employment of the Armored Division.

The General Board was established by General Orders 128, Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, US Army, dated 17 June 1945, as amended by General Orders 182, dated 7 August 1945 and General Orders 312, dated 20 November 1945, Headquarters United States Forces, european Theater, to prepare a factual analysis of the strategy, tactics, and administration employed by the United States forces in the European Theater.

File: R 320.2/3 Study Number 48

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1 GENERAL -1-

CHAPTER 2 MISSIONS ASSIGNED TO ARMORED DIVISIONS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER -2-

CHAPTER 3 ACTUAL COMBAT FORMATIONS OF ARMORED DIVISIONS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER -5-

CHAPTER 4 HISTORICAL EXAMPLES OF THE EMPLOYMENT OF ARMORED FORMATIONS -7-

CHAPTER 5 OPINIONS OF AVAILABLE COMMANDERS OF ARMOR -22-

CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS -24-

APPENDIX 1 TYPICAL TACTICAL FORMATIONS OF ARMORED DIVISIONS, EUROPEAN THEATER -25-

APPENDIX 2 TYPICAL TACTICAL FORMATION OF LIGHT ARMORED DIVISION

APPENDIX 3 TYPICAL TACTICAL FORMATION OF HEAVY ARMORED DIVISION

APPENDIX 4 CHART OF OPINIONS, SENIOR OFFICERS

APPENDIX 5 OPINIONS OF JUNIOR COMBAT OFFICERS

APPENDIX 6 CONFERENCE ON ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT OF THE ARMORED DIVISION -35-

APPENDIX 7 CHART OF PROPOSED ARMORED DIVISION

APPENDIX 8 CHARTS OF PROPOSED COMPANY, TROOP AND BATTERY ORGANIZATIONS

APPENDIX 8 CHART OF POSSIBLE TACTICAL FORMATION OF PROPOSED ARMORED DIVISION

THE GENERAL BOARD UNITED STATES FORCES,
EUROPEAN THEATER APO 408

REPORT ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMORED DIVISION

Prepared by;
Brig Gen J. A. Holly, 012360, Chief, Armored section.
Col J. A. Smith, 010228, FA (Armd)
Col R. L. Howze, 016055. Cav (Armd)
Col Walter Burnside, 015208, Cav (Armd)
Col J. C. Welborn, 018863, Inf (Armd)
Col A. E. Harris, 018121, Cav (Armd)
Lt Col E. C. Orth Jr., 019863, Inf (Armd)

Principal consultants:
Col E. t. Owen, 015488, Field Artillery Section.
Col D. J. Bailey, 016174, Antiaircraft Artillery Section.
Col T. A. Broom, 018246, Quartermaster Section.
Col R. W. Jenna, 019564, 41 Armd Inf Regt.
Col R. W. Wilkinson, 020529, Medical Section.
Col H. A. Morris, 020141, Engineer Section.
Col R. G. Stillwell, 021065, G-3 Section.
Lt Col R. T. Nelson, 017308, Signal Section.
Lt Col J. B. Routh, 0328240, 183 Field Artillery.
Lt Col E. G. Bevan, 0441090. Ordnance Section
Capt R. R. Duddy, 01285723, Provost Marshal Section.

THE GENERAL BOARD
UNITED STATES FORCES, EUROPEAN THEATER APO 408

ORGANIZATION, EQUIPMENT AND TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF THE ARMORED DIVISION

CHAPTER 1

GENERAL

1. Purpose of this study is to present:

a. A picture of the internal organization of armored divisions as they actually fought in the European Theater, with a discussion of their various tactical grouping.
b. A discussion of the various recommendations solicited from the commanders who fought this armor.
c. The conclusions and recommendations of the General Board, United States Forces, European Theater, for the organization, equipment and tactical employment of the armored division.

2. Scope.

a. Chapter 2 is a comparison of missions assigned armor in the European Theater with those prescribed by Field Service Regulations.
b. Chapter 3 contains the typical formations utilized in combat, and a discussion thereof. Two armored divisions which operated in the European Theater (the 2d and 3d) were organized according to Table of Organization Number 17, dated 1 March 1942, and are referred to as “heavy divisions”. The remaining 13 armored divisions were organized according to Table of Organization Number 17, dated 12 February 1944, and are referred to as “light divisions”. Charts showing the typical combat formations of the various armored divisions (except the 20th) are attached as Appendix 1. Appendices 2 and 3 show the typical tactical formations of the two types of divisions.
c. Chapter 4 contains historical examples of how the smaller typical formations were employed in combat.
d. Chapter 5 contains a synopsis of the opinions of senior commanders of the armored formations which operated in the European Theater. These opinions were obtained through the medium of questionnaires. A chart showing these opinions is attached marked Appendix 4.
e. Chapter 6 contains the conclusions of The General Board, United States Forces, European theater, and its recommendations for the organization, equipment and tactical employment of the armored division.

CHAPTER 2

MISSIONS ASSIGNED TO ARMORED DIVISIONS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER

3. On the fourth day following the initial invasion of Normandy, the beachhead was sufficiently large to provide assembly area for an armored division.

On this day the 2 Armored Division landed on Utah beach. It was followed closely by the 3, 4, 5, and 6 Armored Divisions, and later by ten additional divisions, the last in early 1945. Of these the 2 Armored Division was the only one which had previous combat experience.

On 27 July, 1944 a breakthrough was made by infantry divisions at ST LO, and the armor was ordered through the gap created.

Then followed the dash across FRANCE and BELGIUM in which American armor surpassed the Germans in “blitz” although the latter had originated the method. Under courageous, farsighted leadership, the armored divisions were properly employed, according to the principles laid down in Field Service Regulations. The overwhelming success proved that the principles were sound.

Then excellent leadership and sound employment continued, through the Siegfried Line, during the bitter fighting in the Ardennes, to the RHINE and on into the very heart of Germany, where the war's end found the armor spearheading all advances.

4. Numerous examples illustrating the assignment of proper missions to armor and their successful accomplishment may be found in the historical records of the European Theater. In the following paragraphs, the missions of armor, as prescribed by Field Service Regulations, are extracted and illustrations are briefly cited. These illustrations were selected as typical. Many more are recorded.

a. The primary role of the Armored Division is “OFFENSIVE

OPERATIONS IN HOSTILE REAR AREAS.“

(1) Following the ST LO breakthrough the 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 Armored Divisions performed this mission.

(2) Following the crossing of the RHINE RIVER all Armored Divisions were employed offensively behind the German lines.

b. “breakthrough and enemy protective screen and establishment early contact with hostile forces"

On 7 March 1945 the 9 Armored Division seized the REMAGEN BRIDGE, broke through the German screen on the east bank of the RHINE RIVER and by 9 March 1945 established contact with he German mobile reserves which had beset up for the defense of the RHINE.

c. “SEIZE GROUND ESSENTIAL TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE HIGHER COMMANDER'S PLAN.”

On 1 April 1945 the 3 Armored Division, following a successful drive from the REMAGEN bridgehead, captured PADERBORN. This was essential for the establishment of contact with the Ninth U.S. Army which had been operating to the North.

d. “REGAIN THE INITIATIVE BY MEANS OF SURPRISE ATTACK.“

On 1 January 1945 the 6 Armored Division attacked northeast of BASTOGNE to the vicinity MAGERET. This was the first action of a general offensive resulting in the reduction of the ARDENNES salient.

e. “RESTORE THE IMPETUS OF AN ATTACK THAT HAS LOST MOMENTUM.”

(1) The First Army Offensive which began on 16 November 9144 had come to a standstill northeast of the HURTGEN FOREST in early December. On 10 december one combat command of the 3 Armored Division launched an attack from LANGERWEHE, Germany between the 9 and 104 U.S. Infantry Divisions. This restored impetus to the attack and resulted in the capture of the west bank of the ROER RIVER in the vicinity of DUREN, Germany.

(2) After crossing the WURM RIVER on 3 October 1944 the attack of the 30 Infantry Division was bogged down west of UBACH, Germany. A combat command of the 2 Armored Division attacked through the 30 Infantry Division and seized UBACH. This allowed the 30 Infantry Division to reorganize and continue its attack.

f. “SPEARHEAD ATTACK AGAINST AN ENEMY INCOMPLETELY PREPARED FOR DEFENSE.“

On March 1945 the 4 Armored Division passed through the gap created by the 90 Infantry division and spearheaded the attack of the Third U.S. Army in the reduction of the PALATINATE. This division traveled 48 miles in 52 hours through scattered resistance.

< g. “ATTACK ON A NARROW FRONT AGAINST A PREPARED POSITION.”

On 20 February 1945 the 6 Armored Division attacked on a 4000 yd front, breached the Siegfried Line in the vicinity DASBURG, Germany and by 24 February 1945 had penetrated 20 miles into the German western defenses.

h. “BREAK THROUGH ON A WIDE FRONT AGAINST A DEMORALIZED ENEMY.“

On 5 March 1945 the 11 Armored Division, operating to the left rear of the 4 Armored Division, broke through the remnants of the German defenses northeast of LUXEMBOURG on a front of approximately 10 miles and by 9 March had reached the west bank of the RHINE RIVER in the vicinity of ANDERNACH.

i. “EXPLOIT A SUCCESS.“

(1) On 27 July 1944, the German defenses had been breached at ST LO, FRANCE by the Infantry Divisions. The 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 Armored Divisions, on purely exploitation missions, rolled through northern FRANCE and BELGIUM until stopped by the German defenses in the Siegfried Line in the middle of September.

(2) In March and April 1945, following the crossing of the RHINE RIVER, all armored divisions were employed to exploit this success.

j. “PURSUE A DEFEATED ENEMY.“

In the exploitation following the ST LO breakthrough mentioned above, the German forces were retreating the Siegfried Line. All armored divisions then on the continent were in pursuit.

k. “PERFORM STRATEGIC ENVELOPMENT.“

After breaking out of the REMAGEN bridgehead, which was accomplished by 26 March 1945, the 3, 7, and 9 Armored Divisions spearheaded the advance of the infantry divisions of the First U.S. Army east to the DILL RIVER. On 28 March they turned north and advanced to the vicinity of PADERBORN. The 2 Armored Division as a part of the Ninth U.S. Army made contact with the First Army at Lippstadt. This completed the envelopment of the RUHR pocket and resulted in the capture of 370,000 German troops.

1. “ATTACK TO DESTROY ENEMY ARMORED UNITS WHEN FORCED TO DO SO AS A MATTER OF SELF-PRESERVATION OR WHEN HOSTILE TANKS THREATEN SERIOUSLY TO DISRUPT OPERATIONS OF OTHER TROOPS.“

German forces employed in the ARDENNES winter offensive in December 1944 and January 1945 consisted of the Fifth and Sixth Panzer Armies. During this campaign the 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10. and 11 Armored Divisions were required to attack German armored units in order to prevent the annihilation of American troops originally in the area and finally to reduce the salient.

m. “OPERATE AGAINST LIGHTLY ARMORED FORMATIONS OR INSTALLATIONS.“

On 31 August 1944, the 2 Armored Division, pursing the German forces through BELGIUM, came upon a lightly armored German column in the vicinity of ORCHIES and completely destroyed it.

n. “COUNTERATTACK IN WITHDRAWAL TO DISRUPT HOSTILE OPERATIONS.“

During the period 17-20 December, 1944, prior to the stabilizing of the allied lines in the ARDENNES, the 7 Armored Division was forced to execute numerous counterattacks in the vicinity of ST VITH< BELGIUM.

o. “EXECUTE DELAYING ACTION.“

In the early stages of the German attack in the ARDENNES during December 1944, the 7 and 9 Armored Divisions were employed to delay the hostile advance.

CHAPTER 3

ACTUAL COMBAT FORMATIONS OF ARMORED DIVISIONS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER

(9 June 1944 to 10 May 1945)

5. Source. In order to obtain information concerning the actual tactical formations used by the various armored divisions, after action reports and combat observer interviews were studied. These reports were available on all armored divisions in the European Theater with the exception of the 20 Armored Division, reports on which had not been tabulated and filed.

6. Type. The vast differences in strength and organization of the heavy and light divisions make them incommensurable. Consequently their organizations are presented and discussed separately.

7. Heavy Divisions.

a. Both the 2 and 3 Armored Divisions operated in the European Theater under the control of the First U.S. Army until November 1944, when 2 Armored Division was shifted to the Ninth U.S. Army. Both divisions had an antiaircraft and a tank destroyer battalion attached and these same battalions remained with their respective divisions. One additional armored field artillery battalion (105mmSP) was attached to each division during combat operations. Medium artillery was attached in varying quantities, but normally at least one battalion of either howitzers or guns was attached in combat. Infantry varying in quantity from a battalion to a regiment was attached whenever corps made it available.
b. Both divisions operated with three combat commands, the third one being designated “CCR”. In each division the headquarters of the organic infantry regiment functioned as the headquarters of CCR. Although improvised, CCR was a third fighting combat command and was utilized exactly as were CCA and CCB.
c. Combat commands consisted essentially of two tank battalions, one organic armored infantry battalion, one infantry battalion (whenever an infantry regiment was attached to the division) and tank destroyer, engineer and antiaircraft elements. Medical and maintenance elements were attached or in support. Normally two combat commands were committed to action and the third was held in reserve. Each forward combat command was normally directly supported by two armored field artillery battalions and the medium artillery was in general support.
d. Usually each combat command operated with two task forces or columns. A typical task force consisted of a tank battalion, an infantry or armored infantry battalion, tank destroyer and engineer platoons, directly supported by an armored field artillery battalion.
e. Tables of Organization provided for a light tank battalion and two medium tank battalions per armored regiment. Prior to landing on the European Continent both divisions reorganized the armored regiments so that each tank battalion consisted of a headquarters company (containing assault guns and mortars), two medium tank companies, and one light tank company.
f. Attached infantry was transported on tanks and in 2 1/2 ton trucks.

8. Light Divisions.

a. Light armored divisions operated under the control of all four U.S. Armies in the European Theater, as well as the Second British Army.
b. Attachments to light armored divisions were practically the same as attachments to heavy division.
c. These divisions also operated with three combat commands. Most used CCR as a third fighting combat command; others kept it primarily in reserve, rotating troops through it from CCA and CCB. Wherever possible the headquarters of CCR was increased to practically the size of the headquarters of CCA and CCB. Armored group headquarters and headquarters companies when attached, were utilized for this purpose.
d. As in the heavy divisions, combat commands of the light divisions usually operated with two task forces; one consisted of a tank battalion (less one medium tank company), a rifle company of armored infantry, and tank destroyer and engineer platoons; the other task force would usually consist of an armored infantry battalion (less one rifle company), one medium tank company and tank destroyer and engineer platoons. When additional infantry was attached to the division, the proportion of infantry in the task forces was correspondingly increased. Armored artillery was either attached to or in direct support of each combat command.

9. Preliminary Conclusions. From the above and a study of Appendices 1, 2, and 3 the following preliminary conclusions may be drawn:

a. Antiaircraft and tank destroyer battalions were, to all intents and purposes, organically a part of the armored divisions.
b. Attachment of an additional armored field artillery battalion was so frequent that the number of light battalions was constantly four per division.
c. One or more medium artillery battalions were normally attached to an armored division.
d. The attachment of an infantry regiment to armored divisions brought the ratio of tank battalions to infantry battalions in heavy divisions to 1 to 1 and light divisions to 1 to 2.
e. The task forces of light divisions approximated the strength of a battalion and contained tank companies and infantry companies. The task forces of the heavy divisions approximated the strength of a small regiment and contained a tank battalion and an infantry battalion. Each division normally operated with six task forces.

CHAPTER 4

HISTORICAL EXAMPLES OF THE EMPLOYMENT OF ARMORED FORMATIONS

10. Combinations of combat and elements.

The assignment of missions to the larger armored formations and the typical combat formations adopted by the Armored Divisions have been discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. In paragraphs 11 to 16 are presented some typical historical examples illustrating how the various combat elements were grouped in the lower echelons and how the commanders actually employed their available tools to accomplish the missions assigned them.

map

11. Capture of a city by armor.

During the drive into Central Germany the 6 Armored Division was directed to seize MUHLHAUSEN, a city of thirty thousand inhabitants.

On the night of 3-4 April 1945 one bridge over the WERRA RIVER was captured intact. The division crossed on this bridge, Combat Command “A”. Vehicles were crossed without distance as enemy air was not active and speed was necessary. The flow of traffic over the bridge was never halted. When the heads of columns were slowed by narrow streets or by road blocks the elements in rear immediately swung off the roads and coiled, thus never slowing in column in its crossing.

CC“A” was ordered to close in on the city from the north and northwest. CC“B” was ordered to close on the city from the south and southwest, A hasty reconnaissance was made by combat commanders and their task forces. Under CC“A“ were Task Forces 15, 68, and 9; under CC“B”were Task forces 50, 699, and 44. The following tables show compositions of Task Forces:

table

CC“B” assembled near HEYERODE, CC“A” SW of EIGENRIEDEN. (See sketch). Both Commands started the encirclement of MUHLHAUSEN simultaneously.

Opposition was light. Small forces of enemy infantry were cleared from the small towns adjacent to MUHLHAUSEN. Anti-tank fire was encountered by TF #15 in BICKENRIEDE and in DACHRIEDEN and was quickly overcome. TF #15 and TF #69 both by-passed MUHLHAUSEN as if to continue east, then TF #15 hooked south, then west and blocked all blocked from the north and east. By dusk all Task Forces were in position as shown on attached sketch and held MUHLHAUSEN in a vice-like grip. The Division Commander decided that the attack to clear the city would be launched at 0700, 5 April 1945. All artillery was emplaced so as to give support if heavy resistance was encountered. All Task Forces held in place except T

F # 9 and TF # 50, which drove into the city. Sporadic street fighting was encountered. Some three to four hundred prisoners were taken in town, whereas some twelve hundred were gathered in by TF #15 as they tried to flee eastward.

The city was cleared by 0930, 5 April 1945 with a minimum of losses. The enemy troops were well equipped and had excellent morale. It was learned upon questioning the German officers that the rapid encirclement had completely disrupted their plan of defense; thus the quick capitulation of the entire garrison.

map

12. Attack by One Combat Command (Heavy Armored Division) to Restore Impetus to an Attack which Had Lost Momentum.

At dark, 9 December 1944, the American front lines were along a north-south line through the eastern edge of LANGERWEHE, approximately four miles west of DUREN. There had been little advance during the previous 10 days.

During the night 9-10 December 1944, one combat of the 3 Armored Division, consisting of two tank battalions, one armored infantry battalion, one tank destroyer company, one reconnaissance company and one armored engineer company, moved into LANGERWEHE. Its mission was to attack early 10 December 1944 in its zone (see sketch) from the vicinity of LANGERWEHE and capture ECHTZ, prepared for further action in the direction of HOVEN.

The combat command was organized into two task forces (TF-K and TF-H) and a reserve. TF-K contained a battalion of tanks, less the light tank company, one armored infantry company, one platoon of engineers, and one tank destroyer platoon. TF-H contained a battalion of tanks, a battalion of armored infantry, less one rifle company, one engineer platoon, and one tank destroyer platoon. The reserve consisted of one light tank company, one reconnaissance company and the remaining platoons of engineers and tank destroyers. The entire division artillery was in direct support of the combat command.

The plan of action was as follows:

TF-K to take positions in support just east of the north-south road east of LANGERWEHE prior to daylight. TF-H to attack east at daylight and capture OBERGEICH and GEICH. Upon the capture of the latter, TF-K to capture the high ground north of GEICH. Subsequently, TF-H, supported by TF-K to capture ECHTZ.

The 60th Infantry Regiment, 9th Infantry Division was to move to the vicinity of GEICH, following its capture and attack east to capture KONZERDORF. One battalion was to take over occupation of ECHTZ after its capture.

The operation began at 0730, 10 December 1944. TF-K led through the single exit of LANGERWEHE and occupied its support positions. TF-H followed and deployed east of the town and attacked with tanks and infantry together. By noon it was evident that unexpected hostile strength in OBERGEICH would prevent the capture of GEICH that day. Consequently, TF-K was ordered to take the high ground north of GEICH without waiting for GEICH without waiting for GEICH to fall. This attack was made with four platoons of medium tanks deployed in line, followed at approximately 100 yards by the infantry company. The high ground was taken by 1400 against light resistance.

Meanwhile, it was realized that TF-K, originally designed as a secondary attack, was short of infantry. A request was made (and approved) that the 60th Infantry Regiment begin movement into the GEICH and ECGTZ areas.

While the above mission was being accomplished TF-H continued to clear up OBERGEICH. This was accomplished at approximately 1530 and infantry and tanks were in contact with hostile elements on the western edge of GEICH at dark. The position of these elements was so exposed that they were withdrawn to OBERGEICH after dark leaving outposts in contact with GEICH.

At approximately 1430 TF-K was ordered to attack and capture ECHTZ. At 1615 this force was pushing into the town, the tanks having led to this point and the infantry were beginning to work ahead of the tanks down the streets. By 2100 TF-K had complete control of the objective.

At 0945 one light tank platoon, one reconnaissance platoon, and one squad of engineers were dispatched on the mission of establishing a roadblock at ROTHHAUS. This force followed one company of infantry which was part of TF-H and established the block about the middle of the afternoon. They were ordered to hold this at all costs and as a result some 50 German infantrymen were cut off between ROTHHAUS and GEICH>

During the night 10-11 December 1944 orders were issued as follows:

TF-H to attack at 0900, 11 December 1944 from OBERGEICH and capture GEICH in cooperation with the 2nd Battalion, 60th Infantry Regiment. Upon the capture of GEICH, TF-H to push on rapidly to ECHTZ, clearing out hostile resistance northeast of GEICH to be continued throughout the night 10-11 December 1944.

TF-K to initiate reconnaissance in force in the direction of HOVEN beginning not later then 0800, 11 December 1944, and should HOVEN prove to be held lightly by the enemy to take it and establish sufficient forces there to hold it.

Operations began promptly at 0800, 11 December 1944. TF-H and 2nd Battalion, 60th Infantry Regiment, heavily supported by artillery, advanced steadily and secured GEICH by 0845. This task force left one medium tank company in GEICH and began movement to ECHTZ. The armored infantry battalion, less one company, was detached from this task force and assigned to TF-K.

TF-K met strong resistance on the movement of its reconnaissance force towards HOVEN and was unable to make progress. The resistance consisted of heavy small arms and assault gun fire from HOVEN and from a pillbox to the west of the village, and by direct high velocity gun fire from across the ROER RIVER>

It was realized that more than a reconnaissance force would be necessary to occupy HOVEN, so TF-K was withdrawn into ECHTZ and orders were received to launch a coordinated attack the following day and capture HOVEN.

The 1st Battalion, 60th Infantry Regiment, which had moved into ECHTZ the previous night and had assisted in outposting the town, was attached to the combat command. Orders were issued to the assembled commanders for the attack on 12 December 1944. The plan was to attack with the two infantry battalions abreast, the ECHTZ-HOVEN road being the boundary between battalions inclusive to the north battalion. The tank battalion of TF-K was to support the armored infantry battalion on the north. One medium tank company from TF-H was to support the 1st Battalion, 60th Infantry on the south. As the ground was completely open and flat, smoke was to be laid on HOVEN, along the western river bank north of the town, and along the combat command boundary on the north. Two 155mm self- propelled guns were brought to ECHTZ for the purpose of destroying the pillbox mentioned above at H hour. H hour was set at 0745.

Under cover of the smoke the infantry advanced across the open ground between ECHTZ and HOVEN. However, when the smoke on the south was lifted, small arms fire from the village and pillbox, which the 155mm guns had failed to destroy, slowed their advance and they were subjected to heavy time fire from across the river. It was here that the greatest number of casualties of the action were suffered. However, the tanks provided close support and joined the infantry in the advance at the edge of the village, and HOVEN was entered at 1020. There was considerable house to house fighting and the village was completely secured by 1600.

13. Infantry With Tanks.

map

On the afternoon of April 7, 1945, CC“R”, 2 Armored Division completed mopping up the two towns on phase line D (see Sketch) and at 1530 was reported ready to jump off to take phase line E, a ridge commanding HILDESHEIM. CC“R”s strong force was composed of two task forces, A, and B, each composed of one company of medium tanks and one company of infantry. Boundary between task forces was the main E-W road leading into HILDESHEIM.

The task forces attacked at 1540, both using the east edges of the small towns as lines of departure. TF-“A” attacked with the tanks about 150 yards ahead of the infantry who were well dispersed. All tanks kept up steady machine gun fire on what appeared to be dug-in infantry. Some 75 and 76 HE and WP was used on the woods near the top of the ridge. Some small arms fire was returned, but the machine gun fire of the moving tanks kept most of it neutralized. As the tanks approached the “Barn”, German infantry started moving out of their holes, surrendering. One 88mm AT-AA gun fired 3 or 4 rounds, but Pozit fuse 105mm fire was placed on it by a battery artillery and the crew were either wounded or abandoned their positions. Five well placed HE tank shots in the barn forced 25 Germans from it. The tanks continued on, with one platoon of infantry rounding up prisoners. The ridge was rushed at 1630, a distance of 1 ¼ miles having been covered. Two platoons of infantry came up just short of the ridge and took the lead. The tanks followed to the ridge and took hull down positions, digging in for the night.

TF“B”attacked with the infantry riding on the backs of the tanks, all tank machine guns firing on the slopes of the rolling terrain. No opposition was found to its front and TF “B” assisted TF “A”by placing fire on the other ridge. It gained its objective at 1615, the infantry having dismounted 200 yards from the top of the ridge. The tanks took hull down positions and TF “B” dug in for the night.

The entire operation netted 4 Germans killed, 14 wounded and 135 PWs. American losses were 1 infantryman wounded. Opposition during the day had been light, with enemy surrendering readily upon being fired on.

The attack brought out two methods of using infantry with tanks:

1. In TF “S”, infantry followed tanks at such a distance as would preclude their being hit buy artillery fire p[laced on the tanks. Tanks led as no mines or AT guns had been encountered all day. Infantry did not ride tanks, as dug in enemy could be observed.
2. In TF “B”, infantry rode tanks until near the top of the ridge, where they dismounted and led the attack. No positions had been observed in front of TF “B”, and by getting the task force northeast of the German positions quickly, it helped make the German position untenable.

14. Attack Against Emplaced Dual Purpose Weapons by Armor with Air Support.

map

During late afternoon on 14 April 1945 after having cleared a nest of thirty-five dual purposed 88mm guns, the Commanding Officer of Task Force 15, Combat Command “A”, 6 Armored Division, was notified by his reconnaissance agents of another enemy position on the axis of his advance.

He quickly summoned his company officers and the supporting artillery commanders and made a reconnaissance. He formulated his plan, made it known to the Combat Command Commander and received approval.

Air support was requested and an early morning mission was obtained.

The force moved into attack position “B” during hours of darkness.

PLAN OF ATTACK:

One medium tank company with one platoon of infantry mounted on the tanks to envelop the right of enemy position “A”. One medium tank company with one platoon of infantry mounted on the tanks to envelop the left of enemy position and to drive on and seize the air field.

The light tank company, reinforced by one platoon of medium tanks and one platoon of infantry to seize the village of NEU.

The light artillery battalion plus one medium artillery battalion to give general support.

Time of attack: 0700, 15 April 1945.

At 0645. 15 April 1945 the air liaison officer reported that one flight of P47 fighters was in the air and available.

A heavy ground haze enveloped the entire area.

At 0715 the haze lifted and both battalions of artillery laid on target with smoke and high explosive.

The flight commander signalled that he was ready for the run over the target. The artillery stopped firing; a blanket of smoke marked the target. The fighters dropped their bombs, the tanks with infantry mounted on them moved out rapidly. The fighters circled, made another run, fired their rockets and strafed. The enemy guns were silent.

Slowly the steel cordon of tanks moved in on the enemy position. The fighters strafed again and then they made two dry runs as the tanks opened up with machine guns and cannons. The tanks closed in, the infantry dismounted while moving and followed. The position was over-run. Thirty- three dual purpose, concrete emplaced 88mm guns and three hundred and fifty prisoners were taken without loss of any equipment and with but two men wounded.

15. Seizure of Remagen Bridge by an Armored Task Force.

map

Early on the afternoon of 7 March 1945 “Task Force Engeman”, consisting of the 14 Tank Battalion (less one medium tank company), 27 Armored Infantry Battalion, one reconnaissance platoon and a detachment of armored engineers, reached the hills (A) overlooking the Rhine River near Remagen. Lt Col Engeman, observing that the LUDENDORF Bridge was intact and that fleeing German vehicles were moving across this bridge, sent an armored infantry company and one platoon of medium tanks, with tanks leading, rapidly through REMAGEN to the bridge. The tanks from positions on the west bank (B) supported the infantry with direct fire. The dismounted armored infantry company ran across the bridge, and the leading platoon climbed the towers (C) on the east bank and destroyed the machine guns which had been firing from them. The next platoon seized the tunnel and occupied positions down stream (E) in order to protect the left flank. The third platoon climbed the bluff and destroyed the snipers and antiaircraft guns (D) which had been firing from there. The engineers then moved onto the bridge and began the removal of demolition charges which had failed to explode. While this was going on the remainder of the 276 Armored Infantry Battalion crossed dismounted and established the initial bridge head.

16. Counter-attack to Repel a Local Penetration.

map

At the end of January 1945 the MLR of the VI Corps was the Moder River line from INGWILLER at the foot of the VOSGES, east through HAGENAU to BISCHWILLER. There were three Infantry Divisions and several Task Forces defending the Corps front. CCB, 14 Armored Division was in Corps Reserve with the mission of counter-attacking to repel any penetration of the MLR.

During the night of 27 January a force of German infantry crossed the river in the vicinity of SCHWEIGHAUSEN and occupied positions in the heavily wooded areas at A and B (see sketch). Their obvious mission was to secure the river crossing at SCHWEIGHAUSEN; then to advance on the town of OHLUNGEN which controlled the road net. A task force of an infantry division had been unable to contain the penetration.

On the morning of 28 January CCB was ordered to counter- attack and restore the MLR. The terrain had been rendered difficult by snow and frost.

The 19 Armored Infantry battalion, less one company, plus a Company of the 25 Tank Battalion, supported by the 499 Armored Field Artillery battalion moved north from its assembly position at BATZENDORF, to the road running northeast from OHLUNGEN. The mission was to destroy the enemy dug in at A. The 25 Tank Battalion less Co A, plus an armored infantry company was held in an attack position northwest of WITTERSHEIM, prepared to maneuver to the left or right of the attacking force as the situation would demand.

While the infantry advanced toward A a reinforced light tank platoon advanced north on road D, its mission to protect the flank of the attacking force and to neutralize any threat from the hostile force in the woods at B.

The infantry, working carefully with the tank company, jumped off shortly after noon and by 1600 had reached its objective. The enemy's position was rendered-untenable, so that all who were not killed withdrew across the river that night.

The light tank patrol more than proved its worth. It left road D, accompanied by a small force of infantry, entered woods B and engaged the reinforcing enemy infantry, many of whom were not dug in. Nearly 300 bodies were counted in woods B when the action was completed.

CHAPTER 5

OPINIONS OF AVAILABLE COMMANDERS OF ARMOR

17. Analysis of Opinions.

a. Attention is invited to Appendix 4. A number of additional questionnaires were sent to other commanders but answers were received only from those indicated.

b. An analysis of the opinions expressed indicate the following definite trends:

(1) The missions and methods of employment of armor laid down in Field Service Regulations are sound and correct.

(2) The Armored Division as distinct from the Infantry Division should be a component of the post-war Army.

(3) The strength of the armored division should be increased to approximate the size of the “heavy division”.

(4) Regimental organization is favored over separate battalion organization.

(5) Within the regiment, tanks and infantry should be combined.

(6) Tanks and infantry should not be combined in battalions.

(7) Considering the trend to tanks to tanks armed with high velocity weapons capable of destroying other tanks, Tank Destroyer Units are not necessary to an armored division.

(8) The various elements of truck units, artillery and anti- aircraft artillery, normally attached, should be made organic to an armored division.

(9) A full track personnel carrier should be provided as the basic infantry and engineer squad vehicle. The same vehicle, modified as a command post vehicle, should replace all command half-tracks.

(10) The armored division should be equipped with two types of tanks - reconnaissance and exploitation. A heavily armored tank which sacrifices some mobility for the heavier armor, should be provided for use of infantry divisions against fortified areas.

(11) Additional liaison airplanes for liaison and command purposes are necessary.

18. Junior officers who actually commanded battalions, companies and platoons in combat were questioned on the details of the various company organizations. (see Appendix 5). Their opinions are reflected in the organization charts of tank, rifle and battalion headquarters companies and will not be further discussed.

19. Conference on Organization and Equipment of the Armored Division.

a. On 7 November 1945, a conference was held at Bad Nauheim, Germany, at which the preliminary conclusions and recommendations of the Armored Section, General Board, European Theater were presented and discussed. The following officers attended:

Lt Gen Geoffrey Keyes
Maj Gen R. R. Allen
Maj Gen J. M. Devine
Maj Gen R. W. Grow
Brig Gen T. E. Boudinot
Brig Gen J. D. Balmer
Brig Gen J. H. Collier
Col C. V. Bromley, Jr.
Col F. J. Brown
Col C. D. Dodge
Col R.J. Handy
Col C. I. Hutton
Col J. L. Inskeep
Col L. R. Dewey
Lt Col J. G. Felber

COMMITTEE MEMBERS

Col John A. Smith, Jr.
Col Walter Burnside
Col R. L. Howze Jr.
Col A. E. Harris
Lt Col E. C. Orth

b. An account of the opinions expressed and the conclusions reached in this conference is contained in Appendix 6. With the exception of those pertaining to the Cavalry Squadron and the artillery, the recommendations of this group of officers have been incorporated into the recommendations of The General Board, United States Forces, European Theater.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

20. Conclusions.

a. The employment of armor in the European Theater was based on the methods prescribed by Field Service Regulations. These methods are correct and resulted in success.

b. The use and employment of armor in the European Theater clearly indicated the necessity for Armored Divisions distinct from Infantry Divisions.

c. The “Light Armored Division” is not sufficiently strong.

d. The “Heavy Armored Division” was greatly deficient in infantry.

e. Elements which were found necessary for attachment to armored divisions should be made organic to them.

g. Combat commands were set up as operational headquarters for control of various combinations of units, which were temporarily assigned. This is believed to be a weakness in organization.

h. The organization of the armored division should be such as to facilitate the formation of task forces within the three major striking components. It is believed that a composite tank-infantry regiment will accomplish this and in addition insure that the assault elements of the division normally operate under their own permanently assigned commanders.

21. Recommendations.

a. That the armored division represented by Appendix 7 be adopted, with such minor modifications in personnel as development of improved equipment indicated. Appendix 8 contains the proposed organization of the various companies, troops and batteries, Appendix 9 illustrates a possible tactical break down of the proposed division with task forces.

b. That pertinent doctrines, techniques, T/O's and T/E's be amended by appropriate agencies of the War Department.

APPENDIX 1

TYPICAL TACTICAL FORMATIONS OF ARMORED DIVISIONS, EUROPEAN THEATER

Typical Tactical formation of 2 Armored Division

Typical Tactical formation of 3 Armored Division

Typical Tactical formation of 4 Armored Division

Typical Tactical formation of 5 Armored Division

Typical Tactical formation of 6 Armored Division

Typical Tactical formation of 7 Armored Division

Typical Tactical formation of 8 Armored Division

Typical Tactical formation of 9 Armored Division

Typical Tactical formation of 10 Armored Division

Typical Tactical formation of 11 Armored Division

Typical Tactical formation of 12 Armored Division

Typical Tactical formation of 13 Armored Division

Typical Tactical formation of 14 Armored Division

Typical Tactical formation of 16 Armored Division

chart

THE GENERAL BOARD UNITED STATES FORCES, EUROPEAN THEATER
Armored Section APO 408

OPINIONS OF JUNIOR COMBAT OFFICERS

The following questionnaire was submitted to 88 officers, between the grades of 2d Lieutenant and Lt Colonel, who had served an average of eight and one half (8 1/2) months with various armored units (12 Armored Divisions and 3 Separate Tank Battalions) during combat on the continent of Europe. The results are tabulated below. Tank officers answered questions pertinent to tanks, likewise infantry officers to infantry. (List of officers is appended hereto.)

QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS

No Answer

1. How many tanks should there be in a tank platoon?
43 5 Tks
2 6 Tks
9 4 Tks
6 3 Tks

2. How many platoons should there be in each infantry or tank company?
34 3 Tk Plat
14 4 Tk Plat
13 3 Inf Plat
15 4 Inf Plat

3. How many officers should there be in:
a. Tank Company? Average 7
b. Armored Infantry Company Average 7

4. a. Should we have light tanks?
68 Yes
8 No

b. If Yes, where should they be and how many?
34 1 Co/Bn
19 w/Rcn

5. What weapons platoons should there be in:

a. The Tank Battalion Hq Co? - 49AG Plat

43 Mort Plat

b. The Armored Infantry Battalion HQ Co?

48 Ag Plat
50 Mort Plat
28 HMG Plat

6. What Reconnaissance unit should there be in:

a. The Tank Bn: (Give size, and component and elements)?
12 A/C & 1/4 Ts
21 Lt Tks & !/4 Ts

b. The Armored Infantry Bn: (Give size, and components elements)?
14 A/c & 1/4 Ts
12 Lt Tks & 1/4 Ts
13 HT & 1/4 Ts

7. Should the Hq Companies of the Tank Bn and the Armored Infantry Bn be identical?
10Yes
53 No

8. Should the Service Co of the Tank Bn and the Armored Infantry Bn be identical?
2Yes
68 No

9. a. Should there be a combined HQ and Service Co in the Tank Bn?
46 No
2 Yes

b. The Armored Infantry Battalion?
4 Yes

10. What is your opinion of the proposed Armored Inf Co? Satisfactory

11. a. Do you like the 105mm Assault Gun?
79 Yes
3 No

b. How were they used? Btry Indirect fire

12. Should the 60mm mortar be retained?

(Qualify your answer.)
25 Yes
33 No

APPENDIX 6

CONFERENCE ON ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT OF THE ARMORED DIVISION

1. The following is a resume of the comments and recommendations of the group which attended the conference with the Armored Division Committee on 7 November 1945. Those who were invited will be referred to as the Group.
2. The Group unanimously approved the regimental organization. They also approved organization within the regiment of one tank battalion and two infantry battalions with two dissenting votes. Considerable discussion was had on the proportion of infantry companies to two tank companies was accepted. Opinions were expressed on the proportions of three infantry companies to two tank companies, two infantry companies to two tank company, and one infantry company to one tank company. The following were those who favored the ratio of three to two: General Collier, Colonels Inskeep, Hutton, Dodge, Dewey, Brown, and Handy, The following desired a proportion of two infantry to one tank companies: Generals Keyes, Allen, Boudinot, and Grow, and Colonel Bromley. General Devine was the only one desiring equal proportion of one infantry company to one tank company.
3. The Group recommended the adoption of a Cavalry Squadron consisting of a headquarters, headquarters and service troop, four cavalry troops equipped with light tanks instead of armored cars, and an assault gun troop. The head of the Cavalry Committee (Colonel Biddle) recommended the substitution of an improved armored car for the light tank and the addition of rifle squads within the platoons for the reconnaissance troops, but these recommendations were not accepted by the Group. It was the consensus of the Group that a suitable light tank should be produced for use as a primary combat vehicle for the Cavalry Squadron.
4. After hearing a discussion by Colonel Morris of the Engineer Section of the Board on the reasons for their recommendations for the Engineer Regiment as shown on the chart, the consensus of the Group was that the Engineer component of the proposed division should consist of an Engineer Battalion of four line companies and one Bridge Company with Headquarters and Service Company.
5. After discussion by the head of the Artillery Section of the Board for the artillery component of the proposed division and after listening to his recommendations, the Group voted 7 to 6 to adopt an organic artillery component consisting of four light battalions and two medium battalions.
6. After a discussion by General Armstrong, Head of the Anti- aircraft Section of the Board, the Group accepted by vote of 11 to 1 to proposed antiaircraft regiment as shown in Appendix 7.

8. The maintenance Battalion as recommended was accepted unanimously by the Group.

9. The Medical Battalion as recommended was accepted after a discussion of the advisability of changing the battalion organization to separate collecting and clearing companies.

10. The Special Troops of the division were accepted as recommended.

11. It was recommended that the artillery commander and that the commander of each armored regiment be a brigadier general and that the assistant division commander be eliminated. Also that a G-5 section, the composition of which will be determined later, abe added to the General Staff of Division Headquarters.

12. General Grow expressed the opinion that the term “infantry” should be eliminated with reference to any elements of the armored division. It was suggested that all elements now referred to as “armored infantry” be referred to as “armored rifle battalions”, “armored rifle companies”, etc.

13. It was agreed by the Group that a tank replacement section should be included in the maintenance companies of each armored regiment.