ARMY
The fourth part of this essay
Charles Francis Atkinson
Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th edition Volume II pgs 592-625
GERMAN ARMY
87. The German army, strictly speaking, dates only from 1871, or at
earliest 1866. Before the unification of the German empire or confederation,
the several states possessed distinct armies, federal armies when required
being formed from the contingents which the members of the union, like those of
an ordinary alliance, engaged to furnish. The armies of the Holy Roman Empire
were similarly formed from single, double, or
treble contingents under the supreme command of specially appointed
field marshals of the Empire. In the troubles of 1848 there was witnessed the
curious spectacle of half of a victorious army being unable to pursue the
enemy; this, being composed of Prussian as distinct from
federal contingent troops, had to stop at the frontier of another
state. The events of 1866 and 1870 put an end to all this, and to a very great
extent to the separate armies of the old confederation, all being now
remodelled on Prussian lines. The Prussian army therefore is at once the most
important and historically the most interesting of the forces of the German
empire. Its debut (about 1630) was not satisfactory, and in the Thirty Years'
War troops of Sweden, of the Emperor, of the League, &c., plundered
Brandenburg unharmed. The elector, when appealed to for protection, could but
answer, Que faire? Ils ont des canons. The humiliations of this
time, were, however, avenged by the troops of the next ruler of Brandenburg,
called the Great Elector. The supposed invincibility of the Swedes did not
prevent him from inflicting upon them a severe defeat at Fehrbeffln, and
thereafter the Prussian contingents which took part in the many European wars
of the time acquitted themselves creditably. One of their generals was the
famous Leopold of Anhalt-Dessau, and the reckless gallantry of this leader was
conspicuous on many fields, from Blenheim to Malplaquet. But Leopold's greatest
work was done in the years of peace (171540), during which Prussia was
preparing the army with which Frederick the Great won his battles. He had
introduced (about 1700) iron ramrods into the infantry service, and for over
twenty years the Prussian infantry was drilled to a perfection which gave it a
superiority of five to three over the best- drilled troops of the Austrian
service, and still greater predominance over the French, which was then
accounted the best in Europe. Frederick William I, king of Prussia, directed
and supervised the creation of the new Prussian army, and Leopold was his
principal assistant. In organization and methods of recruiting, as well as in
tactical efficiency, the army of 1740 was equally pre-eminent. Then came the
wars of Frederick the Great. It is not too much to say that the infantry won
his earlier battles; the cavalry had been neglected both by Frederick William
and by Leopold, and Frederick wrote that it was not worth the devil's
while to fetch it away. But the predominance of the infantry was so far
indisputable that Frederick was able to devote himself to the reorganization of
the mounted arm, with results which appeared in the splendid victories of
Hohenfriedberg, Rossbach, Leuthen and Zorndorf. But long before the close of
the Seven Years' War the incomparable infantry of the old army had disappeared,
to be replaced by foreigners, deserters and vagabonds of all kinds, not to
mention the unwilling Saxon and other recruits forced into the king's service.
The army of 200,000 men which Frederick bequeathed to his successor was indeed
superb, and deserved to be the model of Europe. But with Frederick's death the
genius which had animated it, and which alone gave value to such heterogeneous
materials, was gone. The long peace had the customary effect of sapping the
efficiency of the long-service troops. They still retained their imposing
appearance and precision of movement, and overweening self-confidence. But in
1806, after two crushing defeats and a series of humiliating surrenders,
Prussia found herself at the feet of the conqueror, shorn of half her
territory, obliged to receive French troops in all her towns and fortresses,
and only existing on sufferance. But in these very disasters were laid the
seeds of her future greatness. By the treaty of Tilsit the Prussian army was
limited to 43,000 men. This limitation suggested rather subsidiary to voluntary
enlistment, to Scharnhorst universal service on the Krum per 1
system already described (see § 36 above).
88. Reforms
The bitter humiliation and suffering endured under the French yoke
aroused a national spirit which was capable of any sacrifices. The civilian
became eager to be trained to fight against the oppressor of his country; and
when Prussia rose in 1813, the armies she poured into the field were no longer
pro fessional, but national armies, imperfectly trained and organized, but
animated by a spirit which more than compensated for these defects. At the
close of the war her rulers, with far- seeing sagacity, at once devoted
themselves to organize on a permanent footing the system which had sprung up
under the necessities and enthusiasm of the moment. Universal compulsory
service, and a three years' term in the ranks, with further periods in the
reserve and Landwehr, were then introduced; and though variations have
subsequently been made in the distribution of time, the principles were
substantially the same as those now in force. By the law of 1814 the periods of
service were fixed at three years in the army, two in the reserve and fourteen
in the Landwehr, and the annual contingent at 40,000 men. As the population
increased, it was felt that the service was unequally distributed, pressing
unnecessarily heavily on some, while others escaped altogether. Further, the
experiences of Bronnzell and Olmutz in 1850, and of 1859, when Prussia armed in
anticipation of a war with France, aroused great doubts as to the efficiency of
the Landwehr, which then formed the bulk of Prussia's forces, and of whom many
had been as long as ten years away from the colours. At this time the French
remark that the Prussian army was a sort of militia was by no means
untrue. Accordingly, by the law of 1800 the annual contingent was fixed at
63,000, the period in the reserve was increased from two to four years, and
that in the Landwehr reduced from fourteen to five, The total armed force thus
remained nearly the same (12 contingents of 63,000, in place of 19 of 40,000),
but the army and its reserves were more than doubled (increased from 5 X 40,000
to 7 x 63,000) while the Landwehr was proportionately reduced.
This change was not effected without great opposition, and led to a
prolonged struggle between the king, guided by Bismarck, and the parliament. It
required the victories of 1866 and 1870, and the position thereby won for
Prussia, to reconcile the nation to the new law. The military alliance (1866)
of Prussia with the other German states gave place in 1871 to the union of all
the armies into the German army as it is today. Some retained their old
peculiarities of uniform, and even more than this was allowed to Bavaria and to
Saxony, but the whole army, which has been increased year by year to its
present strength, is modeled on the Prussian part of it. The Prussian army
corps are the Guard, and the line numbered I to XI, and XV to XVIII.
89. Saxon Army
The Saxon Army formerly played a prominent part in all the wars of
northern Europe, chiefly in connection with Poland. In the War of the Austrian
Succession the Saxon army played a prominent part, but in the end it suffered a
heavy defeat in the battle of Kesselsdorf (1745). In the Seven Years' War
Saxony was overrun by the Prussians almost without resistance, and the military
forces of the country under Field Marshal Rutowski were forced to surrender en
masse at Pirna (1756); the men were compelled by Frederick the Great to join
the Prussian army, and fought, though most unwillingly, through the remainder
of the war as Prussian soldiers. A few outlying regiments which had not been
involved in the catastrophe served with the Austrians, and on one occasion at
least, at Kolin, inflicted a severe blow on the Prussians. At the outbreak of
the wars of the French Revolution the Saxon army was over 30,000 strong. It
took part in the campaign of Jena on the side of the Prussians, and during the
Napoleonic domination in Germany Saxony furnished strong contingents to the
armies of Napoleon, who in return recognized her elector as king, and largely
increased his territories. The newly made king remained faithful to Napoleon
even in his reverses; but the army was too German in feeling to fight willingly
under the French flag.
1. From Krumperpferde (cast horses attached to batteries, &c.,
for odd jobs), applied to the recruits in jest.
Their defection at Leipzig contributed not a little to the results
of that bloody day. After the peace the king was shorn of a great part of his
dominions, and the army was reconstituted on a smaller scale. In 1866 Saxony
sided with Austria, and her army shared in the disasters of the brief campaign
and the crowning defeat at Koniggratz. Under the crown prince's leadership,
however, the Saxons distinguished themselves by their courage and steadiness
wherever they were engaged. After the war Saxony became part of the North
German Confederation, and in 1870 1871 her troops, under the command of
the crown prince, formed the XII corps of the great German army. They were
assigned to the II army of Prince Frederick Charles, and delivered the decisive
attack on the French right at Gravelotte. Subsequently a IV army was formed
under the command of the crown prince, in which the XII corps, now under Prince
George of Saxony, served with unvarying credit in the campaign of Sedan and the
siege of Paris. The Saxon army is now organized in every respect on Prussian
lines, and forms two army corps (XII at Dresden and XIX at Leipzig) of the
German army. The German emperor, in concert with the king of Saxony, names the
officers for the higher commands. Saxony retains, however, her separate war
ministry, budget, &c.; and appointments and promotion to all but the
highest commands are made by the king. The colours of the older Saxon forces,
and especially the green of the tunics, are retained in many of the uniforms of
the present day.
90. The Bavarian Army
The Bavarian Army has perhaps the most continuous record of good
service in the field of any of the minor German armies. The oldest regiments
date from the Thirty Years' War, in which the veteran army of the Catholic
league, commanded by Count Tilly and formed on the nucleus of the Bavarian
army, played a conspicuous part. Later in the war the Bavarian general, Count
Mercy, proved himself a worthy opponent of Turenne and Condé.
Hence-forward the Bavarians were engaged in almost every war between France and
Austria, taking part successively in the wars of the Grand Alliance, the
Spanish Succession (in which they came into conflict with the English), and the
Polish and Austrian Succession wars. In pursuance of the traditional
anti-Austrian policy, the troops of Bavaria, led by a distinguished Bavarian,
Marshal (Prince) Wrede, served in the campaigns of 1805 to 1813 side by side
with the French, and Napoleon made the electorate into a kingdom. But in 1813
Bavaria joined the Alliance, and Wrede tried to intercept the French on their
retreat from Leipzig. Napoleon, however, inflicted a severe defeat on his old
general at Hanau, and opened his road to France. In 1866 the Bavarians took
part against Prussia, but owing to their dilatoriness in taking the field, the
Prussians were able to beat them in detail. In 1870, reorganized to some extent
on Prussian lines, they joined their former enemy in the war against France,
and bore their full share in the glories and losses of the campaign, the II
Bavarian corps having suffered more heavily than any but the III Prussian
corps. The I Bavarian corps distinguished itself very greatly at Sedan and on
the Loire. Bavaria still retains her separate war office and special
organization, and the troops have been less affected by the Prussian influence
than those of the other states. The Bavarian corps are numbered separately (I
Bay, Munich; II Bav, Wurzburg; III Bay, Nuremberg), and the old light blue
uniforms and other distinctive peculiarities of detail are still
maintained.
91. Wurttemburg Army
Württemberg furnishes one army corps (XIII; headquarters,
Stuttgart), organized, clothed and equipped in all respects like the Prussian
army. Like the Bavarians, the Wurttembergers fought against the Prussians in
1866, but in 1870 made common cause with them against the French, and by the
convention entered into the following year placed their army permanently under
the command of the Prussian king as emperor. The emperor nominates to the
highest commands, but the king of Wurttemberg retains' the nomination and
appointment of officers in the lower grades.
92. Hanoverian Army
The old Hanoverian Army disappeared, of course, with the annexation
of Hanover to Prussia in 1866, but it is still represented officially by
certain regiments of the X army corps, and, in one case at least, battle
honours won by the King's German Legion in the British service are borne on
German colours of today. The Hessian Army is now represented by the XXV (Grand-
ducal Hessian) division, which forms part of the XVIII army corps.
ITALIAN ARMY
93. The old conscription law of the kingdom of Sardinia is the basis
of the military organization of Italy, as its constitution is of that of the
modern Italian kingdom. The Piedmontese have long borne a high reputation for
their military qualities, a
reputation shared by the rulers of the house of Savoy (q.v.), many
of whom showed special ability in preserving the independence of their small
kingdom between two, such powerful neighbours as France and Austria. During,
the wars of the French Revolution Piedmont was temporarily absorbed into the
French republic ?and empire. The Italian troops who fought under Napoleon
proved themselves, in many if not most cases, the best of the French allies,
and Italy contributed large numbers of excellent general officers to the,
Grande Armée.
After 1815 various causes combined to place Piedmont (Sardinia) at
the head of the national movement which agitated Italy during the ensuing
thirty years, and bring her in direct antagonism to Austria. Charles Albert,
her then ruler, had paid great attention to the army, and when ltaly rose
against Austria in 1848 he took the field with an excellent force of nearly
70,000 men. At the outset fortune favoured the arms of Italy; but the genius
and energy of Radetzky, the veteran Austrian commander, turned the tide, and in
the summer of 1849 after many battles the Piedmontese army was decisively
defeated at Novara, and her king compelled to sue for peace. Charles Albert
abdicated in favour of his son Victor Emanuel, a prince who had already
distinguished himself by his personal gallantry in the field. Under his care
the army soon recovered its efficiency, and the force which joined the allied
armies in the Crimea attracted general admiration from the excellence of its
organization, equipment and discipline. In 1859 Piedmont again took up arms
against Austria for the liberation of Italy; but this time she had the powerful
assistance of France, and played but a subordinate part herself. In this
campaign the Sardinian army was composed of one cavalry and five infantry
divisions, and numbered about 60,000 combatants. By the peace of Villafranca,
Italy, with the exception of Venetia, was freed from the Austrians, and
Lombardy was added to Piedmont. The revolutionary campaign of Garibaldi in the
following year united the whole peninsula under the rule of Victor Emanuel, and
in 1866, when Italy for the third time took up arms against Austriathis
time as the ally of Prussia her forces had risen to nearly 450,000, of
whom about 270,000 actually took the field. But in quality these were far from
being equal to the old Piedmontese army; and the northern army, under the
personal command of the king, was decisively defeated at Custozza by the
archduke Albert of Austria.
The existing organization of the Italian army is determined by the
laws of 1873, which made universal liability to service the basis of
recruiting. The territorial system has not, however, been adopted at the same
time, the materials of which the Italian army is composed varying so much that
it was decided to, blend the different types of soldiers so far as possible by
causing them to serve together. The colonial wars in which Italian troops have
taken part have been marked with great disasters, but relieved by the gallantry
of the officers and the rank and file.
RUSSIAN ARMY
94. The history of the Russian army begins with the abolition of
the Strelitz (q.v.) by Peter the Great in 1698, the nucleus of the new forces
being four regiments of foot, two of which are well known to-day under their
old titles of Preobrazhenski and Semenovski. Throughout the 18th century
Russian military progress obeyed successive dynasties of western European
modelsfirst those of Prussia, then those of France. In the earlier part
of the 19th century the army, used chiefly in wars against the revolutionary
spirit, became, like others of that time, a dynastic force; subsequently the
nation in arms principle reasserted itself, and on this basis has
been carried out the reorganization of Russia's military power. The enormous
development of this since 1874 is one of the most striking phenomena in recent
military history. In 1892, in expectation of a general European war, whole
armies were massed in the districts of Warsaw and Vilna, three-fifths of the
entire forces being in position on the German and Austrian frontiers.
The Russo-Japanese War of 19045 is generally held to have
proved that the fighting power of the Russian has in no way diminished in
intrinsic value from that of the days of Zorndorf, Borodino and Sevastopol. The
proverbial stubbornness of the rank and file is the distinctive quality of the
armies of the tsar, and in view of the general adoption of two-years' service
in other countries it is a matter for grave consideration whether, against
European forces and in defence of their own homes, the Russians would not prove
more than formidable antagonists to the men of more highly individualized races
who are their probable opponents. Equally remarkable is the new power of
redistribution possessed by Russia. Formerly it was usual to count upon one
campaign at least elapsing before Russia could intervene effectively in
European wars; much, in fact the greater part, of her losses in the Crimean War
was due to the enormous distances which had to be traversed on foot. Nowadays
the original equal distribution of the army over the country has been modified
in accordance with the political needs of each moment. In 1892 the centre of
gravity was shifted to Poland and Kiev, in 1904 the performances of the
trans-Siberian railway in transporting troops to the seat of war in Manchuria
excited the admiration of military Europe. The attitude of the army in the
troubles which followed upon the Japanese War belongs to the history of Russia,
not to that of military organization, and it will be sufficient to say that the
conduct of the nation in arms at times of political unrest may vary
between the extremes of unquestioning obedience to authority and the most
dangerous form of licence, examples of both being frequent in the history of
nearly all national armies. A remarkable innovation in the modern history of
this army is the conversion of the whole of the cavalry, except a few elite
regiments, into dragoons of the old type. After the war of 1904- 5, however,
this policy was reversed and the cavalry reformed on the usual model. The
Cossacks still retain to a large extent the peculiarities of the light troops
of the 18th century.
SPANISH ARMY
95. The feudal sovereignties of medieval Spain differed but little,
in their military organization, from other feudal states. As usual, mercenaries
were the only forces on which reliance was placed for foreign wars. These
troops called almogavares (Arabic=scouts) won a great reputation on
Italian and Greek battlefields of the 13th century, and with many
transformations in name and character appeared from time to time up to the
Peninsular War. Castile, however, had a military system very different from the
rest. The forces of the kingdom were composed of local contingents similar to
the English fyrd, professional soldiers who were paid followers of the
great lords, and the heavy cavalry of the military orders. The groups of cities
called Hermandades, while they existed, also had permanent forces in their pay.
At the union of Castile and Aragon the Castilian methods' received a more
general application. The new Hermandad was partly a light cavalry, partly a
police, and was organized in the ratio of one soldier to every hundred
families. In the conquest of Grenada (148292) mesnadas or
contingents were furnished by the crown, the nobles and the cities, and
permanently kept in the field. The Hermandad served throughout the war as a
matter of course. From the veterans of this war was drawn the army which in the
Italian wars won its reputation as the first army in Europe.
In 1596 the home defence of Spain was reorganized and the
ordenanza, or militia, which was then formed of all men not belonging to
the still extant feudal contingents, was generally analogous to the system of
assizes at arms in England. This ordenanza served in the Peninsular
War.
96. Spain in Italy
With the Italian wars of the early 16th century came the
development of the regular army; a brief account of its place in the evolution
of armies has been given above. Discipline, the feeling of comradeship and
soldierly honour were the qualities which marked out the Spanish army as the
model for others to follow, and for more than a century the Spanish army
maintained its prestige as the first in Europe. The oldest regiments of the
present Spanish army claiming descent from the tercios date from 1535. An
officer whose regiment was reduced commonly took a pike in some other corps
(e.g. Tilly), the señor soldado was counted as a gentleman, and his wife
and family received state allowances. Nor was this army open only to Spaniards.
Walloons, Italians, Burgundians and other nationalities ruled over by the
Habsburgs all contributed their quotas. But the career of the old army came to
an end at Rocroi (1643), and after this the forces of the monarchy began more
and more to conform to the French model.
97. Spanish Army 17th - 18th Century
The military history of Spain from 1650 to 1700 is full of
incident, and in the long war of the Spanish Succession both the army and the
ordenanza found almost continuous employment. They were now organized, as were
most other armies of Europe, on the lines of the French army, and in 1714 the
old tercios, which had served in the Spanish Netherlands under Marlborough,
were brought to Spain. The king's regiment Zamora of the present
army descends from one of these which, as the tercio of Bovadilla, had been
raised in 1580. The army underwent few changes of importance during the 18th
century, and it is interesting to note that there were never less than three
Irish regiments in the service. In 1808 the Irianda, Ultonia (=Ulster)
and Hibernia regiments had come to consist (as had similar corps in the French
service before the Revolution) largely of native soldiers. At that time the
Spanish army consisted of 119 Spanish and foreign (Swiss, Walloon and Irish)
battalions, with 24 cavalry regiments and about 8000 artillery and engineers.
There were further 51 battalions of militia, and the total forces numbered
actually 137,000. The part played by the Spanish standing army in the
Peninsular War was certainly wholly insignificant relatively to these figures.
It must be borne in mind, however, that only continued wars can give real value
to. long-service troops of the old style, and this advantage the Spanish
regulars did not possess. Further, the general decadence of administration
reacted in the usual way, the appointment of court favourites to high command
was a flagrant evil, and all that can be urgedis that the best elements of the
army behaved as well as did the Prussians of 1806, that the higher leading and
the administration of the army in the field were both sufficiently weak to have
ruined most armies, and that the men were drawn from the same country and the
same classes which furnished the guerrilleros whom it became fashionable to
exalt at the expense of the soldiers. In the later campaigns of Wellington,
Spanish divisions did good service, and the corps of La Romaña (a picked
contingent of troops which had been sent before the war to Denniark at
Napoleon's instance), though often defeated, always retained some cohesion and
discipline. But the result of this war, the second French invasion, and the
continued civil wars of the 19th century was the destruction of the old army,
and the present army of Spain still bears traces of the confusion out of which
it arose.
The most important changes were in 1870, when conscription was
introduced, and in 1872, when universal service was proposed in its place. The
military virtues of the rank and -file and the devotion of the officers were
conspicuously displayed in the Spanish-American War of 1898, and it cannot be
claimed even for the Germans of 1870 that they fired so coolly and accurately
as did the ?defenders of S. Juan and El Caney.
TURKISH ARMY
98. The writers who have left the most complete and trustworthy
contemporary accounts of the Turkish army in the 14th and 15th centuries, when
it reached the height of its most characteristic development, are Bertrandon de
la Brocquière, equerry to Philip the Good, duke of Burgundy, and
Francesco Filelfo of Tolentino. Bertrandon, a professional soldier, visited
Palestine in 1432, and returned overland in 1433, traversing the Balkan
Peninsula by the main trade-route from Constantinople to Belgrade. He wrote an
account of-his journey for Philip: see Early Travels in Palestine, translated
and edited by T. Wright (London, 1848). Filelfo served as sècretary to
the Venetian baylo at Constantinople, and recorded his observations in a series
of letters (see FILELFO). Both ascribe the military superiority of the Turks
over the nations of western Europe to two factsfirstly to their
possession of a well-organized standing army, an institution unknown elsewhere,
and secondly to their far stricter discipline, itself a result of their
military organization and of the moral training afforded by Islam.
The regular troops comprised the Janissaries (q.v.), a corps of
infantry recruited from captured sons of Christians, and trained to form a
privileged caste of scientific soldiers and religious fanatics; and the Spahis,
a body of cavalry similarly recruited, and armed with scimitar, mace and bow.
Celibacy was one of the rules of this standing army, which, in its semi-
monastic ideals and constitution, resembled the knightly orders of the West in
their prime. The Janissaries numbered about 12,000, the Spahis about 8000. A
second army of some 40,000 men, mostly mounted and armed like the Spahis, was
feudal in character, and consisted chiefly of the personal followers of the
Moslem nobility; more than half its numbers were recruited in Europe. This
force of 60,000 trained soldiers was accompanied by a horde of irregulars,
levied chiefly among the barbarous mountaineers of the Balkans and Asia Minor,
and very ill-armed and ill-disciplined. Their numbers may be estimated at
140,000, for Bertrandon gives 200,000 as the total of the Turkish forces. Many
15th and 16th century writers give a smaller total, but refer only to the
standing and feudal armies. Others place the total higher. Laonicus
Chalcocondylas in his Turcica Historia states that at the siege of
Constantinople in 1453 the sultan commended 400,000 troops, but most other
eye-witnesses of the siege give a total varying from 150,000 to 300,000. Many
Christian soldiers of fortune enlisted with the Turks as artillerists or
engineers, and supplied them at Constantinople with the most powerful cannon of
the age. Other Christians were compelled to serve as engineers or in the ranks.
As late as 1683 a corps of Wallachians was forced to join the Turkish army
before Vienna, and entrusted with the task of bridging the Danube. But in the
18th and early 19th centuries the introduction of Christians tended to weaken
the moral of the army already sapped by defeat; it was found impossible to
maintain the discipline of the Janissaries, whose privileges had become a
source of danger; and the feudal nobility became more and more independent of
the sultan's authority. These three causes contributed to make reorganization
inevitable.
The destruction of the Janissaries in 1826 marked the close of the
history. of the old Turkish army; already the re-creation of the service on the
accepted models of western Europe had been commenced. This was still incomplete
when the new force was called upon to meet the Russians in 1828, and though the
army displayed its accustomed bravery, its defective organization and other
causes led to its defeat. Since then the army has been almost as constantly on
active service as the British; the Crimean War, the Russo-Turkish War of 1877
and the Greek-Turkish War of 1897 witnessed the employment of a large
proportion of the sultan's available forces, while innumerable local revolts in
different parts of the empire called for great exertions, and often for fierce
fighting on the part of the troops locally in garrison and those sent up from
the nearest provinces.
UNITED STATES ARMY
99. The regular army of the United States has always been small.
From the first it has been a voluntary force, and until 1898 its chief work in
peace was to furnish numerous small posts on the frontier and amongst the
Indians, and to act as a reserve to the civil power in the great cities. In
war-time the regular army, if, as was usually the case, it was insufficient in
numbers for the task of subduing the enemy, formed the nucleus of large armies
raised for the war. In 1790 the rank.and file of the army, as fixed
by act of Congress, amounted to 1216 men; and in 1814 an English expedition of
only 3500 men was able to seize and burn Washington, the capital of a country
which even then numbered eight millions of inhabitants. In 1861, at the
begining of the Civil War, the whole regular force amounted to about 15,300
men. In April of that year the president called out 75,000 volunteers for three
months; and in May a further-call for 42,000 was made. In July a call for
500,000 men was authorized by Congress, and as even this vast force proved
insufficient it was found necessary to use a system of drafts, In October 1863
a levy of 300,000 men was ordered, and in February 1864 a further call of
500,000 was made. Finally, in the beginning of 1865 two further levies,
amounting in all to 500,000 men, Were ordered, but were only partially carried
out in consequence of the cessation of hostilities The total number of men
called under arms by the government of the United States, between April 1861
and April 1865, amounted to 2,759,049, of whom 2,656,053 were actually embodied
in the armies. If to these be added the 1,100,000 men embodied by the South
during the same time, the total armed forces reach the enormous amount of
nearly four millions, drawn from a population of only 32 millions
figures before which the celebrated uprising of the French nation in 1793, or
the efforts of France and Germany in the Franco-German War, sink into
insignificance. These 2,700,000 Federals were organized into volunteer
regiments bearing state designations. The officers, except general and staff
officers, were appointed by the governors of the respective states. The maximum
authorized strength of the regular army never, during the war, exceeded 40,000
men; and the number in the field, especially towards the close of the war, was
very much less. The states, in order to obtain men to fill their quotas,
offered liberal bounties to induce men to enlist, -and it therefore became very
difficult to obtain recruits for the regular army, for which no bounties were
given. The regular regiments accordingly dwindled away to skeletons. The number
of officers present was also much reduced, since many of them, while retaining
their regular commissions, held higher rank in the volunteer army. After the
close of the Civil War the volunteers were mustered out, and by the act of
Congress of the 28th of July 1866 the line of the army was made to consist of
10 regiments of cavalry of 12 troops each, 5 regiments of artillery of 12
batteries each and 45 regiments of infantry of 10 companies The actual strength
in August 1867 was 53,962. The act of the 3rd of March 1869 reduced the number
of infantry regiments to 25 and the enlisted strength of the army to 35,036.
The numbers were further reduced, without change in organization, to 32,788 in
1870 and to 25,000 in 1874. The latter number remained the maximum for
twenty-four years.
In March 1898, in view of hostilities with Spain, the artillery was
increased by 2 regiments and, in April, 2 companies were - added, to each
infantry regiment, giving it battalions of companies each. The strength of
batteries, troops and companies was increased, the maximum enlisted strength
reached during 1898 being over 63,000. A volunteer army was also organized. Of
this army, 3 regiments of engineer troops, of cavalry and 10 of infantry were
United States volunteers, all the officers being commissioned by the president.
The other organizations came from the states, the officers being appointed by
the respective governors. As fast as they were organized and filled up, they
were mustered into the service of the United States. The total number furnished
for the war with Spain was 10,017 officers and 213,218 enlisted men. All
general and staff officers were appointed by the president. Three hundred and
eighty-seven officers of the regular army received volunteer commissions. After
the conclusion of hostilities with Spain, the mustering out of the volunteers
was begun, and by June 1899 all the volunteers, except those in the
Philippines, were out of the service. The latter, as well as those servitg
elsewhere, having enlisted only for the war, were brought home and mustered out
as soon as practicable.
The act of the 2nd of March 1899 added 2 batteries to each regiment
of artillery. On the 2nd of February 1901 Congress passed an important bill
providing for the reorganization and augmentation (max. 100,000) of the regular
army, and other measures followed in the next years. (See UNITED
STATES.)
MINOR ARMIES
100. Dutch and Belgian Armies
The military power of the United Provinces dates its rise
from the middle of the 16th century, when, after a long and sanguinary
struggle, they succeeded in emancipating themselves from the yoke of Spain; and
in the following century it received considerable development in consequence of
the wars they had to maintain against Louis XIV. In 1702 they had in their pay
upwards of 100,000 men, including many English and Scottish regiments, besides
30,000 in the service of the Dutch East India Company. But the slaughter of
Malplaquet deprived the republic of the flower of the army. Its part in the War
of the Austrian Succession was far from being as creditable as its earlier
deeds, a Prussian army overran Holland in 1787 almost without opposition, and
at the beginning of the wars of the French Revolution the army had fallen to
36,000 men. In 1795 Holland was conquered by the French under Pichegru, and in
the course of the changes which ensued the army was entirely reorganized, and
under French direction bore its share in the great wars of the empire.
With the fall of Napoleon and the reconstitution of the
Netherlands, the Dutch-Belgian army, formed of the troops of the now united
countries, came into existence. The army fought at Waterloo, but was not
destined to a long career, for the revolution of 1830 brought about the
separation of Belgium. A Dutch garrison under Baron Chassé, a
distinguished veteran of the Napoleonic wars, defended Antwerp against the
French under Marshal Gerard, and the Netherlands have been engaged in many
arduous colonial wars in the East Indies. The Belgian army similarly has
contributed officers and non-commissioned officers to the service of the Congo
Free State.
101. Swiss Army
The inhabitants of Switzerland were always a hardy and
independent race, but their high military reputation dates from the middle of
the 15th century, when the comparatively ill-armed and untrained mountaineers
signally defeated Charles the Bold of Burgundy and the flower of the chivalry
of Europe in the battles of Granson, Morat and Nancy. The Swabian war, towards
the end of that century, and the Milanese war, at the begin-fling of the
following one, added to the fame of the Swiss infantry, and made it the model
on which that arm was formed all over Europe. The wealthier countries vied with
each other in hiring them as mercenaries, and the poor but warlike Swiss found
the profession of arms a lucrative one.
A brief account of the Swiss mercenaries will be found earlier in
this article. Their fall was due in the end to their own indiscipline in the
first place, and the rise of the Spanish standing army and its musketeers in
the second. Yet it does not seem that the military reputation of the Swiss was
discredited, even by reverses such as Marignan. On the contrary, they continued
all through the 17th and r8th centuries to furnish whole regiments for the
service of other countries, notably of France, and individuals, like Jomini in
a later age, followed the career of the soldier of fortune everywhere. The most
notable incident in the later military history of the Swiss, the heroic
faithfulness of Louis XVI.'s Swiss guard, is proverbial, and has been
commemorated with just pride by their countrymen. The French Revolutionary
armies overran Switzerland, as they did all the small neighbouring states, and
during Napoleon's career she had to submit to his rule, and furnish her
contingent to his armies. On the fall of Napoleon she regained her
independence, and returned to her old trade of furnishing soldiers to the
sovereigns and powers of Europe. Charles X of France had at one time as many as
17,000 Swiss in his pay; Naples and Rome had each four regiments. The
recruiting for these foreign services was openly acknowledged and encouraged by
the government. The young Swiss engaged usually for a period of four or six
years; they were formed in separate regiments, officered by countrymen of their
own, and received a higher rate of pay than the national regiments; and at the
close of their engagement returned with their earnings to settle down on their
paternal holdings. A series of revolutions, however, expelled them from France
and Italy, and recently the advance of liberal ideas, and the creation of great
national armies based on the principle of personal service, has destroyed their
occupation. Switzerland is now remarkable in a military sense as being the only
country that maintains no standing army (see Militia).
102. The Swedish Army
The Swedish Army can look back with pride to the days of Gustavus
Adolphus and of Charles XII. The contributions made by it to the military
science of the 17th century have been noticed above. The triumphs of the small
and highly disciplined army of Charles were often such as to recall the similar
victories of the Greeks under Alexander. The then nebulous armies of Russia and
Poland resembled indeed the forces of Darius in the 4th century B.C., but Peter
the Great succeeded at last in producing a true army, and the resistance of the
Swedes collapsed under the weight of the vastly superior numbers then brought
against them.
The Danish Army has a long and meritorious record of good service
dating from the Thirty Years' War.
103. The Portuguese Army
The existing Army of Portugal dates from the Peninsular War, when a
considerable force of Portuguese, at one time exceeding 60,000 men, was
organized under Marshal Beresford. Trained and partly officered by English
officers, it proved itself not unworthy of its allies, and bore its full share
in the series of campaigns and battles by which the French were ultimately
expelled from Spain. At the peace the army numbered about 50,000 infantry and
5000 cavalry, formed on the English model, and all in the highest state of
efficiency. This force was reduced in 1821, under the new constitutional
government, to about one-half.
104. The Balkan Armies
The Rumanian, Bulgarian and Servian armies are the youngest in
Europe. The conduct of the Rumanians before Plevna in 1877 earned for them the
respect of soldiers of all countries. Servia and Bulgaria came to war in 1885,
and the Bulgarian soldiers, under the most adverse conditions, achieved
splendid victories under the leadership of their own officers. In the crisis
following the Austrian annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (1908-9), it seemed
likely that the Servian forces might play an unexpectedly active part in war
even with a strong power.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Below are the titles of some of the more important works on the
subject of armies. See also under biographical headings and articles dealing
with the several arms, &c. A large proportion of the works mentioned below
are concerned mainly with the development of strategy and tactics.
V.der Goltz Das Volk in Waffen (1883, new ed., 1898, English
translation, P. A. Ashworth, Nation in Arms, London, 1887, new ed.,
1907, French, Nation arméc, Paris, 1889); Jahns, Jfeeresver
fassung und Vblkerleben (Berlin, 1885); Berndt, Die ZahI im Kriege
(Vienna, 1895); F. N. Maude, Evolution of Modern Strategy (1903),
Voluntary versus Compulsory Service (1897), and War and the World's
Life (1907); Pierron, Mithodes de guerre. vol. i.; Jhhns,
Geschichte der Krsegswissenschaften (an exhaustive bibliography, with
critical notes); Troschke, Mil. Litteratur seit den Befreiungskrie;en
(Berlin, 1870); T. A. Dodge, Great Captains (Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar,
Gustavus, Napoleon); Bronsart v. Schellendorf (Eng. trans., War Office,
1905) Duties of the General Staff; Favh, Histoire et tactigue des
trois armes (Liege, 1850); Maynert, Gesch. des Kriegswesens u.. der
Heeresverfassungen in Europa (Vienna, 1869); Jahns, Hand buch für
cine Geschichte des Kriegswesens v. der Urzeit bis zur Renaissance
(Leipzig, 1880); de Ia Barre Duparcq, Histoire de l'art de la guerre avant
l'usage de poudre (Paris, 1860); Rüstow and Kochly, Geschichie des
griechischen Kriegswesens (Aarau, 1852); Kochly and Rustow, Griechische
Kriegsschriftsteller (Leipzig, 1855); Forster, in Hermes, xii.
(1877); D. G. Hogarth, Philip and Alexander (London, 1897); Macdougall,
Campaigns of Hannibal (London, 1858); Rustow, Heerwesen, &c.,
Julius Casars (Nordhausen, 1855); Organ der M. Wissensch. Verein of 1877
(Vienna); Polybius literature of the 17th and 18th centuries; supplement to
M.W.B,, 1883; the works of Xenophon, Aelian, Arrian, Vegetius, Polybius,
Caesar, &c. (see Kochly and Rüstow: a collection was made in the 15th
century, under the title Veteres de re militari scriptores, 1487); Oman,
A History of the Art of War: Middle Ages (London, 1898); Delpech, La
Tactique au XII1~ siècle (Paris, 1886); Kohier, Die Eniwickelung
des Kriegswesens v. II. Jahrhdt. bis Zn den Hussitenkriegen (Breslau,
18861893); Ricotti, Storia delle Compagnie di Ventura (Turin,
1846); Steger, Gesch. Francesco Sforzas und d. ital. Condottieri (Leipzig,
1865) ; J. A. Symonds, The Renaissance in Italy and The Age of the Despots; A
Brandenburg Mobilization of 1477 (German General Staff Monograph, No. 3);
Palacky, ?Kriegskunst der Bohmen, Zeitschrift bohmisch. Museums
(Prague, 1828); George, Battles of English History (London, 1895);
Biottot, Les Grands ins pirés devant la science: Jeanne d'Arc
(Paris, 1907); V. Ellger, Kriegswesen, &c., der Eidgenossen, 14.,
15., 16. Jahrhdt. (1873); de Ia Chauvelays, Les Armies de Charles le
Témeraire (Paris, 1879); Guillaume, Hist. des bandes d'ordonnance
dans les Pays-Bas (Brussels, 1873); the works of Froissart, de Brantome,
Machiavelli, Lienhard Fronsperger (Kriegsbuch, 1570), de Ia Noue, du Bellay,
&c.; Villari, Life and Times of Machiavelli (English version);
Die frommen Landsknechte (M. W. B., supplement, 1880);
Kriegsbilder aus der Zeit der Landsknechte (Stuttgart, 1883);
C. H. Fifth, Cromwell's Army (London, 1902); Heilmann,
Das Kriegswesen der Kaiserlichen und Schweden (Leipzig, 1850); C.
Walton, History of the British Standing Army, 16601700 (London,
1894); E. A. Altnam in United Service Magazine, February 1907; Austrian
official history of Prince Eugene's campaigns, &c.; de Ia Barre Duparcq,
Hist. milit. de Ia Prusse avant 1756 (Paris, 1857); Marsigli, L'Etat
militaire de Semp. Ottoman (1732); Prussian Staff History of the
Silesian wars; C. von B(inder)- K(rieglstein), Geist und S/off im
Kriege (Vienna, 1895); E. d'Hauterive, L'Armee sous Ia Révol
u/ion (Paris, 1894); C. Rousset, Les Volontaires de 17911794;
Michelet, Les Soldats de Ia Revolution (Paris, 1878); publications
of the French general staff on the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars; H.
Bonnal, Esprit de la guerre moderne (a series of studies in military
history, 18051870); Paimblant du Rouil, La Division Durutte, les
Refractaires, also supplement, M.W.B., 1890; The French
Conscription (suppi. M.W.B., 1892); C. v. der Goltz, Von Rossbach bis
Jena und Auerstodt (a new edition of the original Rossbach und Jena,
Berlin, 1883); German General Staff Monograph, No. 10; M.W.B. supplements of
1845, 1846, 1847, 1854, 1855,1856, 1857, 1858, 1862, 1865, 1866, 1867, 1887; v.
Duncker, Preussen wahrend der franz. Okkupation (1872); Archives of
Prussian war ministry, publications of 1892 and 1896; histories of the wars of
1866 and 1870; V. Chareton, Comme la Prusse a prépare sa revanche,
18061813; Reports of Col. Baron Stoffel, French attaché at
Berlin (translation into English, War Office, London); Haxthausen, Les
Forces militaires de la Prusse (Paris, 1853); de la Barre Duparcq,
Etudes historiques genérales et militaires sur Ia Prusse (Paris,
1854); Paixhans, Constitution militaire de Ia France (Paris, 1849); Duc
d'Aumale, Lee Institutions mill/aires de Ia France (Paris, 1867); C. v.
Decker, Uber die Personlichkeit des preussischen Soldaten (Berlin,
1842); War Office, Army Book of the British Empire (London, 1893); M.
Jahns, Das franzosische Heer von der grossen Revolution his zur Gegenwart
(Leipzig, 1873); Baron Kaulbars, The German Army (in Russian) [St
Petersburg, 18901; Die Schweiz jm ip. Jahrhundert (Berne and Lausanne,
1899); Heimann, L'Armie allemande (Paris, 1895); R. de l'Homme de
Courbihre, Grundzüge der deutschen Militarverwaltung (Berlin,
1882); G. F. R. Henderson, The Science of War (London, 1905); J. W.
Fortescue, History of the British Army (London, 1899 ); R.
de l'Homme de Courbière, Gesch. der brandenburg- preussisch.
Heeresverfassung (Berlin, 1852); Krippentagel and Kustel, Die preuss.
Armee von der 01/es/en Zeit his zur Gegenwart (Berlin, 1883); Gansauge,
Das brandenbg.-preus:. Kriegs u'esen,1440,1640,1740(Berlin, 1839);
A.v.Boguslawksi ,Die Landwehr, 18131893 (1893); A. R. v.
Sichart, Gesch. d. k. Hannover. Armee (Hanover, 1866); v.
Reitzenstein, Die k. Hannover. Kavallerie, 1631 i866 (1892);
Schlee, Zur Gesch. des Hessischen Kriegswesens (Kassel, 1867);
Leichtlen, Badens Kriegsverfassung (Carlsruhe, 1213) v. Stadlinger,
Gesch. des wurttembergischen Kriegswesens (Stuttgart, 1858); Munich,
Entwickelung der bayerischen Armee (Mumch, 1864); official Gesch. d. k.
bayer. Armee (Munich, 1901 onward); Wurdinger, Kriegsgeschich/e v.
Bayern (Munich, 1868); H. Meynert, Gesch. des Os/err. Kriegswesens
(Vienna, 1852), Kriegswesen Ungarns (Vienna, 1876); Anger, Gesch. der
K.-K. Armee (Vienna, .1886); Beitrage zur Gesch. des Os/err. Heerwesens,
17541814 (Vienna, 1872); R. v. Ottenfeld and Teuber, Die Oserr.
Armee, 1700-1867 (Vienna, 1895); V. Wrede, Gesch. d. K. u. K.
Wehrmacht (Vienna, 1902); May de Rainmoter, Histoire Militaire de Ia
.Suisse (Lausanne, 1788); Cusachs y Barado, La Vida Militar en
España (Barcelona, 1888); Guillaume, Hist. de I'infanterie
wallonne sous la maisos.~ d'Espagne (Brussels, 1876); A. Vitu, Histoire
civile de l'armée (Paris, 1868); A. Pascal, Hist. de l'arme'e
(Paris, 1847); L. Jablonski, L'Armie française a travers les
dges; C. Romagny, His/. générale de l'armée
nationale (Paris, 1893); E. Simond, Hist. mu. de Ia France; Susane,
Hist. de I'infanterie, cavalerie, artillerie françaises (Paris,
1874); Père Daniel, Hist. des milices francaises (1721); the
official Historique des corps de troupe (Paris, 1900 ); Cahu, Le
Soldat francais (Paris, 1876); 3. Molard, Cent antde l'armée
francaise, 17891889 (Paris, 1890); v. Stein, Lehre vom Heerwesen
(Stuttgart, 1872); du Verger de S. Thomas, L'Italie et son
armée, 1865 (Paris, 1866); C. Martel, Military Italy
(London, 1884); Sir R. Biddulph, Lord Cardwell at the War Office
(London, 1904) ; Willoughby Verner, Military Life of the Duke of Cambridge
(London, ?9o~); W. H. Daniel, The Miitary Forces of the Crown
(London, 1902); War Office, Annual Report of the British Army; Broome,
Rise and Progress of the Bengal Army (Calcutta, 185o); W. J. Wilson,
Hist. of the Madras Army (London, 18821885); C. M. Clode,
Military Forces of the Crown; Blume, Die Grundlage unserer Wehrkraft
(Berlin, 1890); Spenser Wilkinson, The Brain of an Army (London,
1890 and 1895); v. Olberg, Die franzosische Armee im Exerzirplatz und im
Felde (Berlin, 1861); Die Heere und Flo/te der Gegenwart, ed.
Zepelin (Berlin, 1896); Molard, Puissances mill/aires de l'Europe
(Paris, 1895);works of Montecucculi, Puységur, Vauban, Feuquihres,
Guibert, Folard, Guichard, Joly de Maizeroy, Frederick the Great, Marshal Saxe,
the prince de Ligne, Napoleon, Carnot, Scharnhorst, Clausewitz, Napoleon III.,
Moltke, Hamley, &c.
The principal general military periodicals are
:English,Journal of the R. United Service Institution; United States,
Journal of the Military Service Institution; French, Revue d'histoire and Revue
des drmées itrangères (general staff); Rau and Lauth, L'Eat
militaire des puissances (about every 4 years); Revue militaire
générale, founded in 1907 by General Langlois; Atmanach du
drapeau (a popular aide-mémoire published annually); German, the
Vierteljahrsheft of the general staff: Mslitdr- Wochenblatt (referred to above
as M.W.B.the supplements are of great value); von Löbell's
Jahresberichte (annual detailed reports on the state, &c., of all armies an
English précis appears annually in the Journal of the R.U.S.
Institution); Austrian, Streffleurs Ost. Militär - Zeitschrift, with which
was amalgamated (1907) the Organ d. militarwissenschaft. Vereins. The British
War Office issues from time to time handbooks dealing with foreign armies, and,
quarterly since April 1907, a critical review and bibliography of recent
military literature in the principal languages, under the name of Recent
Publications of Military Interest.(C. F. A.)