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AN EPITOME OF THE RUSSO-TURKISH WAR OF 1877/78
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by
Adolf von Horsetzky
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POLITICAL CAUSES OF THE WAR AND PREVIOUS EVENTS
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The insurrections in Herzegovina in 1875 led in the summer of 1876 to
war between Servia and Montenegro and Turkey. Put as early as August Prince
Milan was compelled to call on the Powers to intervene. After the armistice the
turks dispersed the Servian army on October 29, 1876 north of Nis (near
Djunis). There-upon Czar Alexander II demanded of Turkey that it cease
hostilities, which was complied with. The conference of the six European Powers
in Constantinople, which were intended to force Turkey to make reforms, were
fruitless as England secretly supported Turkey. When Turkey declined the
respective protocols of April 10, 1877, Russia decided to free by itself alone
the Slavs from the Turkish domination and declared war against Turkey on April
24th. For this event Russia had entered an agreement with Austria as early as
January, which overcame the danger that had threatened its army in 1854 on the
Danube by the flanking position of Siebenburgen. Austria assured Russia of full
freedom of action on the eastern part of the Balkan peninsula, while Russia
left it to Austria-Hungary to occupy Basnia and Herzegovina. In the start
Russia arranged a treaty with Rumania, through whose terrain it had to go to
the Danube, referring to transition and subsistence matters only.
Corresponding to its political phases, the military measures on the part of
Russia proceeded only step by step and considering the uncertainty whether war
would actually break out - in an unsteady and fickle manner. The intention in
August 1876 was to have the Odessa Division and two army corps invade Bulgaria;
in September an army of operation of four corps was to be organized in
Bessarabia; in November orders were issued for the mobilization of twenty
infantry and seven cavalry divisions.
At that time Russia had 48 infantry and 16 cavalry divisions, of which 41
infantry divisions were organized in European Russia. It thus designated only
two-fifth of its forces for the war; it believed, as it did in 1828/29 that
Turkey was completely exhausted and not capable to oppose eight or ten
divisions entering Bulgaria. Put in this Russia made a mistake. Then war broke
out and knowledge received of the Turkish preparations, the first
"November mobilization" was followed in April and May be the
mobilization of eight additional infantry and one cavalry division, and in July
and August of a further nine infantry and 2 cavalry divisions, so that finally
there were only eleven infantry and six cavalry divisions not yet mobilized.
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MILITARY SYSTEM
The cavalry corps, organized in the thirties had been disbanded again after the
Crimean War; the main portion of them being changed into Dragoons. In 1862 the
army was organized into corps, consisting of two and three infantry and cavalry
divisions. Each infantry divisions consisted of sixteen battalions and four
batteries. The Rifle battalions were organized into rifle brigades. After the
Franco-Prussian war, in 1874,universal service was adopted. Every man on
reaching the age of 20 had to become a soldier, remaining subject to military
service until the age of 40. Six years he served with the colors, nine in the
reserve, the remainder of the period in the "Opoltschenie"
(Landstrum). As a matter of fact actual service with the colors was for only
four years so that more men could enter the ranks annually. Recruiting was not
by territorial districts. European Russia (excepting the German Baltic
Provinces, Poland, and the government districts of Kowno and Bessarabia)
furnished 164 infantry regiments out of 164 recruiting districts. The ten Guard
and eighteen Grenadier Regiments, the 28 Rifle battalions, and all mounted
troops were recruited from the entire country. The Cossacks retained their old
military system.
The total strength of the Russian army in 1876 was 720,000 men; in November
that number was increased to 970,000 by calling 250,000 reservists to the
colors; in May and August this number was again increased to more than
1,800,000; counting off the losses in sick, etc, this left an effective
strength of approximately 1,500,000 men in August 1877.
When war broke out in 1877 a portion of the Russian infantry was armed with the
Berdan rifle (caliber 10.6 mm, initial velocity 442m, range 2000m, sighted for
1500m), the larger portion still carrying the Kruka rifle (caliber 15.2mm,.
initial velocity 305m, sighted at 600 to 1200m). Bayonets were always fixed;
each man carried 60 rounds of ammunition, 60 rounds being carried in the
ammunition carts; infantry had tents but no entrenching tools; a number of
tools being carried on wagons. Combat tactics in the battalion consisted in one
company being deployed in skirmish line, followed by the remaining companies in
two lines. The main combat formation was the line in close order, the principal
method of fire was the volley, fired at 400 meters range, whereupon the charge
was made; the skirmishers fired at will. Steps had been taken to re-arm the
artillery,k but none of the new material had been supplied so far.
The war found Russia unprepared (it was never prepared at any time), it
suffered still of the consequences of the Crimean war and from the enormous
costs of the railroad construction found necessary in the interim; the military
reforms, started in the first fifteen years after the Crimean war, had been
changed into new channels because of the experiences gained in the
Frnaco-Prussian War of 1870/71; and the universal service introduced in 1874
had so far (up to 1877) shown neither quantitative nor qualitative results.
There was great lack of trained men for the reserve and lines of communications
organizations; lack of officers was especially felt in all organizations.
Interdiction against having a fleet on the Black Sea had been abrogated in
1871, but no such fleet had as yet been organized; Turkey dominated the sea,
prevented direct communication between the two presumable theaters of
operations in the Balkans and in Asia Minor, and even threatened the little
protected coast line at Odessa and of the Crimea. Under these conditions Russia
could hardly arrive at any other plan than to first march into Rumania,
trusting to the convention agreed between it and Austria-Hungary, and to cross,
in the subsequent operations, the Danube between the Serbian frontier and
Rustrschuk. The further object then was to advance on Adrianople, without
stopping to besiege the fortresses north of the Balkans, but freeing the Slav
population of Bulgaria. It was hoped that the difficult crossing of the Danube
could be accomplished by blocking the mouth of that river to the Turkish fleet
and by laying mines and resorting to torpedo maneuvers within the stretch
selected for the crossing. For this purpose fourteen steam (torpedo) cutters
were available.
The fighting forces of Turkey were far smaller than those of Russia, and Turkey
had less means for a war. The land troops were organized into seven corps
(Ordus); only 37,000 men joined the colors annually. The honor to carry arms
was given only to the Mohanedan population, numbering about 19 millions.
Service with the colors was for six years; there were about 200,000 field
troops (Nizam), 200,000 Landwehr (Redif) and 300,000 Landsturm (Mustaphiz). As
a matter of fact the Turkish army never attained a larger force than 500,000
men - or 2% of the Mohamedan population. The Turkish Danube fleet numbered 20
ships.
Two-thirds of the Turkish infantry were armed with Martini-Henry rifle (caliber
11.4mm, initial velocity 415m,sighted up to 1800 meters); which was about equal
to the Berdin rifle. The other third was armed with the Snyder rifle (caliber
14.6mm, initial velocity 358m, sighted up to 1300 meters), which was about
equal to the Krnka rifle. The men carried 60 rounds of ammunition each. The
field artillery materiel, mostly Krupp model. was superior to the Russian
materiel.
When war broke out the end of April the Turkish troops stood as follows:
-- 90,000 men in Bosnia, Albania, Epirus, Nacedonia, in Creta opposite the
different insurrectionists;
-- 60,000 men along the Serbian frontier at Widden;
-- 90,000 men in Eastern Bulgaria and in the fortresses;
-- 40,000 men in the Balkan and in Constantinople;
-- 280,000 men total in Europe;
-- 120,000 men in Asia, making a grand total of
-- 4000,000 men.
Political as well as military Turkey could think only of the defensive, of
maintaining and defending the status quo. Of course its fleet could become
dangerous to the Russian coast cities. The Turkish plan of operations laid the
point of gravity of operations on the Danube and the northern foothills of the
Balkans, into the so-called fortress quadrangle Rustchuk, Silistria, Schumla,
Varna. Razgrad, between Rustchuk and Schumla, was also fortified. The main army
at Schumla was under command of Abdul Kerim Pasha, that at Widdin under Osman
Pasha, that in Herzegovina, at Gacko-Pilek, etc., under Suleiman Pasha.
As the Russians, at the outbreak of war, did not reckon with the Rumanian army
participating therein, and as Serbia had just been almost annihilated, it could
only be assumed only that in any case the 20 to 25,000 Montegrians would hold
down just as many Turkish troops and the other opponents an additional 25 to
30,000 Turks. By designating only 200,000 men for invasion in November (while
120,000 operated in the Caucasus,), 70,000 men for Odessa and in the Crimea,
and as 70,0-00 men were to remain on the Austrian frontier, the ratio on the
Balkan peninsula between Russians and Turks was as 20,000 to 220-230,000.
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MOBILIZATION AND CONCENTRATION OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY OF OPERATIONS
The Russian mobilization started on November 13th and included twenty infantry
divisions with their artillery brigades and seven cavalry divisions of the
military districts of Odessa, Kiev, Charkov, and Moscou, and also of the
Caucasus. November 14th was the first day of mobilization. Of the 250,000
reservists called in, more than three-quarters arrived at the assembly stations
as early as the fifth mobilization day. The total number of troops mobilized
for Europe and Asia with all auxiliary units, etc., was approximately 550,000
men. Transportation of reservists and horses commenced on the third
mobilization day and lasted seventeen days; the train schedules prepared in
advance for the entire mobilization, however, had to be worked over and
rearranged. Of the mobilized troops four army corps (VIIIth, XIth, XIIth),
160,000 men, were designated as an army of operation in Bulgaria.
CONCENTRATION AT KISCHINEV
Transportation point at Kischinev commenced on the seventh mobilization day
(November 20th) and lasted until January 8, 1877 - fifty days. Two large
interruptions happened. Because of insufficient rolling stock on the Odessa
railroad and blockades of stations of the Kursk railroad, which also was a
single track road,it was found necessary to stop all transportation of troops
for three days on all the roads; and transportation was not resumed until the
27th, the 11th mobilization day. A second interruption was caused by the
inadequacy of the water supply at the different stations,k and so as not to
again stop the entire transport about fifty-five trains had to be cut out, the
troops thereon having to take other trains as best as could be managed. The
very cold weather interfered greatly with this detraining and entraining. Not
counting the mobilization trains and trains carrying provisions exclusively, it
took 2000 trains to transport the mobilized troops, or forty trains per day.
The "Army of Operations" remained in cantonments now for four months
in Bessarabia; the XIIth Corps between the Rumanian frontier and Kischinew, the
VIIIth Corps at and south of Pender, the XIth still farther south towards
Galatz, the IXth in second line on the railroad leading from Zmerinka to
Odessa. The Cossacks were out in front. The VIIth and the Xth Corps, detailed
to guard the coast, took station at Odessa and in the Crimea. Four divisions
concentrated for greater security - in spite of the Convention - in the Kiev
military district along the Austrian-Hungarian frontier.
These four months were employed for tactical training of the troops and for
disciplining the numerous reservists, the artillery breaking in the new horses.
The trains were found too clumsy. Grand Duke Nicholas Nicolajevich Senior, 45
years of age, commanded this army.
When war broke out three additional army corps (IVth, XIIIth, XIVth) were
attached April 26th to the Army of Operations, which latter was then supposed
to have a strength of 260,000 effective. The Bulgarian Landsturm also joined it
with some 30 to 40,000 men.
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COURSE OF THE WAR
Chapter I
Invasion of Rumania by the Russians
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The declaration of war was sent to Constaninople on April 24, 1877 and
the frontier crossed at the same time. By a forced march of 80 kilometers one
Cossack regiment reached Galatz as early as the 25th and occupied the Sereth
bridge to the south at Barbos, to prevent its destruction by the Turks. This
regiment was followed by the XIth Corps to Galatz and Braila, to secure the
railroad and vicinity there. Under the protection of this corps the VIIIth
Corps then marched via Leovo and along the Pruth, followed by the XIIth and
IXth Corps (the letter partly by rail, Pender-Jassi-Galatz-Bukarest), to the
Rumanian capital. The cavalry divisions advanced to the Danube. This advance
lasted until June 4th (350 km in 40 days). Protracted rains and high water
delayed the corps. It often took 12 ox teams to haul the cartridge and
provision wagons over the sodden roads of Moldavia. The bridge that had been
planned for construction at Leovo, could not be started because of the high
water. The VIIIth Corps reached Bukarest twelve days later than it had been
expected to get there. Rail transportation was greatly delayed by lack of
rolling stock and damaged bridges, the total delay being about a month. This
delay in the concentration was not very important, as the high stage of the
Danube, occurring that year later than usual, made a crossing of that river the
beginning of June impossible and, so as to cross the Danube with at least four
corps, it was intended to await the arrival of the XIVth Corps, which was to
relieve the XIth Corps at Galatz. The corps arrived there the middle of June.
The Rumanian army mobilized in April and took up a position facing Widdin - at
Calafat - at the mouth of the Alt opposite Nicopolis. That army was composed of
four divisions with a total of 50,000 men.
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CHAPTER II
The Russians Cross the Danube
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With the arrival of the first Russian troops and the subsequent
arrival of mine planters and torpedo vessels, which were shipped knocked down,
energetic action against the Turkish Danube fleet commenced. Supported by the
shore batteries consisting in the start of only field guns, but later of heavy
guns, success was very soon attained in blocking the sector between Reni and
Hirsovo on the lower Danube to the Turkish fleet as well as in blocking the
Danube with nines between Corabia and the mouth of the Alt and in front of
Rustschuk and in pushing back the Turkish monitors and vessels to the
fortresses Rustschuk and Silistria.
Grouping of forces the middle of June:
Of the Russian army the following stood in the first line on the Danube:
The 8th Cavalry Division at Turnu Magurele and Zimnica; the Detachment Scobelev
(4th Rifle Brigade and Caucasian Cossack Brigade) in the sector from the Vede
river to Giurgevo; the 12th Cavalry Division in the sector of Oltenitza; the
11th Cavalry Division opposite Silistra as far as the mouth of the Dimbovitza,
connecting there with the "Lower Danube" corps (now the XIVth Corps)
at Galatz--Braila.
The XIth Corps stood in front of Oltenitza and Guirgevo, the VIIIth, IXth and
XIIth Corps in cantonments at Bukarest. At Slatina on the ALt work was in
progress in asking floats from the materials for the Danube bridge, the
material having been brought partly from the Siebenburgen frontier (the forests
there) and partly from Galatz by rail. It was expected that the XIIIth Corps
would arrive the end of June and the IVth Corps the middle of July.
On the Turkish side, a weak detachment was in the Dobrudscha at Macin, opposite
Braila; in addition to the garrisons of the fortresses there were, for guarding
the Upper Danube, garrisons of 2 to 3 and even four battalions in the different
localities along the Danube between the fortresses; about 10,000 men were in
Nicopolis and 2000 to 3000 men in Sistova and surrounding localities.
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PLANS OF OPERATIONS
Grand Duke Nicolas had selected for his Danube crossing the stretch
between Nicopolis and Rustschuk, where it was hoped there would be no
difficulty in bringing - in spite of the fortress of Nicopolis - the bridge
material prepared in the Alt river easily to the Danube under protection of the
shore batteries. Four corps (VIIIth, IXth, XIIth, and XIIIth, a total of eight
divisions) were to cross not far from Sistova and which were thereafter to gain
a foothold opposite Rustschuck, on the Jantra and at Tirenovo, while an
"advance guard" under General Gurko was to rapidly cross the Balkans
and induce the Bulgarians to start an insurrection against the Rurks. The XIV
the Corps - Zimmermann - was to march into the Dobrudscha a day prior to the
main crossing so as to diverge the attention of the Turks from Sistova.
Four corps remained behind for protecting the communications and guarding the
coast: the XIth Corps opposite Ristschuk, the IVth Corps at Calarasi opposite
Silistria (and Bukarest), the VIIth Corps at Odessa, and the Xth Corps in the
Crimea.
In the face of the advance of the Russians to the Danube, Abdul Kerim did not
attempt a direct defense of the Danube, but wanted to start to meet the
Russians only if they - as was to be assumed - took steps to invest Rustschuk
and Schumla.
Crossing the Danube
The secondary crossing commenced the middle of June. The XIVth Corps threw a
bridge - under protection of its shore batteries and torpedo crusiers - from
Braila to the right bank, which was widely inundated, not far from the point
where a bridge had been thrown in 1853. However, this bridge could not be fully
utilized for crossing because the Turkish guns completely dominated that
bridge. First of all the Turks had to be driven off. For that purpose on June
22d two regiments were transferred across by steamers from Galatz; these drove
off the weak Turkish garrison after a short fight near Kacin, whereupon the
XIVth Corps marched without further trouble into the Dobrudscha.
The next day, June 23d, the main crossing was to take place; the marches to the
point selected therefore, Turnu Magurcle and Zimnica, had commenced as early as
the 16th, when information was received that the four pontooneer battalions and
the ponton park could not arrive at the point where the bridge was to be thrown
before June 26th. Thereupon the movements were stopped for three days and the
date of crossing fixed at the 27th. In the meantime the Grand Duke personally
reconnoitered the Danube between Turnu Magurele Zimnica and ordered then that
the crossing should take place at the last named point. At this place the river
is from 1000 to 1800 meters across, has many arms, and on the left bank swampy
terrain; the Bulgarian bank being 20 to 30 meters high and steep, the depth of
the river being 4 to 7 meters, the current four miles per hour.
June 25th and 26th the technical troops under General Richter, the 14th
Infantry Division and 4th Rifle Brigade under General Dragomir off arrived at
Zimnica. In the afternoon of the 26th of June the troops were, for the propose
of crossing the river, divided into seven echelons, each echelon consisting of
twelve companies of infantry, 60 Cossacks and eight guns, or about 2500 men. A
starting place for the infantry was designated about one kilometer up the river
from the station of the Austrian Lloyd and one for the horses and guns about
one kilometer downstream from the mentioned station, both covered by islands.
When it became dark the engineers started from the town for the bank of the
river and put the pontons together. At 11 o'clock the first echelon started for
the Danube; it started at 1:00 a.m. and 2:00 a.m. the first twelve companies
started across the river. The second echelon followed about half and hour
later. The crossing took one hour, for wind and waves drove the pontons, each
carrying 30 men, apart, but all companies of the first echelon landed between
3:00 and 3:30 a.m. three to four kilometers below Sistova, not far from a
Turkish guard house. The Turkish guards did not discover the Russians until
they were by a dew hundred yards from the bank; and though they fired on the
pontons with rifles and guns they could not prevent their landing, though some
of the pontons were sunk. The Turkish battalions hastening up to the point from
Sistova (and Vardim), a total of about 4,000 and two batteries, attacked the
Russians at 6:00 a.m. Though the subsequent echelons were not formed according
to the program, at the time of the Turkish attack four of the echelons had
arrived, a total of 8000 to 10,000 men, so that the Turks were outnumbered and
thrown back from the river. By 10:30 a.m. the entire 14th Infantry Division had
crossed the river; and now the smaller steamers came into action.
The next day, June 28th, construction of the "lower ponton bridge"
commenced with the iron and wooden pontons assembled in Slatina, which had
fortunately passed Nicopolis during the night from the Alt into the Danube, and
been towed then by steamers to the island and from there to the Bulgarian shore
at a point about 1 1/2 kilometers below Sistova. The bridge was 1300 meters
long and was finished by July 1st, though a storm tore the bridge apart the
night of June 29th, during which many of the iron pontons sank. (A second
bridge was thrown between July 19th and August 9th farther upstream for heavy
vehicles).
The artillery and the trains of the troops of the VIIIth Corps that had then
crossed, proceeded across the river on July 2d, as did also the artillery and
trains of the cavalry of the advance guard; after these were across, followed
the main body of the XIIth, the XIIIth and the IXth Corps.
July 5th the advance guard under Gurko started from Sistova for Tirnova (20
kilometers and the advance guard of the Rustschuk army group to Bjela (30
kilometers). Because of repeated damages to the bridge the assembly of the IXth
Corps was delayed till the 9th, the last brigade not closing up until July
12th.
The XIIth and XIIIth Corps under the successor to the Crown followed the
cavalry towards the left by way of Bjela and the Jantra to the Kara Lom and
established themselves at Pyros, about 15 kilometers in front of Rustschuk and
at Kaceljevo. The IXth Corps marched from July 12th to 15th to Nicopolis, 40
kilometers distant.
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CHAPTER III
Gurko's First Crossing of the Balkans
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The "Advance Guard Corps" (4th Rifle Brigade and three
cavalry brigades), followed by four (of the mobilized six) battalions of the
Bulgarian levy (Bulgarian battalions being composed of picked men, each
battalion 1000 effective), a total of 10 1/2 battalions, 45 squadrons and 40
guns (Ammunition and subsistence reserve carrying on pack animals) had advanced
on the 6th, when Gurko assumed command, directly against the Balkans on
Tirnovo. It reached, almost without fighting - being opposed only by some
cavalry - that city on July 7th, whereupon the Grand Duke immediately followed
up with the VIIIth Corps, arriving there on the 12th of July. Though his flanks
towards the Kara Lom on the left and towards Nicopolis and Plevna on the right
were little covered and insufficiently protected, he was carried away by the
though of rapidly taking tirnovo so much that he proposed to the Czar to
abandon the siege of Rustschuk entirely and to have the tow corps there follow
up the VIIIth Corps and cross the Balkans. But that plan appeared too audacious
to the Czar. No approved only that - while the Kara Lom be held by the XIIth
and the XIIIth Corps left and the Wid on the right by the IXth Corps - the
movement of the VIIIth Corps might take place across the Balkans as soon as the
following up XIth and IVth Corps had come up.
In Tirnova (65 kilometers from Sistova, 205 meters above sea level) Gurko stood
at the exit of four Balkan passes. Kept well informed by the Bulgarians, he
knew that only the Shipka pass (1250 meters above sea level), the main
connecting route between Rustschuk and Sofia and Andrianople, was occupied and
fortified, and that the other passes were unoccupied. He decided to go around
the Shipka pass by way of the road to the east from Nainkoj 'Heinboghaz). July
12th, after the arrival of the VIIIth Corps, he started from Tirnova; on the
13th all wagons taken along had to remain behind; on the 14th he reached the
lower pass (683 meters above sea level); on the 15th he arrived at the exit of
the defile at Hainkoj - 322 meters above sea level - in the southern foothills;
on the 16th he turned along the southern slope west towards Maglis; a day
later, the 17th, he reached, after a smaller engagement, Kazanlik and the
village of Shipka at the southern slope of the Shipka pass. That day, July
17th, according to a prior agreement, a detachment from the VIIIth Corps
attacked from direction of Gabrova the pass, but as Gurko did not appear that
detachment had to fall back. July 18th Gurko on his part attacked the
fortifications of the pass from the south. His attack was also defeated, but
Kulissi Pasha voluntarily evacuated with the four to five battalions under his
command the positions during the night of the 18th/19th and evade the
threatening surrounding by a retreat square across the mountains to
Philippopel.
During this time the XIVth Corps in the Dobrudscha had reached the Trajanswall
on the 13th of July, without having encountered any resistance to speak of; the
XIIth and XIIIth Corps stood on a 30 kilometers broad line east of the Jantra
on the Kara Lom; the XIth Corps had established itself east of Tirnova to cover
the left flank in connection with the XIIIth Corps on the road to Osmanbazar;
the IXth Corps had forced Nicopolis to surrender on the 17th of July with its 7
to 8000 men.
Thus, the first operations were successful in all directions; no serious
resistance had been countered at any point. Army headquarters in Tirnova
(Imperial headquarters being 42 kilometers north, in Bjela) was under the
impression that there would be no difficulty in occupying also Southern
Bulgaria, when a tempest approached - believed in the start to be not at all
dangerous - which brought about a complete change in the situation - which
proves that no occupation of terrain has a military value as long the enemy's
power of resistance in the open field has not been broken.
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CHAPTER IV
The Turkish Plan of Operations of July 10th - Osman's Approach and the
First Battle of Plevna
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After the main attack of the Russians had shown itself by the crossing
at Zimnica, Osman Pasha had recommended from Widdin as early as the end of June
that his army, or the main body of it, march to Tirnova to join the main army.
When now Gurko appeared on July 7th in the old Bulgarian capital at the
northern foothills of the Balkans, Sultan Abdul Hamid accepted that
recommendation and during the course of July 10th issued orders for Osman's
army to march to Tirnova and for Suleiman Pasha to march from Montenegro to the
principal theater of war in Bulgaria. At the same time he relieved Abdul Kerim
Pasha from command and assigned, on July 27th, Mehemet Ali in Schumla to the
command of the "Eastern Army of the Danube." Of the "Western
Army of the Danube" - numbering 70 battalions, 26 squadrons and 10
batteries, about 12,000 men, started from Widdin on July 13th and, marching
mostly at night because of the extreme heat, arrived uninterested with and
unobserved in Plevna (35 kilometers southwest of Nicopoliis) between July 17th
and 19th (having covered 160 to 170 kilometers in seven days).
The march had undoubtedly been observed by the Rumanians and reported to the
Grand Duke in Tirnova on the 14th, but that report had been paid no attention
to. A valet de chambre of the Grand Duke received the telegram and handed into
the Grand Duke, who merely read it but did not transmit it to the general
staff. So far only a detachment of some 2000 men stood at Plevna, which had
been sent there from the fortress on July 9th. Osman's main body had remained
partly in Widdin and partly south of and on the line of approach, to keep down
the Bulgarian population, which amounted to about 60% of the entire population,
and to cover the line of communications to Widdin and Sofia. Osman had arrived
about two days too late to relieve the garrison of Nicopolis. On the other
hand, he arrived at the opportune time, to prevent the Russians from capturing
the city of Plevna.
FIRST BATTLE AT PLEVNA
Immediately prior to the capture of Nicopolis, July 16th and on July 17th
again, the Grand Duke had directed the IXth Corps to occupy as rapidly as
possible Plevna, the main city of western Bulgaria on the main road Rustschuk
--Bjela--Widdin "in order to secure itself there against any probable
offensive coming from Widdin." Thereupon General Krudener directed General
Schilder-Schuldner with two infantry regiments and five batteries from
Nicopolis, and also the 19th Infantry Regiment with one battery - which up to
then stood at Bulgareni, 30 kilometers east of Plevna on the Osma, at the cross
roads to Sistova - and finally the Caucasian Cossack Brigade to start for
Plevna on July 18th. On July 19th Schilder encountered with his two regiments
(without his cavalry having observed the approach of Osman nor his arrival in
Plevna on the 19th) entirely unexpectedly a very strong hostile position,
supported by artillery, on the heights just north of the town of Bukova. The
19th Regiment had marched independently only along the main road to within 10
kilometers east of Plevna. July 20th Schilder attacked the heights of Bukova
from the north with about 8,000 men and five batteries; the 19th Regiment
attacked the heights at Grivica from the east, about 2,000 men and one battery
strong. The two battlefields were about seven or eight kilometers apart; at
Bukova stood between 9000 and 10,000 Turks; at Grivica 2000; in the city in
reserve between 5000 and 6000. Both columns of the Russians were completely
defeated.
The Turks did not pursue and did not continue their match on Tirnova but,
expecting another attack coming from Nicopolis, held the heights around Plevna.
July 27th Lovca was occupied by a Turkish division (under Rifat Pasha) with
about 4,000 men and thereby communication established with Sofia. The Turks now
threatened Sistova from Plevna and Tirnova from Lovca. By July 30th the Turks
had thrown up about 14 fortifications: 1st to 6th on the heights of Bukova,
facing north; 7th and 8th on the hill at Grivica; 9th and 10th on the heights
west of the Tucenice defile on both sides of the road leading to Lovca. The
fortifications at Grivica were about 6 kilometers from the center of the town,
numbers 9 and 10 about 2 to 3 kilometers, number 14 about four kilometers. The
Grivica fortifications faced east, the 11th to 14th facing south; numbers 9 and
10 formed a sort of curtain between the neighboring groups.
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CHAPTER V
The Second Battle of Plevna
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Believing that there would be no difficulty in easily overcoming the
Turkish army group in Plevna, and desiring to follow Gurka across the Balkans
as soon as possible with the VIIIth Corps (which decision was arrived at on
July 22d and 23d), only one infantry and one cavalry brigade with six batteries
of the XIth Corps, which had been sent against Tirnova, facing towards
Osmanbazar (one division remaining there, the other brigade being in front of
Oltenitza) were placed under General Krudener's command, and subsequently also
two infantry brigades and six batteries of the IVth Corps which had just then
arrived at Sistova. General Krudener thus had at his disposal, by July 27th, 36
battalions, 36 squadrons and 180 guns, or from 26 to 28,000 effective. This
general estimated the Turkish forces in Plevna at 50,000 men and consequently
considered himself entirely too weak. Army headquarters did not believe that
such a strong force could be there, and in addition considered that Krudener's
cavalry and artillery outnumbered the Turkish three or four to one, and
directed him to finish with Plevna as rapidly as possible. On July 28th, 29th,
and 30th three regiments crossed the Danube, but they were not sent to
reinforce Krudener, receiving orders instead to march to Tirnova. The 124th
infantry regiment, guarding the bridge, was placed under the orders of Krudener
only on July 28th, so that it arrived too late. Thus, army headquarters was
much to blame for the defeat Krudener suffered on July 30th.
July 28th and 29th General Krudener placed his forces in readiness near the
Bjela--Plevna road at Laragac Bulagrski and southwest thereof at
Polischat--Pordim, about 10 to 15 kilometers east of Plevna. July 30th about
half of his force advanced to attack fortifications numbers 7 and 8 situated
north of the road and brook there near the village of Grivica, while the
smaller half of his force under Schachovskoi attacked the hills south of the
road, about 4 kilometers from Grivica and Plevna, which appeared to be but
weakly held and where the Turks were constructing their fortifications number 9
and 10. The reserve followed along the road. Skobeleff with a strong cavalry
column, which had reconnoitered towards Lovca, accompanied the attack west of
the Tucenica brook, which had steep banks, in order - like the cavalry on the
right wing - to interrupt the connection between Plevna and the Wid.
Osman Pasha had at his disposal approximately 20,000 men and 58 guns. He had
placed one division, 12 battalions, on the heights of the north and east front,
at Grivica, one division on the south front, and kept nine battalions in
reserve. The one and a half Russian divisions, on the right wing, saw when they
arrived on front of Grivica that a frontal attack would be out of the question
and General Krudener wanted to discontinue the attack even before noon, when he
received a report from Schachovski that he would attack at 2:00 p.m. the
hostile position about 1500 meters in his front (Fortifications numbers 9 and
10) and that he counted on Krudener's support. (The Grivica fortifications were
about 300 meters above the low-lying village traversed by the main road, but
were overtopped by the hills on the east and south by 30 to 60 meters at a
distance of 3000 to 4000 meters, so that if the Russian troops had been used
rationally, and considering that the Russian artillery outnumbered the Turks
there three to one, the fire superiority could have been attained easily and
probably the earthworks destroyed. But we must remark here that the Russians
had no information at all of the construction of the works, though several
reconnaissances had been made. The fortifications in most cases were open
redoubts with sunken cover and were made bomb-proof like the infantry
trenches.) When Krudener learned Schachovskoi's intentions he sent him one
regiment from his reserve and also had his right wing advance to the attack
towards 3:00 p.m. Both groups got to very close to the fortifications, some
individual men even entering the trenches; but finally both wings were forced
to retire. The weak 3d column Skobeleff, which had approached very close to the
city on the Green Hills, had to abandon the advantages it had so far gained.
July 31st Skobeleff and Schachovskoi fell back to Podim and Krudener to
Trestenik and Bulgareni, 15 and 30 kilometers respectively from Plevna; a panic
overtook some of the trains in this retreat and they fled to the bridges at
Zimnica (70 kilometers) carrying fright and confusion to the left bank of the
Danube. The day (July 20th) the Russians lost 2400 men, on the 30th some 7000
men or 23% some single regiments lost as high as 40%. Of the total number lost
the cavalry lost only 18, the artillery only 85 men. The loss of the Turks was
1200 men. And at the same time a catastrophe overtook Gurko's advance guard.
The Russians soon found out that the forces they had mobilized for the war were
entirely inadequate. Orders therefore were issued for the mobilization of the
Guard and the Grenadier Corps as well as of the 24th and 26th Infantry
Divisions (a total of seven infantry and two cavalry divisions), after orders
had already been issued for the start of the already mobilized 2d and 3d
Infantry Divisions and 3d Rifle Brigade from the Moscow military district to
Bulgaria. But as it would take at least two months for the Guard and Grenadier
Corps to reach the theater of operations (as a matter of fact they arrived
there the beginning of October), co-operation of the Rumanian army was now
accepted. One Rumanian Division (the 4th), standing in front of Nicopolis,
immediately started to the southern bank of the Danube for Plevna.
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CHAPTER VI
The Turkish Offensive
Gurko's and Suleiman's Operations South of the Balkans
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Reuf Pasha, who had been assigned to the command of the troops
defending the Balkans at the last moment - 14 to 16 Turkish battalions -
assembled those battalions at Jeni Zagra (Nova Zagora) and was driven from that
place by General Gurko on July 30th after a short fight. Gurko's right flank
detachment soon reported from Eski Zagra (Stara Zagora) that new and stronger
Turkish forces were approaching - the army under Suleiman.
After a stubborn fight Suleiman had dispersed the Montenegrians and had been be
called to the main theater of war as had also Osman, by orders of the Sultan
dated July 10th. The same day the fleet of transports left Constantinople,
arriving in Antivari on July 14th. Suleiman embarked his six brigades, about 50
weak battalions,on July 16th. The first echelon landed in Dedeagatsh (1500
kilometers from Antivari) on the 21st, proceeding thence by rail to Adrianople
(July 22d) and to Karabunar (July 25th to 27th). He started his advance
resolutely on Eski Zagra on the 28th. He drew Reuf Pasha's force onto his own
from Jeni Zagra, reaching Eski Zagra on the 30th of July, on which day Gurko
reached Jeni Zagra. He pushed Gurko thereby away from Kazanlik and Shipka, the
latter falling back in all haste across the Hainkioj. Gurko's troops reached
Tirnova entirely exhausted and had to be put into recuperation cantonments
north of Tirnova.
The successes of Osman at Plevna and of Suleiman on the south of the Balkans
threw the Russians entirely on the defensive. Army as well as Imperial
Headquarters retired to G. Studen (20 kilometers from Sistova). Preparations
were made for a renewed attack on Plevna and until that time the corps on the
south and east line were to merely hold their positions. The Turks were left
consequently the initiative in the offensive. However, there was no correct
co-operation between the three armies. It is true that the Sultan approved
Suleiman's intentions to attack the Shipka, but the simultaneous attack he
desired Osman and Mehemet to make on Tirnova went to pieces because the last
named two armies were insufficiently equipped for any offensive on a larger
scale.
Grouping of Forces the Middle of August.
Of the 270,000 Russians the West Army group (Zatow) stood in front of Plevna
with about 45,000 men; the Rumanian 4th Division in Nicopolis; as left flank
detachment (Skobeleff) towards Lovca; the South Army group (Radetzky) at Selvi,
Tirnova, in the passes of the Balkans, especially in the Shipka pass and
towards Osmanbazar, approximately 50,000 men; the Rustschuk group in three
bodies in front of Rustschuk towards Razgrad and Eski Dzuma, 55,000 men.
The 3d Rifle Brigade crossed the Danube on the 8th, the 2d and 3d Infantry
Divisions crossed between August 14th and 30th and formed the army reserve of
approximately 35,000. Grand total: 185,000 men.
Of the 300,000 Turkish troops in the Balkans about 200,000 were in Bulgaria; of
these Osman was with 30,000 to 35,000 men at Plevna; Suleiman Pasha with
approximately 35,000 men at Kzanlik. Mehemet Ali had about 60,000 men of the
100,000 men of the fortress quadrangle in three groups on the Kara Lom - a
total of approximately 130,000 men in the field.
Suleiman Pasha's Attack Against the Shipka.
After a rest of about ten days which had been employed in properly training,
etc. of his troops, Suleiman Pasha started on August 10th by way of Tvrdica
(reaching there the 13th) to Hainkoij (14th to 16th), from there, after leaving
a brigade, he marched by Maglis to Kazanlik, arriving there on the 18th, and
the village of Shipka, reaching the steep slopes of the southern face of the
Balkans on the 19th of August, with the intention of attacking with his 25,000
to 26,000 men and 48 guns the Shipka Pass, about 8 kilometers distant, and
having an elevation of 800 to 900 meters above the village of Shipka. He had
left strong detachments in the Elenam Brbrova and Hainkioj passes, which, in
conjunction with the Bashibozuks and Turkish population harassed the Russian
stations so much that Radetzky departed with his reserves towards Elena on the
19th and 20th of August, just when Suleiman Pasha arrived at the Shipka Pass.
August 21st Suleiman ascended with one brigade the slope on both sides of the
highroad to very close south of the Russian fortifications at the foot of the
Sveti Nicolai rock and with two brigades the heights of Brdek east thereof, to
attack those fortifications in flank. General Stoljetow had at his disposal for
defense five Bulgarian and three Russian battalions, more than 6000 men and 30
guns (8 and 9-pounders, as well as mountain guns); he had formed that force
into three separate groups, each group having three to four batteries on a line
of approximately 2000 meters extension and 1500 meters depth. The steep and
very rocky heights of the passes were overtopped on the cast by the Brdek, 1
1/2 to 2 kilometers off, on the west by the Lisaja gorna, two to three
kilometers off, but only very narrow ridges, with wooded slopes, led to the
Russian positions and the defenders could sweep them at every point with their
fire. Suleiman's attack on the 21st of August miscarried as in spite of all
efforts only few mountain guns could be brought onto the Brdek. A
reconnaissance was again made on August 22d and on the 23d Suleiman again
attacked from three sides with all his brigades. The attackers had worked their
way, with what support they could get from the few guns in position to within a
few hundred meters and the final charge was about to be made when Radetzky
arrived late in the afternoon with the Rifle Brigade, being followed at night
by two infantry regiments, totally exhausted however by the marches to Elena
and back.
The arrival of additional reinforcements on August 24th enabled General
Radetzky with his twenty battalions to offer permanent resistance to the
Turkish attacks, and to even take the offensive himself and therefore Suleiman
desisted from all further attacks on August 26th. He entrenched himself close
opposite the Russian fortifications and besieged them, extending his positions
as far as Zelendrevo (halfway to Gabrova), without however being able to hold
the main road.
The battles for possession of the Shipka Pass had induced Russian army
headquarters to make a series of troop shifts, especially from Selvi towards
Gabrova.
Simultaneously with the fighting at the Shipka Pass engagements took place on
the Lom and on the Jantra. Mehemet Ali shifted the first days in August for
operations in the open field two corps (the IIId and IVth) with a total of five
to six divisions from Schumla and one to two divisions from Rustshuk towards
the Lom against the Grand Duke. The latter had the XIIth and XIIIth Corps in
the northern third, and in the southern third the XIth Corps at his disposal -
the latter being joined the beginning of August by the detachments employed
prior to then at Plevna. When Suleiman Pasha attacked the Shipka Pass Mehemet
Ali executed an attack with his left wing against the Jantra, which led on the
22d and 23d of August to the engagements at Ajazlar and Popkioj. On August 30th
he again attacked with two divisions of the center the advanced forces of the
Russian XIIIth Corps at Karahassankioj, but again without being able to pierce
that line.
August 31st a larger engagement ensued at Kadikioj (Stroklevo) south of
Rustschuk, which the Russians again renewed on the 4th of September. Finally,
the beginning of September, when it was already too late considering conditions
with Suleiman, Mehemet Ali advanced with his right wing and his center, with
three to four divisions, against the Russian position at Kaceljevo-Ablava, and
with one division from Osmanbazar in the direction of Tirnova.
These movements resulted on September 5th in the engagements at Kaceljevo and
Ablava, by which the left wing of the group under the Grand Duke was pushed
across the Lom and had to retreat to the Jantra and the hills east of Bjela
(reaching there on the 9th).
August 31st Osman Pasha made a sortie towards Zgalevice and Polischat on the
southeast front of Plevna, but without achieving any success. With all these
individual operations the offensive power of the Turks did out.
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CHAPTER VII
The Third Battle of Plevna (September 7-12)
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After, on the one hand, negotiations with Rumania, started the
beginning of August, had ed to the result that three Rumanian divisions crossed
the Danube at Corabia between August 24th and 27th and Prince Karol assumed
command on the 29th of his four divisions and the Russian Division Zatow in
front of Plevna and after, on the other hand, the crisis in the Shipka Pass had
been fortunately overcome and the attacks of the Turks on the Lom and at Plevna
had been successfully defeated, and as finally nor reinforcements could be
expected until October, it was decided to make an attack against Plevna with
full energy from the East and South with all nine Russo-Rumanian divisions.
However, Lovca had to be captured prior to that attack. for that purpose
General Prince Imeritinski attacked the Turkish Division Rifat at Lovca on
September 3d with the 2d and half of the 3d Infantry divisions and 3d Rifle
Brigade, which had again been detached from the group at the Shipka Pass, in
conjunction with the detachment under Skobeleff coming from Selvi. The Turkish
division Rifat was driven back to Plevna. Leaving one brigade in Lovca,
Imeritinski marched on September 5th to Bogot, south of Plevna.
Osman Pasha had thrown up very strong earthworks in a semi-circle around the
city, only the southwest and west front being still open. He had between 30,000
and 35,000 men at his disposal and a total of 70 field pieces, a few
three-pounders among them. The Russians greatly overestimated his forces,
calculating to be no less than 50,000 to 60,000 men with from 120 to 150 field
pieces.
It was decided to make a simultaneous attack against the east, southeast and
south front, each attacking line to be about 5000 meters in extent. the
Rumanians attacked with three divisions the east front, the Grivica works, the
IXth and IVth Corps (four divisions) attacked the southeast front, the
Radischevo works, the 2d Infantry Division and 3d Rifle Brigade (1 1/2
divisions) under Skobeleff, coming from Lovca, attacked the south front, the
Green Hill - a total of eight and a half divisions, approximately 85,000 men
and 425 field pieces. Twenty- four siege guns bombarded the Radischevo works.
For the reason that it was held that in the second battle of Plevna the
artillery preparation had been insufficient, the general assault was this time
to be preceded by a specially long artillery bombardment. It had been
impossible to thoroughly reconnoiter the nature of the hostile front.
Third Battle of Plevna
The Russian troops proceeded to their positions in the foreground on September
6th; on September 7th the artillery battle commenced; the tactical
concentration was completed that day. the bombardment was continued from
September 8th to 10th but without success, as was ascertained subsequently; the
range was too long in some cases, and in some cases there was a total absence
of massed fire effect. The main assault took place on September 11th. Skobeleff
gained a firm foothold on the Green Hill immediately in front of Plevna; the
Rumanians captured one of the Grivica redoubts; but the attack of the main
column against the Radischevo front went to pieces nd had no result. September
12th Osman Pasha led his reserves forward to recapture the lost position on the
Green Hill. Skobeleff was forced to retire.
A few days later the Russian army detachment on the Lom also went through a
crisis, for Mehemet Ali appeared to have made up his mind to make an attack on
a larger scale. However, the weak attack started from Ajazlar in the direction
of Bjela was defeated at Cajirkioj -Cerkovna between the 18th and 21st of
September, and the Grand Duke was thereby enabled to again take up his old
positions on the Kara Lom.
Suleiman's audacious night attack against the Sveti Nicolai on September 17th
was defeated also by Radetzky.
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CHAPTER VIII
Investment and Fall of Plevna
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After the third battle of Plevna the Russian headquarters called on
the defender of Sebatopol, General Todleben, to take charge of the operations
in front of Plevna, to completely invest that place, starve it out, and
eventually storm it. But first of all the Cavalry Corps Kryloff and Laskarev
(with their 75 squadrons) were to interrupt the communications of Osman's force
with Orhanje--Sofia. No ,success was attained in this matter however.
Repeatedly large convoys from Sofia entered Plevna , for instance on September
22d and 23d and again on October 5th. The Turks also organized a reserve army
at Sofia and Orhanje and entrenched themselves at the most important line of
communications stations along the Sofia--Plevna road, to protect communication
with Plevna as best as practicable.
Only after Gurko took with his 20,000 to 30,000 men and 60 guns - after having
been joined by the Russian Guard on October 24th- Gorni Dubnjak which was
defended by 4000 Turks with four guns (in which action Gurko's command suffered
material losses) and after having driven the Turks mainly by artillery fire out
of Telsch on October 28th was communication with sofia interrupted and Osman
Pasha completely invested.
Turkish Attempts at Relieving Plevna
The middle of November, on the Russian side, stood the Grand Duke with six
divisions on the Lom; Radetski with three divisions in the Shipka Pass; Gurko
with two and a half divisions on the Plevna-Orhanje road; and one division
between Radetzky and Gurko at Lovca. This was a total of 12 1/2 divisions or
125,000 men four to five marches away from the army investing Plevna, which on
its part numbered twelve divisions or 120,000 effective under Prince Charles
and General Todleben.
On the Turkish side, Osman Pasha had enlarged Plevna fortifications so much
that they now formed a fortified camp extending as far as the Wid bridge, 30
kilometers in extent.
Suleiman Pasha had assumed command on October 3d of the turkish main army,
which had fallen back to Razgrad after the engagements at Cajirkoj--Cerkovna.
Shefket Pasha had concentrated about 20,000 to 25,000 men from Bosnia and from
Adrianople around Sofia; these were mostly raw troops, with but few Redifs
among them. to him always fell the principal working all the attempts at
relieving Plevna. He also wanted to take up the offensive as soon as his army
was in proper shape and as soon as the promised reinforcements from the Shipka
army and from the main army had reached him. For the present he had established
himself firmly and entrenched himself in part along the road to Plevna as well
as in the mountains on the northern slope of the Etropol Balkan, his strongest
positions being on the road east of Orhanje and farther in rear at Arabi-Konak.
He also guarded all roads circumventing his positions.
Wessel Pasha, who commanded at Shipka in place of Suleiman, had been compelled
repeatedly to detach forces of his command during the month of November to the
Sofia Army, so that very soon had no more than 20,000 to 25,000 men left at his
disposal. However, he masked the departure so well through smaller offensive
operations, that the Russians continually forced a large offensive to take
place on the part of the Turks at the Shipka and suffered in inconvenience of
losing large numbers of deserters (Stragglers) and sick because of the
continual excitement and hard service during the exceeding cold and bad
snowstorms. But there could be no talk of an actual offensive on the part of
Wessel Pasha.
The middle of November Gurko's recommendation was approved to get ahead, by an
offensive, of all attempts at relieving Plevna which had to be feared at any
time coming from Sofia. Leaving sufficient cavalry to hold Vraca, he
established himself one march north of Orhanje with two Guard and half an
infantry division (30,000 to 35,000 effective) at Jablonica and southeast
thereof. November 23d he attacked the advanced entrenched positions in the
mountain defiles at Vracesm at Pravec (east of Orhanje) and at Etropol and
caused the Turks to evacuate them. Nehemed Ali, who had assumed command there,
had to fall back to the main position at the Arabi-Kinak Pass. Gurko pursued to
that position, but he could not take it at the first rush. Because he
considered himself entirely too weak to execute a far reaching envelopment
eastward towards Zlatica or westward towards Sofia, he drew back the main body
of his army in December form the mountains to the valley at Orhanje and waited
there fore the fall of Plevna, expected to occur within a very short time.
As now, through these operations on the part of Gurko, the chances for relief
of Plevna became smaller and smaller, Suleiman's attempts to bring about a
change in the situation on the Kara Lom, also miscarried. He first started from
Rustschuk against Pyrgos and got as far as Meczka, but was compelled to fall
back from there. He again attacked Meczka on November 26th, and also Trstenik.
The main attack against Elena was made on December 4th. Here Fuad Pasha drove
Prince Mirski under heavy loss of guns back to within one day's march of
Tirnova and caused there, as on front of Plevna, great confusion for the time
being, but no decisive success was attained there, for Suleiman had in the
meantime received orders from Constantinople to send a portion of his army back
across the Balkans to sofia to oppose Gurko.
Osman Pasha finally, after all these events, remained confined to his own
resources. When his supplies became short, he made a sortie on December 10th in
a westerly direction towards D. Metropolje, to march, in case he did pierce the
Russian lines, by way of Perkovica to Sofia. The piercing attempt went to
pieces, after a few minor successes in the start, at the strongly fortified
Russian investing line. The Russians soon took up the offensive on their own
part. Osman was wounded and the army capitulated.
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CHAPTER IX
Gurko's Second Crossing of the Balkans. Campaign in Rumania
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After the capitulation of Plevna Gurko started with the main body of
the investing army the march on Sofia in spite of the cold weather in order to
take the turkish position on the Shipka in rear by his advance south of the
Balkans and to thereby bring Wessel Pasha between two fires. Mehemet Alistill
was in command of the Turkish troops opposed to him at Arabi-Konak. By December
24th Gurko had five and a half divisions assembled at Orhanje. The second
crossing of the Bakjabs then commenced on December 25th. This crossing,
estimated to take no more than two days, actually required six days. By
December 31st the main column had laboriously crossed the Curjak Pass (west of
the Arabi-Konak) and attacked Tashkisen. But in the interim the Turks had
evacuated their positions unobserved. Now Gurko turned with a portion of his
forces southeastward towards Otlukioj for pursuing Schakir Pasha, and with his
main body occupied Sofia on January 4th. After a short rest there he again
started in pursuit of the demoralized turkish columns retreating on Tartar
Pazardshik.
Kept back in his positions during January 8th, 9th, and 10th because of the
erroneous information sent by the Turkish Minister for War Reuf Pasha, Suleiman
Pasha, who had by that time taken command there, had great difficulty in
assembling the main body of that command on January 12th and 13th at tatar
Pazardshik - the main body also having been joined by that time by the
reinforcements from Shumla, some 20,000 to 25,000 men. The subsequent retreat
for the purpose of holding Adrianople proved to be impracticable, as in the
meantime the Turkish Shipka army had been forced to capitulate - again due to
Reuf Pasha's unfortunate interference in things.
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CHAPTER X
The Capture of the Shipka Positions and Radetzky's Advance by Way of
Adrianople against the
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Tshataldja Line
January 5th General Radetzky started the attack against the Shipka position.
Holding the S. Nicolai, two enveloping columns with a few guns each were to
advance across the mountains on both sides of the Shipka pass; the western
column being 16,000 to 18,000 the eastern 18,000 to 20,000 men; the former,
under Skobeleff to take direction on Imetly, 5 kilometers west of the pass, the
latter, under Prince Mirski, on Gjusevo, 15 kilometers east. Both columns were
to make a simultaneous attack on January 8th against Wessel's camp supposed to
be at the village of Shipka. This camp, however, was at Sheinovo, off the road
to Kazanlik, three kilometers south of the village of Shipka. The crossings
over the mountains, though only 16 kilometers long, were extremely difficult.
the altitude of both was about 1250 meters. Much snow covered the ground, the
cold was intense, and the descent down the south slope very steep, especially
in case of the western column towards Imetli, and could be passes only in
single file. By January 8th Skobeleff had only about half his force (9
battalions, 7 squadrons, and 4 guns) brought to Imetli and was afraid of making
an attack. But Prince Mirski, whose crossing was easier and apparently better
prepared for in advance, attacked as ordered. His attack was defeated.
Skobeleff started to attack sheinovo only on the 9th; he succeeded, supported
by Mirski, in taking the camp and in forcing the Turks to capitulate.
As early as January 7th Wessel Pasha had reported his difficult situation, to
Suleiman at once counselled immediate retreat. But Reuf Pasha , who had
temporarily assumed command, sent orders to hold the Shipka positions under all
circumstances, being under the entirely unjustified impression that the
Russians would grant an armistice, Wessel Pasha included in his capitulation of
January 9th not only the 12,000 to 15,000 men in the camp at Sheinovo, but also
the 5000 to 8000 men, the actual defenders of the Turkish Shipka positions
which had bloodily defeated that very day a frontal attack executed by the
central column under Radetzky for the support of the enveloping columns.
The destruction of Wessel Pasha, was to have protected the right flank and the
rear of the Turkish main army by holding the Shipka fortifications, precluded
any further defense in the Marica valley and especially the further defense of
Adrianople,which at that time was unfortified.
As the distance from Kazanlik to Semenli is 90 kilometers, that from Tatar
Bazardshik to Semenli 130 kilometers, Radetzky's advance guard reached those
places, past which the road to Adrianople leads, as early as January 15th,
16th, and 17th at Philippopel, Suleiman could do nothing then make his retreat
across the Rhodope Mountains to the sea; he accomplished this retreat
successfully, but having to leave his artillery at the foot of the mountains,
of course.
Radetzky arrived at Adrianople, 150 kilometers from Shipka, on January 19th.
January 30th the Russian advanced troops were only two marches from
constantinople, at the weakly occupied, hardly 30 kilometers broad lines of
Tshataldja. But Suleiman's army was still at Dedeagatsh waiting to embark for
Constantinople. The devastation of the country, directed by the Minister for
War, destroyed the welfare of the populace in the upper Marica and in the
Tundza valleys for a decade to come, but it never delayed the advance of the
Russians in the slightest.
Results of the War
The preliminary peace protocol was signed on March 3d in San Stefano. Its
clauses were materially modified in the Berlin Congress - June 13th to July
13th. But Bulgaria received its independence and Eastern Rumanlia autonomy.
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See also Encyclopedia Britannica entry on Russo-Turkish War and entry on Battle of
Plevna
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