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The siege is also described in the article on
the Sicily Expedition:
Introduction:
The Athenian siege of Syracuse of 414-413 was a two year long epic that ended
with the total defeat and destruction of the Athenian army, and that put Athens
onto the defensive in the renewed fighting in the Great Peloponnesian War. The
siege of Syracuse followed a different pattern to most sieges. The Syracusans
were never entirely blockaded within the city, and for most of the time had a
sizable field army and fleet at their disposal. The siege thus developed into a
series of battles fought around the city, both on land and at sea. At different
stages in the battle it was the Athenians who felt besieged, and eventually
they would even suffer a naval defeat. The Athenian invasion of Sicily began in
415. A large army and fleet under
Nicias,
Alcibiades and
Lamachus were sent to the
island, officially to aid an Athenian ally, but in reality in an attempt to
conquer Syracuse and that city's allies. The expedition didn't begin well. An
attempt to find allies amongst the Greek cities of Italy failed, and very few
Sicilians supported them. The key city of Messenia, at the north-eastern tip of
the island, refused to let them in, but eventually they found a base at Catane,
half way between Messenia and Syracuse. Soon after this success a trireme
arrived from Athens to arrest Alcibiades, who managed to escape into exile in
Sparta. This left Nicias in effective command of the expedition. Nicias
realised that it would be difficult to march overland to Syracuse in the face
of the enemy cavalry. Instead he tricked the Syracusans into marching towards
Catane, then transported the army by ship to the Great Harbour, south of
Syracuse. The Syracusans marched back, but were forced to fight on ground of
the Athenians choosing. The resulting battle of Syracuse took place in 415 and
was the one clear-cut Athenian success of the war, but afterwards they
abandoned their camp near Syracuse and returned to Catane.
While this was going on Syracusan envoys reached Corinth to ask for help. The
Corinthians agreed to provide troops, and also to help persuade the Spartans to
help. At Sparta the envoys met Alcibiades, who helped convince the Spartans to
offer support. Even then the Spartans only agreed to send a small force, under
the command of Gylippus, a
'mothax' rather than a full 'Spartiate' (he was probably the son of a Spartiate
who didn't qualify for some reason).
The course of the siege was largely dictated by the geographical layout of the
area around Syracuse. The city was built at the south-eastern corner of a large
peninsula. To its south was a large bay - the Great Harbour. The peninsula of
Ortygia stuck out from Syracuse across the entrance to the bay, pointing
towards Plemmyrium, at the southern end of the bay. The Great Harbour thus had
a fairly narrow entrance. Inland the position was dominated by the heights of
Epipolae, which fill most of the large peninsula to the north-west of Syracuse.
Although the Syracusans had been quite active during the winter, they did fail
to fortify the heights,
The First Year of the Siege:
The Athenians finally decided to besiege Syracuse in the spring of 414. They
moved by sea down the coast to Leon, on the coast to the north of the heights,
and hidden from view from Syracuse. They then marched onto the heights via the
pass of Euryalus, on their western side. By a remarkable coincidence the
Syracusans had finally realised the importance of the heights, and on the very
same day prepared to send a force to occupy them. Their army was parading on
the shores of the Grand Harbour as the Athenians occupied the heights. The
Syracusans rushed to the scene in an attempt to push the Athenians off the
heights, but this failed. After this victory the Athenians erected the first of
a series of trophies that they would build to commemorate their victories
around Syracuse. After this first success the Athenians marched to Syracuse,
where they offered battle, but the defenders refused to come out. The Athenians
planned to build a wall to blockade Syracuse by land. This would run from the
coast at Trogilus, east of their landing point at Leon, across the heights and
down into the lower land west of the city, before reaching the sea again in the
middle of the Great Harbour. Their first step was to build a fort at Labdalum,
at the western edge of the heights, which they used to protect their stores.
They then moved to Syca, on the southern side of the heights, where they built
a fort called 'the Circle'. This was to stand at the centre of their blockading
wall.
The Syracusans responded to this building work by bringing their army out of
the city to offer battle. A major pitched battle was only avoided because of
the poor discipline of the Syracusan infantry, which struggled to form a proper
line. Seeing this, their generals decided to withdraw back into the city,
leaving a cavalry force to harass the Athenians. For once the Athenians got the
better of a cavalry battle, sending their entire cavalry force, supported by
some hoplites, to deal with the Syracusans. A second victory followed, and a
second trophy was built.
The Syracusans next decided to build a counter-wall of their own. This would
run south-west from the city and cross the Athenian wall running from the
Circle to the Great Harbour. At first this work went well, and a wooden
counter-wall soon began to take shape, but the Athenians waited until the
Syracusans guard was down and launched a counter attack. A picked force of 300
hoplites and heavily armoured light troops captured the stockade protecting the
counter wall. The Syracusans fled back towards the city, followed by the
Athenians, who were in turn counter-attacked and forced to retreat back towards
the rest of their army. This victory allowed the Athenians to destroy this
first counter wall and erect a third trophy. The Syracusans were not
discouraged by this setback, and began to build a second counter-wall a little
further to the south. This wall had to cross the marsh that bordered the Great
Harbour, making for difficult working conditions. Once again the Athenians
decided to attack the builders, and at the same time move their fleet into the
Grand Harbour. This triggered another, rather more complex battle. At first the
Athenians were victorious. The Syracusan force split in two, with the right
wing fleeing into the city and the left wing towards the Anapus River. The 300
Athenians selected for the previous attack pursued the Syracusan left, hoping
to prevent them from crossing the river. Instead they came under attack from
the Syracusan cavalry, and were routed. The cavalry then attacked the main part
of the Athenian right wing, causing a second rout. Lamachus, who was commanding
the army on this occasion, attempted to restore the situation, but was isolated
and killed.
The main part of the Athenian army then arrived on the scene, and the
Syracusans retreated. Meanwhile these successes had encouraged the troops who
had fled into the city. Some of them formed up against the main Athenian force,
while others moved to attack the Circle, expecting to find it weakly guarded.
They were correct, and were able to destroy around 1,000ft of the Athenian wall
on the heights, but the fort itself was saved by Nicias, who was suffering from
illness at the time and was thus unable to take part in the battle. He ordered
the wooden supplies around the fort to be set on fire. This stopped the
Syracusan advance, and alerted the rest of the Athenian army who began to move
back towards the Circle. At the same time their fleet entered the Great
Harbour. The Syracusans retreated back into the city, and the Athenians erected
a fourth victory trophy. Morale within the city now fell to a low ebb. The
current generals were removed, three new generals elected, and many within the
city began to discuss possible peace terms.
The city was saved by the arrival of Gylippus and his small force of Spartans.
At first Gylippus believed that the Athenians had completed their walls, and
the blockade was complete. If this was the case then he wouldn't be able to
reach the city, and so instead he decided to visit the Greek cities of Italy to
make sure they didn't decide to side with the Athenians. Once in Italy he
discovered that Syracuse was not yet entirely blockaded. Gylippus decided to
land on the east coast of Sicily and march overland to Syracuse. He landed at
Himera, and immediately gained local support. His original tiny force of 700
men soon expanded to one of 3,000. As Gylippus approached the city overland, a
single boat containing the Corinthian commander Gongylus managed to slip past
the Athenians and enter Syracuse. He arrived just in time to prevent an
assembly from discussing peace terms, and was able to convince the Syracusans
to prepare to cooperate with Gylippus.
At this stage the Athenian walls were almost complete to the south, but there
was quite a large gap to the north of the Circle, on the heights of Epipolae.
This wouldn't have been a problem if Nicias had defended the pass of Euryalus,
but he failed to take this elementary precaution, and Gylippus was able to lead
his men onto the heights and join up with the Syracusans. Their united army
offered battle, but Nicias refused to leave the shelter of the walls, and so
Gylippus camped just outside Syracuse. On the following day he captured the
Athenian fort at Labdalum, on the western edge of the high ground. An attack on
a weak part of the Athenian line failed, but the momentum on land had shifted
from the Athenians to the Syracusans and their allies. The Syracusans now began
to build another counter wall, this time across the heights towards Labdalum,
cutting across the last major gap in the Athenian lines. Nicias responded by
turning his attention to the naval war. Plemmyrium, at the southern entrance to
the Great Harbour, was fortified and the fleet made its base there. The
Athenians were now rather widely spread, for most of their army was still
facing Gylippus on the heights.
Yet another battle was fought, this time between the two walls, and yet again
the Athenians won. A fifth victory trophy followed. Gylippus learnt from his
mistakes. As the counter wall came close to cutting across the line of the
Athenian wall he offered battle again. This time the fighting took place
further away from the walls. The Athenian left was routed by the Syracusan
cavalry and javelin throwers and the entire army forced to retreat. The
defenders took advantage of their victory, and extended their wall across the
line of the Athenian wall. Thucydides claimed that after this it was no longer
possible for the Athenians to blockade the city from the land, although of
course they could have either built a wall a little further to the west, or
captured the Syracusan wall (this second tactic would soon be tried). The real
significant of this battle was that it marked the beginning of a decline in the
morale of the first Athenian army. Even the naval blockade was weakening -
twelve ships were able to enter the harbour without being stopped, and Gylippus
was able to slip away to tour the island, where he was able to gather new
allies. The Syracusans also sent ambassadors to Sparta and Corinth to ask for
more help, and began to train their fleet.
Nicias also sent a message back home, in his case to tell the people of Athens
how dangerous a position he was in, how weak his fleet was and how little he
could do with the army at his disposal. If Nicias was hoping that the
expedition, which he had always opposed, would now be withdrawn, he was to be
disappointed. The messengers reached Athens in the winter of 414-413, and the
Athenians decided to send a second, equally large army, to join him.
Eurymedon, a commander
with experience on Sicily, and Demosthenes, the real
victor at Pylos, were appointed to command the new army.
The Second Year of the Siege:
Gylippus returned to Syracuse in the spring of 413, with significant
reinforcements. He then convinced the Syracusans to risk a naval attack on the
Athenians, while at the same time he would take the army around their positions
and attack Plemmyrium. The naval attack ended in failure. The Syracusan fleet
was split in two - thirty-five triremes attacked from the Great Harbour and 45
from the little harbour (on the eastern, sea-ward side of the city). The
Athenians sent 25 ships to face the 35 and 35 ships to face the 45. At first
both Athenian forces were put under heavy pressure, and the fleet outside the
Great Harbour was actually forced back into the harbour. At this point the
Syracusans lost their discipline, and the Athenians were able to defeat them as
they sailed into the harbour. The combined Athenian fleet then defeated the
Syracusan ships inside the harbour.
On land the battle went against the Athenians. The garrisons of the three forts
at Plemmyrium were distracted by the naval battle, and Gylippus was able to
capture all three of them. The Syracusans were able to erect three trophies to
celebrate the fall of the three forts, while the Athenians built their sixth
trophy, to commemorate the naval victory. The Athenians were now in a fairly
desperate position.
Their fleet was now almost trapped inside the Great Harbour, and supply convoys
had to fight their way in. Morale in the army fell even more. Worse was to
come. In an attempt to win before the Athenian reinforcements could arrive, the
Syracusans launched another naval attack. This time their ships had been given
stronger prows to give them an advantage in head-on ramming attacks. In
contrast the Athenians relied on skill to allow them to ram triremes in their
vulnerable sides. The Syracusan modifications took advantage of the battlefield
inside the Great Harbour, where there wasn't really room for the Athenian
manoeuvres. On the first day of fighting neither side gained an advantage. No
fighting took place on the next day, but on the following day the Syracusans
came out again. This time the food market for the sailors was moved to the
harbour to allow the Syracusans to make two attacks in the same day after a
short break for food. This tactic was a great success - the Athenians held
their own during the first attack, but were caught out when the Syracusans put
back to sea so quickly. After a brief standoff the Athenians decided to attack,
but their head-on attack played into their enemies' hands. Seven Athenian ships
were sunk and more disabled and their crews captured and killed. The Syracusans
only lost two ships. Just as the Syracusans must have been expected an imminent
victory, Demosthenes finally arrived with his fleet. He had 1,200 Athenian
hoplites, 3,800 allied hoplites, sixty-five triremes and a large number of
javelin troops and slingers. Athenian morale soared, and Syracusan morale
plummeted, but the change would only be temporary. Demosthenes realised that he
needed a quick victory, and so decided to try and retake control of Epipolea.
He decided to risk a night attack, and this decision would end in disaster. At
first things went well, and the Syracusan counter wall was occupied and some of
it was destroyed. After this the difficulties of a night battle took over. The
defenders rallied, and the larger and unwieldy Athenian force began to retreat.
The retreat turned into a disaster, and the army's newly found confidence was
shattered.
Defeat and Disaster:
In the aftermath of this defeat the Athenian commanders debated their next
move. Demosthenes wanted to abandon the entire venture and return to Athens.
Nicias was less willing to admit that he had failed. He kept hinting that he
was in contact with elements in Syracuse who were ready to surrender, but
without giving any details. Demosthenes responded by suggesting that they leave
Syracuse and move to somewhere else on Sicily to continue the war. The
discussions ended in stalemate, and the army remained where it was. Meanwhile
Gylippus had been travelling around Sicily gathering more reinforcements. When
this fresh army reached Syracuse even Nicias was willing to order the retreat.
The Athenians were on the verge of escaping to sea when there was an eclipse of
the moon. The soothsayers regarded this as a bad omen and demanded that the
army wait 27 days before moving. Many of the more superstitious men supported
them, as, fatally, did Nicias. The army was forced to sit and wait while the
Syracusans prepared to try and stop them from leaving. The delay proved fatal
to the entire Athenian army.
The Syracusans learnt both of the Athenian decision to leave, and the reason
for the delay. Just before the Athenians would have attempted to leave, the
Syracusans went onto the attack. On the first day they attacked the Athenian
walls and won a sharp action. On the second day seventy-six Syracusan ships put
to sea. The Athenians responded with eighty-six ships, but despite their
numerical advantage were beaten. Their only consolation was that they were able
to fight off an attempt by Gylippus to capture the ship's crews as they were
forced ashore. The Athenians raised a seventh trophy, but the day had been a
disaster for them.
The Syracusans now began to make efforts to trap the Athenians within the
harbour. They blocked the entrance to the Great Harbour with a line of triremes
and merchants ships moored side on, and prepared for another naval battle. This
meant that the Athenians were now besieged inside the Great Harbour, with no
way to get fresh supplies. In the meantime the Athenians prepared to make a
breakout. They built a second wall to protect a small area around their
anchorage. The plan was to leave a small garrison in this fort, and use every
other man in the army to man the ships. If the attempt to escape by sea failed,
then the army would attempt to march overland to the nearest friendly city.
This time it was the Athenians who relied on numbers and brute force, instead
of skill. Their plan was to use their heavily laden ships to board the enemy
triremes and fight what would have been a land battle at sea. Between them the
two fleets contained 200 ships, all fighting within the Great Harbour.
Eventually the Athenians were forced to give way, and suffered a second major
naval defeat in a short period. Demosthenes and Nicias were unable to persuade
their sailors to make a second attempt to escape. The army's only hope was to
escape overland. This was a desperate venture. The Syracusans still had their
advantage in cavalry, and much of the surrounding countryside was friendly to
them. The Athenians were already short of food, and would have to march and
fight for several days before they had any hope of finding fresh supplies. The
Athenians didn't help themselves by delaying their departure in order to give
the soldiers time to pack! This gave the Syracusans the time they needed to
post guards at key points on any potential Athenian route, blocking river
crossings and passes.
The retreat eventually began two days after the naval defeat. The Athenians and
their allies still had 40,000 men, a potentially very dangerous army if it
could escape from the trap at Syracuse. On the first day the army marched in a
hollow square, with Nicias commanding the front half and Demosthenes the rear.
On that day the army forced its way across the Anapus River, and marched for
only four and a half miles before camping on a hill. On the second day they
made even less progress, only moving two and a half miles before camping in an
inhabited area, where they expected to find supplies. The third day was even
worse. The Syracusans blocked the pass the Athenians were planning to use (the
Acreaen cliff), and after failing to force they way though the Athenians were
forced back to their starting point. On the fourth day the Athenians actually
attacked the Syracusan fortifications in the pass, but were repulsed and forced
to retreat again. On the fifth day the two sides fought a slow moving battle,
and the Athenians were only able to advance by half a mile. By now food and
water were both running short. That night Nicias and Demosthenes realised that
they were unlikely to be able to reach Catane, their first target. Instead they
began a night march in a different direction, hoping to reach Camaraina or
Gela, on the southern coast of the island. The night march didn’t go well.
Nicias was able to keep his half of the army together, but Demosthenes had less
success. His half of the army became separated from Nicias and began to
scatter. During the following day the Syracusans caught up with Demosthenes and
attacked his men. Demosthenes attempted to form up and fight, but the
Syracusans didn't offer him a chance for a battle. Instead they bombarded his
troops with javelins all day, and eventually Demosthenes and his troops
surrendered on terms. None were to be put to death, be killed in prison or to
be starved. Only 6,000 men surrendered here, suggesting that the army had
suffered heavy losses during the march from Syracuse, for half of the army
should have numbered 20,000. Meanwhile Nicias and his half of the army
continued their march. They crossing the River Erineus and took up a position
on high ground. On the seventh day the Syracusans caught up with Nicias, who
refused to believe that the other half of the army had surrendered until his
own scout confirmed it. When it was clear that the news was true Nicias offered
to pay the entire cost of the war if the Syracusans and their allies would let
his men return to Athens, but these terms were turned down. Nicias' men were
then subjected to a day-long bombardment. That night they planned to make one
final attempt at a breakthrough, but this was discovered before it started, and
the attempt was abandoned. On the eighth day of the retreat they advanced to
the River Assinarus, but when they reached the river thirst broke the army. The
desperate survivors of the retreat attempted to take a drink while under attack
from both banks. Eventually Nicias surrendered to Gylippus, but even this
didn't stop the slaughter. When it eventually finished fewer men were captured
than on the previous day, although a larger number were taken privately by
members of the Syracusan army. The surrender didn't end the suffering of the
Athenian soldiers, very few of whom would return home. Nicias and Demosthenes
were both executed by the Syracusans, despite Gylippus's attempts to save them,
while the surviving soldiers were placed in the stone quarry near Syracuse. The
Athenians and Italian Greeks remained in the quarries for some time and very
few would have survived the terrible conditions, but the rest of the prisoners
were sold into slavery after ten weeks.
The disaster at Syracuse was a massive blow to Athenian power. Thousands of men
were lost, as were two fleets and a vast amount of money. Sparta and Athens's
other enemies in Greece were greatly encouraged, and even the Persians would
soon become involved. Despite the odds against them, the Athenians managed to
hold on for another ten years, but for most of that time they were on the
defensive.
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