This is part 3 of the Encyclopedia article
ARMY
Charles Francis Atkinson
Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th edition Volume II pgs 592-625
50. Army
The term army is applied, in war time, to any
command of several army corps, or even of several divisions, operating under
the orders of one commander-in-chief. The army in this sense (distinguished by
a number or by a special title) varies, therefore, with circumstances. In the
American Civil War, the Army of the Ohio consisted in 1864 only of the army
staff and the XXIII corps. At the other extreme we find that the German II Army
in 1870 consisted of seven army corps and two cavalry divisions, and the III
Army of six army corps and two cavalry divisions. The term army in
this sense is therefore very elastic in its application, but it is generally
held that large groups of corps operating in one theatre of war should be
subdivided into armies, and that the strength of an army should not exceed
about 150,000 men, if indeed this figure is reached at all. This again depends
upon circumstances. It might be advisable to divide a force of five corps into
two armies, or on the other hand it might be impossible to find suitable
leaders for more than two armies when half a million men were present for duty.
In France, organization has been carried a step further. The bulk of the
national forces is, in case of war, organized into a group of armies
under a commander, usually, though incorrectly, called the
generalissimo. This office, of course, does not exist in peace, but the
insignia, the distinctive marks of the headquarters flag, &c., are stated
in official publications, and the names of the generalissimo and of his chief
of staff are known. Under the generalissimo would be four or five army
commanders, each with three or four army corps under him. Independent of this
group of armies there would be other and minor armies
where required.
51. Chief Command
The leading of the group of armies referred to
above does not, in France, imply the supreme command, which would be exercised
by the minister of war in Paris. The German system, on the other hand, is based
upon the leadership of the national forces by the sovereign in person, and even
though the headquarters of the supreme war lord (Oberste
Kriegsherr) are actually in the field in one theatre of operations, he
directs the movements of the German armies in all quarters. Similarly, in 1864,
General Grant accompanied and controlled as a group the Armies of
the Potomac and the James, supervising at the same time the operations of other
groups and armies. In the same campaign a subordinate general, Sherman,
commanded a group consisting of the Armies of the Tennessee, the
Cumberland and the Ohio. The question as to whether the supreme command and the
command of the principal group of armies should be in the same hands is very
difficult of solution. In practice, the method adopted in each case usually
grows out of the military and political conditions. The advantage of the German
method is that the supreme commander is in actual contact with the troops, and
can therefore form an accurate judgment of their powers. Under these conditions
the risk of having cabinet strategy forced upon the generals is at its minimum,
and more especially so if the supreme commander is the head of the state. On
the other hand, his judgment is very liable to be influenced unduly by facts,
coming under his own notice, which may in reality have no more than a local
signifi cance. Further, the supreme commander is at the mercy of distant
subordinates to a far greater degree than he would be if free to go from one
army to another. Thus, in 1870 the king of Prussia's headquarters before Paris
were subjected to such pressure from subordinate army commanders that on
several occasions selected staff-officers had to be sent to examine, for the
king's private information, the real state of things at the front. The conduct
of operations by one group commander in the campaign of 1864 seemed, at a
distance, so eccentric and dangerous that General Grant actually left his own
group of armies and went in person to take over command at the threatened
point. Balanced judgment is thus often impossible unless the supreme command is
independent of, and in a position to exercise general supervision over, each
and every group or army. At the other end of the scale is the system of command
employed by the Turks in 1877, in which four armies, three of them being
actually on the same theatre of war, were directed from Constantinople. This
system may be condemned unreservedly. It is recognized that, once the armies on
either side have become seriously engaged, a commander-in-chief on the spot
must direct them. Thus in 1904, while the Japanese and Russian armies were
under the supreme command of their respective sovereigns, General Kuropatkin
and Marshal Oyama personally commanded the chief groups of armies in the field.
This is substantially the same as the system of the French army. It is
therefore permissible to regard the system pursued by the Germans in 1870, and
by the Union government in 1864, more as suited to special circumstances than
as a general rule. As has been said above, the special feature of the German
system of command is the personal leadership of the German emperor, and this
brings the student at once to the consideration of another important part of
the superior leading.
52. The Chief of the General Staff
The Chief of the General Staff is, as his title implies, the chief
staff officer of the service, and -as such, he has duties of the highest
possible importance, both in peace and war. For the general subject of staff
duties see STAFF. Here we are concerned only with the peculiar position of the
chief of staff under a system in which the sovereign is the actual
commander-in-chief. It is obvious in the first place that the sovereign may not
be a great soldier, fitted by mental gifts, training and character to be placed
at the head of an army of, perhaps, a million men. Allowing that it is
imperative that, whatever he may be in himself, the sovereign should ex
officio command the armies, it is easy to see that the ablest general in
these armies must be selected to act as his adviser, irrespective of rank and
seniority. This officer must therefore be assigned to a station beyond that of
his army rank, and his orders are in fact those of the sovereign himself. Nor
is it sufficient that he should occupy an unofficial position as adviser, or
ad la/us. If he were no more than this, the sovereign could act without
his adviser being even aware of the action taken. As the staff is the machinery
for the transmission of orders and despatches, all orders of the
commander-in-chief are signed by the chief of staff as a matter of course, and
this position is therefore that in which the adviser has the necessary
influence. The relations between the sovereign and his chief military adviser
are thus of the first importance to the smooth working of the great military
machine, and never have the possibilities of this apparently strange system
been more fully exploited than by King William and his chief of staff von
Moltke in 1866 and in 187071.It is not true to say that the king was the
mere figurehead of the German armies, or that Moltke was the real
commander-in-chief. Those who have said this forget that the sole
responsibility for the consequences of every order lay with the king, and that
it is precisely the fear of this responsibilty that has made so many brilliant
subordinates fail when in chief command. The characters of the two men
supplemented each other, as also in the case of Blucher and Gneisenau and that
of Radetzky and Hess. Under these circumstances, the German system of command
works, on the whole, smoothly. Matters would, however, be different if either
of the two officers failed to realize their mutual interdependence, and the
system is in any case only required when the self-sufficing great soldier is
not available for the chief executive command.
53. First and Second Lines
-The organization into arms and units is of course maintained
in peace as well as for war. Military forces are further organized, in peace,
into active and reserve troops, first and second lines, &c., according to
the power possessed by the executive over the men. Broadly speaking, the latter
fall into three classes, regulars, auxiliary forces and irregular troops. The
regulars or active troops are usually liable to serve at all times and in any
country to which they may be sent. Auxiliary forces may be defined as all
troops which undergo actual military training without being constantly under
arms, and in Great Britain these were until 1908. represented by the Militia,
the Yeomanry and the Volunteers, and now by the Territorial Force and the
Special Reserve. In a country in which recruiting is by voluntary enlistment
the classification is, of course, very different Lom that prevailing in a
conscript army. The various lines are usually composed of separate
organizations; the men are recruited upon different engagements, and receive a
varying amount of training. Of the men not permanently embodied, only the
reserve of the active army has actually served a continuous term with the
colours. Other troops, called by various appellations, of which
militia may be taken as generic, go through their military training
at intervals. The general lines of army organization in the case of a country
recruiting by universal service are as follows :The male population is
divided into classes, by ages, and the total period of liability to service is
usually about 25 years. Thus at any given time, assuming two years'
colour-service, the men of 20 and 21 years of age would constitute the active
army serving with the colours, those of, say, 22 and 23, the reserve. The
Landwehr or second line army would consist of all men who had been
through the active army and were now aged 24 to 36. The third line would
similarly consist of men whose ages were between 36 and Assuming the same
annual levy, the active army would consist of 200,000 men, its reserve 200,000,
the second line of 1,300,000, and the third of 800,000. Thus of 2,500,000 men
liable to, and trained for, military service, 200,000 only would be under arms
at any given time. The simple system here outlined is of course modified and
complicated in practice owing to re-engagements by non- commissioned officers,
the speedy dismissal to the reserve of intelligent and educated men,
&c.
54. War Reserves
In war, the reserves increase the field armies to 400,000
men, the whole or part of the second line is called up and formed into
auxiliary regiments, brigades and divisions, and in case of necessity the third
line is also called upon, though usually this is only in the last resort and
for home defence only. The proportion of reservists to men with the colours
varies of course with the length of service. Thus in France or Germany, with
two years' service in force, half of the rank and file of a unit in war would
be men recalled from civil life. The true military value of reservists is often
questioned, and under certain circumstances it is probable that units would
take the field at peace strength without waiting for their reservists. The
frontier guards of the continental military powers, which are expected to move
at the earliest possible moment after hostilities have begun, are maintained at
a higher effective than other units, and do not depend to any great extent on
receiving reservists. The peace footing of cavalry and artillery units is
similarly maintained at an artificial level. An operation of the nature of a
coup de main would in any case be carried out by the troops available at the
moment, however large might be the force requiredtwenty weak battalions
would, in fact, be employed instead of ten strong ones. There is another class
of troops, which may be called depot troops. These consist of officers and men
left behind when the active corps completed with reserves takes the field, and
they have (a) to furnish drafts for the frontand (b) to form a nucleus
upon which all later formations are built up. The troops of the second line
undertake minor work, such as guarding railways, and also furnish drafts for
the field army. Later, when they have been for some time under arms, the second
line troops are often employed by themselves in first line. A year's training
under war conditions should bring such troops to the highest efficiency. As for
irregulars, they have real military value only when the various permanent
establishments do not take up the whole fighting strength of the nation, and
thus states having universal service armies do not, as a rule, contemplate the
employment of combatants other than those shown on the peace rolls. The status
of irregulars is ill defined, but it is practically agreed that combatants,
over whose conduct the military authorities have no disciplinary power, should
be denied the privileges of recognized soldiers, and put to death if captured.
So drastic a procedure is naturally open to abuse and is not always expedient.
Still, it is perfectly right that the same man shall not be allowed, for
example, to shoot a sentry at one moment, and to claim the privileges of a
harmless civilian at the next. The division into first, second and third lines
follows generally from the above. The first line troops, in a conscript army,
are the active army or regulars, permanently under arms in peace
time, and its reserves, which are used on the outbreak of war to complete the
existing units to full strength. The German terms Landwehr and
Landsturm are often applied to armies of the second and the third
lines.
55. The military characteristics
-The military characteristics of the various types of regular
troops have been dealt with in considering the advantages and disadvantages of
the several forms of recruiting. It only re mains to give some indication of
the advantages which such forces (irrespective of their time of service)
possess over troops which only come up for training at intervals. Physically,
the men with the colours are always superior to the rest, owing to their
constant exercise and the regularity and order under which they live; as
soldiers, they are more under the control of their officers, who are their
leaders in daily life, in closer touch with army methods and discipline, and,
as regards their formal training, they possess infinitely greater power of
strategic and tactical manceuvre. Their steadiness under fire is of course more
to be relied upon than that of other troops. Wellington, speaking of the
contrast between old and young soldiers (regulars), was of opinion that the
chief difference lay in the greater hardiness, power of endurance, and general
campaigning qualities given by experience. This is of course more than ever
true in respect of regular and auxiliary troops, as was strikingly demonstrated
in the Spanish-American War. On the whole, it is true to say that only a
regular army can endure defeat without dissolution, and that volunteers,
reservists or militiamen fresh from civil life may win a victory but cannot
make the fullest use of it when won. At the same time, when they have been
through one or two arduous campaigns, raw troops become to all intents and
purposes equal to any regulars. On the other hand, the greatest military virtue
of auxiliary forces is their enthusiasm. With this quality were won the great
victories of 179294 in France, those of 1813 in Germany, and the
beginnings of Italian unity at Calatafimi and Palermo. The earlier days of the
American Civil War witnessed desperate fighting, of which Shiloh is the best
example, between armies which had had but the slightest military training. In
the same war the first battle of Bull Run illustrated what has been said above
as to the weaknesses of unprofessional armies. Both sides, raw and untrained,
fought for a long time with the greatest determination, after which the
defeated army was completely dissolved in rout and the victors quite unable to
pursue. So far it is the relative military value of the professional soldier
and the citizen-soldier that has been- reviewed. A continental army of the
French Or German stamp is differently constituted. It is, first of all, clear
that the drilled citizen-soldier combines the qualities of training and
enthusiasm. From this it follows that a hostile feeling as well as
a hostile view must animate such an army if it is to do good
service. If a modern nation in arms is engaged in a- purely
dynastic quarrel against a professional army of inferior strength, the result
will probably be victory for the latter. But the active army of France or
Germany constitutes but a small part of the nation in arms, and the
army for war is composed in addition of men who have at some period in the past
gone through a regular training. Herein lies the difference between continental
and British auxiliary forces. In the French army, an ex-soldier during his ten
years of reserve service was by the law of 1905 only liable for two months'
training, and for the rest of his military career for two weeks' service only.
The further reduction of this liability was proposed in 1907 and led to much
controversy. The question of the value of auxiliary forces, then, as between
the continuous work of, say, English territorials, and the permanent though
dwindling influence of an original period of active soldiering, is one of
considerable importance. It is largely decided in any given case by the average
age of the men in the ranks.
56. Mobilization
-The transfer of troops from the state of peace to that of war is
called mobilization. This is, of course, a matter which primarily
depends on good administration, and its minutest details are in all states laid
down beforehand. Reservists have to be summoned, and, on arrival, to be clothed
and equipped out of stores maintained in peace. Officers and men of the regular
army on leave have to be recalled, the whole medically examined for physical
fitness to serve, and a thousand details have to be worked out before the unit
is ready to move to its concentration station. The concentration and the
strategic deployment are, of course, dependent upon the circumstances of each
war, and the peace organization ceases to be applicable. But throughout a war
the depots at home, the recruiting districts of second-line troops, and above
all the various arsenals, manufactories and offices controlled by the war
department are continually at work in maintaining the troops in the field at
proper strength and effectiveness.
57. Territorial System
The feudal system was of course a territorial system in
principle. Indeed, as has been shown above, a feudal army was chiefly at fault
owing to the dislocation of the various levies. Concentration was equally the
characteristic of the professional armies which succeeded those of feudalism,
and only such militia forces as remained in existence preserved a local
character. The origin of territorial recruiting for first-line troops is to be
found in the cantonal system, said to have been introduced by Louis
XIV., but brought to the greatest perfection in Prussia under Frederick William
I. But long service and the absence of a reserve vitiated the system in
practice, since losses had to be made good by general recruiting, and even the
French Revolution may hardly be said to have produced the territorial system as
we understand it today. It was only in the deliberate preparation of the
Prussian army on short-service lines that we find the beginning of the
territorial system of dislocation and command. This is so intimately
connected with the general system of organization that it cannot be considered
merely as a method of recruiting by districts. It may be defined as a system
whereby, for purposes of command in peace, recruiting, and of organization
generally, the country is divided into districts, which are again divided and
subdivided as may be required. In a country in which universal service
prevails, an army corps district is divided into divisional districts, these
being made up of brigade and of regimental districts. Each of these units
recruits, and is in peace usually stationed, in its own area; the artillery,
cavalry and special arms are recruited for the corps throughout the whole
allotted area, and stationed at various points within the same. Thus in the
German army the III. army corps is composed entirely of Brandenburgers. The
infantry of the corps is stationed in ten towns, the cavalry in four and the
artillery in five. In countries which adhere to voluntary recruiting, the
system, depending as it does on the calculable certainty of recruiting, is not
so fully developed, but in Great Britain the auxiliary forces have been
reorganized in divisions of all arms on a strictly territorial basis. The
advantage of the system as carried into effect in Germany is obvious. Training
is carried out with a minimum of friction and expense, as each unit has an
ample area for training. Whilst the brigadiers car' exercise general control
over the colonels, and the divisional generals over the brigadiers, there is
little undue interference of superior authority in the work of each grade, and
the men,if soldiers by compulsion, at any rate are serving close to their own
homes. Most of the reservists required on mobilization reside within a few
miles of their barracks. Living in the midst of the civil population, the
troops do not tend to become a class apart. Small garrisons are not, as
formerly, allowed to stagnate, since modern communications make supervision
easy. Further, it must be borne in mind that the essence of the system is the
organization and training for war of the whole military population. Now so
great a mass of men could not be administered except through this
decentralization of authority, and the corollary of short service universally
applied is the full territorial system, in which the whole enrolled strength of
the district is subjected to the authority of the district commander. Practice,
however, falls short of theory, and the dangers of drawing whole units from
disaffected or unmilitary districts are often foreseen and discounted by
distributing the recruits, non-regionally, amongst more or less distant
regiments.
58. Army Administration
The existing systems of command and organization,
being usually based upon purely military considerations, have thus much; indeed
almost all, in common. Administration differs from them in one important
respect. While the methods of command and organization are the result of the
accumulated experience of many armies through many hundred years, the central
administration in each case is the product of the historical evolution of the
particular country, and is dependent upon forms of government, constitutions
and political parties. Thus France, after 1870, re- modeled the organization of
her forces in accordance with the methods which were presumed to have given
Germany the victory, but the headquarters staff at Paris is very different in
all branches from that of Berlin. Great Britain adopted German tactics, and to
some extent even uniform, but the Army Council has no counterpart in the
administration of the German emperor's forces.
The first point for consideration, therefore, is, what is the
ultimate, and what is the proximate, authority supervising the administration?
The former is, in most countries, the people or its representatives in
parliament, for it is in their power to stop supplies, and without money the
whole military fabric must crumble. The constitutional chief of the army is the
sovereign, or, in republics, the president, but in most countries the direct
control of army matters by the representatives of the people extends over all
affairs into which the well-being of the civil population, the expenditure of
money, alleged miscarriages of military justice, &c., enter, and it is not
unusual to find grand strategy, and even the technical deficiencies of a
field-gun or rifle, the subject of interpellation and debate. The peculiar
influence of the sovereign is in what may be termed patronage (that is, the
selection of officers to fill important positions and the general supervision
of the officer-corps), and in the fact that loyalty is the foundation of the
discipline and soldierly honour which it is the task of the officers to
inculcate into their men. In all cases the head of the state is ipso facto
the head of the army. The difference between various systems may then be
held to depend on the degree of power allowed to or held by him. This reacts
upon the central administration of the army, and is the cause of the
differences of system alluded to. For the civil chief of the executive is not
necessarily a soldier, much less an expert and capable soldier; he must,
therefore, be provided with technical advisers. The chief of the general staff
is often the principal of these, though in some cases a special
commander-in-chief, or the minister for war, or, as in France and England, a
committee or council, has the duty of advising the executive on technical
matters.
59. Branches of Administration
In these circumstances the only general principle of army
administration common to all systems is the division of the labour between two
great branches. Military administration, in respect of the troops and material
which it has to control, is divided between the departments of the War
Office and the General Staff. In the staff work of subordinate
Units, e.g. army corps and divisions, the same classification of duties
is adopted, general staff duties being performed by one set of
officers, routine staff duties by another.
The work of a Genera) Staff may be taken as consisting in
preparation for war, and this again, both in Great Britain and abroad, consists
of military policy in all its branches, staff duties in war, the collection of
intelligence, mobilization, plans of operations and concentration, training,
military history and geography, and the preparation of war regulations. These
subjects are usually subdivided into four or five groups, each of which is
dealt with by a separate section of the general staff, the actual division of
the work, of course, varying in different countries. Thus, the second section
of the French staff deals with the organization and tactics of foreign
armies, study of foreign theatres of war, and military missions abroad. A
War Office is concerned with peace administration and with the provision
of men and material in war. Under the former category fall such matters as
routine administration, finance, justice, recruiting, promotion of
officers (though not always), barracks and buildings generally, armament,
equipment and clothing, &c., in fact all matters not directly relevant to
the training of the troops for and the employment of the troops in war. In war,
some of the functions of a war office are suspended, but on the other hand the
work necessary for the provision of men and material to augment the army and to
make good its losses is vastly increased. In 1870 the minister of war, von
Roon, accompanied the headquarters in the field, but this arangement did not
work well, and will not be emloyed again. The chief duties other than those of
the general staff fall into the two classes, the "routine staff,"
administration or adjutant-general's branch, which deals with all matters
affecting personnel,
and the quartermaster-general's branch, which supervises the
provision and issue of supplies, stores and materiel of all kinds. Over
and above these, provision has to be made for control of all the technical
parts of administration, such as artillery and engineer services (in Great
Britain, this, with a portion of the quartermaster-general's department, is
under the master- general of the ordnance), and for military legislation,
preparation of estimates, &c. These are, of course, special subjects, not
directly belonging to the general administrative system. It is only requisite
that the latter should be sufficiently elastic to admit of these departments
being formed as required. However these subordinate offices may be multiplied,
the main work of the war office is in the two departments of the
adjutant-general (personnel) and the quartermaster-general
(materiel). Beyond and wholly distinct from these is the general staff, the
creation of which is perhaps the most important con tribution of the past
century to the pure science of military organization.
Comparative strength of Various Armies
(a) compulsory service (1906)
|
France |
Germany |
Russia |
Austria-Hungary |
Italy |
Annual contingent for the Colours |
230,000 |
222,000 |
254,000 |
128,000 |
83,000 |
Medically unfit and exempt |
90,000 |
127,000 |
120,000 |
57,000 |
110,000 |
Excused from Service in peace, able, bodied |
|
291,000 |
606,000 |
285,000 |
122,000 |
Total of Men becoming liable for Service in 1907 |
320,000 |
540,000 |
980,000 |
470,000 |
315,000 |
Total permanent force during Peace |
610,000 not including
colonial troops |
610,000 |
1,226,000 |
356,000 |
269,000 |
First-lineTroops, war-strength - estimated |
1,350,000 |
1,675,000 |
2,187,000 |
950,000 |
800,000 |
Second-line Troops - war strength - estimated |
3,000,000 |
2,275,000 |
1,429,000 |
1,450,000 |
1,150,000 |
Numbers available in excess of these |
450,000 |
3,950,000 |
9,384,000 |
5,000,000 |
1,200,000 |
Total War Resources of all kinds |
4,800,000 |
7,900,000 |
13,000,000 |
7,400,000 |
3,150,000 |
Annual Military expenditure - total - in British
pounds |
27,720,000 |
32,228,000 |
36,080,000 |
15,840,000 |
11,280,000 |
Annual Military expenditure per capita |
13s, 9d |
10s, 9d |
5s, 3d |
6s, 8d |
6s, 5d |
(b) Authorized Establishments and Aproximate Military Resources of
the British Empire (1906-07)
|
British Regular
Army |
Reserves for
Regular Army |
Auxiliary
Forces |
Native
Troops |
Colonial
Forces |
Total |
Great Britain |
117,000 |
120,000 |
500,000 |
|
|
737,000 |
Channel Islands, Malta, colonies
and Dependencies |
65,000 |
|
6,000 |
|
30,000 |
101,000 |
India |
75,000 |
|
30,000 |
202,000 |
|
307,000 |
Canada |
|
|
46,000 |
|
59,000 |
105,000 |
Australia and New Zeland |
|
|
70,000 |
|
|
70,000 |
South African forces |
|
|
20,000 |
|
|
20,000 |
Totals |
257,000 |
120,000 |
672,000 |
202,000 |
89,000 |
1,340,000 |
Note - Ex-soldiers of regular and auxiliary forces ,still fit for
service, and estimated levees en masse, are not counted. Enlistment
chiefly voluntary
(c) The Regular Army of the United States has a miximum authorized
establishment (1906) of 60,000 enlisted men; the Organized Militia was at the
same date 110,000 strong. Voluntary enlistment thoroughout. (See United States)
In 1906-1907 the total numbers available for a levee en masse were
estimated at 13,000,000.
BRITISH ARMY
60. British Army
Prior to the Norman Conquest the armed force of England was
essentially a national militia. Every freeman was bound to bear arms for the
defence of the country, or for the maintenance of order. To give some
organization and training to the levy, the several sheriffs had authority to
call out the contingents of their shires for exercise. The "fyrd", as
the levy was named, was available for home service only, and could not be moved
even from its county except in the case of emergency' and it was principally to
repel oversea invasions that its services were required. Yet even in those days
the necessity of some more permanent force was felt, and bodies of paid troops
were maintained by the kings at their own cost. Thus Canute and his successors,
and even some of the great earls kept up a household force
(huscarics).The English army at Hastings consisted of the fyrd
and the corps of huscarles.
The English had fought on foot; but the mailed horseman had now
become the chief factor in war, and the Conqueror introduced into England the
system of tenure by knight-service familiar in Normandy. This was based on the
unit of the feudal host, the constabularia of ten knights, the Conqueror
granting lands in return for fielding one or more of these units (in the case
of great barons) or some fraction of them (in the case of lesser tenants). The
obligation was to provide knights to serve, with horse and arms, for forty days
in each year at their own charges. This obligation could be handed on by
sub-enfeoffment through a whole series of under-tenants. The system. being
based, not on the duty of personal service, but on the obligation to supply one
or more knights (or it might be only the fraction of a knight), it was early
found convenient to commute this for a money payment known as
scutage (see KNIGHT SERVICE and SCUTAGE). This money enabled the
king to hire mercenaries, or pay such of the feudal troops as were willing to
serve beyond the usual time. From time to time proclamations and statutes were
issued reminding the holders of knights' fees of their duties; but the
immediate object was generally to raise money rather than to enforce personal
service, which became more and more rare. The feudal system had not, however,
abrogated the old Saxon levies, and from these arose two national
institutions the posse comitatus, liable to be called out by the
sheriff to maintain the king's peace, and later the militia (q.v.). The
posse comitatus, or power of the county, included all males able to bear
arms, peers and spiritual men excepted; and though. primarily a police force it
was also bound to assist in the defence of the country. This levy was organized
by the Assize of Arms under Henry II. (1181) and subsequently under Edward. I.
(1285) by the so-called Statute of Winchester, which determined the
numbers and description of weapons to be kept by each man according to his
property, and also provided for their periodical inspection. The early
Plantagenets made free use of mercenaries. But the weakness of the feudal
system in England was preparing, through the 12th and 13th centuries, a nation
in arms absolutely unique in the middle ages. The Scottish and Welsh wars were,
of course, fought by the feudal levy, but this levy was far from being the mob
of unwilling peasants usual abroad, and from the fyrd came the English
archers, whose fame was established by Edward I's wars, and carried to the
continent by Edward III. Edward III realized that there was better material to
be had in his own country than abroad, and the army with which he invaded
France was an army of national mercenaries, or, more simply, of English
soldiers. The army at Crecy was composed exclusively of English, Welsh and
Irish. From the pay list of the army at the siege of Calais (1346) it appears
that all ranks, from the prince of Wales downward, were paid, no attempt being
made to force even the feudal nobles to serve abroad at their own expense.
These armies were raised mainly by contracts entered into with some
knight or gentleman expert in war, and of great revenue and livelihood in the
country, to serve the king in war with a number of men. Copies of the
indentures executed when Henry V raised his army for the invasion of France in
1415 are in existence. Under these the contracting party agreed to serve the
king abroad for one year, with a given number of men equipped according to
agreement, and at a stipulated rate of pay. A certain sum was usually paid in
advance, and in many cases the crown jewels and plate were given in pledge for
the rest. The profession of arms seems to have been profitable. The pay of the
soldier was high as compared with that of the ordinary labourer, and he had the
prospect of a share of plunder in addition, so that it was not difficult to
raise men where the commander had a good military reputation. Edward III is
said to have declined the services of numbers of foreign mercenaries who wished
to enrol under him in his wars against France.
The funds for the payment of these armies were provided partly from
the royal revenues, partly from the fines paid in lieu of military service, and
other fines arbitrarily imposed, and partly by grants from parliament. As the
soldier's contract usually ended with the war, and the king had seldom funds to
renew it even if he so wished, the armies disbanded of themselves at the close
of each War. To secure the services of the soldier during his contract, acts
were passed (18 Henry VI. c. 19; and 7 Henry VII. c. I inflicting
penalties for desertion; and in Edward VI.'s reign an act touching the
true service of captains and soldiers was passed, somewhat of the nature
of a Mutiny Act.
61. Hundred Years War to Civil War
It is difficult to summarize the history of the army between the
Hundred Years' War and 1642. The final failure of the English arms in France
was soon followed by the Wars of the Roses, and in the long period of civil
strife the only national force remaining to England was the Calais garrison.
Henry VIII. was a soldier- king, but. he shared the public feeling for the old
bow and bill, and English armies which served abroad did not, it seems, win the
respect of the advanced professional soldiers of the continent. In 1519 the
Venetian ambassador described the English forces as consisting of 150,000 men
whose peculiar, though not exclusive, weapon was the long bow (Fortescue i.
117). The national levy made in 1588 to resist the Armada and the threat of
invasion produced about 750 lancers (heavy-armed cavalry), 2000 light horse and
56,000 foot, beside 20,000 men employed in watching the coasts. The small
proportion of mounted men is very remarkable in a country in which Cromwell was
before long to illustrate the full power of cavalry on the battlefield. It is
indeed not unfair to regard this army as a miscellaneous levy of inferior
quality.
It was in cavalry that England was weakest, and by three different
acts it was sought to improve the breed of horses, though the light horse of
the northern counties had a good reputation, and even won the admiration of the
emperor Charles V. Perhaps the best organized force in England at this time was
the London volunteer association which ultimately became the Honourable
Artillery Company. At Flodden the spirit of the old English yeomanry triumphed
over the outward form of continental battalions which the Scots had adopted,
and doubtless the great victory did much to retard military progress in
England. The chief service of Henry VIII to the British army was the formation
of an artillery train, in which he took a special interest. Before he died the
forces came to consist of a few permanent troops (the bodyguard and the
fortress artillery service), the militia or general levy, which was for home,
and indeed for county, service only, and the paid armies which were collected
for a foreign war and disbanded at the conclusion of peace, and were recruited
on the same principle of indents which had served in the Hundred Years' War. In
the reign of Mary, the old Statute of Winchester was revised (1553), and the
new act provided for a readjustment of the county contingents and in some
degree for the rearmament of the militia. But, from the fall of Calais and the
expedition to Havre up to the battle of the Dunes a century later, the
intervention of British forces in foreign wars was always futile and generally
disastrous. During this time, however, the numerous British regiments in the
service of Holland learned, in the long war of Dutch independence, the art of
war as it had developed on the continent since 1450, and assimilated the
regimental system and the drill and armament of the best models. Thus it was
that in 1642 there were many hundreds of trained and war-experienced officers
and sergeants available for the armies of the king and the parliament. By this
time bows and bills had long disappeared even from the militia, and the Thirty
Years' War, which, even more than the Low Countries, offered a career for the
adventurous man, contributed yet more trained officers and soldiers to the
English and Scottish forces. So closely indeed was war now studied by
Englishmen that the respective adherents of the Dutch and the Swedish systems
quarreled on the eve of the battle of Edgehill. Francis and Horace Vere, Sir
John Norris, and other Englishmen had become generals of European reputation.
Skippon, Astley, Goring, Rupert, and many others soon to be famous were
distinguished as company and regimental officers in the battles and sieges of
Germany and the Low Countries.
The home forces of England had, as has been said, little or nothing
to revive their ancient renown. Instead, they had come to be regarded as a
menace to the constitution. In Queen Elizabeth's time the demands of the Irish
wars had led to frequent forced levies, and the occasional billeting of the
troops in England also gave rise to murmurs, but the brilliancy and energy of
her reign covered a great deal, and the peaceful policy of her successor
removed all immediate cause of complaint. But after the accession of Charles I.
we find the army a constant and principal source of dispute between the king
and parliament, until under William III it is finally established on a
constitutional footing. Charles, wishing to support the Elector Palatine in the
Thirty Years' War, raised an army of 10,000 men. He was already encumbered with
debts, and the parliament refused all grants, on which he had recourse to
forced loans. The army was sent to Spain, but returned without effecting
anything, and was not disbanded, as usual, but billeted on the inhabitants. The
billeting was the more deeply resented as it appeared that the troops were
purposely billeted on those who had resisted the loan. Forced loans, billeting
and martial law all directly connected with the maintenance of the army
formed the main substance of the grievances set forth in the Petition of
Right. In accepting this petition, Charles gave up the right to maintain an
army without consent of parliament; and when in 1639 he wished to raise one to
act against the rebellious Scots, parliament was called together, and its
sanction obtained, on the plea that the army was necessary for the defence of
England. This army again became the source of dispute between the king and
parliament, and finally both sides appealed to arms.
62. Civil War
The first years of the Great Rebellion (q.v.) showed
primarily the abundance of good officers produced by the wars on the continent,
and in the second place the absolute inadequacy of the military system of the
country; the commissions of array, militia ordinances, &c., had at last to
give way to regular methods of enlistment and a central army administration. It
was clear, at the same time, that when the struggle was one of principles and
not of dynastic politics, excellent recruits, far different from the wretched
levies who had been gathered together for the Spanish war, were to be had in
any reasonable number. These causes combined to produce the New
Model which, originating in Cromwell's own cavalry and the London trained
bands of foot, formed of picked men and officers, severely disciplined, and
organized and administered in the right way, quickly proved its superiority
over all other armies in the field, and in a few years raised its general to
supreme civil power. The 15th of February 1645 was the birthday of the British
standing army, and from its first concentration at Windsor Park dates the
scarlet uniform. The men were for the most part voluntarily enlisted from
existing corps, though deficiencies had immediately to be made good by
impressment.
Four months later the New Model decided the quarrel of king and
parliament at Naseby. When Cromwell, the first lieutenant- general and the
second captain-general of the army, sent his veterans to take part in the wars
of the continent they proved themselves a match for the best soldiers in
Europe. On the restoration of the monarchy in 1660 the army, now some 8o,ooo
strong, was disbanded. It had enforced the execution of Charles I, it had
dissolved parliament, and England had been for years governed under a military
régime. Thus the most popular measure of the Restoration was the
dissolution of the army. Only Monk's regiment of foot(now the Coldstream
Guards) survived to represent the New Model in the army of today. At the same
time the troops (now regiments) of household cavalry, and the regiment of foot
which afterwards became the Grenadier Guards, were formed, chiefly from
Royalists, though the disbanded New Model contributed many experienced
recruits. The permanent forces of the crown came to consist once more of the
garrisons and guards, maintained by the king from the revenue
allotted to him for carrying on the government of the country. The
garrisons were commissioned to special fortressesthe Tower of
London, Portsmouth, &c. The guards comprised the sovereign's
bodyguards (the yeomen of the guard and
gentlemen-at-arms, who had existed since the times of Henry VII and
VIII), and the regiments mentioned above. Even this small force, at first not
exceeding 3000 men, was looked on with jealousy by parliament, and every
attempt to increase it was opposed. The acquisition of Tangier and Bombay, as
part of the dower of the infanta of Portugal, led to the formation of a troop
of horse (now the 1st Royal Dragoons) and a regiment of infantry (the 2nd, now
Queen's R.W. Surrey, Regiment) for the protection of the former; and a regiment
of infantry (afterwards transferred to the East India Company) to hold the
latter (1661). These troops, not being stationed in the kingdom, created no
distrust; but whenever, as on several occasions during Charles's reign,
considerable armies were raised, they were mostly disbanded when the occasion
ceased. Several regiments, however, were added to the permanent force,
including Dumbarton's regiment (the 1st or Royal Scots, nicknamed Pontius
Pilate's Bodyguard) which had a long record of service in the armies of
the continent, and represented the Scots brigade of Gustavus Adoiphus's army
and the 3rd Buffs, representing the English regiments of the Dutch army
and through them the volunteers of 1572, and on Charles's death in 1685 the
total force of guards and garrisons had risen to 16,500, of whom
about one-half formed what we should now call the standing army.
63. King James II
James II, an experienced soldier and sailor, was more obstinate
than his predecessor in his efforts to increase the army, and Monmouth's
rebellion afforded him the opportunity. A force of about 20,000 men was
maintained in England, and a large camp formed at Hounslow. Eight cavalry and
twelve infantry regiments (the senior of which was the 7th Royal
Fusiliers, formed on a new French model) were raised, and given the numbers
which, with few exceptions, they still bear. James even proposed to disband the
militia, which had not distinguished itself in the late rebellion, and further
augment the standing army; and although the proposal was instantly rejected, he
continued to add to the army till the Revolution deprived him of his throne.
The army which he had raised was to a great extent disbanded, the Irish
soldiers especially, whom he had introduced in large numbers on account of
their religion, being all sent home.
The condition of the army immediately engaged the attention of
parliament. The Bill of Rights had definitely established that the
raising or keeping of a standing army within the kingdom, unless it be by the
consent of parliament, is against the law, and past experience made them
very jealous of such a force. But civil war was imminent, foreign war certain;
and William had only a few Dutch troops, and the remains of James's army, with
which to meet the storm. Parliament therefore sanctioned a standing army,
trusting to the checks established by the Bill of Rights and Act of Settlement,
and by placing the pay of the army under the control of the Commons. An event
soon showed the altered position of the army. A regiment mutinied and declared
for James. It was surrounded and compelled to lay down its arms; but William
found himself without legal power to deal with the mutineers. He therefore
applied to parliament, and in 1689 was passed the first Mutiny Act, which,
after repeating the provisions regarding the army inserted in the Bill of
Rights, and declaring the illegality of martial law, gave power to the crown to
deal with the offences of mutiny and desertion by courts-martial. From this
event is often dated the history of the standing army as a constitutional force
(but see Fortescue, British Army, i. 335).
64. William III
Under William the army was considerably augmented. The old
regiments of James's army were reorganized, retaining, however, their original
numbers, and three of cavalry and eleven of infantry (numbered to the 28th)
were added. In 1690 parliament sanctioned a force of 62,000 men, further
increased to 65,000 in 1691; but on peace being made in 1697 the Commons
immediaely passed resolutions to the effect that the land forces be reduced to
7000 men in England and 12,000 in Ireland. The War of the Spanish Succession
quickly obliged Great Britain again to raise a large army, at one time
exceeding 200,000 men; bu of these the greaer number were foreign troops
engaged for the continental war. Fortescue (op.cit. i, 555) estimates
that British forces at home and abroad as 70,000 men at the highest figure.
Afer the Peace of Utrecht the force was again reduced to 8000 men in Great
Britain and 11,000 in the plantations (i.e. colonies) and abroad. From that
time to the present the strength of the army has been determined by the annual
votes of parliament, and though frequently the subject of warm debates in both
houses, it has ceased to bera matter od dispute between the crown and
parliament. The following table shows the fluctuations from that time onward -
the peace years showing the average peace strength, the war years the maximum
to which the forces were raised:-
PEACE |
|
WAR |
|
Year |
Number |
Year |
Number |
1750 |
18,857 |
1745 |
74,187 |
1793 |
17,013 |
1761 |
67,776 |
1822 |
71,790 |
1777 |
90,734 |
1845 |
100,011 |
1812 |
245,996 |
1857 |
156,995 |
1856 |
275,097 |
1866 |
203,404 |
1858 |
222,874 |
During William's reign the small English army bore an honourable
part in the wars against Louis XIV, and especially distinguished itself under
the king at Steinkirk, Neerwinden though it had gradually risen to twenty
thousand in 1792. Twenty English regiments took part in the part in the
campaign of 1694. In the great wars of Queen Anne's reign the British army
under Marlborough acquired a European reputation. The cavalry, which had called
forth the admiration of Prince Eugene when passed in review before him after
its long march across Germany (1704) especially distinguished itself in the
batttle of Blenheim, and Ramillies, Oudenarde and Malplaquet were added to the
list of English victories. But the army as usual was reduced at once, and even
the cadres of old regiments were disbanded, thought the alarm of Jacobite
insurrections soon broght about the re-creation of many of these. During the
reign of the first and second Georges an artillery corps was organized, and the
army further increased by five regimetns of cavalry and thiry-five of infantry.
Fresh laurels were won at Dettingen (1743), in which battle twenty English
regiments took part; and though Fontenoy (q.v.) was a day of disaster
for the English arms, it did not lower their reputation, but rather added to
it. Six regiments of infantry won the chief glory of Prince Ferdinand's victory
of Minden (q.v.) in 1759, and throughout the latter part of he Seven
Years' War the British contingent of Ferdinand's army served with almost
unvarying distinction in numerous actions. About this time the first english
regiments were sent to India,k and the 39th shared in Clive's vicory at
Plassey. During the first half of George III's reign the army was principally
occupied in America; anj though the conquest of Canada may be counted with
pride among its exploits, this page in its history is certainly the darkest.
English armies capitulated at Saratoga and at Yorktown, and the war ended by
the evaculation of the revolted states of American and the acknowledgment of
their independence.
65. Army in 18th century
Before passing to the great French Revolutionary wars, from which a
fresh period in the history of the army may be dated, it will be well to review
the general condition of the army in the preceding century, injured as it was
by the distrust of parliament and departmental weakness and coruption which
went far to neutralize the good work of the duke of Cumberland as
commander-in-chief and of Pitt as war administrator. Regiments were raised
almost as in the days of the Edwards. The crown contracted with a distinguished
soldier, or gentleman of high position; who undertook to raise the men,
receiving a certain sum as bounty-money for each recruit. In some cases, in
lieu of money, the contractor received the nomination of all or some of the
officers, and recouped himself by selling the commissions. This
systemtermed raising men for rank was retained for many
years, and originally helped to create the purchase system of
promotion. For the maintenance of the regiment the colonel received an annual
sum sufficient to cover the pay of the men, and the expenses of clothing and of
recruiting. The colonel was given a beating order, without which no
enlistment was legal, and was responsible for maintaining his regiment at full
strength. Muster masters were appointed to muster the regiments,
and to see that the men for whom pay was drawn were really effective.
Sometimes, when casualties were numerous, the allowance was insufficient to
meet the cost of recruiting, and special grants were made. In war time the
ranks were also filled by released debtors, pardoned criminals, and impressed
paupers and vagrants. Where the men were raised by voluntary enlistment, the
period of service was a matter of contract between the colonel and the soldier,
and the engagement was usually for life; but exceptional levies were enlisted
for the duration of war, or for periods of three or five years. As .for the
officers, the low rate of pay and the purchase system combined to exclude all
but men of independent incomes. Appointments (except when in the gift of the
colonel) were made by the king at home, and by the commander-in-chief abroad;
even in Ireland the power of appointment rested with the local commander of the
forces until the Union. The soldier was clothed by his colonel, the charge
being defrayed from the stock fund. The army lived in barracks,
camps or billets. The barrack accommodation in Great Britain at the beginning
of the18th century only sufficed for five thousand men; and though ithad
gradually risen to twenty thousand in 1792, a large part of the army was
constantly in camps and billets - the latter causing endless compaints and
difficulties.
66. War with France
The first efforts of the army in the long war with France did not
tend to raise its reputation amongst the armies of Europe. The campaigns of
allied armies under the duke of York in the Netherlands, in which British
contingents figured largely, were uniformly unsuccessful (1793-94 and 1799),
though in this respect they resembled those of almost all suldiers who
commanded against the "New French" army. The policy of the younger
Pitt sent thousands of the best soldiers to un-profitable employment, and
indeed to death, in the West Indies. At home the administration was corrupt and
ineffective, and the people generally shared the contemptuous feeling towards
the regular army which was then prevalent in Europe. But a better era began
with the appointment of Frederick Augustus, duke of York, as commander
-in-chief of the army. He did much to improve its organization, discipline and
training, and was ably seconded by commanders of distinguished ability. Under
Abercromby in Egypt, under Stuart at Maida, and under Lake, Wellesley and
others in India, the British armies again attached victory to their standards.
and made themselves feared and respected. Later, Napoleon's threat of invading
England excited her martial spirit to the highest pitch to which it had ever
attained. Finally, her military glory was raised by the series of successful
campaigns in the Peninsula, until it culminated in the great victory of
Waterloo; and the army emerged from the war with the most solidly founded
reputation of any in Europe.
The events of this period belong to the history of Europe, and fall outside the
province of an article dealing only with the army. The greaaugmentations
required during the war were effected partly by raising additional regiments,
but principally but increasing the number of battalions, some regiments being
given as many as four. On the conclusion of peace these battalions were reduced
but the regiments were retained and the army was permanently increased from
about twenty thousand, the usual peace establishment before the war, to an
average of eighty thousand. The duke of York, on first appointment to the
command, had introduced a uniform drill throughout the army, which was further
modified according to Sir David Dundas's system in 1800; and, under the
direction of Sir John Moore and others, a high perfectino of drill was
attained. At the beginning of the war, the infantry, like that of the
continental powers, was formed in three ranks; but a two-rank formation had
been introduced in America and in India and gradually became general, and in
1809 was finally approved. In the Peninsula the army was permanently organized
in divisions, usually consisting of two brigades of three or four battalions
each, and one or two batteries of artillery. The duke of Wellington had also
brought the commissariat and the army transport to a high pitch of perfection,
but in the long peace which followed these establishments were reduced or
broken up.
67. Early 19th Century
The period which elapsed between Waterloo and the Crimean War is
marked by a number of Indian and colonial wars, but by no organic changes in
the army, with perhaps the single exception of the Limited Service Act of 1847,
by which enlistment for ten or twelve years, with power to re-engage to:
complete twenty-one, was substituted for the life enlistments hitherto in
force. The army went to sleep on the laurels and recollections of the
Peninsula. The duke of Wellington, for many years commander-in- chief, was too
anxious to hide it away in the colonies in order to save it from further
reductions or utter extinction, to attempt any great administrative reforms.
The force which was sent to the Crimea in 1854 was an agglomeration of
battalions, individually of the finest quality,, but unused to work together,
without trained staff, administrative departments or army organization of any
kind. The lesson of the winter before Sevastopol was dearly bought, but was not
thrown away. From that time successive war ministers and commanders-in-chief
have laboured perseveringly at the difficult task of army organization and
administration. Foremost in the work was Sidney Herbert (Lord Herbert of Lea),
the soldier's friend, who fell a sacrifice to his labours (1861), but not
before he had done much for the army. The whole system of administration was
revised. In 1854 it was inconceivably complicated and cumbersome. The
secretary of state for war and colonies, sitting at the Colonial
Office, had a general but vague. control, practically limited to times of war.
The secretary at war was the parliamentary representative of the
army, and exercised a certain financial control, not extending, however, to the
ordnance corps. The commander-in-chief was responsible to the sovereign alone
in all matters connected with the discipline, command or patronage of the army,
but to the secretary at war in financial matters. The master-general and board
of ordnance were responsible for the supply of material on requisition, but
were otherwise independent, and had the artillery and engineers under them. The
commissariat department had its headquarters at the treasury, and until 1852
the militia were under the home secretary. A number of minor subdepartments,
more or less independent, also existed, causing endless confusion,
correspondence and frequent collision. In 1854 the business of the colonies was
separated from that of war, and the then secretary of state, the duke of
Newcastle, assumed control over all the other administrative officers. In the
following year the secretary of state was appointed secretary at war also, and
the duties of the two offices amalgamated. The same year the commissariat
office was transferred to the war department, and the Board of Ordnance
abolished, its functions being divided between the commander-in-chief and the
secretary of state. The minor departments were gradually absorbed, and the
whole administration divided under two great chiefs, sitting at the war office
and Horse Guards respectively. In 1870 these, two were welded into one, and the
war office now existing was constituted,
Corresponding improvements were effected in every branch. The
system of clothing the soldiers was altered, the contracts being taken from the
colonels of regiments, who received a money allowance instead, and the clothing
supplied from government manufactories. The pay, food and general condition of.
the soldier were improved; reading and recreation rooms, libraries, gymnasia
and facilities for games of all kinds being provided. Barracks (q.v.)
were built on improved principles, and a large permanent camp was formed at
Aldershot, where considerable forces were collected and manoeuvred together.
Various educational establishments were opened, a staff college was established
for the instruction of officers wishing to qualify for the staff, and
regimental schools were improved.
68. Army in India
The Indian Mutiny of 1857, followed by the transference of the
government of India, led to important changes. The East India Company's white
troops were amalgamated with the Queen's'army, and the whole reorganized (see
Indian Army below).
The fact that such difficulties as those of 1854 and 1857, not to
speak of the disorders of 1848, had been surmounted by the weak army which
remained over from the reductions of forty years, coupled with the
instantaneous and effective rejoinder to the threats of the French colonels in
1859the creation of the Volunteer Force-certainly lulled the
nation and its representatives into a false sense of security. Thus the two
obvious lessons of the German successes of 1866 and 1870 the power of a
national army for offensive invasion, and the rapidity with which such an army
when thoroughly organized could be moved created the greatest sensation
in England. The year 1870 is, therefore, of prime importance in the history of
the regular forces of the crown. The strength of the home forces at different
times between 1815 and 1870 is given as follows (Bidduiph, Lord Cardwell at
the War Office)
|
Regulars.
|
Auxiliaries
.
|
Field
Guns.
|
1820
|
64,426
|
60,740
|
22
|
1830
|
50,876
|
34,614
|
? 30
|
1840
|
53,379 |
20,791
|
30
|
1850
1860
1870 ?
|
68,538 ,
100,701
89,051
later 109,000)
|
29,868
229,501
281,692
|
70
180.
180 |
|
|
|
|
69. Reform Period
The period of reform commences therefore with 1870, and is
connected, indissolubly with the name of Edward, Lord Cardwell, secretary of
state for war 18691874. In the matter of organization the result of his
labours was seen in the perfectly arranged expedition to Ashanti (1874); as for
recruiting, the introduction of short service and reserve enlistment together
with many rearrangements of pay, &c., proved so far popular that the number
of men annually enlisted was more than trebled (11,742 n 1869; 39,971 rn 1885;
40,729 in 1898), and so far efficient that Lord Cardwell's ?. . . system,
with but small modification, gave us during the Boer War 80,000 reservists, of
whom 96 or 97 % ?were. found efficient, and has enabled us to keep an army of
150,000 regulars in the field for i~ months (Rt. Hon. St John Brodrick,
House of Commons, 8th of March 1901). The localization of the army,
subsequently completed by the territorial system of 1882, was commenced under
Cardwell's régime, and a measure which encountered much. powerful
opposition at the time, the abolition of the purchase of commissions, was also
effected by him (1871).. The machinery of administration was improved, and
autumn manceuvres were practiced on a scale hitherto unknown in England. In
1871 certain powers over the militia, formerly held by lords- lieutenant, were
transferred : to the crown, and the auxiliary forces were placed directly under
the generals commanding districts. In 1881 came an important change in the
infantry of the line, which was entirety remodeled in two-battalion regiments
bearing territorial titles. This measure (the linked
battalionsystem) aroused great opposition; it was dictated chiefly by the
necessity of maintaining the Indian and colonial garrisons at full strength,
and was begun during Lord Cardwell's tenure of office, the principle being that
each regiment should have, one battalion at home and one abroad, the latter
being fed by the former, which in its turn drew upon the reserve to complete it
for war. The working of the system is to be considered as belonging to present
practice rather than to history, and the reader is therefore referred to the
article UNITED KINGDOM. On these general lines the army progressed up to 1899,
when the Boer War called into the field on a distant theatre of war all the
resources of the regular army, and in addition drew largely upon the existing
auxiliary forces, and even upon wholly untrained civilians, for the numbers
required to make war in an area which comprised nearly all Africa south of the
Zambezi. As the result of this war (see TRANSVAAL) successive schemes of reform
were undertaken by the various war ministers, leading up to Mr Haldane's
territorial scheme (1908), which put the organization of the forces
in the United Kingdom (q.v.) on a new basis.
Innovations had not been unknown in the period immediately
preceding the war; as a single example we may take the develop ment of the
mounted infantry (q.v.) It was natural that the war itself, and
especially a war of so peculiar a character, should intensify the spirit of
innovation. The corresponding period in the German army lasted from 1871 to
1888, and such a period of unsettlement is indeed the common, practically the
universal, result of a war on a large scale. Much that was of value in the
Prussian methods, faithfully and even slavishly copied by Great Britain as by
others after 1870, was temporarily forgotten, but the pendulum swung back
again, and the Russo-Japanese War led to the disappearance, so far as Europe
was concerned, of many products of the period of doubt and controversy which
followed the struggle in South Africa. Side by side with continuous discussions
of the greater questions of military policy, amongst these being many
well-reasoned proposals for universal service, the technical and administrative
efficiency of the service has undergone great improvement, and this appears to
be of more real and permanent value than the greater part of the solutions
given for the larger problems. The changes in the organization of the artillery
afford the best evidence of this spirit of practical and technical reform. In
the first place the old royal regiment was divided into two
branches. The officers for the field and horse artillery stand now on one
seniority list for promotion, the garrison, heavy and mountain batteries on
another. In each branch important changes of organization have been also made.
In the field branch, both for Royal Field and Royal Horse Artillery, the
battery is no longer the one unit for all purposes. A lieutenant-colonel's
command, the brigade, has been created. It consists of a group, in
the horse artillery of two, in the field artillery of three batteries. For the
practical training of the horse and field artillery a large area of ground on
the wild open country of Dartmoor, near Okehampton, has for some years been
utilized. A similar school has been started at Glen Imaal in Ireland, and a new
training ground has been opened on Salisbury Plain. Similarly, with the Royal
Garrison Artillery a more perfect system has been devised for the regulation
and practice of the fire of each fortress, in accordance with the varying
circumstances of its position, &c. A practice school for the garrison
artillery has been established at Lydd, but the various coast fortresses
themselves carry out regular practice with service ammunition.
INDIAN ARMY
70. Historically, the Indian army grew up in three distinct
divisions, the Bengal, Madras and Bombay armies. This separation was the
natural result of the original foundation of separate settlements and factories
in India; and each retains to the present day much of its old
identity.
Bengal
The English traders in Bengal were long restricted by the
native princes to a military establishment of an ensign and 30 men; and this
force may be taken as the germ of the Indian army. In 1681 Bengal received the
first reinforcement from Madras, and two years later a company was sent from
Madras, raising the little Bengal army to a strength of 250 Europeans. In 1695
native soldiers were first enlisted. In 17011702 the garrison of Calcutta
consisted of 120 soldiers and seamen gunners. In 1756 occurred the defence of
Calcutta against Suraj-ud-Dowlah, and the terrible tragedy of the Black Hole.
The work of reconquest and punishment was carried out by an expedition from
Madras, and in the little force with which Clive gained the great victory of
Plassey the Bengal army was represented by a few hundred men only (the British
39th, now Dorsetshire regiment, which was also present, was the first King's
regiment sent to India, and bears the motto Primus in Indis); but from
this date the military power of the Company rapidly increased. A company of
artillery had been organized in 1748; and in 1757, shortly before Plassey, the
1st regiment of Bengal native infantry was raised. Next, in 1759 the native
infantry was augmented, in 1760 dragoons were raised, and in 1763 the total
forces amounted to 1500 Europeans and 12 battalions of native infantry (11,500
men). In 1765 the European infantry was divided into 3 regiments, and the whole
force was organized in 3 brigades, each consisting of 1 company of artillery, 1
regiment European infantry, troop of native cavalry, and 7 battalions of
sepoys. In 1766, on the reduction of some money allowances, a number of
officers of the Bengal army agreed to resign their commissions simultaneously.
This dangerous combination was promptly put down by Clive, to whom the Bengal
army may be said to owe its existence.
The constant wars and extensions of dominion of the next thirty
years led to further augmentations; the number of brigades and of European
regiments was increased to 6; and in 1794 the Bengal army numbered about 3500
Europeans and 24,000 natives.
71. Madras
The first armed force in the Madras presidency was the
little garrison of Armegon on the Coromandel coast, consisting of 28 soldiers.
In 1644 Fort St George was built and garrisoned, and in 1653 Madras became a
presidency. In 1745 the garrison of Fort St George consisted of 200 Europeans,
while a similar number, with the addition of 200 Topasses
(descendants of the Portuguese), garrisoned Fort St David. In 1748 the various
independent companies on the Coromandel coast and other places were
consolidated into the Madras European regiment. From this time the military
history of the Madras army was full of incident, and it bore the principal part
in Clive's victories of Arcot, Kavaripak and Plassey. In 1754 the 39th regiment
of the Royal army was sent to Madras. In 1758 three others followed. In 1772
the Madras army numbered 3000 European infantry and 16,000 natives, and in 1784
the number of native troops had risen to 34,000.
72. Bombay
The island of Bombay formed part of the marriage portion
received by Charles II with the infanta of Portugal, and in 1662 the Bombay
regiment of Europeans was raised to defend it. In 1668 the island was granted
to the Company, and the regiment at the same time transferred to them. In 1708
Bombay became a presidency, but it did not play so important a part as the
others in the early extension of British power, and its forces were not so
rapidly developed. It is said, however, to have been the first to discipline
native troops, and Bombay sepoys were sent to Madras in 1747, and took part in
the battle of Plassey in 1757. In 1772 the Bombay army consisted of 2500
Europeans and 3500 sepoys, but in 1794, in consequence of the struggles with
the Mahratta power, the native troops had been increased to 24,000.
73. Consolidation of the Army
In 1796 a general reorganization took place. Hitherto the
officers in each presidency had been borne on general lists,
according to branches of the service. These lists were now broken up and cadres
of regiments formed. The colonels and lieutenant- colonels remained on separate
lists, and an establishment of general officers was created, while the
divisional commands were distributed between the royal and Company's officers.
Further augmentations took place, consequent on the great extension of British
supremacy. In 1798 the native infantry in India numbered 122 battalions. In
1808 the total force in India amounted to 24,500 Europeans and 154,500
natives.
The first half of the 19th century was filled with wars and
annexations and the army was steadily increased. Horse artillery was formed,
and the artillery in general greatly augmented. Irregular cavalry
was raised in Bengal and Bombay, and recruited from a better class of troopers,
who received high pay and found their own horses and equipment. Local
forces were raised in various parts from time to time, the most important
being the Punjab irregular force (raised after the annexation of the Punjab in
1849), consisting of 3 field batteries, 5 regiments of cavalry, and 5 of
infantry, and the Nagpur and Oudh irregular, forces. Another kind of force,
which had been gradually formed, was that called contingents troops
raised by the protected native states. The strongest of these was that of
Hyderabad, originally known as the nizam's army. Changes were also made in the
organization of the army. Sanitary improvements were effected, manufacturing
establishments instituted or increased, and the administration generally
improved.
74. The Army before the Mutiny
The officering and recruiting of the three armies were in all
essentials similar. The officers were mainly supplied by the Company's military
college at Addiscombe in Surrey (established in 1809), and by direct
appointments. The Bengal army was recruited from Hindustan, the infantry being
mostly drawn from Oudh and the great Gangetic plains. The soldiers were chiefly
high-caste Hindus, a sixth being Mahommedans. The cavalry was composed mainly
of Mahommedans, recruited from Rohilkhand and the Gangetic Doab. The only other
elements in the army were four Gurkha regiments, enlisted from Nepal, and the
local Punjab irregular force. The Madras army was chiefly recruited from that
presidency, or the native states connected with it, and consisted of
Mahommedans, Brahmans, and of the Mahratta, Tamil and Telugu peoples. The
Bombay army was recruited from its own presidency, with some Hindustanis,, but
chiefly formed of Mahrattas and Mahomnmedans; the Bombay light cavalry mainly
from Hindustan proper.
Including the local and irregular troops (about 100,000 strong),
the total strength amounted to 38,000 Europeans of all arms, with 276 field
guns, and 348,000 native troops, with 248 field guns truly a magnificent
establishment, and, outwardly, worthy of the great empire which England had
created for herself in the East, but inwardly unsound, and on the very verge of
the great mutiny of 1857.
|
Bengal.
|
Madra s.
|
Bombay .
|
Tota l
|
British Cavalry
Regiments .
British Infantry Battalions .
Company's European Battalions
European and Native Artillery
Battalions. ...
|
2
15
3
12
|
I
3
3
7
|
I
4
3
5
|
4
22
9
24
|
Native Infantry
Battalions .
Native Cavalry Regiments .
|
74
28
|
52
·8
|
29
3
|
155
39
|
An account of the events of 185758 will be found under INDIAN
MUTINY. After the catastrophe the reorganization of the military forces on
different lines was of course unavoidable. Fortunately, the armies of Madras
and Bombay had been almost wholly untouched by the spirit of disaffection, and
in the darkest days the Sikhs, though formerly enemies of the British, had not
only remained faithful to them, but had rendered them powerful
assistance;
75. The Reorganization
By the autumn of 1858 the mutiny was virtually crushed, and
the task of reorganization commenced. On the 1st of September 1858 the East
India Company ceased to rule, and Her Majesty's government took up the reins of
power. On the important question of the army, the opinions and advice of the
most distinguished soldiers and civilians were invited. Masses of reports: and
evidence were collected in India, and by a royal commission in England. On the
report of this commission the new system was based. The local European army was
abolished, and its personnel amalgamated with the royal army. The
artillery became wholly British, with the exception of a few native mountain
batteries. The total strength of the British troops, all of the royal army, was
largely increased, while that of the native troops was largely diminished.
Three distinct native armiesthose of Bengal, Madras and Bombaywere
still maintained. The reduced Indian armies consisted of cavalry and infantry
only, with a very few artillery, distributed as follows:
|
Battalions Infantry |
Regiments Cavalry |
Bengal |
49 |
19 |
Madras |
40 |
4 |
Bombay |
30 |
7 |
Punjab Force |
12 |
6 |
Total |
131 |
36 |
There were also three sapper battalions, one to each army. The
Punjab force, which had 5 batteries of native artillery attached to it,
continued under the Punjab government. In addition, the Hyderabad contingent of
4 cavalry, 6 infantry regiments and 4 batteries, and a local force in central
India of 2 regiments cavalry and 6 infantry, were retained under the government
of India. After all the arrangements had been completed the army of India
consisted of 62,000 British and 125,000 native troops.
76. The Modern Army
The college at Addiscombe was closed in 1860, and the direct
appointment of British officers to the Indian local forces ceased in 1861. In
that year a staff corps was formed by royal warrant in each presidency to
supply a body of officers for service in India, by whom various offices and
appointments hitherto held by officers borne on the strength of the several
corps in the Indian forces shall in future be held. Special rules were laid
down. The corps was at first recruited partly from officers of the Company's
service and partly from the royal army, holding staff appointments (the new
regimental employment being considered as staff duty) and all kinds of
political and civil posts; for the system established later see INDIA:
Army. The native artillery and sappers and miners were to be officered
from the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers. The only English warrant and
non-commissioned officers now to be employed in the native army were to be
those of the Royal Engineers with the sappers and miners.
A radical change in the regimental organization of all the native
armies was effected in 1863. The Punjab Frontier Force was from the first
organized on the irregular system, which was there seen at its best, as also
were the new regiments raised during the Mutiny. This system was now applied to
the whole army, each regiment and battalion having seven British officers
attached to it for command and administrative duties, the immediate command of
troops and companies being left to the native officers. Thus was the system
reverted to, which was initiated by Clive, of a few British officers only being
attached to each corps for the higher regimental duties of command and,
control. Time had shown that this was more effective than the regular system
instituted in 1796 of British officers commanding troops and
companies.
A new spirit was breathed into the army. The supremacy of the
commandant was the main principle. He was less hampered by the unbending
regulations enjoined upon the old regular regiments, had greater powers of
reward and punishment, was in a position to assume larger responsibility and
greater freedom of action, and was supported in the full exercise of his
authority. The system made the officers.
Up to 1881 the native army underwent little change, but in that
year 18 regiments of infantry and 4 of cavalry were broken up, almost the same
total number of men being maintained in fewer and stronger regiments. The only
reduction made in the British troops was in the Royal Artillery, which was
diminished by 11 batteries. The events of 1885, however, on the Russo-Afghan
frontier, led to augmentations. The 11 batteries Royal Artillery were brought
back from England; each of the 9 British cavalry regiments in India received a
fourth squadron; each of the British infantry battalions was increased by 100
men, and 3 battalions were added. The native cavalry had a fourth squadron
added to each regiment; three of the four regiments broken up in 1881 were
re-raised, while the native infantry was increased in regimental strength, and
9 new battalions raised composed of Gurkhas, Sikhs and Punjabis. The addition
in all amounted to 10,600 British and 21,200 native troops. In 1890 the
strength of the army of India was 73,000 British and, including irregulars,
147,500 native troops. For the Indian volunteers, see VOLUNTEERS.
Many important changes took place between 1885 and 1904. Seven
Madras infantry regiments were converted into regiments for service in Burma,
composed of Gurkhas and hardy races from northern India; six Bengal and Bombay
regiments were similarly converted into regiments of Punjabis, Pathans and
Gurkhas; the native mountain batteries have been increased to ten; a system of
linked battalions has been introduced with the formation of regimental centres
for mobilization; and reserves for infantry and mountain artillery have been
formed. The number of British officers with each regiment has been increased to
nine, and the two wing commands in battalions have been converted into 4
double-company commands of 250 men each, under a British commander, who is
responsible to the commandant for their training and efficiency, the command of
the companies being left to the native officers. This system, which is
analogous to the squadron command in the cavalry, admits of closer individual
attention to training, and distributes among the senior British regimental
officers effective responsibility of a personal kind.
An addition (at the imperial expense) of five battalions of Sikhs,
Punjabi Mahommedans, Jats and hillmen in northern India was made in 1900, as
the result of India being called upon to furnish garrisons for Mauritius and
other stations overseas.
The unification of the triplicate army departments in the different
presidential armies was completed in 1891, all being brought directly under the
supreme government; and the three separate staff corps of Bengal, Madras and
Bombay were fused into one in 1891 as the Indian Staff Corps. The term
"Indian Staff Corps was in turn replaced by that of Indian
Army in 1903. These measures prepared the way for the new system of army
organization which, by authority of parliament, abolished divided control and
placed the whole army of India under the governor- general and the
commander-in-chief in India.
77. CANADIAN FORCES
In the earliest European settlements in Canada, the necessity of
protection against Indians caused the formation of a militia, and in 1665
companies were raised in every parish. The military history of the Canadian
forces under French rule is full of incident, and they served not only against
Indian raiders but also against the troops of Great Britain and of her North
American colonies. Six militia battalions took part in the defence of Quebec in
1759, and even the transfer of Canada from the French to the British crown did
not cause the disbandment of the existing forces. The French Canadians
distinguished themselves not less than the British settlers in the War of
American Independence, and in particular in the defence of Quebec against
Montgomery and Arnold. In 1787 an ordinance was made whereby three battalions
of the militia were permanently embodied, each contingent serving for two
years, at the end of which time a fresh contingent relieved it, and after this
a succession of laws and regulations were made with a view to complete
organization of the force. The brunt of the fighting on the American frontier
in the war of 1812 was borne very largely by the permanent force of three
battalions and the fresh units called out, all these being militia corps. Up to
1828 a distinction had been made between the British and the French regiments:
this was then abolished. The militia was again employed on active service
during the disturbances of 1837, and the Active Militia in 1863 had
grown to a strength of 25,000 men. The Fenian troubles of 1864 and 1866 caused
the embodiment of the Canadian forces once more. In 1867 took place the
unification of Canada, after which the whole force was completely organized on
the basis of a militia act (1868). A department of Militia and Defence with a
responsible minister was established, and the strength of the active militia of
all arms was fixed at 40,000 rank and file. Two years later the militia
furnished 6000 men to deal with the Fenian Raid of 1870, and took part in
Colonel (Lord) Wolseley's Red River expedition. In 1871 a permanent force,
serving the double purpose of a regular nucleus and an instructional cadre, was
organized in two troops of cavalry, two batteries of artillery and one regiment
of infantry, and in 1876 the Royal Military College of Canada was founded at
Kingston. In 1885 the Riel rebellion was dealt with, and the important action
of Batoche won, by the militia, without assistance from regular troops. In the
same year Canada contributed a force of voyageurs to the Nile expedition
of Lord Wolseley the experience of these men was admittedly of great assistance
in navigating the Rapids. The militia sent contingents of all arms to serve in
the South African War, 18991902, including Strathcona's
Horse, a special corps, recruited almost entirely from the Active Militia
and the North-west Mounted Police. The latter, a permanent constabulary of
mounted riflemen, was formed in 1873.
After the South African War an extensive scheme of reorganization
was taken in hand, the command being exercised for two years (19021904)
by Major-General Lord Dundonald, and subsequently by a militia council (Militia
Act 1904), similar in constitution to the home Army Council. For details of the
present military strength of Canada, see the article CANADA.
78. AUSTRIAN ARMY
The Landsknecht infantry constituted the mainstay of the
imperial armies in the 16th century. Maximilian I and Charles V are recorded to
have marched and carried the long pike in their ranks. Maximilian
also formed a corps of Kyrisser, who were the origin of the modern
cuirassiers. It was not, however, until much later that the Austrian army came
into existence as a permanent force. Rudolph II formed a small standing force
about 1600, but relied upon the enlistment system, like other
sovereigns of the time, for the bulk of his armies. The Thirty Years' War
produced the permanence of service which led in all the states of Europe to the
rise of standing armies. In the Empire it was Wallenstein who first raised a
distinctly imperial army of soldiers owing no duty but to the sovereign; and it
was the suspicion that he intended to use this army, which was raised largely
at his own expense, to further his own ends, that led to his assassination.
From that time the regiments belonged no longer to their colonels, but to the
emperor; and the oldest regiments in the present Austrian army date from the
Thirty Years' War, at the close of which Austria had 19 infantry, 6 cuirassier
and 1 dragoon regiments. The almost continuous wars of Austria against France
and the Turks (from 1495 to 1895 Austrian troops took part in 7000 actions of
all sorts) led to a continuous increase in her establishments. The wars of the
time of Montecucculi and of Eugene were followed by that of the Polish
Succession, the two Turkish wars, and the three great struggles against
Frederick the Great. Thus in 1763 the army had been almost continuously on
active service for more than 100 years, in the course of which its organization
had been modified in accordance with the lessons of each war. This, in
conjunction with the fact that Austria took part in other Turkish campaigns
subsequently, rendered this army the most formidable opponent of the forces of
the French Revolution (1792). But the superior leading. organization and
numbers of the emperor's forces were totally inadequate to the magnitude of the
task of suppressing the Revolutionary forces, and though such victories as
Neerwinden were sufficient proof of the efficiency and valour of the Austrians,
they made no headway. In later campaigns, in which the enemy had acquired war
experience, and the best of their officers had come to the front, the tide
turned against the Imperialists even on the field of battle. The archduke
Charles's victories of 1796 were more than counterbalanced by Bonaparte's
Italian campaign, and the temporary success of 1799 ended at Marengo and
Hohenlinden.
79. Austrian Army
The Austrians, during the short peace which preceded the war of
1805, suffered, in consequence of all this, from a feeling of distrust, not
merely in their leaders, but also in the whole system upon which the army was
raised, organized and trained. This was substantially the same as that of the
Seven Years' War time. Enlistment being voluntary and for long service, the
numbers necessary to cope with the output of the French conscription could not
be raised, and the inner history of the Austrian headquarters in the Ulm
campaign shows that the dissensions and mutual distrust of the general officers
had gone far towards the disintegration of an army which at that time had the
most esprit de corps and the highest military qualities of any army in
Europe. But the disasters of 1805 swept away good and bad alike in the
abolition of the old system. Already the archduke Charles had designed a
nation in arms after the French model, and on this basis the
reconstruction was begun. The conscription was put in force and the necessary
numbers thus obtained; the administration was at the same time reformed and the
organization and supply services brought into line with modern requirements.
The war of 1809 surprised Austria in the midst of her reorganization, yet the
new army fought with the greatest spirit. The invasion of Bavaria was by no
means so leisurely as it had been in 1805, and the archduke Charles obtained
one signal victory over Napoleon in person. Aspern and Wagram were most
desperately contested, and though the archduke ceased to take part in the
administration after 1809 the work went on steadily until, in 1813, the
Austrian armies worthily represented the combination of discipline with the
nation in arms principle. Their intervention in the War of
Liberation was decisive, and Austria, in spite of her territorial losses of the
past years, put into the field well-drilled armies far exceeding in numbers
those which had appeared in the wars of the Revolution. After the fall of
Napoleon, Austria's hold on Italy necessitated the maintenance of a large army
of occupation. This army, and in particular its cavalry, was admittedly the
best in Europe, and, having to be ready to march at a few days' notice, it was
saved from the deadening influence of undisturbed peace which affected every
other service in Europe from 1815 to 1850.
80. Austrian Army
The Austrian system has conserved much of the peculiar tone of the
army of 1848, of which English readers may obtain a good idea from George
Meredith's Viltoria. It was, however, a natural result of this that the
army lost to some considerable extent the spirit of the nation in
arms of 1809 and 1813. It was employed in dynastic wars, and the
conscription was of course modified by substitution; thus, when the war of 1859
resulted unfavourably to the Austrians, the army began to lose confidence,
precisely as had been the case in 1805. Once more, ?in 1866, an army animated
by the purely professional spirit, which was itself weakened by distrust, met a
nation in arms, and in this case a nation well trained in peace and
armed with a breechloader. Bad staff work, and tactics which can only be
described as those of pique, precipitated the disaster, and in seven weeks the
victorious Prussians were almost at the gates of Vienna.
The result of the war, and of the constitutional changes about this
time, was the re-adoption of the principles of 18061813, the abolition of
conscription and long service in favour of universal service for a short term,
and a thorough reform in the methods of command and staff work. It has been
said of the Prussian army that discipline isthe officers.
This is more true of the K.K. army than of any other in Europe; the
great bond of union between the heterogeneous levies of recruits of many races
is the spirit of the corps of officers, which retains the personal and
professional characteristics of the old army of Italy.
The phrase K. und K. (Kaiserlich und Koniglich)
is applied to all services common to the Austrian and Hungarian
armies.
K.-K. (Kaiserlich-Koniglich) refers strictly only to
the troops of Austria, the Hungarian army being known as the K.Uug. (Royal
Hungarian) service.
81. FRENCH ARMY
The French army (see for further details FRANCE: Law and
Institutions) dates from the middle of the 15th century, at which time
Charles VII formed, from mercenaries who had served him in the Hundred Years'
War, the compagnies d'ordonnance, and thus laid the foundation of a
national standing army. But the armies that followed the kings in their wars
still consisted mainly of mercenaries, hired for the occasion; and the work of
Charles and his successors was completely undone in the confusion of the
religious wars. Louvois, was minister of Louis XIV, was the true creator of the
French royal army. The organization of the first standing army is here given in
some detail, as it served as a model for all armies for more than a century,
and is also followed to some extent in our own times. Before the advent of
Louvois, the forces were royal only in name. The army was a fortuitous
concourse of regiments of horse and foot, each of which was the property of its
colonel. The companies similarly
belonged to their captains, and, the state being then in no
condition to buy out these vested interests, superior control was almost
illusory. Indeed, all the well-known devices for eluding such control, for
instance, showing imaginary men on the pay lists, can be traced to the French
army of the 16th century. A further difficulty lay in the existence of the
offices called Colonel-General, Marshal-General and Grand Master of Artillery,
between whom no common administration was possible. The grand master survived
until 1743, but Louvois managed to suppress the other offices, and even to put
one of his own subordinates into the office of grand master. Thus was assured
direct royal control, exercised through the war minister. Louvois was unable
indeed to overthrow the proprietary system, but he made stringent regulations
against abuses, and confined it to the colonels (mestre de camp in the
cavalry) and the captains. Henceforward the colonel was a wealthy noble, with
few duties beyond that of spending money freely and of exercising his court
influence on behalf of his regiment. The real work of the service was done by
the lieutenant-colonels and lieutenants, and the king and the minister
recognized this on all occasions. Thus Vauban was given, as a reward for good
service, a company in the Picardie regiment without purchase.
Promotions from the ranks were very rare but not unknown, and all promotions
were awarded according to merit except those to captain or colonel. One of the
captains in a regiment was styled major, and acted as adjutant. This post was
of course filled by selection and not by purchase. The grades of general
officers were newly fixed by Louvois the brigadier, maréchal
de camp, lieutenant-general and marshal of France. The general principle
was to give command, but not promotion, according to merit. The rank and file
were recruited by voluntary enlistment for four years' service. The infantry
company was maintained in peace at an effective of 60, except in the guards and
the numerous foreign corps, in which the company was always at the war strength
of 100 to 200 men. This arm was composed, in 1678, of the Gardes
françaises, the Swiss guards, the old (vieux and petits
vieux) regiments of the line, of which the senior, Picardie,
claimed to be the oldest regiment in Europe, and the regiments raised under the
new system. The regiment du roi, which was deliberately made the model
of all others and was commanded by the celebrated Martinet, was the senior of
these latter. The whole infantry arm in 1678 numbered 320,000 field and
garrison troops. The cavalry consisted of the Maison du Roi (which
Louvois converted from a show corps to one of the highest
discipline and valour), divided into the Gardes du Corps and the
Mousquetaires, the Gendarmerie (descended from the old feudal
cavalry and the ordonnance ccmpanies) and the line cavalry, the whole
being about 55,000 strong. There were also 10,000 dragoons. In addition to the
regular army, the king could call out, in case of need, the ancient
arriere-ban or levy, as was in fact done in 1674. On that occasion,
however, it behaved badly, and it was not again employed. In 1688 Louvois
organized a militia raised by ballot. This numbered 25,000 men and proved to be
better, at any rate, than the arriereban. Many infantry regiments of the
line were, as has been said, foreign, and in 1678 the foreigners numbered
30,000, the greater part of these being Swiss.
82. French Army
The artillery had been an industrial concern rather than an arm of
the service. In sieges a sum of money was paid for each piece put in battery,
and the grand master was not subordinated to the war office. A nominee of
Louvois, as has been said, filled the post at this time, and eventually Louvois
formed companies of artillerymen, and finally the regiment of
Fusiliers which Vauban described as the finest regiment in
the world. The engineer service, as organized by Vauban, was composed of
engineers in ordinary, and of line officers especially employed in
war. Louvois further introduced the system of magazines. To ensure the regular
working of supply and transport, he instituted direct control by the central
executive, and stored great quantities of food in the fortresses, thereby
securing for the French armies a precision and certainty in military operations
which had hitherto been wanting. The higher administration of the army, under
the minister of war, fell into two branches, that of the commissaries and that
of the inspecting officers. The duties. of the former resembled those of a
modern routine staffissue of equipment, checking of returns,
&c. The latter exercised functions analogous to those of a general staff,
supervising the training and general efficiency of the troops. Louvois also
created an excellent hospital service, mobile and stationary, founded the Hotel
des Invalides in Paris for the maintenance of old soldiers, established cadet
schools for the training of young officers, and stimulated bravery and good
conduct by reviving and creating military orders of merit.
83. French Army - 17th Century
The last half of the 17th century is a brilliant period in the
annals of the French armies. Thoroughly organized, animated by the presence of
the king, and led by such generals as Condé, Turenne, Luxembourg,
Catinat and Vendome, they made head against coalitions which embraced nearly
all the powers of Europe, and made France the first military nation of Europe.
The reverses of the later part of Louis XIV's reign were not of course without
result upon the tone of the French army, and the campaigns of Marlborough and
Eugene for a time diminished the repute in which the troops of Louis were held
by other powers. Nevertheless the War of the Spanish Succession closed with
French victories, and generals of the calibre of Villars and Berwick were not
to be found in the service of every prince. The war of the Polish Succession in
Germany and Italy reflected no discredit upon the French arms; and the German
general staff, in its history of the wars of Frederick the Great, states that
in 1740 the French army was still regarded as the first in Europe.
Since the death of Louvois very little had changed. The army was still governed
as it had been by the great war minister, and something had been done to reduce
evils against which even he had been powerless. A royal regiment of artillery
had come into existence, and the engineers were justly regarded as the most
skillful in Europe. Certain alterations had been made in the organization of
both the guard and the line, and the total strength of the French in peace was
somewhat less than 200,000. Relatively to the numbers maintained in other
states, it was thus as powerful as before. Indeed, only one feature of
importance differentiated the French army from its contemporariesthe
proportion of officers to men, which was one to eleven. In view of this, the
spirit of the army was necessarily that of its officers, and these were by no
means the equals of their predecessors of the time of Turenne or Luxembourg.
Louvois' principle of employing professional soldiers for command and wealthy
men for colonelcies and captaincies was not deliberately adopted, hut
inevitably grew out of the circumstances of the time. The system answered
fairly whilst continual wars gave the professional soldiers opportunities for
distinction and advancement. But in a long peace the captains of eighteen and
colonels of twenty-three blocked all promotion, and there was no work save that
of routine to be done. Under these conditions the best soldiers sought servke
in other countries, the remainder lived only for pleasure, whilst the titular
chiefs of regiments and companies rarely appeared on parade. Madame de Genlis
relates how, when young courtiers departed to join their regiments for a few
weeks' duty, the ladies of the court decked them with favours, as if proceeding
on a distant and perilous expedition.
On the other hand, the fact that the French armies required large
drafts of militia to bring up their regular forces to war strength gave them a
vitality which was unusual in armies of the time. Even in the time of Louis XIV
the military spirit of the country had arisen at the threat of invasion, and
the French armies of 1709 fought far more desperately, as the casualty lists of
the allies at Malplaquet showed, than those of 1703 or 1704. In the time of the
Revolution the national spirit of the French army formed a rallying-point for
the forces of order, whereas Prussia, whose army was completely independent of
the people, lost all power of defending herself after a defeat in the field. It
is difficult to summarize the conduct of the royal armies in the wars of
174063. With a few exceptions the superior leaders proved themselves
incompetent, and in three great battles, at least, the troops suffered
ignominious defeat (Dettingen 1743, Rossbach Minden 1759). On the other hand,
Marshal Saxe and others of the younger generals were excellent commanders, and
Fontenoy was a victory of the first magnitude. The administration, however, was
corrupt and inefficient, and the general reputation of the French armies fell
so low that Frederick the Great once refused an important command to one of his
generals on the ground that his experience had been gained only against French
troops.
Under Louis XVI things improved somewhat; the American War and the
successes of Lafayette and Rochambeau revived a more warlike spirit.
Instruction was more carefully attended to, and a good system of drill and
tactics was elaborated at the camp of St Omer. Attempts were made to reform the
administration. Artillery and engineer schools had come into existence, and the
intellectual activity of the best officers was remarkable (see Max Jahns,
Gesch. der Kriegswissenschaften, vol. iii. passim). But the Revolution
soon broke over France, and the history of the royal army was hence forward
carried on by that revolutionary array, which, under a new flag, was destined
to raise the military fame of France to its greatest height.
84. Carnot
If Louis was the creator of the royal army, Carnot was so of the
revolutionary army the outbreak of the Revolution i the royal army consisted of
224 infantry battalions, 7 regiments of artillery, and 62 regiments of cavalry,
numbering about 173,000 in all, but capable of augmentation on war strength to
210,000. To this might be added about 60,000 militia (see Chuquet, Premiere
i;zvasion prussienne).
The first step of the Constituent Assembly was the abrogation of an
edict ot 1781 whereby men of non-noble birth had been denied commissioned rank
(1790). Thus, when many of the officers emigrated along with their fellows of
the noblesse, trained non- commissioned officers, who would already have
been officers save for this edict, were available to fill their places. The
general scheme of reform (see CONSCRIPTION) was less satisfactory, but the
formation of a National Guard, comprising in theory the whole military
population, was a step of the highest importance. At this time the titles of
regiments were abandoned in favour of numbers, and the costly and dangerous
Maison du Roi abolished. But voluntary enlistment soon failed; the old
corps, which kept up their discipline, were depleted, and the men went to the
volunteers, where work was less exacting and promotion more rapid.
Aussi fut-on, says a French writer, reduit bicniôt
a forcer l'engagement volontaire el d imposer le choix du
corps. The first invasion (July 1792) put an end to
half-measures, and the country was declared in danger. Even these
measures, however, were purely designed to meet the emergency, and, after
Valmy, enthusiasm waned to such a degree that, of a paper strength of 800,000
men (December 1792), only 112,000 of the line and 290,000 volunteers were
actually present. The disasters of the following spring once more called for
extreme energy, and 300,000 national guards were sent to the line, a step which
was followed by a compulsory levee en masse; one million men were thus
assembled to deal with the manifold dangers of civil and foreign war. France
was saved by mere numbers and the driving energy of the Terrorists, not by
discipline and organization. The latter was chaotic, and almost every element
of success was wanting to the tumultuary levies of the year 1793 save a
ferocious energy born of liberty and the guiilotine. But under the Terrorist
régime the army became the rallying-point of the nation, and when Lazare
Carnot (q.v.) became minister of war a better organization and
discipline began to appear. The amalgamation of the old army and the
volunteers, which had been commenced but imperfectly carried out, was effected
on a different and more thorough principle. The infantry was organized in
demi-brigades of three battalions (usually one of the old army to two of
volunteers). A permanent organization in divisions of all arms was introduced,
and the a blest officers selected for the commands. Arsenals and manufactories
of warlike stores were created, schools of instruction were re-established; the
republican forces were transformed from hordes to armies, well disciplined,
organized and equipped. Later measures followed the same lines, and the
artillery and engineers, which in 1790 were admittedly the best in Europe and
which owing to the roturier element in their officer cadres had not been
disorganized. by the emigration, steadily improved. The infantry, and in a less
degree the cavalry, became good and trustworthy soldiers, and the glorious
campaigns of 1795 and 1796, which were the direct result of Carnot's
administration, bore witness to the potentialities of the essentially modern
system. But, great as was the triumph of 1796-97, the exhaustion of years of
continuous warfare had made itself felt: the armies were reduced to mere
skeletons, and no sufficient means existed of replenishing them, till in 1798
the conscription was introduced. From that ti-me the whole male
population of France was practically at her ruler's disposal; and Napoleon had
full scope for his genius in organizing these masses. His principal
improvements were effected in the interval between the peace of Amiens and the
war with the third coalition, while threatening the invasion of England. His
armies were collected in large camps on the coasts of the Channel, and there
received that organization which, with minor variations, they retained during
all his campaigns, and which has since been copied by all European nations. The
divisions had already given place to the army corps, and Napoleon completed the
work of his predecessors. He withdrew the whole of the cavalry and- a portion
of the artillery from the divisions, and thus formed corps troops
and cavalry and artillery reserves for the whole army. The grade of marshal of
France was revived at Napoleon's coronation. At the same time, the operation of
Jourdan's law, acquiesced in during times of national danger and even during
peace, soon found opposition when the conscripts realized that long foreign
wars were to be their lot. It was not the actual losses of the field armies,
great as these undoubtedly were, which led Napoleon in the full tide of his
career to adopt the fatal practice of anticipating the
conscription, but the steady increase in the number of refractaires, men
who refused to come - up for service. To hunt these men down, no less than
forty thousand picked soldiers were engaged within the borders of France, and
the actual French element in the armies of Napoleon grew less and less with
every extension of the empire. Thus, in the Grand Army of 1809, about one-third
of the corps of all arms were purely German, and in 1812 the army which invaded
Russia, 467,000 strong, included 280,000 foreigners. In other words, the
million of men produced by the original conscription of 1793 had dwindled to
about half that number (counting the various subsidiary armies in Spain,
&c.), and one hundred thousand of the best and sturdiest Frenchmen were
engaged in a sort of civil war in France itself. The conscription was
anticipated even in 1806, the conscripts for 1807 being called up
before their time. As the later wars of the Empire closed one by one the
foreign - sources of recruiting, the conscription became more terrible every
year, - with the result that more refractaires and more trusted soldiers to
hunt them down were kept in non-effective employment. Finally the capacity for
resistance was exha-usted, and the army, from the marshals downward, showed
that it had had enough.
85. Restoration
One of the first acts of the Restoration was to abolish the
conscription, but it had again to be resorted to within three years. In 1818
the annual contingent was fixed at 40,000, and the period of service at six
years; in 1824 the contingent was increased to 60,000, and in 1832 to 80,000.
Of this, however, a part only, - according to the requirements of the service,
were enrolled; the remainder were sent home on leave or furlough. Up to 1855
certain exemptions were authorized, and substitution or exchange of lots
amongst young men who had drawn was permitted, but the individual drawn was
obliged either to serve personally or find a substitute. The long series of
Algerian wars produced further changes, and in 1855 the law of
dotation or exemption by payment was passed, and put an end to
personal substitution. The state now undertook to provide substitutes for all
who paid a fixed sum, and did so by high bounties to volunteers or to soldiers
for re-engaging. Although the price of exemption was fixed as high as £92,
-on an average 23,000 were claimed annually, and in 1859 as many as 42,000 were
granted. Thus gradually the conscription became rather subsidiary to voluntary
enlistment, and in 1866, out of a total establishment of 400,000, only 120,000
were conscripts. Changes had also taken place in the constitution of the army.
On the Restoration its numbers were reduced to 150,000, the old regiments
broken up and recast, and a royal guard created in place of the old imperial
one. When the revolution of July 1830 had driven Charles X. from his throne,
the royal guard, which had made itself peculiarly obnoxious, was dissolved; and
during Louis Philippe's reign the army was augmented to about 240,000 with the
colours. Under the Provisional Government of 1848 it was further increased, and
in 1854, when France allied herself with England against Russia, the army was
raised to 500,000 men. The imperial guard was re- created, and every effort
made to revive the old Napoleonic traditions in the army. In 1859 Napoleon III
took the field as the champion and ally of Italy, and the victories of
Montebello, Magenta and Solferino raised the reputation of the army to the
highest pitch, and for a time made France the arbiter of Europe. But the
campaign of 1866 suddenly made the world aware that a rival military power had
arisen, which was prepared. to dispute that supremacy.
Marshal Niel (q.v.), the then war minister, saw clearly that
the organization which had with difficulty maintained 150,000 men in Italy, was
no match for that which had within a month thrown 250,000 into the very heart
of Austria, while waging a successful war on the Main against Bavaria and her
allies. In 1867, therefore, he brought forward a measure for the reorganization
of the army. This was to have been a true nation in arms based on
universal service, and Niel calculated upon producing a first- line army
800,000 stronghalf with the colours, half in reservewith a separate
army of the second line. But many years must elapse before the full effect of
this principle of recruiting can be produced, as the army is incomplete in some
degree until the oldest reservist is a man who has been through the line
training. Niel himself died within a year, and 1870 witnessed the complete ruin
of the French army. The law of 1868 remained therefore no more than an
expression of principle.
86. Franco-German War
At the outbreak of the Franco-German War (q.v.) the French
field troops consisted of 368 battalions, 252 squadrons, and 984 guns. The
strength of the entire army on peace footing was 393,000 men; on war footing,
567,000. Disasters followed one another in rapid succession, and the bulk of
this war-trained long-service army was captive in Germany within three months
of the opening battle. But the spirit of the nation rose to the occasion as it
had done in 1793. The next year's contingent of recruits was called out and
hastily trained. Fourth battalions were formed from the depot cadres, and
organized into regiments de marche. The gardes mobiles (Niel's
creation) were mobilized, and by successive decrees and under various names
nearly all the manhood of the country called to arms.
The regular troops raised as regiments de marche, &c.,
amounted to 213,000 infantry, 12,000 cavalry and 10,000 artillery. The garde
mobile exceeded 300,000, and the mobilized national guard exceeded
1,100,000 - of whom about 180,000 were actually in the field and 250,000 in
Paris; the remainder preparing themselves in camps or depots for active work.
Altogether the new formations amounted to nearly 1,700,000. Though, in the face
of the now war- experienced well-led and disciplined Germans, their efforts
failed, this cannot detract from the admiration which must be felt by every
soldier for the patriotism of the people and the creative energy of their
leaders, of whom Gambetta and Freycinet were the chief. After the war every
Frenchman set himself to solve the army problem not less seriously than had
every Prussian after Jena, and the reformed French army (see FRANCE) was the
product of the period of national reconstruction. The adoption of the
universal service principle of active army, reserves and
second-line troops, the essential feature of which is the line training of
every man, was almost as a matter of course the basis of the reorganization,
for the want of a trained reserve was the most obvious cause of the disasters
of the terrible year.