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The fourth part of this essay

Charles Francis Atkinson
Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th edition Volume II pgs 592-625


87. The German army, strictly speaking, dates only from 1871, or at earliest 1866. Before the unification of the German empire or confederation, the several states possessed distinct armies, federal armies when required being formed from the contingents which the members of the union, like those of an ordinary alliance, engaged to furnish. The armies of the Holy Roman Empire were similarly formed from “single,” “double,” or “treble” contingents under the supreme command of specially appointed field marshals of the Empire. In the troubles of 1848 there was witnessed the curious spectacle of half of a victorious army being unable to pursue the enemy; this, being composed of “Prussian“ as distinct from “federal contingent“ troops, had to stop at the frontier of another state. The events of 1866 and 1870 put an end to all this, and to a very great extent to the separate armies of the old confederation, all being now remodelled on Prussian lines. The Prussian army therefore is at once the most important and historically the most interesting of the forces of the German empire. Its debut (about 1630) was not satisfactory, and in the Thirty Years' War troops of Sweden, of the Emperor, of the League, &c., plundered Brandenburg unharmed. The elector, when appealed to for protection, could but answer, “Que faire? Ils ont des canons.” The humiliations of this time, were, however, avenged by the troops of the next ruler of Brandenburg, called the Great Elector. The supposed invincibility of the Swedes did not prevent him from inflicting upon them a severe defeat at Fehrbeffln, and thereafter the Prussian contingents which took part in the many European wars of the time acquitted themselves creditably. One of their generals was the famous Leopold of Anhalt-Dessau, and the reckless gallantry of this leader was conspicuous on many fields, from Blenheim to Malplaquet. But Leopold's greatest work was done in the years of peace (1715—40), during which Prussia was preparing the army with which Frederick the Great won his battles. He had introduced (about 1700) iron ramrods into the infantry service, and for over twenty years the Prussian infantry was drilled to a perfection which gave it a superiority of five to three over the best- drilled troops of the Austrian service, and still greater predominance over the French, which was then accounted the best in Europe. Frederick William I, king of Prussia, directed and supervised the creation of the new Prussian army, and Leopold was his principal assistant. In organization and methods of recruiting, as well as in tactical efficiency, the army of 1740 was equally pre-eminent. Then came the wars of Frederick the Great. It is not too much to say that the infantry won his earlier battles; the cavalry had been neglected both by Frederick William and by Leopold, and Frederick wrote that “it was not worth the devil's while to fetch it away.” But the predominance of the infantry was so far indisputable that Frederick was able to devote himself to the reorganization of the mounted arm, with results which appeared in the splendid victories of Hohenfriedberg, Rossbach, Leuthen and Zorndorf. But long before the close of the Seven Years' War the incomparable infantry of the old army had disappeared, to be replaced by foreigners, deserters and vagabonds of all kinds, not to mention the unwilling Saxon and other recruits forced into the king's service. The army of 200,000 men which Frederick bequeathed to his successor was indeed superb, and deserved to be the model of Europe. But with Frederick's death the genius which had animated it, and which alone gave value to such heterogeneous materials, was gone. The long peace had the customary effect of sapping the efficiency of the long-service troops. They still retained their imposing appearance and precision of movement, and overweening self-confidence. But in 1806, after two crushing defeats and a series of humiliating surrenders, Prussia found herself at the feet of the conqueror, shorn of half her territory, obliged to receive French troops in all her towns and fortresses, and only existing on sufferance. But in these very disasters were laid the seeds of her future greatness. By the treaty of Tilsit the Prussian army was limited to 43,000 men. This limitation suggested rather subsidiary to voluntary enlistment, to Scharnhorst “universal service” on the Krum per 1 system already described (see § 36 above).

88. Reforms

The bitter humiliation and suffering endured under the French yoke aroused a national spirit which was capable of any sacrifices. The civilian became eager to be trained to fight against the oppressor of his country; and when Prussia rose in 1813, the armies she poured into the field were no longer pro fessional, but national armies, imperfectly trained and organized, but animated by a spirit which more than compensated for these defects. At the close of the war her rulers, with far- seeing sagacity, at once devoted themselves to organize on a permanent footing the system which had sprung up under the necessities and enthusiasm of the moment. Universal compulsory service, and a three years' term in the ranks, with further periods in the reserve and Landwehr, were then introduced; and though variations have subsequently been made in the distribution of time, the principles were substantially the same as those now in force. By the law of 1814 the periods of service were fixed at three years in the army, two in the reserve and fourteen in the Landwehr, and the annual contingent at 40,000 men. As the population increased, it was felt that the service was unequally distributed, pressing unnecessarily heavily on some, while others escaped altogether. Further, the experiences of Bronnzell and Olmutz in 1850, and of 1859, when Prussia armed in anticipation of a war with France, aroused great doubts as to the efficiency of the Landwehr, which then formed the bulk of Prussia's forces, and of whom many had been as long as ten years away from the colours. At this time the French remark that the Prussian army was ”a sort of militia“ was by no means untrue. Accordingly, by the law of 1800 the annual contingent was fixed at 63,000, the period in the reserve was increased from two to four years, and that in the Landwehr reduced from fourteen to five, The total armed force thus remained nearly the same (12 contingents of 63,000, in place of 19 of 40,000), but the army and its reserves were more than doubled (increased from 5 X 40,000 to 7 x 63,000) while the Landwehr was proportionately reduced.

This change was not effected without great opposition, and led to a prolonged struggle between the king, guided by Bismarck, and the parliament. It required the victories of 1866 and 1870, and the position thereby won for Prussia, to reconcile the nation to the new law. The military alliance (1866) of Prussia with the other German states gave place in 1871 to the union of all the armies into the German army as it is today. Some retained their old peculiarities of uniform, and even more than this was allowed to Bavaria and to Saxony, but the whole army, which has been increased year by year to its present strength, is modeled on the Prussian part of it. The Prussian army corps are the Guard, and the line numbered I to XI, and XV to XVIII.

89. Saxon Army

The Saxon Army formerly played a prominent part in all the wars of northern Europe, chiefly in connection with Poland. In the War of the Austrian Succession the Saxon army played a prominent part, but in the end it suffered a heavy defeat in the battle of Kesselsdorf (1745). In the Seven Years' War Saxony was overrun by the Prussians almost without resistance, and the military forces of the country under Field Marshal Rutowski were forced to surrender en masse at Pirna (1756); the men were compelled by Frederick the Great to join the Prussian army, and fought, though most unwillingly, through the remainder of the war as Prussian soldiers. A few outlying regiments which had not been involved in the catastrophe served with the Austrians, and on one occasion at least, at Kolin, inflicted a severe blow on the Prussians. At the outbreak of the wars of the French Revolution the Saxon army was over 30,000 strong. It took part in the campaign of Jena on the side of the Prussians, and during the Napoleonic domination in Germany Saxony furnished strong contingents to the armies of Napoleon, who in return recognized her elector as king, and largely increased his territories. The newly made king remained faithful to Napoleon even in his reverses; but the army was too German in feeling to fight willingly under the French flag.

1. From Krumperpferde (cast horses attached to batteries, &c., for odd jobs), applied to the recruits in jest.

Their defection at Leipzig contributed not a little to the results of that bloody day. After the peace the king was shorn of a great part of his dominions, and the army was reconstituted on a smaller scale. In 1866 Saxony sided with Austria, and her army shared in the disasters of the brief campaign and the crowning defeat at Koniggratz. Under the crown prince's leadership, however, the Saxons distinguished themselves by their courage and steadiness wherever they were engaged. After the war Saxony became part of the North German Confederation, and in 1870— 1871 her troops, under the command of the crown prince, formed the XII corps of the great German army. They were assigned to the II army of Prince Frederick Charles, and delivered the decisive attack on the French right at Gravelotte. Subsequently a IV army was formed under the command of the crown prince, in which the XII corps, now under Prince George of Saxony, served with unvarying credit in the campaign of Sedan and the siege of Paris. The Saxon army is now organized in every respect on Prussian lines, and forms two army corps (XII at Dresden and XIX at Leipzig) of the German army. The German emperor, in concert with the king of Saxony, names the officers for the higher commands. Saxony retains, however, her separate war ministry, budget, &c.; and appointments and promotion to all but the highest commands are made by the king. The colours of the older Saxon forces, and especially the green of the tunics, are retained in many of the uniforms of the present day.

90. The Bavarian Army

The Bavarian Army has perhaps the most continuous record of good service in the field of any of the minor German armies. The oldest regiments date from the Thirty Years' War, in which the veteran army of the Catholic league, commanded by Count Tilly and formed on the nucleus of the Bavarian army, played a conspicuous part. Later in the war the Bavarian general, Count Mercy, proved himself a worthy opponent of Turenne and Condé. Hence-forward the Bavarians were engaged in almost every war between France and Austria, taking part successively in the wars of the Grand Alliance, the Spanish Succession (in which they came into conflict with the English), and the Polish and Austrian Succession wars. In pursuance of the traditional anti-Austrian policy, the troops of Bavaria, led by a distinguished Bavarian, Marshal (Prince) Wrede, served in the campaigns of 1805 to 1813 side by side with the French, and Napoleon made the electorate into a kingdom. But in 1813 Bavaria joined the Alliance, and Wrede tried to intercept the French on their retreat from Leipzig. Napoleon, however, inflicted a severe defeat on his old general at Hanau, and opened his road to France. In 1866 the Bavarians took part against Prussia, but owing to their dilatoriness in taking the field, the Prussians were able to beat them in detail. In 1870, reorganized to some extent on Prussian lines, they joined their former enemy in the war against France, and bore their full share in the glories and losses of the campaign, the II Bavarian corps having suffered more heavily than any but the III Prussian corps. The I Bavarian corps distinguished itself very greatly at Sedan and on the Loire. Bavaria still retains her separate war office and special organization, and the troops have been less affected by the Prussian influence than those of the other states. The Bavarian corps are numbered separately (I Bay, Munich; II Bav, Wurzburg; III Bay, Nuremberg), and the old light blue uniforms and other distinctive peculiarities of detail are still maintained.

91. Wurttemburg Army

Württemberg furnishes one army corps (XIII; headquarters, Stuttgart), organized, clothed and equipped in all respects like the Prussian army. Like the Bavarians, the Wurttembergers fought against the Prussians in 1866, but in 1870 made common cause with them against the French, and by the convention entered into the following year placed their army permanently under the command of the Prussian king as emperor. The emperor nominates to the highest commands, but the king of Wurttemberg retains' the nomination and appointment of officers in the lower grades.

92. Hanoverian Army

The old Hanoverian Army disappeared, of course, with the annexation of Hanover to Prussia in 1866, but it is still represented officially by certain regiments of the X army corps, and, in one case at least, battle honours won by the King's German Legion in the British service are borne on German colours of today. The Hessian Army is now represented by the XXV (Grand- ducal Hessian) division, which forms part of the XVIII army corps.


93. The old conscription law of the kingdom of Sardinia is the basis of the military organization of Italy, as its constitution is of that of the modern Italian kingdom. The Piedmontese have long borne a high reputation for their military qualities, a

reputation shared by the rulers of the house of Savoy (q.v.), many of whom showed special ability in preserving the independence of their small kingdom between two, such powerful neighbours as France and Austria. During, the wars of the French Revolution Piedmont was temporarily absorbed into the French republic ?and empire. The Italian troops who fought under Napoleon proved themselves, in many if not most cases, the best of the French allies, and Italy contributed large numbers of excellent general officers to the, Grande Armée.

After 1815 various causes combined to place Piedmont (Sardinia) at the head of the national movement which agitated Italy during the ensuing thirty years, and bring her in direct antagonism to Austria. Charles Albert, her then ruler, had paid great attention to the army, and when ltaly rose against Austria in 1848 he took the field with an excellent force of nearly 70,000 men. At the outset fortune favoured the arms of Italy; but the genius and energy of Radetzky, the veteran Austrian commander, turned the tide, and in the summer of 1849 after many battles the Piedmontese army was decisively defeated at Novara, and her king compelled to sue for peace. Charles Albert abdicated in favour of his son Victor Emanuel, a prince who had already distinguished himself by his personal gallantry in the field. Under his care the army soon recovered its efficiency, and the force which joined the allied armies in the Crimea attracted general admiration from the excellence of its organization, equipment and discipline. In 1859 Piedmont again took up arms against Austria for the liberation of Italy; but this time she had the powerful assistance of France, and played but a subordinate part herself. In this campaign the Sardinian army was composed of one cavalry and five infantry divisions, and numbered about 60,000 combatants. By the peace of Villafranca, Italy, with the exception of Venetia, was freed from the Austrians, and Lombardy was added to Piedmont. The revolutionary campaign of Garibaldi in the following year united the whole peninsula under the rule of Victor Emanuel, and in 1866, when Italy for the third time took up arms against Austria—this time as the ally of Prussia— her forces had risen to nearly 450,000, of whom about 270,000 actually took the field. But in quality these were far from being equal to the old Piedmontese army; and the northern army, under the personal command of the king, was decisively defeated at Custozza by the archduke Albert of Austria.

The existing organization of the Italian army is determined by the laws of 1873, which made universal liability to service the basis of recruiting. The territorial system has not, however, been adopted at the same time, the materials of which the Italian army is composed varying so much that it was decided to, blend the different types of soldiers so far as possible by causing them to serve together. The colonial wars in which Italian troops have taken part have been marked with great disasters, but relieved by the gallantry of the officers and the rank and file.


94. The history of the Russian army begins with the abolition of the Strelitz (q.v.) by Peter the Great in 1698, the nucleus of the new forces being four regiments of foot, two of which are well known to-day under their old titles of Preobrazhenski and Semenovski. Throughout the 18th century Russian military progress obeyed successive dynasties of western European models—first those of Prussia, then those of France. In the earlier part of the 19th century the army, used chiefly in wars against the revolutionary spirit, became, like others of that time, a dynastic force; subsequently the “nation in arms” principle reasserted itself, and on this basis has been carried out the reorganization of Russia's military power. The enormous development of this since 1874 is one of the most striking phenomena in recent military history. In 1892, in expectation of a general European war, whole armies were massed in the districts of Warsaw and Vilna, three-fifths of the entire forces being in position on the German and Austrian frontiers.

The Russo-Japanese War of 1904—5 is generally held to have proved that the fighting power of the Russian has in no way diminished in intrinsic value from that of the days of Zorndorf, Borodino and Sevastopol. The proverbial stubbornness of the rank and file is the distinctive quality of the armies of the tsar, and in view of the general adoption of two-years' service in other countries it is a matter for grave consideration whether, against European forces and in defence of their own homes, the Russians would not prove more than formidable antagonists to the men of more highly individualized races who are their probable opponents. Equally remarkable is the new power of redistribution possessed by Russia. Formerly it was usual to count upon one campaign at least elapsing before Russia could intervene effectively in European wars; much, in fact the greater part, of her losses in the Crimean War was due to the enormous distances which had to be traversed on foot. Nowadays the original equal distribution of the army over the country has been modified in accordance with the political needs of each moment. In 1892 the centre of gravity was shifted to Poland and Kiev, in 1904 the performances of the trans-Siberian railway in transporting troops to the seat of war in Manchuria excited the admiration of military Europe. The attitude of the army in the troubles which followed upon the Japanese War belongs to the history of Russia, not to that of military organization, and it will be sufficient to say that the conduct of the “nation in arms” at times of political unrest may vary between the extremes of unquestioning obedience to authority and the most dangerous form of licence, examples of both being frequent in the history of nearly all national armies. A remarkable innovation in the modern history of this army is the conversion of the whole of the cavalry, except a few elite regiments, into dragoons of the old type. After the war of 1904- 5, however, this policy was reversed and the cavalry reformed on the usual model. The Cossacks still retain to a large extent the peculiarities of the light troops of the 18th century.


95. The feudal sovereignties of medieval Spain differed but little, in their military organization, from other feudal states. As usual, mercenaries were the only forces on which reliance was placed for foreign wars. These troops called almogavares (Arabic=scouts) won a great reputation on Italian and Greek battlefields of the 13th century, and with many transformations in name and character appeared from time to time up to the Peninsular War. Castile, however, had a military system very different from the rest. The forces of the kingdom were composed of local contingents similar to the English fyrd, professional soldiers who were paid followers of the great lords, and the heavy cavalry of the military orders. The groups of cities called Hermandades, while they existed, also had permanent forces in their pay. At the union of Castile and Aragon the Castilian methods' received a more general application. The new Hermandad was partly a light cavalry, partly a police, and was organized in the ratio of one soldier to every hundred families. In the conquest of Grenada (1482—92) mesnadas or contingents were furnished by the crown, the nobles and the cities, and permanently kept in the field. The Hermandad served throughout the war as a matter of course. From the veterans of this war was drawn the army which in the Italian wars won its reputation as the first army in Europe.

In 1596 the home defence of Spain was reorganized and the ordenanza, or militia, which was then formed of all men not belonging to the still extant feudal contingents, was generally analogous to the system of “assizes at arms” in England. This ordenanza served in the Peninsular War.

96. Spain in Italy

With the Italian wars of the early 16th century came the development of the regular army; a brief account of its place in the evolution of armies has been given above. Discipline, the feeling of comradeship and soldierly honour were the qualities which marked out the Spanish army as the model for others to follow, and for more than a century the Spanish army maintained its prestige as the first in Europe. The oldest regiments of the present Spanish army claiming descent from the tercios date from 1535. An officer whose regiment was reduced commonly took a pike in some other corps (e.g. Tilly), the señor soldado was counted as a gentleman, and his wife and family received state allowances. Nor was this army open only to Spaniards. Walloons, Italians, Burgundians and other nationalities ruled over by the Habsburgs all contributed their quotas. But the career of the old army came to an end at Rocroi (1643), and after this the forces of the monarchy began more and more to conform to the French model.

97. Spanish Army 17th - 18th Century

The military history of Spain from 1650 to 1700 is full of incident, and in the long war of the Spanish Succession both the army and the ordenanza found almost continuous employment. They were now organized, as were most other armies of Europe, on the lines of the French army, and in 1714 the old tercios, which had served in the Spanish Netherlands under Marlborough, were brought to Spain. The king's regiment “Zamora” of the present army descends from one of these which, as the tercio of Bovadilla, had been raised in 1580. The army underwent few changes of importance during the 18th century, and it is interesting to note that there were never less than three Irish regiments in the service. In 1808 the Irianda, Ultonia (=Ulster) and Hibernia regiments had come to consist (as had similar corps in the French service before the Revolution) largely of native soldiers. At that time the Spanish army consisted of 119 Spanish and foreign (Swiss, Walloon and Irish) battalions, with 24 cavalry regiments and about 8000 artillery and engineers. There were further 51 battalions of militia, and the total forces numbered actually 137,000. The part played by the Spanish standing army in the Peninsular War was certainly wholly insignificant relatively to these figures. It must be borne in mind, however, that only continued wars can give real value to. long-service troops of the old style, and this advantage the Spanish regulars did not possess. Further, the general decadence of administration reacted in the usual way, the appointment of court favourites to high command was a flagrant evil, and all that can be urgedis that the best elements of the army behaved as well as did the Prussians of 1806, that the higher leading and the administration of the army in the field were both sufficiently weak to have ruined most armies, and that the men were drawn from the same country and the same classes which furnished the guerrilleros whom it became fashionable to exalt at the expense of the soldiers. In the later campaigns of Wellington, Spanish divisions did good service, and the corps of La Romaña (a picked contingent of troops which had been sent before the war to Denniark at Napoleon's instance), though often defeated, always retained some cohesion and discipline. But the result of this war, the second French invasion, and the continued civil wars of the 19th century was the destruction of the old army, and the present army of Spain still bears traces of the confusion out of which it arose.

The most important changes were in 1870, when conscription was introduced, and in 1872, when universal service was proposed in its place. The military virtues of the rank and -file and the devotion of the officers were conspicuously displayed in the Spanish-American War of 1898, and it cannot be claimed even for the Germans of 1870 that they fired so coolly and accurately as did the ?defenders of S. Juan and El Caney.


98. The writers who have left the most complete and trustworthy contemporary accounts of the Turkish army in the 14th and 15th centuries, when it reached the height of its most characteristic development, are Bertrandon de la Brocquière, equerry to Philip the Good, duke of Burgundy, and Francesco Filelfo of Tolentino. Bertrandon, a professional soldier, visited Palestine in 1432, and returned overland in 1433, traversing the Balkan Peninsula by the main trade-route from Constantinople to Belgrade. He wrote an account of-his journey for Philip: see Early Travels in Palestine, translated and edited by T. Wright (London, 1848). Filelfo served as sècretary to the Venetian baylo at Constantinople, and recorded his observations in a series of letters (see FILELFO). Both ascribe the military superiority of the Turks over the nations of western Europe to two facts—firstly to their possession of a well-organized standing army, an institution unknown elsewhere, and secondly to their far stricter discipline, itself a result of their military organization and of the moral training afforded by Islam.

The regular troops comprised the Janissaries (q.v.), a corps of infantry recruited from captured sons of Christians, and trained to form a privileged caste of scientific soldiers and religious fanatics; and the Spahis, a body of cavalry similarly recruited, and armed with scimitar, mace and bow. Celibacy was one of the rules of this standing army, which, in its semi- monastic ideals and constitution, resembled the knightly orders of the West in their prime. The Janissaries numbered about 12,000, the Spahis about 8000. A second army of some 40,000 men, mostly mounted and armed like the Spahis, was feudal in character, and consisted chiefly of the personal followers of the Moslem nobility; more than half its numbers were recruited in Europe. This force of 60,000 trained soldiers was accompanied by a horde of irregulars, levied chiefly among the barbarous mountaineers of the Balkans and Asia Minor, and very ill-armed and ill-disciplined. Their numbers may be estimated at 140,000, for Bertrandon gives 200,000 as the total of the Turkish forces. Many 15th and 16th century writers give a smaller total, but refer only to the standing and feudal armies. Others place the total higher. Laonicus Chalcocondylas in his Turcica Historia states that at the siege of Constantinople in 1453 the sultan commended 400,000 troops, but most other eye-witnesses of the siege give a total varying from 150,000 to 300,000. Many Christian soldiers of fortune enlisted with the Turks as artillerists or engineers, and supplied them at Constantinople with the most powerful cannon of the age. Other Christians were compelled to serve as engineers or in the ranks. As late as 1683 a corps of Wallachians was forced to join the Turkish army before Vienna, and entrusted with the task of bridging the Danube. But in the 18th and early 19th centuries the introduction of Christians tended to weaken the moral of the army already sapped by defeat; it was found impossible to maintain the discipline of the Janissaries, whose privileges had become a source of danger; and the feudal nobility became more and more independent of the sultan's authority. These three causes contributed to make reorganization inevitable.

The destruction of the Janissaries in 1826 marked the close of the history. of the old Turkish army; already the re-creation of the service on the accepted models of western Europe had been commenced. This was still incomplete when the new force was called upon to meet the Russians in 1828, and though the army displayed its accustomed bravery, its defective organization and other causes led to its defeat. Since then the army has been almost as constantly on active service as the British; the Crimean War, the Russo-Turkish War of 1877 and the Greek-Turkish War of 1897 witnessed the employment of a large proportion of the sultan's available forces, while innumerable local revolts in different parts of the empire called for great exertions, and often for fierce fighting on the part of the troops locally in garrison and those sent up from the nearest provinces.


99. The regular army of the United States has always been small. From the first it has been a voluntary force, and until 1898 its chief work in peace was to furnish numerous small posts on the frontier and amongst the Indians, and to act as a reserve to the civil power in the great cities. In war-time the regular army, if, as was usually the case, it was insufficient in numbers for the task of subduing the enemy, formed the nucleus of large armies raised “for the war.” In 1790 the rank.and file of the army, as fixed by act of Congress, amounted to 1216 men; and in 1814 an English expedition of only 3500 men was able to seize and burn Washington, the capital of a country which even then numbered eight millions of inhabitants. In 1861, at the begining of the Civil War, the whole regular force amounted to about 15,300 men. In April of that year the president called out 75,000 volunteers for three months; and in May a further-call for 42,000 was made. In July a call for 500,000 men was authorized by Congress, and as even this vast force proved insufficient it was found necessary to use a system of drafts, In October 1863 a levy of 300,000 men was ordered, and in February 1864 a further call of 500,000 was made. Finally, in the beginning of 1865 two further levies, amounting in all to 500,000 men, Were ordered, but were only partially carried out in consequence of the cessation of hostilities The total number of men called under arms by the government of the United States, between April 1861 and April 1865, amounted to 2,759,049, of whom 2,656,053 were actually embodied in the armies. If to these be added the 1,100,000 men embodied by the South during the same time, the total armed forces reach the enormous amount of nearly four millions, drawn from a population of only 32 millions — figures before which the celebrated uprising of the French nation in 1793, or the efforts of France and Germany in the Franco-German War, sink into insignificance. These 2,700,000 Federals were organized into volunteer regiments bearing state designations. The officers, except general and staff officers, were appointed by the governors of the respective states. The maximum authorized strength of the regular army never, during the war, exceeded 40,000 men; and the number in the field, especially towards the close of the war, was very much less. The states, in order to obtain men to fill their quotas, offered liberal bounties to induce men to enlist, -and it therefore became very difficult to obtain recruits for the regular army, for which no bounties were given. The regular regiments accordingly dwindled away to skeletons. The number of officers present was also much reduced, since many of them, while retaining their regular commissions, held higher rank in the volunteer army. After the close of the Civil War the volunteers were mustered out, and by the act of Congress of the 28th of July 1866 the line of the army was made to consist of 10 regiments of cavalry of 12 troops each, 5 regiments of artillery of 12 batteries each and 45 regiments of infantry of 10 companies The actual strength in August 1867 was 53,962. The act of the 3rd of March 1869 reduced the number of infantry regiments to 25 and the enlisted strength of the army to 35,036. The numbers were further reduced, without change in organization, to 32,788 in 1870 and to 25,000 in 1874. The latter number remained the maximum for twenty-four years.

In March 1898, in view of hostilities with Spain, the artillery was increased by 2 regiments and, in April, 2 companies were - added, to each infantry regiment, giving it battalions of companies each. The strength of batteries, troops and companies was increased, the maximum enlisted strength reached during 1898 being over 63,000. A volunteer army was also organized. Of this army, 3 regiments of engineer troops, of cavalry and 10 of infantry were United States volunteers, all the officers being commissioned by the president. The other organizations came from the states, the officers being appointed by the respective governors. As fast as they were organized and filled up, they were mustered into the service of the United States. The total number furnished for the war with Spain was 10,017 officers and 213,218 enlisted men. All general and staff officers were appointed by the president. Three hundred and eighty-seven officers of the regular army received volunteer commissions. After the conclusion of hostilities with Spain, the mustering out of the volunteers was begun, and by June 1899 all the volunteers, except those in the Philippines, were out of the service. The latter, as well as those servitg elsewhere, having enlisted only for the war, were brought home and mustered out as soon as practicable.

The act of the 2nd of March 1899 added 2 batteries to each regiment of artillery. On the 2nd of February 1901 Congress passed an important bill providing for the reorganization and augmentation (max. 100,000) of the regular army, and other measures followed in the next years. (See UNITED STATES.)


100. Dutch and Belgian Armies

—The military power of the United Provinces dates its rise from the middle of the 16th century, when, after a long and sanguinary struggle, they succeeded in emancipating themselves from the yoke of Spain; and in the following century it received considerable development in consequence of the wars they had to maintain against Louis XIV. In 1702 they had in their pay upwards of 100,000 men, including many English and Scottish regiments, besides 30,000 in the service of the Dutch East India Company. But the slaughter of Malplaquet deprived the republic of the flower of the army. Its part in the War of the Austrian Succession was far from being as creditable as its earlier deeds, a Prussian army overran Holland in 1787 almost without opposition, and at the beginning of the wars of the French Revolution the army had fallen to 36,000 men. In 1795 Holland was conquered by the French under Pichegru, and in the course of the changes which ensued the army was entirely reorganized, and under French direction bore its share in the great wars of the empire.

With the fall of Napoleon and the reconstitution of the Netherlands, the Dutch-Belgian army, formed of the troops of the now united countries, came into existence. The army fought at Waterloo, but was not destined to a long career, for the revolution of 1830 brought about the separation of Belgium. A Dutch garrison under Baron Chassé, a distinguished veteran of the Napoleonic wars, defended Antwerp against the French under Marshal Gerard, and the Netherlands have been engaged in many arduous colonial wars in the East Indies. The Belgian army similarly has contributed officers and non-commissioned officers to the service of the Congo Free State.

101. Swiss Army

—The inhabitants of Switzerland were always a hardy and independent race, but their high military reputation dates from the middle of the 15th century, when the comparatively ill-armed and untrained mountaineers signally defeated Charles the Bold of Burgundy and the flower of the chivalry of Europe in the battles of Granson, Morat and Nancy. The Swabian war, towards the end of that century, and the Milanese war, at the begin-fling of the following one, added to the fame of the Swiss infantry, and made it the model on which that arm was formed all over Europe. The wealthier countries vied with each other in hiring them as mercenaries, and the poor but warlike Swiss found the profession of arms a lucrative one.

A brief account of the Swiss mercenaries will be found earlier in this article. Their fall was due in the end to their own indiscipline in the first place, and the rise of the Spanish standing army and its musketeers in the second. Yet it does not seem that the military reputation of the Swiss was discredited, even by reverses such as Marignan. On the contrary, they continued all through the 17th and r8th centuries to furnish whole regiments for the service of other countries, notably of France, and individuals, like Jomini in a later age, followed the career of the soldier of fortune everywhere. The most notable incident in the later military history of the Swiss, the heroic faithfulness of Louis XVI.'s Swiss guard, is proverbial, and has been commemorated with just pride by their countrymen. The French Revolutionary armies overran Switzerland, as they did all the small neighbouring states, and during Napoleon's career she had to submit to his rule, and furnish her contingent to his armies. On the fall of Napoleon she regained her independence, and returned to her old trade of furnishing soldiers to the sovereigns and powers of Europe. Charles X of France had at one time as many as 17,000 Swiss in his pay; Naples and Rome had each four regiments. The recruiting for these foreign services was openly acknowledged and encouraged by the government. The young Swiss engaged usually for a period of four or six years; they were formed in separate regiments, officered by countrymen of their own, and received a higher rate of pay than the national regiments; and at the close of their engagement returned with their earnings to settle down on their paternal holdings. A series of revolutions, however, expelled them from France and Italy, and recently the advance of liberal ideas, and the creation of great national armies based on the principle of personal service, has destroyed their occupation. Switzerland is now remarkable in a military sense as being the only country that maintains no standing army (see Militia).

102. The Swedish Army

The Swedish Army can look back with pride to the days of Gustavus Adolphus and of Charles XII. The contributions made by it to the military science of the 17th century have been noticed above. The triumphs of the small and highly disciplined army of Charles were often such as to recall the similar victories of the Greeks under Alexander. The then nebulous armies of Russia and Poland resembled indeed the forces of Darius in the 4th century B.C., but Peter the Great succeeded at last in producing a true army, and the resistance of the Swedes collapsed under the weight of the vastly superior numbers then brought against them.

The Danish Army has a long and meritorious record of good service dating from the Thirty Years' War.

103. The Portuguese Army

The existing Army of Portugal dates from the Peninsular War, when a considerable force of Portuguese, at one time exceeding 60,000 men, was organized under Marshal Beresford. Trained and partly officered by English officers, it proved itself not unworthy of its allies, and bore its full share in the series of campaigns and battles by which the French were ultimately expelled from Spain. At the peace the army numbered about 50,000 infantry and 5000 cavalry, formed on the English model, and all in the highest state of efficiency. This force was reduced in 1821, under the new constitutional government, to about one-half.

104. The Balkan Armies

The Rumanian, Bulgarian and Servian armies are the youngest in Europe. The conduct of the Rumanians before Plevna in 1877 earned for them the respect of soldiers of all countries. Servia and Bulgaria came to war in 1885, and the Bulgarian soldiers, under the most adverse conditions, achieved splendid victories under the leadership of their own officers. In the crisis following the Austrian annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (1908-9), it seemed likely that the Servian forces might play an unexpectedly active part in war even with a strong power.


Below are the titles of some of the more important works on the subject of armies. See also under biographical headings and articles dealing with the several arms, &c. A large proportion of the works mentioned below are concerned mainly with the development of strategy and tactics.

V.der Goltz Das Volk in Waffen (1883, new ed., 1898, English translation, P. A. Ashworth, Nation in Arms, London, 1887, new ed., 1907, French, Nation arméc, Paris, 1889); Jahns, Jfeeresver fassung und Vblkerleben (Berlin, 1885); Berndt, Die ZahI im Kriege (Vienna, 1895); F. N. Maude, Evolution of Modern Strategy (1903), Voluntary versus Compulsory Service (1897), and War and the World's Life (1907); Pierron, Mithodes de guerre. vol. i.; Jhhns, Geschichte der Krsegswissenschaften (an exhaustive bibliography, with critical notes); Troschke, Mil. Litteratur seit den Befreiungskrie;en (Berlin, 1870); T. A. Dodge, Great Captains (Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Gustavus, Napoleon); Bronsart v. Schellendorf (Eng. trans., War Office, 1905) Duties of the General Staff; Favh, Histoire et tactigue des trois armes (Liege, 1850); Maynert, Gesch. des Kriegswesens u.. der Heeresverfassungen in Europa (Vienna, 1869); Jahns, Hand buch für cine Geschichte des Kriegswesens v. der Urzeit bis zur Renaissance (Leipzig, 1880); de Ia Barre Duparcq, Histoire de l'art de la guerre avant l'usage de poudre (Paris, 1860); Rüstow and Kochly, Geschichie des griechischen Kriegswesens (Aarau, 1852); Kochly and Rustow, Griechische Kriegsschriftsteller (Leipzig, 1855); Forster, in Hermes, xii. (1877); D. G. Hogarth, Philip and Alexander (London, 1897); Macdougall, Campaigns of Hannibal (London, 1858); Rustow, Heerwesen, &c., Julius Casars (Nordhausen, 1855); Organ der M. Wissensch. Verein of 1877 (Vienna); Polybius literature of the 17th and 18th centuries; supplement to M.W.B,, 1883; the works of Xenophon, Aelian, Arrian, Vegetius, Polybius, Caesar, &c. (see Kochly and Rüstow: a collection was made in the 15th century, under the title Veteres de re militari scriptores, 1487); Oman, A History of the Art of War: Middle Ages (London, 1898); Delpech, La Tactique au XII1~ siècle (Paris, 1886); Kohier, Die Eniwickelung des Kriegswesens v. II. Jahrhdt. bis Zn den Hussitenkriegen (Breslau, 1886—1893); Ricotti, Storia delle Compagnie di Ventura (Turin, 1846); Steger, Gesch. Francesco Sforzas und d. ital. Condottieri (Leipzig, 1865) ; J. A. Symonds, The Renaissance in Italy and The Age of the Despots; A Brandenburg Mobilization of 1477 (German General Staff Monograph, No. 3); Palacky, ?Kriegskunst der Bohmen,” Zeitschrift bohmisch. Museums (Prague, 1828); George, Battles of English History (London, 1895); Biottot, Les Grands ins pirés devant la science: Jeanne d'Arc (Paris, 1907); V. Ellger, Kriegswesen, &c., der Eidgenossen, 14., 15., 16. Jahrhdt. (1873); de Ia Chauvelays, Les Armies de Charles le Témeraire (Paris, 1879); Guillaume, Hist. des bandes d'ordonnance dans les Pays-Bas (Brussels, 1873); the works of Froissart, de Brantome, Machiavelli, Lienhard Fronsperger (Kriegsbuch, 1570), de Ia Noue, du Bellay, &c.; Villari, Life and Times of Machiavelli (English version); Die frommen Landsknechte” (M. W. B., supplement, 1880); Kriegsbilder aus der Zeit der Landsknechte (Stuttgart, 1883);

C. H. Fifth, Cromwell's Army (London, 1902); Heilmann, Das Kriegswesen der Kaiserlichen und Schweden (Leipzig, 1850); C. Walton, History of the British Standing Army, 1660—1700 (London, 1894); E. A. Altnam in United Service Magazine, February 1907; Austrian official history of Prince Eugene's campaigns, &c.; de Ia Barre Duparcq, Hist. milit. de Ia Prusse avant 1756 (Paris, 1857); Marsigli, L'Etat militaire de Semp. Ottoman (1732); Prussian Staff History of the Silesian wars; C. von B(inder)- K(rieglstein), Geist und S/off im Kriege (Vienna, 1895); E. d'Hauterive, L'Armee sous Ia Révol u/ion (Paris, 1894); C. Rousset, Les Volontaires de 1791—1794; Michelet, Les Soldats de Ia Revolution (Paris, 1878); publications of the French general staff on the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars; H. Bonnal, Esprit de la guerre moderne (a series of studies in military history, 1805—1870); Paimblant du Rouil, La Division Durutte, les Refractaires, also supplement, M.W.B., 1890; “ The French Conscription” (suppi. M.W.B., 1892); C. v. der Goltz, Von Rossbach bis Jena und Auerstodt (a new edition of the original Rossbach und Jena, Berlin, 1883); German General Staff Monograph, No. 10; M.W.B. supplements of 1845, 1846, 1847, 1854, 1855,1856, 1857, 1858, 1862, 1865, 1866, 1867, 1887; v. Duncker, Preussen wahrend der franz. Okkupation (1872); Archives of Prussian war ministry, publications of 1892 and 1896; histories of the wars of 1866 and 1870; V. Chareton, Comme la Prusse a prépare sa revanche, 1806—1813; Reports of Col. Baron Stoffel, French attaché at Berlin (translation into English, War Office, London); Haxthausen, Les Forces militaires de la Prusse (Paris, 1853); de la Barre Duparcq, Etudes historiques genérales et militaires sur Ia Prusse (Paris, 1854); Paixhans, Constitution militaire de Ia France (Paris, 1849); Duc d'Aumale, Lee Institutions mill/aires de Ia France (Paris, 1867); C. v. Decker, Uber die Personlichkeit des preussischen Soldaten (Berlin, 1842); War Office, Army Book of the British Empire (London, 1893); M. Jahns, Das franzosische Heer von der grossen Revolution his zur Gegenwart (Leipzig, 1873); Baron Kaulbars, The German Army (in Russian) [St Petersburg, 18901; Die Schweiz jm ip. Jahrhundert (Berne and Lausanne, 1899); Heimann, L'Armie allemande (Paris, 1895); R. de l'Homme de Courbihre, Grundzüge der deutschen Militarverwaltung (Berlin, 1882); G. F. R. Henderson, The Science of War (London, 1905); J. W. Fortescue, History of the British Army (London, 1899— —); R. de l'Homme de Courbière, Gesch. der brandenburg- preussisch. Heeresverfassung (Berlin, 1852); Krippentagel and Kustel, Die preuss. Armee von der 01/es/en Zeit his zur Gegenwart (Berlin, 1883); Gansauge, Das brandenbg.-preus:. Kriegs u'esen,1440,1640,1740(Berlin, 1839); A.v.Boguslawksi ,Die Landwehr, 1813—1893 (1893); A. R. v. Sichart, Gesch. d. k. Hannover. Armee (Hanover, 1866); v. Reitzenstein, Die k. Hannover. Kavallerie, 1631— i866 (1892); Schlee, Zur Gesch. des Hessischen Kriegswesens (Kassel, 1867); Leichtlen, Badens Kriegsverfassung (Carlsruhe, 1213) v. Stadlinger, Gesch. des wurttembergischen Kriegswesens (Stuttgart, 1858); Munich, Entwickelung der bayerischen Armee (Mumch, 1864); official Gesch. d. k. bayer. Armee (Munich, 1901 onward); Wurdinger, Kriegsgeschich/e v. Bayern (Munich, 1868); H. Meynert, Gesch. des Os/err. Kriegswesens (Vienna, 1852), Kriegswesen Ungarns (Vienna, 1876); Anger, Gesch. der K.-K. Armee (Vienna, .1886); Beitrage zur Gesch. des Os/err. Heerwesens, 1754—1814 (Vienna, 1872); R. v. Ottenfeld and Teuber, Die Oserr. Armee, 1700-1867 (Vienna, 1895); V. Wrede, Gesch. d. K. u. K. Wehrmacht (Vienna, 1902); May de Rainmoter, Histoire Militaire de Ia .Suisse (Lausanne, 1788); Cusachs y Barado, La Vida Militar en España (Barcelona, 1888); Guillaume, Hist. de I'infanterie wallonne sous la maisos.~ d'Espagne (Brussels, 1876); A. Vitu, Histoire civile de l'armée (Paris, 1868); A. Pascal, Hist. de l'arme'e (Paris, 1847); L. Jablonski, L'Armie française a travers les dges; C. Romagny, His/. générale de l'armée nationale (Paris, 1893); E. Simond, Hist. mu. de Ia France; Susane, Hist. de I'infanterie, cavalerie, artillerie françaises (Paris, 1874); Père Daniel, Hist. des milices francaises (1721); the official Historique des corps de troupe (Paris, 1900— —); Cahu, Le Soldat francais (Paris, 1876); 3. Molard, Cent antde l'armée francaise, 1789—1889 (Paris, 1890); v. Stein, Lehre vom Heerwesen (Stuttgart, 1872); du Verger de S. Thomas, L'Italie et son armée, 1865 (Paris, 1866); C. Martel,” Military Italy (London, 1884); Sir R. Biddulph, Lord Cardwell at the War Office (London, 1904) ; Willoughby Verner, Military Life of the Duke of Cambridge (London, ?9o~); W. H. Daniel, The Miitary Forces of the Crown (London, 1902); War Office, Annual Report of the British Army; Broome, Rise and Progress of the Bengal Army (Calcutta, 185o); W. J. Wilson, Hist. of the Madras Army (London, 1882—1885); C. M. Clode, Military Forces of the Crown; Blume, Die Grundlage unserer Wehrkraft (Berlin, 1890); Spenser Wilkinson, The Brain of an Army (London, 1890 and 1895); v. Olberg, Die franzosische Armee im Exerzirplatz und im Felde (Berlin, 1861); Die Heere und Flo/te der Gegenwart, ed. Zepelin (Berlin, 1896); Molard, Puissances mill/aires de l'Europe (Paris, 1895);works of Montecucculi, Puységur, Vauban, Feuquihres, Guibert, Folard, Guichard, Joly de Maizeroy, Frederick the Great, Marshal Saxe, the prince de Ligne, Napoleon, Carnot, Scharnhorst, Clausewitz, Napoleon III., Moltke, Hamley, &c.

The principal general military periodicals are :—English,Journal of the R. United Service Institution; United States, Journal of the Military Service Institution; French, Revue d'histoire and Revue des drmées itrangères (general staff); Rau and Lauth, L'Eat militaire des puissances (about every 4 years); Revue militaire générale, founded in 1907 by General Langlois; Atmanach du drapeau (a popular aide-mémoire published annually); German, the Vierteljahrsheft of the general staff: Mslitdr- Wochenblatt (referred to above as M.W.B.—the supplements are of great value); von Löbell's Jahresberichte (annual detailed reports on the state, &c., of all armies an English précis appears annually in the Journal of the R.U.S. Institution); Austrian, Streffleurs Ost. Militär - Zeitschrift, with which was amalgamated (1907) the Organ d. militarwissenschaft. Vereins. The British War Office issues from time to time handbooks dealing with foreign armies, and, quarterly since April 1907, a critical review and bibliography of recent military literature in the principal languages, under the name of Recent Publications of Military Interest.(C. F. A.)