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The Battle of Arausio took place on 6 October
105 BC, at a site between the town of Arausio (now Orange, Vaucluse), and the
Rhône River. Ranged against the migratory tribes of the Cimbri under
Boiorix and the Teutoni under Teutobod were two Roman armies, commanded by the
proconsul Quintus Servilius Caepio and consul Gnaeus Mallius Maximus. However,
bitter differences between the commanders prevented the Roman armies from
co-operating, with devastating results. The terrible defeat gave Gaius Marius
the opportunity to come to the fore and make radical reforms to the
organisation and the recruitment of Roman legions. Roman losses are described
as being up to 80,000 troops as well as another 40,000 auxiliary troops
(allies) and servants and camp follower, virtually all of their participants in
the battle. In terms of losses, the battle is regarded as one of the worst
defeats in the history of ancient Rome.
Prelude:
The migrations of the Cimbri tribe through Gaul and adjacent territories had
disturbed the balance of power and incited or provoked other tribes, such as
the Helvetii, into conflict with the Romans. An ambush of Roman troops and the
temporary rebellion of the town of Tolosa (modern Toulouse) caused Roman troops
to mobilize in the area, with eighty strong forces.[citation needed] Having
regained Tolosa, the proconsul Quintus Servilius Caepio adopted a defensive
strategy, waiting to see if the Cimbri would move toward Roman territories
again. On October 6th 105 BC, they did.
Data:
Date: 6 October 105 BC
Location: Arausio, on the Rhône River, France
Result: Cimbrian and Teutonic victory
Opponents: Cimbri Teutones vs Roman Republic
Commanders and leaders: King Boiorix of Cimbri and King Teutobod of Teutoni
Romans - Quintus Servilius Caepio - Gnaeus Mallius Maximus
Strength:
Cimbri -Teutoni - About 200,000
Romans: 80,000 troops (10–12 legions) up to 40,000 auxiliaries and camp
followers Total: ca. 120,000
Casualties and losses:
Cimbri -15,000 killed
Romans - 80,000 killed or up to 120,000 killed if support troops and camp
followers included
A skirmish and two routs:
Even before battle was joined, the Romans were in trouble. The senior of the
year's two consuls, Publius Rutilius Rufus, was an experienced and highly
decorated soldier, veteran of the recent war in Numidia, but for some reason
did not take charge of the military campaign himself but remained in Rome while
his inexperienced, untried colleague Gnaeus Mallius Maximus led the legions
north. The reasons for Rutilius not taking charge himself do not seem to be
known: perhaps he faced political opposition because of his friendship with
Gaius Marius, or perhaps he believed Mallius Maximus deserved the chance to
earn himself a share of glory, or perhaps he was simply temporarily ill.
Two of the major Roman forces available were camped out on the Rhone River,
near Arausio: one led by Mallius Maximus, and the other by the proconsul
Quintus Servilius Caepio. As the consul of the year, Maximus out-ranked Caepio
and therefore should by law have been the senior commander of the combined
armies. However, because Maximus was a novus homo and therefore lacked the
noble background of the Roman aristocracy - in addition to his military
inexperience - Caepio refused to serve under him and made camp on the opposite
side of the river.
The initial contact between the two forces occurred when a detached picketing
group under the legate Marcus Aurelius Scaurus met an advance party of the
Cimbri. The Roman force was completely overwhelmed and the legate was captured
and brought before king Boiorix. Scaurus was not humbled by his capture and
advised Boiorix to turn back before his people were destroyed by the Roman
forces. The king of the Cimbri was indignant at this impudence and had Scaurus
executed. Caepio however only crossed the river after a direct order from the
senate, but even then insisted on having a separate camp and ignored orders
from Mallius.
According to Mommsen, Caepio was presumably motivated into action by the
thought that Maximus might be successful in negotiations and claim all the
credit for a successful outcome; he launched a unilateral attack on the Cimbri
camp on 6 October. However, Caepio's force was annihilated because of the hasty
nature of the assault and the tenacity of Cimbri defence. The Cimbri were also
able to ransack Caepio's camp, which had been left practically undefended.
Caepio himself escaped from the battle unhurt. With a great boost in confidence
from an easy victory, the Cimbri then proceeded to destroy the force commanded
by Maximus. Already at a low ebb due to the infighting of the commanders, this
Roman force had also witnessed the complete destruction of their colleagues. In
other circumstances the army might have fled, but the poor positioning of the
camp left them with their backs to the river. Many tried to escape in that
direction, but crossing the river would have been difficult encumbered with
armor. The number of Romans who managed to escape were very few. This includes
the servants and camp followers, who usually numbered at least half as many
again as the actual troops. Though the actual casualty figure remains debated,
Livy claims that the total number of Roman casualties (not including camp
followers or other non-combatants) amounted to 80,000. Mommsen claims that
besides the 80,000 Roman soldiers, half as many of the auxiliaries and
camp-followers perished.
Aftermath:
Rome was a warlike nation and accustomed to military setbacks. However, the
recent string of defeats ending in the calamity at Arausio was alarming for all
the people of Rome. The defeat left them not only with a critical shortage of
manpower and lost military equipment, but also with a terrifying enemy camped
on the other side of the now-undefended Alpine passes. In Rome, it was widely
thought that the defeat was due to the arrogance of Caepio rather than to a
deficiency in the Roman Army, and popular dissatisfaction with the ruling
classes grew.
The Cimbri next clashed with the Arverni tribe, and after a hard struggle set
out for the Pyrenees instead of immediately marching into Italy. This gave the
Romans time to re-organise and elect the man who would become known as the
savior of Rome. The catastrophic scale of the loss, which cut a large swath
through the ranks of aristocrats and commoners alike, inspired the Roman Senate
and people to set aside the peacetime legal constraints that prevented a man
from being consul a second time until ten years had passed since his first
consulship, and to immediately propose and elect the highly skilled general
Gaius Marius (despite his absence) as senior consul only three years after his
first consulship. Then, for a further unprecedented four successive years, they
continued to elect him as senior consul (thus commander-in-chief of all Roman
forces) while the war was being prosecuted.
Plutarch, in his Life of Marius, mentions that the soil of the fields the
battle had been fought upon were made so fertile by human remains that they
were able to produce "magna copia" (a great abundance) of yield for
many years.
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