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The Theban–Spartan War of 378–362 BC was a series of military
conflicts fought between Sparta and Thebes for hegemony over Greece.
Contents 1 378 BC –
Theban coup 1.1
Invasions of Agesilaus II 1.2
Battle of Tegyra 1.2.1 378–371 BC –
Aftermath
1.2.2 Peace conference of 371 BC 1.2.3 Battle of Leuctra (371 BC) 1.3 Theban
hegemony 1.3.1 First Invasion of the Peloponnese (370 BC) 1.3.2 Trial 1.3.3
Second invasion of the Peloponnese (369 BC) 1.3.4 Thessaly (368 BC) 1.3.5 Third
invasion of the Peloponnese (367 BC) 1.3.6 Achaemenid attempt at mediation
(368-366 BC) 1.3.7 Resistance to Thebes 1.3.8 Fourth invasion of the
Peloponnese (362 BC) 2 Athens and the Theban Wars 3 Notes 4 References 5
Bibliography 5.1 Ancient sources 5.2 Modern sources 378 BC –
Theban coup: Boeotian War
The defeat of the pro-Athens forces and the triumph of Sparta in the preceding
Corinthian War (394-386 BC) was especially disastrous to Thebes, as the general
settlement of 387 BC, called the King's Peace, stipulated the complete autonomy
of all Greek towns and so withdrew the other Boeotians from the political
control of Thebes. The power of Thebes was further curtailed in 382 BC, when a
Spartan force occupied the citadel by a treacherous coup de main. When the
Theban citadel was seized by the Spartans (383 or 382 BCE), Pelopidas and other
leading Theban democrats fled to Athens where Pelopidas took the lead in a
conspiracy to liberate Thebes. In the years following the Spartan takeover, the
exiled Thebans regrouped in Athens and, at the instigation of Pelopidas,
prepared to liberate their city. Meanwhile, in Thebes, Epaminondas began
preparing the young men of the city to fight the Spartans.[1] In the winter of
379 BC, a small group of the exiles, led by Pelopidas, infiltrated the city.[2]
They then assassinated the leaders of the pro-Spartan government, and supported
by Epaminondas and Gorgidas, who led a group of young men, and a force of
Athenian hoplites, they surrounded the Spartans on the Cadmeia.[3] The
following day, Epaminondas and Gorgidas brought Pelopidas and his men before
the Theban assembly and exhorted the Thebans to fight for their freedom; the
assembly responded by acclaiming Pelopidas and his men as liberators. The
Cadmeia was surrounded, and the Spartans attacked; Pelopidas realised that they
must be expelled before an army came from Sparta to relieve them. The Spartan
garrison eventually surrendered on the condition that they were allowed to
march away unharmed. The narrow margin of the conspirators' success is
demonstrated by the fact that the Spartan garrison met a Spartan force on the
way to rescue them as they marched back to Sparta.[4] Plutarch portrays the
Theban coup as an immensely significant event: ...the subsequent change in the
political situation made this exploit the more glorious. For the war which
broke down the pretensions of Sparta and put an end to her supremacy by land
and sea, began from that night, in which people, not by surprising any fort or
castle or citadel, but by coming into a private house with eleven others,
loosed and broke in pieces, if the truth may be expressed in a metaphor, the
fetters of the Lacedaemonian supremacy, which were thought indissoluble and not
to be broken.[2] Invasions of Agesilaus II Spartan King Agesilaus II The Sacred
Band first saw action in 378 BC, at the beginning of the Boeotian War. It was
during the famous stand-off between the Athenian mercenary commander (and later
strategos) Chabrias (d. 357 BC) and the Spartan King Agesilaus II (444
BC–360 BC).[5] Prior to the creation of the Sacred Band under Gorgidas,
the Athenians had helped the Theban exiles retake control of Thebes and the
citadel of Cadmea from Sparta. This was followed by Athens openly entering into
an alliance with Thebes against Sparta. In the summer of 378 BC, Agesilaus led
a Spartan expedition against Thebes from the Boeotian city of Thespiae (then
still allied to Sparta). His force consisted of 1,500 cavalry and 28,000
infantry. At least 20,000 of the infantry were hoplites,[6] while 500 were of
the elite band of Sciritae (S????ta?) light infantry vanguard.[7] Learning of
the impending invasion, Athens quickly came to the aid of Thebes by sending a
force of about 200 cavalry and 5,000 men (both citizen and mercenary, including
hoplites and peltasts) under the command of the Athenian strategos Demeas and
mercenary commander Chabrias.[6] The Spartan forces were held up for several
days by Theban forces manning the earthen stockades at the perimeter of Theban
territory. The Spartans eventually breached the fortifications and entered the
Theban countryside, devastating the Theban fields in their wake. Though the
Athenians have at this time joined the Theban forces, they were still
outnumbered by the Spartans; their combined forces numbering only at 1,700
cavalry, 12,000 hoplites, and around 5,000 light infantry. With the fall of the
stockades, they were left with two choices, either to retreat back to the
defensible walls of Thebes or to hold their ground and face the Spartans in the
open. They chose the latter and arrayed their forces along the crest of a low
sloping hill, opposite the Spartan forces. Gorgidas and the Sacred Band
occupied the front ranks of the Theban forces on the right, while Chabrias and
an experienced force of mercenary hoplites occupied the front ranks of the
Athenian forces on the left.[6] Agesilaus first sent out skirmishers to test
the combined Theban and Athenian lines.[7] These were easily dispatched by the
Theban and Athenian forces, probably by their more numerous cavalry. Agesilaus
then commanded the entire Spartan army to advance. He may have hoped that the
sight of the massed Spartan forces resolutely moving forward would be enough to
intimidate the Theban and Athenian forces into breaking ranks. The same tactic
had worked for Agesilaus against Argive forces in the Battle of Coronea (394
BC).[6] It was during this time that Chabrias gave his most famous command.
With scarcely 200 m (660 ft) separating the two armies, Agesilaus was expecting
the Theban and Athenian forces to charge at any moment.[6] Instead, Chabrias
ordered his men to stand at ease.[8] In unison, his mercenary hoplites
immediately assumed the resting posture—with the spear remaining pointing
upwards instead of towards the enemy, and the shield propped against the left
knee instead of being hoisted at the shoulders.[9] Gorgidas, on seeing this,
also commanded the Sacred Band to follow suit, which they did with the same
military drill precision and confidence.[6][10] The audacity of the maneuver
and the discipline of the execution was such that Agesilaus halted the
advance.[10][11] Seeing that his attempts to provoke the Theban and Athenian
forces to fight on lower ground were unsuccessful, Agesilaus eventually thought
it wiser to withdraw his forces back to Thespiae.[7][12] Xenophon and Diodorus
both mention that Agesilaus nevertheless boasted of being the
"unchallenged champion", claiming it was a Spartan victory since his
enemies declined to accept his invitation to battle.[13] Diodorus notes,
however, that this was merely to mollify his followers who were discouraged at
their king's failure to engage a smaller force. Chabrias, in contrast, was
being praised for his novel strategy and was seen as a savior by the
Thebans.[6][7] Shortly after the stand-off in Thebes, Agesilaus disbanded his
army in Thespiae and returned to Peloponnesos through Megara.[5][14] He left
the Spartan general Phoebidas as his harmost (??µ?st??, a military
governor) at Thespiae.[15] Phoebidas was the same general responsible for the
unauthorized seizure of the citadel of Cadmea in 382 BC, in violation of the
Peace of Antalcidas in place then.[16][17][18] Agesilaus previously refused to
punish Phoebidas (though he was fined),[19][20][21] which have led some modern
historians to believe that Phoebidas' earlier actions were under the direct
command of the king.[22] The Thebans under Gorgidas slaughtered 200 men that
Agesilaus left near Thespiae as an outpost (p??f??a??). He also made several
attacks on Thespian territory, though these accomplished little.[7] Phoebidas,
on his part, started making various raids into Theban territory using the
Spartans under his command and Thespian conscripts.[14][23] These forays became
so destructive that by the end of the summer, the Thebans went out in force
against Thespiae under the command of Gorgidas.[6] Phoebidas engaged the
advancing Theban army with his peltasts. The harrying of the light infantry
apparently proved too much for the Thebans and they started to retreat.
Phoebidas, hoping for a rout, rashly pursued them closely. However, the Theban
forces suddenly turned around and charged Phoebidas' forces. Phoebidas was
killed by the Theban cavalry.[24] His peltasts broke ranks and fled back to
Thespiae pursued by Theban forces.[5][6] There are three records of these
engagements with Phoebidas and Gorgidas surviving today. Xenophon and Diodorus
both say that Phoebidas died during Gorgidas' abrupt turn-around. Diodorus
records that the Spartans and Thespians lost 500 men.[7] Xenophon claims that
only a few of the Thespians were killed and that the maneuver of Gorgidas was
out of necessity, not deliberate.[14] The account of Polyaenus is almost
identical to that of Xenophon and Diodorus but claims instead that Phoebidas
survived and implies that the initial Theban retreat was a deliberate ruse by
Gorgidas.[10][12] Nonetheless, at the death of Phoebidas, the Spartans sent a
new mora (µ??a, the largest tactical unit in ancient Spartan armies) under
a polemarchos (p???µa????, the commander of a mora) by sea to replace the
losses in the Thespian garrison. Aside from Polyaenus, none of these accounts
mention the Sacred Band by name, but given that they were under the command of
Gorgidas, they are likely to have been part of Theban forces involved.[5] Not
long afterwards, Agesilaus mounted a second expedition against Thebes. After a
series of skirmishes which he won with some difficulty, he was forced again to
withdraw when the Theban army came out full force as he approached the city.
Diodorus observes at this point that the Thebans thereafter faced the Spartans
with confidence.[7] Gorgidas disappears from history between 377 and 375,
during which the command of the Sacred Band was apparently transferred to
Pelopidas.[5][note 1] Battle of Tegyra Map of ancient Boeotia showing the
location of the city of Orchomenus Main article: Battle of Tegyra As a single
unit under Pelopidas, the first recorded victory of the Sacred Band was at the
Battle of Tegyra (375 BC). It occurred near the Boeotian city of Orchomenus,
then still an ally of Sparta. Hearing reports that the Spartan garrison in
Orchomenus had left for Locris, Pelopidas quickly set out with the Sacred Band
and a few cavalry, hoping to capture it in their absence. They approached the
city through the northeastern route since the waters of Lake Copais were at
their fullest during that season.[23][25] Upon reaching the city, they learned
that a new mora had been sent from Sparta to reinforce Orchomenus. Unwilling to
engage the new garrison, Pelopidas decided to retreat back to Thebes, retracing
their northeastern route along Lake Copais. However, they only reached as far
as the shrine of Apollo of Tegyra before encountering the returning Spartan
forces from Locris.[19] The Spartans were composed of two morai led by the
polemarchoi Gorgoleon and Theopompus.[26][note 2] They outnumbered the Thebans
at least two to one.[19] According to Plutarch, upon seeing the Spartans, one
of Thebans allegedly told Pelopidas "We are fallen into our enemy's
hands;" to which Pelopidas replied, "And why not they into
ours?" He then ordered his cavalry to ride up from the rear and charge
while he reformed the Sacred Band into an abnormally dense formation, hoping to
at least cut through the numerically superior Spartan lines. The Spartans
advanced, confident in their numbers, only to have their leaders killed
immediately in the opening clashes. Leaderless and encountering forces equal in
discipline and training for the first time in the Sacred Band, the Spartans
faltered and opened their ranks, expecting the Thebans to pass through and
escape. Instead, Pelopidas surprised them by using the opening to flank the
Spartans.[27] The Spartans were completely routed, with considerable loss of
life.[25][28] The Thebans didn't pursue the fleeing survivors, mindful of the
remaining Spartan mora stationed in Orchomenus less than 5 km (3.1 mi) away.
They stripped the dead and set up a tropaion (t??pa???, a commemorative trophy
left at the site of a battle victory) before continuing on to Thebes.[5] Having
proven their worth, Pelopidas kept the Sacred Band as a separate tactical unit
in all subsequent battles.[25][29] An account of the battle was mentioned both
by Diodorus and Plutarch, both based heavily on the report by Ephorus.[30]
Xenophon conspicuously omits any mention of the Theban victory in his
Hellenica,[23] though this has traditionally been ascribed to Xenophon's strong
anti-Theban and pro-Spartan sentiments.[31][32] An obscure allusion to
Orchomenus in Hellenica, however, implies that Xenophon was aware of the
Spartan defeat.[23] The exact number of the belligerents on each side varies by
account. Diodorus puts the number of Thebans at 500 against the Spartan's 1000
(each mora consisting of 500 men), apparently basing it on Ephorus' original
figures. Plutarch puts the number of the Thebans at 300, and acknowledges three
sources for the number of Spartans: 1000 by the account of Ephorus; 1,400 by
Callisthenes (c. 360–328 BC); or 1,800 by Polybius (c. 200–118 BC).
Some of these numbers may have been exaggerated due to the overall significance
of the battle.[30][31] The battle, while minor, was remarkable for being the
first time a Spartan force had been defeated in pitched battle, dispelling the
myth of Spartan invincibility.[29] It left a deep impression in Greece and
boosted the morale among Boeotians, foreshadowing the later Battle of
Leuctra.[16][19][31] In Plutarch's own words: For in all the great wars there
had ever been against Greeks or barbarians, the Spartans were never before
beaten by a smaller company than their own; nor, indeed, in a set battle, when
their number was equal. Hence their courage was thought irresistible, and their
high repute before the battle made a conquest already of enemies, who thought
themselves no match for the men of Sparta even on equal terms. But this battle
first taught the other Greeks, that not only Eurotas, or the country between
Babyce and Cnacion,[note 3] breeds men of courage and resolution; but that
where the youth are ashamed of baseness, and ready to venture in a good cause,
where they fly disgrace more than danger, there, wherever it be, are found the
bravest and most formidable opponents. —?Plutarch, Pelopidas 17[25]
Shortly after this, the Athenians initiated the Common Peace of 375 BC (?????
??????, Koine Eirene) among Greek city-states. According to Xenophon, they were
alarmed at the growing power of Thebes and weary of fending off Spartan fleets
alone as the Thebans were not contributing any money to maintaining the
Athenian fleet.[29] However this broke down soon after in 374 BC, when Athens
and Sparta resumed hostilities over Korkyra (modern Corfu).[16] During this
time period, Athens also gradually became hostile to Thebes.[5] While Athens
and Sparta were busy fighting each other, Thebes resumed her campaigns against
the autonomous pro-Spartan Boeotian poleis. Thespiae and Tanagra were
subjugated and formally became part of the reestablished democratic Boeotian
confederacy.[19] In 373 BC, Thebans under the command of the boeotarch Neocles
attacked and razed its traditional rival, the Boeotian city of Plataea.[33] The
Plataean citizens were allowed to leave alive, but they were reduced to being
refugees and sought sanctuary in Athens.[7][34] Of the pro-Spartan Boeotian
poleis, only Orchomenus remained.[19] By this time, Thebes had also started
attacking Phocian poleis allied to Sparta.[35] Pelopidas is again mentioned as
the commander of the abortive Theban siege of the Phocian city of Elateia (c.
372 BC). In response to the Theban army outside the city's walls, the Phocian
general Onomarchus brought out all the inhabitants of the city (including the
elderly, women, and children) and locked the gates. He then placed the
non-combatants directly behind the defenders of Elateia. On seeing this,
Pelopidas withdrew his forces, recognizing that the Phocians would fight to the
death to protect their loved ones.[5][12] By 371 BC, there was another attempt
to revive the King's Peace to curb the rise of Thebes. It was initiated by
either the Athenians or the Persians (perhaps at the prompting of the
Spartans). The Spartans also sent a large force led by King Cleombrotus I
(Spartans have two kings simultaneously) to Phocis, ready to invade Boeotia if
the Thebans refuse to attend the peace conference or accept its terms.[35][note
4] 378–371 BC – Aftermath When news of the uprising at Thebes reached
Sparta, an army under Cleombrotus I had been dispatched to subdue the city, but
turned back without engaging the Thebans. Another army under Agesilaus II was
then dispatched to attack the Thebans. However, the Thebans refused to meet the
Spartan army in battle, instead building a trench and stockade outside Thebes,
which they occupied, preventing the Spartans advancing on the city. The
Spartans ravaged the countryside but eventually departed, leaving Thebes
independent.[36] This victory so heartened the Thebans that they undertook
operations against other neighboring cities as well.[37] In short order the
Thebans were able to reconstitute their old Boeotian confederacy in a new,
democratic form. The cities of Boeotia united as a federation with an executive
body composed of seven generals, or Boeotarchs, elected from seven districts
throughout Boeotia.[38] This political fusion was so successful that henceforth
the names Theban and Boeotian were used interchangeably in a nod to the
newfound solidarity of the region. Seeking to crush the Thebans, the Spartans
would invade Boeotia three times over the next few years (378, 377, ? possibly
Leuctra).[36] At first the Thebans feared facing the Spartans head on, but the
conflict gave them much practice and training, and they "had their spirits
roused and their bodies thoroughly inured to hardships, and gained experience
and courage from their constant struggles".[39] Although Sparta remained
the dominant land power in Greece, the Boeotians had demonstrated that they,
too, were a martial threat and a politically cohesive power.[40] At the same
time, Pelopidas, an advocate of an aggressive policy against Sparta, had
established himself as a major political leader in Thebes.[41] Epaminondas's
role in the years to 371 BC is difficult to piece together. Certainly, he
served with the Theban armies in the defence of Boeotia in the 370s, and, by
371 BC, he had become a Boeotarch.[42] It seems safe to assume, given their
close friendship, and their close collaboration after 371 BC, that Epaminondas
and Pelopidas also collaborated closely on Theban policy in the period
378–371 BC.[43] Peace conference of 371 BC The years following the Theban
coup had seen desultory fighting between Sparta and Thebes, with Athens also
drawn into the conflict. A feeble attempt at a common peace had been made in
375 BC, but desultory fighting between Athens and Sparta had resumed by 373 BC
(at the latest).[44] By 371 BC, Athens and Sparta were again war-weary, and in
371 BC a conference was held at Sparta to discuss another attempt at a common
peace.[45] Epaminondas was serving as a Boeotarch for 371 BC, and led the
Boeotian delegation to the peace conference. Peace terms were agreed at the
outset of the conference, and the Thebans presumably signed the treaty in their
own name alone.[46] However, on the following day, Epaminondas caused a drastic
break with Sparta when he insisted on signing not for the Thebans alone, but
for all the Boeotians. Agesilaus refused to allow the change of the Theban
envoys' signature, insisting that the cities of Boeotia should be independent;
Epaminondas countered that if this were to be the case, the cities of Laconia
should be as well. Irate, Agesilaus struck the Thebans from the document. The
delegation returned to Thebes, and both sides mobilized for war.[47] Battle of
Leuctra (371 BC) Main article: Battle of Leuctra Pelopidas leading the Thebans
at the Battle of Leuctra Immediately following the failure of the peace talks,
orders were sent out from Sparta to the Spartan king Cleombrotus, who was at
the head of an army in Phocis, commanding him to march directly to Boeotia.
Skirting north to avoid mountain passes where the Boeotians were prepared to
ambush him, Cleombrotus entered Boeotian territory from an unexpected direction
and quickly seized a fort and captured 10 or 12 triremes. Then marching towards
Thebes, he camped at Leuctra, in the territory of Thespiae. Here, the Boeotian
army came to meet him. The Spartan army contained some 10,000 hoplites, 700 of
whom were the elite warriors known as Spartiates. The Boeotians opposite them
numbered about 6,000, but were bolstered by a cavalry superior to that of the
Peloponnesians.[48] Epaminondas was given charge of the Boeotian army, with the
other six Boeotarchs in an advisory capacity. Pelopidas, meanwhile, was captain
of the Sacred Band, the elite Theban troops. Before the battle, there was
evidently much debate amongst the Boeotarchs about whether to fight or not. As
a consistent advocate of an aggressive policy, Epaminondas wished to fight, and
supported by Pelopidas, he managed to swing the vote in favour of battle.[49]
During the course of the battle, Epaminondas was to display a grasp of tactics
hitherto unseen in Greek warfare.[50] The Battle of Leuctra, 371 BC, showing
Epaminondas's tactical advances The phalanx formation used by Greek armies had
a distinct tendency to veer to the right during battle, "because fear
makes each man do his best to shelter his unarmed side with the shield of the
man next him on the right".[51] Traditionally, a phalanx therefore lined
up for battle with the elite troops on the right flank to counter this
tendency.[52] Thus, in the Spartan phalanx at Leuctra, Cleombrotus and the
elite 'Spartiates' were on the right, while the less experienced Peloponnesian
allies were on the left. However, needing to counter the Spartans' numerical
advantage, Epaminondas implemented two tactical innovations. Firstly, he took
the best troops in the army, and arranged them 50 ranks deep (as opposed to the
normal 8–12 ranks) on the left wing, opposite Cleombrotus and the
Spartans, with Pelopidas and the Sacred Band on the extreme left flank.[53]
Secondly, recognizing, that he could not have matched the width of the
Peloponnesian phalanx (even before the deepening the left flank), he abandoned
all attempts to do so. Instead, placing the weaker troops on the right flank,
he "instructed them to avoid battle and withdraw gradually during the
enemy's attack". The tactic of the deep phalanx had been anticipated by
Pagondas, another Theban general, who used a 25 man deep formation at the
Battle of Delium.[54] However, the reversing of the position of the elite
troops, and an oblique line of attack were innovations; it seems that
Epaminondas was therefore responsible for the military tactic of refusing one's
flank.[55] The fighting at Leuctra opened with a clash between the cavalry, in
which the Thebans were victorious over the inferior Spartan cavalry, driving
them back into the ranks of the infantry, and thereby disrupting the phalanx.
The battle then became general, with the strengthened Theban left flank
marching to attack at double speed, while the right flank retreated. After
intense fighting, the Spartan right flank began to give way under the impetus
of the mass of Thebans, and Cleombrotus was killed. Although the Spartans held
on for long enough to rescue the body of the king, their line was soon broken
by the sheer force of the Theban assault. The Peloponnesian allies on the left
wing, seeing the Spartans put to flight, also broke and ran, and the entire
army retreated in disarray.[56] One thousand Peloponnesians were killed, while
the Boeotians lost only 300 men. Most importantly, since it constituted a
significant proportion of the entire Spartan manpower, 400 of the 700
Spartiates present were killed, a loss that posed a serious threat to Sparta's
future war-making abilities.[57] When, after the battle, the Spartans asked if
they and the Peloponnesians could collect the dead, Epaminondas suspected that
the Spartans would try to cover-up the scale of their losses. He therefore
allowed the Peloponnesians to remove their dead first, so that those remaining
would be shown to be Spartiates, and emphasise the scale of the Theban
victory.[58] The victory at Leuctra shook the foundations of the Spartan
dominance of Greece to the core. Since the number of Spartiates was always
relatively small, Sparta had relied on her allies in order to field substantial
armies. However, with the defeat at Leuctra, the Peloponnesian allies were less
inclined to bow to Spartan demands. Furthermore, with the loss of men at
Leuctra and other battles, the Spartans were not in a strong position to
reassert their dominance over their erstwhile allies.[59] Theban hegemony Main
article: Theban hegemony In the immediate aftermath of Leuctra, the Thebans
considered following up their victory by taking their vengeance on Sparta; they
also invited Athens to join them in doing so. However, their Thessalian allies
under Jason of Pherae dissuaded them from shattering what remained of the
Spartan army.[60] Instead, Epaminondas occupied himself with consolidating the
Boeotian confederacy, compelling the previously Spartan-aligned polis of
Orchomenus to join the league.[61] The following year the Thebans invaded the
Peloponnesus, aiming to break Spartan power for good.[62] It is not clear
exactly when the Thebans started to think not just of ending the Spartan
hegemony, but of replacing it with one of their own, but it is clear that
eventually this became their aim. Hans Beck asserts that, unlike Sparta in the
Peloponnesian League and Athens in the Delian League, Thebes made no effort
either to create an empire or to bind its allies in any sort of permanent and
stable organization. Indeed, after Leuctra Thebes devoted its attention to
diplomatic efforts in Central Greece rather than schemes of domination further
afield.[63] By late 370 Thebes' network of alliances in central Greece made her
secure in the area—as she had not been before Leuctra—and offered
scope for further expansion of Theban influence.[64] First Invasion of the
Peloponnese (370 BC) When, in the immediate aftermath of Leuctra, the Thebans
had sent a herald to Athens with news of their victory, the messenger was met
with stony silence. The Athenians then decided to take advantage of the Spartan
discomfiture, holding a conference in Athens, in which the peace terms proposed
earlier in 371 BC were ratified by all cities (except Elis); and this time, the
treaty explicitly made the Peloponnesian cities, formerly under Spartan
dominance, independent.[65] Taking advantage of this, the Mantineans decided to
unify their settlements into a single city, and to fortify it; a decision which
greatly angered Agesilaus. Furthermore, Tegea, supported by Mantinea,
instigated the formation of an Arcadian alliance. This led to the Spartans
declaring war on Mantinea, whereupon the majority of Arcadian cities grouped
together to oppose the Spartans (thus forming the confederation that the
Spartans were trying to prevent), and requested assistance from the Thebans.
The Theban force arrived late in 370 BC, and it was led by Epaminondas and
Pelopidas, both at this time Boeotarchs.[66] As they journeyed into Arcadia,
the Thebans were joined by armed contingents from many of Sparta's former
allies, swelling their forces to some 50–70,000 men.[67] In Arcadia
Epaminondas encouraged the Arcadians to form their proposed league, and to
build the new city of Megalopolis (as a center of power opposed to Sparta).[68]
Messenia in the classical period Epaminondas, supported by Pelopidas and the
Arcadians, then persuaded the other Boeotarchs to invade Laconia itself. Moving
south, they crossed the Evrotas River, the frontier of Sparta, which no hostile
army had breached in memory. The Spartans, unwilling to engage the massive army
in battle, simply defended their city, which the Thebans did not attempt to
capture. The Thebans and their allies ravaged Laconia, down to the port of
Gythium, freeing some of the Lacedaemonian perioeci from their allegiance to
Sparta.[69] Epaminondas briefly returned to Arcadia, before marching south
again, this time to Messenia, a region which the Spartans had conquered some
200 years before. Epaminondas freed the helots of Messenia, and rebuilt the
ancient city of Messene on Mount Ithome, with fortifications that were among
the strongest in Greece. He then issued a call to Messenian exiles all over
Greece to return and rebuild their homeland.[70] The loss of Messenia was
particularly damaging to the Spartans, since the territory comprised one-third
of Sparta's territory and contained half of their helot population. The helots'
labor allowed the Spartans to become a "full-time" army.[71]
Epaminondas' campaign of 370/369 has been described as an example of "the
grand strategy of indirect approach", which was aimed at severing
"the economic roots of her [Sparta's] military supremacy."[62] In
mere months, Epaminondas had created two new enemy states that opposed Sparta,
shaken the foundations of Sparta's economy, and all but devastated Sparta's
prestige. This accomplished, he led his army back home, victorious.[72] Trial
In order to accomplish all that he wished in the Peloponnesus, Epaminondas had
persuaded his fellow Boeotarchs to remain in the field for several months after
their term of office had expired. Upon his return home, Epaminondas was
therefore greeted not with a hero's welcome but with a trial arranged by his
political enemies. According to Cornelius Nepos, in his defense Epaminondas
merely requested that, if he be executed, the inscription regarding the verdict
read: Epaminondas was punished by the Thebans with death, because he obliged
them to overthrow the Lacedaemonians at Leuctra, whom, before he was general,
none of the Boeotians durst look upon in the field, and because he not only, by
one battle, rescued Thebes from destruction, but also secured liberty for all
Greece, and brought the power of both people to such a condition, that the
Thebans attacked Sparta, and the Lacedaemonians were content if they could save
their lives; nor did he cease to prosecute the war, till, after settling
Messene, he shut up Sparta with a close siege.[73] The jury broke into
laughter, the charges were dropped, and Epaminondas was re-elected as Boeotarch
for the next year.[74] Second invasion of the Peloponnese (369 BC) In 369 BC
the Argives, Eleans and the Arcadians, eager to continue their war against
Sparta, recalled the Thebans to their support. Epaminondas, at the height of
his prestige, again commanded an allied invasion force. Arriving at the Isthmus
of Corinth, the Thebans found it heavily guarded by the Spartans and Athenians
(along with the Corinthians, Megarans and Pellenians). Epaminondas decided to
attack the weakest spot, guarded by the Lacedaemonians; in a dawn attack he
forced his way through the Spartan position, and joined his Peloponnesian
allies. The Thebans thus won an easy victory and crossed the Isthmus. Diodorus
stresses that this was "a feat no whit inferior to his former mighty
deeds".[75] However, the rest of the expedition achieved little: Sicyon
and Pellene became allied to Thebes, and the countryside of Troezen and
Epidaurus was ravaged, but the cities could not be taken. After an abortive
attack on Corinth and the arrival of a task force of Iberian mercenaries sent
by Dionysius of Syracuse to aid Sparta, the Thebans decided to march home.[76]
Thessaly (368 BC) When Epaminondas returned to Thebes, he continued to be
dogged by his political enemies who prosecuted him for the second time. They
actually succeeded in excluding him from the office of Boeotarch for the year
368 BC. This was the only time from the Battle of Leuctra until his death that
he did not serve as Boeotarch.[77] In 368, the Theban army marched into
Thessaly to rescue Pelopidas and Ismenias, who had been imprisoned by Alexander
of Pherae while serving as ambassadors. The Theban force not only failed to
overcome Alexander and his allies, but got into serious difficulties when it
tried to withdraw; Epaminondas, serving as a private soldier, succeeded in
extricating it. In early 367, Epaminondas led a second Theban expedition to
free Pelopidas and Ismenias. He finally outmaneuvered the Thessalians and
secured the release of the two Theban ambassadors without a fight.[78] Third
invasion of the Peloponnese (367 BC) In the spring of 367 BC, Epaminondas again
invaded the Peloponnesus. This time an Argive army captured part of the Isthmus
on Epaminondas's request, allowing the Theban army to enter the Peloponnesus
unhindered. On this occasion, Epaminondas marched to Achaea, seeking to secure
their allegiance to Thebes. No army dared to challenge him in the field, and
the Achaean oligarchies therefore acquiesced to the request that they be allied
to Thebes. Epaminondas' acceptance of the Achaean oligarchies roused protests
by both the Arcadians and his political rivals, and his settlement was thus
shortly reversed: democracies were set up, and the oligarchs exiled. These
democratic governments were short-lived, since the pro-Spartan aristocrats from
all the cities banded together and attacked each city in turn, re-establishing
the oligarchies. According to G.L. Cawkwell, "the sequel perhaps showed
the good sense of Epaminondas. When these exiles recovered the cities, they 'no
longer took a middle course'." In the light of their treatment by Thebes,
they abandoned their previously neutral stance, and thereafter "fought
zealously in support of the Lacedaemonians".[79] Achaemenid attempt at
mediation (368-366 BC) Achaemenid envoy Philiscus of Abydos provided important
Achaemenid funds to Sparta and Athens. Daric of Artaxerxes II. In 367/365 BC an
attempt was made to make a common peace, with the Persian King Artaxerxes II as
arbiter and guarantor, through the envoy Philiscus of Abydos.[80] This was a
second attempt to use the power of the Achaemenid king to influence a new
King's Peace as in the Peloponnesian War.[80] Thebes organized a conference to
have the terms of the peace accepted, but their diplomatic initiative failed:
the negotiations could not resolve the hostility between Thebes and other
states that resented its influence (such as the Arcadian leader Lycomedes who
challenged the right of the Thebans to hold the congress in Thebes); the peace
was never fully accepted, and fighting soon resumed.[81] The negotiation
collapsed when Thebes refused to return Messenia to the Spartans.[80] After the
negotiations had failed, Philiscus used Achaemenid funds to finance an army for
the Spartans, suggesting that he was acting in support of the Spartans from the
beginning.[80] With the Achaemenid financing of a new army, Sparta was able to
continue the war.[82] Among the mercenaries whom he had recruited, Philiscus
gave 2,000 to the Spartans.[83] He also probably provided funds to the
Athenians and promised them, on behalf of the King, to help them recover the
Chersonese militarily.[83] Both Philiscus and Ariobarzanes were made citizens
of Athens, a remarkable honor suggesting important services rendered to the
city-state.[83] Susa is located in West and Central Asia Susa Susa Negotiators
from the Greek city states went to the Achaemenid court at Susa for mediation.
During autumn of 367 BCE, first the Spartans sent envoys to the Achaemenid
capital of Susa (in the persons of Antalcidas and probably Euthycles),[84][85]
soon followed by envoys of the Athenians, the Arcadians, the Argives, the
Eleans, the Thebans and other Greek city-states, in attempts to obtain the
support of Achaemenid king Artaxerxes II in the Greek conflict.[80] The
Achaemenid king proposed a new peace treaty, this time highly tilted in favour
of Thebes, which required Messenia to remain independent and that the Athenian
fleet to be dismantled. This Peace proposal was rejected by most Greek parties
except Thebes.[86][82] Sparta and Athens, dissatisfied with the Persian king's
support of Thebes, decided to provide careful military support to the opponents
of the Achaemenid king. Athens and Sparta provided military support for the
revolted satraps, in particular Ariobarzanes: Sparta sent a force to
Ariobarzanes under an aging Agesilaus II, while Athens sent a force under
Timotheus, which was however diverted when it became obvious that Ariobarzanes
had entered frontal conflict with the Achaemenid king.[82][87] An Athenian
mercenary force under Chabrias was also sent to the Egyptian Pharao Tachos, who
was also fighting against the Achaemenid king.[82] Resistance to Thebes The
Theban hegemony; power-blocks in Greece in the decade up to 362 BC Throughout
the decade after the Battle of Leuctra, numerous former allies of Thebes
defected to the Spartan alliance or even to alliances with other hostile
states. By the middle of the next decade, even some Arcadians (whose league
Epaminondas had helped establish in 369 BC) had turned against them. At the
same time, however, Epaminondas managed through a series of diplomatic efforts
to dismantle the Peloponnesian league: the remaining members of the league
finally abandoned Sparta (in 365 Corinth, Epidaurus, and Phlius made peace with
Thebes and Argos),[88] and Messenia remained independent and firmly loyal to
Thebes.[89] Boeotian armies campaigned across Greece as opponents rose up on
all sides; Epaminondas even led his state in a challenge to Athens at sea. The
Theban demos voted him a fleet of a hundred triremes to win over the Rhodes,
Chios, and Byzantium. The fleet finally sailed in 364, but modern scholars
believe that Epaminondas achieved no lasting gains for Thebes on this
voyage.[90] In that same year, Pelopidas was killed while campaigning against
Alexander of Pherae in Thessaly. His loss deprived Epaminondas of his greatest
Theban political ally.[91] Fourth invasion of the Peloponnese (362 BC) Main
article: Battle of Mantinea (362 BC) In the face of this increasing opposition
to Theban dominance, Epaminondas launched his final expedition into the
Peloponnese in 362 BC. The immediate goal of the expedition was to subdue
Mantinea, which had been opposing Theban influence in the region. Epaminondas
brought an army drawn from Boeotia, Thessaly and Euboea. He was joined by
Tegea, which was the center of local opposition to Mantinea, Argos, Messenia,
and some of the Arcadians. Mantinea, on the other hand, had requested
assistance from Sparta, Athens, Achaea and the rest of Arcadia, so that almost
all of Greece was represented on one side or the other.[92] This time the mere
presence of the Theban army was not enough to cow the opposition. Since time
was passing and the Mantinean alliance showed no signs of capsizing,
Epaminondas decided that he would have to break the stalemate. Hearing that a
large Lacedaemonian force was marching to Mantinea, and that Sparta was
practically undefended, he planned an audacious night-time march on Sparta
itself. However, the Spartan king Archidamus was alerted to this move by an
informant, probably a Cretan runner, and Epaminondas arrived to find the city
well-defended.[93] Although he did attack the city, he seems to have drawn off
relatively quickly on discovering that he had not, after all, surprised the
Spartans. Furthermore, the Lacedaemonian and Mantinean troops which had been
stationed at Mantinea had marched to Sparta during the course of the day, and
dissuaded Epaminondas from attacking again. Now hoping that his adversaries had
left Mantinea defenseless in their haste to protect Sparta, Epaminondas counter
marched his troops back to his base at Tegea, and then dispatched his cavalry
to Mantinea. However, a clash outside the walls of Mantinea with Athenian
cavalry foiled this strategy as well.[94] Realising that the time allotted for
the campaign was drawing to a close, and reasoning that if he departed without
defeating the enemies of Tegea, Theban influence in the Peloponnesus would be
destroyed, he decided to stake everything on a pitched battle.[95] The death of
Epaminondas at the Battle of Mantinea What followed on the plain in front of
Mantinea was the largest hoplite battle in Greek history. Epaminondas had the
larger army, 30,000 strong infantry and 3,000 cavalry, whilst his opponents
numbered 20,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry.[96] Xenophon says that, having
decided to fight, Epaminondas arranged the army into battle order, and then
marched it in a column parallel to the Mantinean lines, so that it appeared
that the army was marching elsewhere, and would not fight that day. Having
reached a certain point in the march, he then had the army down arms, so it
appeared they getting ready to camp. Xenophon suggests that "by so doing
he caused among most of the enemy a relaxation of their mental readiness for
fighting, and likewise a relaxation of their readiness as regards their array
for battle".[95] The whole column, which had been marching right-to-left
past the front of the Mantinean army then 'right-faced', so that they were now
in a battle line, facing the Mantineans. Epaminondas, who had been at the head
of the column (now the left wing), brought some companies of infantry from the
extreme right wing, behind the battle line, to reinforce the left wing. By
this, he recreated the strengthened left-wing that the Thebes had fielded at
Leuctra (this time probably made up by all the Boeotians, and not just the
Thebans as at Leuctra). On the wings he placed strong forces of cavalry
strengthened by light-infantry.[97] Epaminondas then gave the order to advance,
catching the enemy off guard, and causing a furious scramble in the Mantinean
camp to prepare for battle. The battle unfolded as Epaminondas had planned.[98]
The cavalry forces on the wings drove back the Athenian and Mantinean cavalry
opposite them. Diodorus says that the Athenian cavalry on the Mantinean right
wing, although not inferior in quality, could not withstand the missiles from
the light-troops that Epaminondas had placed among the Theban cavalry.
Meanwhile, the Theban infantry advanced. Xenophon evocatively describes
Epaminondas's thinking: "[he] led forward his army prow on, like a
trireme, believing that if he could strike and cut through anywhere, he would
destroy the entire army of his adversaries."[95] As at Leuctra, the
weakened right wing was ordered to hold back and avoid fighting. In the clash
of infantry, the issue briefly hung in the balance, but then the Theban
left-wing broke through the Spartan line, and the entire enemy phalanx was put
to flight. However, at the height of the battle, Epaminondas was mortally
wounded by a Spartan, and died shortly thereafter. Following his death, the
Thebes and allies made no effort to pursue the fleeing enemy; a testament to
Epaminondas's centrality to the war effort.[99] Xenophon, who ends his history
with the Battle of Mantinea, says of the battle's results: When these things
had taken place, the opposite of what all men believed would happen was brought
to pass. For since well-nigh all the people of Greece had come together and
formed themselves in opposing lines, there was no one who did not suppose that
if a battle were fought, those who proved victorious would be the rulers and
those who were defeated would be their subjects; but the deity so ordered it
that both parties set up a trophy as though victorious and neither tried to
hinder those who set them up, that both gave back the dead under a truce as
though victorious, and both received back their dead under a truce as though
defeated, and that while each party claimed to be victorious, neither was found
to be any better off, as regards either additional territory, or city, or sway,
than before the battle took place; but there was even more confusion and
disorder in Greece after the battle than before.[95] Athens and the Theban Wars
Sparta's interference and invasion of Thebes in 382 BC gave the latter a very
good reason to join the league. However her behaviour within the league became
difficult and Athens started to realise that Thebes was not necessarily to be
trusted. For example, Thebes destroyed Plataea in 372 BC, which had only
recently been refounded. Athens started to think about negotiating peace with
Sparta; it was while Athens was discussing this with Sparta that Thebes
defeated the Spartan army conclusively at Battle of Leuctra (371 BC). In 378 BC
a Spartan attempt to seize Piraeus brought Athens closer to Thebes. The
Athenian mercenary commander Chabrias successfully faced off the larger army of
Agesilaus II near Thebes. At the advance of Agesilaus' forces, instead of
giving the order to charge, Chabrias famously ordered his men at ease—with
the spear remaining pointing upwards instead of towards the enemy, and the
shield leaning against the left knee instead of being hoisted against the
shoulder. The command was followed immediately and without question by the
mercenaries under his command, to be copied by their counterparts beside them,
the elite Sacred Band of Thebes under the command of Gorgidas. This "show
of contempt" stopped the advancing Spartan forces, and shortly afterwards
Agesilaus withdrew. Athens allied itself with Thebes and formed the Second
Athenian League. The confederacy included most of the Boeotian cities and some
of the Ionian islands. In 377 BC Athens, in preparing for participation in the
Spartan–Theban struggle, reorganised its finances and its taxation,
inaugurating a system whereby the richer citizens were responsible for the
collection of taxes from the less rich. In 376 BC Chabrias won a naval victory
for Athens over the Spartan fleet off the island of Naxos. In 374 BC Athens
tried to retire from the Theban–Spartan war and made peace with Sparta.
However, the peace was quickly broken when Sparta attacked Corcyra, enlisting
Syracusan help, forcing Athens to come to the island's aid. The Athenian
general, Timotheus, captured Corcyra and defeated the Spartans at sea off
Alyzia (Acarnania). In the peace conference of 371 BC, Athens supported the
Spartans' refusal to allow the Thebans to sign the treaty on behalf of all
Boeotia. Consequently, Athens did not welcome the Theban victory at Leuctra,
fearing the rising aggressiveness of Thebes. After the Theban victory, the old
alliance between the Persians and the Thebans was restored. In 370 BC, when
Agesilaus II invaded Arcadia, the Arcadians first turned to Athens for help,
but when it fell on deaf ears, Arcadia turned to the Thebans, causing the first
Theban invasion of the Peloponnese.
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