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The Siege of Syracuse in 397 BC was the
first of four unsuccessful sieges Carthaginian forces would undertake against
Syracuse from 397 to 278 BC. In retaliation to the Siege of Motya by Dionysius
of Syracuse, Himilco of the Magonid family of Carthage led a substantial force
to Sicily. After retaking Motya and founding Lilybaeum, Himilco sacked Messana,
then laid siege to Syracuse in the autumn of 397 BC after the Greek navy was
crushed at Catana. The Carthaginians followed a strategy which the Athenians
had used in 415 BC, and were successful in isolating Syracuse. A pestilence
broke out in the Carthaginian camp in the summer of 396 BC, which killed the
majority of the troops. Dionysius launched a combined land and sea attack on
the Carthaginian forces, and Himilco escaped with the Carthaginian citizens
after an underhand deal with Dionysius. The surviving Libyans were enslaved,
the Sicels melted away while the Iberians joined Dionysius. Dionysius began
expanding his domain, while Carthage, weakened by the plague, took no action
against Syracusan activities until 393 BC
Belligerents Syracuse Sicilian Greeks Carthage Commanders and leaders Dionysius
Leptines Himilco Mago Strength 30,000 troops 80 quinqueremes 30 triremes 50,000
troops 40 quinqueremes 200 triremes 2,000 transports Casualties and losses
Unknown, less than the Carthaginians Unknown, plague killed majority of troops
Background Carthage had previously invaded Sicily in 406 BC, in retaliation of
Greek raids on Phoenician lands. This expedition was first commanded by
Hannibal Mago who, after the Siege of Akragas by his kinsman Himilco, had
managed to capture and sack the cities of Akragas, Gela and Camarina by the
summer of 405 BC. These defeats had caused political turmoil in Syracuse, and
had ultimately brought Dionysius to power as tyrant.[1] Himilco and Dionysius
signed a peace treaty in 405 BC, which left Carthage in direct or indirect
control of 60% of Sicily. The cities of Messina and Leontini were left
independent, and Dionysius was acknowledged as the ruler of Syracuse by
Carthage.[2] Dionysius gets ready Between 405 BC and 398 BC, Dionysius set
about securing his political position and increasing the armed forces of
Syracuse. He broke the treaty with Himilco in 404 BC by starting a war with the
Sicels. While Carthage did nothing in response, Dionysius was put in a
difficult situation by a revolt within his army, which besieged him in
Syracuse. Fortune and incompetence of his enemies helped Dionysius to emerge
triumphant from this crisis.[3] Dionysius then enlarged his territory by
conquering and sacking the cities of Naxos and Catana, and annexing
Leontini.[4] He hired mercenaries and enlarged his fleet, building 200 new
ships. Syracuse was fortified, with Dionysius turning the island of Ortygia
(where the original city of Syracuse stood) into a fortress and encompassing
the Epipolae Plateau by massive walls. He hired workmen to create new weapons
(such as the Catapult), and new ships (such as the Quinquereme).[5] In 398 BC,
Dionysius attacked the Phoenician city of Motya with an army of 80,000 infantry
and 3,000 cavalry, along with a fleet of 200 warships and 500 transports
carrying his supplies and war machines. This ignited the first of four wars he
was to lead against Carthage.[6] The war begins The attack of Dionysius caused
the Sicilian Greeks and Sikans under Carthaginian dominion to rebel, and by the
time Dionysius besieged Motya, only 5 cities remained in league (Segesta,
Entella, Palermo and Solus among them) with Carthage in Sicily. Lacking a
standing army, Carthage could only send a fleet of 100 triremes under Himilco
to aid Motya. Himilco was unsuccessful and Dionysius sacked Motya after
overcoming fierce Punic resistance.[7] After Carthage had readied its forces,
Himilco sailed from Africa and landed at Palermo, and then captured Eryx.
Himilco next stormed Motya, where the mostly Sicel garrison under Biton was
easily overcome.[8] The Carthaginians then lifted the siege of Segesta, and
Dionysius retired to Syracuse instead of offering battle in Western Sicily
against a superior army.[9] Himilco returned to Palermo, garrisoned the
Carthaginian territories, and then sailed to Lipara with 300 warships and 300
transports. After collecting 30 talents of silver as tribute from Lipara,[10]
the Carthaginian force landed at Cape Pelorum, and the army of Messene marched
north from the city to confront the Carthaginians. Himilco sent 200 ships
filled with picked soldiers and rowers to Messene, and easily captured and
sacked the city. The Greeks scattered to the fortresses in the countryside, and
Himilco was unsuccessfully tried to capture the forts.[11] Himilco chose not to
set up base at Messina, but marched south, and founded a city in Tauromenion,
which he populated with Sicels.[12] The Sicels now deserted Dionysius, so two
things was achieved with one stroke, Himilco managed to detached allies away
from Dionysius and at the same time gaining allies to block any activity by the
still hostile Greeks of Messina in his rear. The Carthaginians resumed marching
south along the coast, with the fleet sailing alongside. However, a severe
eruption of Mt. Etna made the path north of Naxos impassable, so Himilco
marched to detour around Mt. Etna. Mago with the fleet sailed to Catana, where
he was to meet up with Carthaginian army. Dionysius had freed all the slaves in
Syracuse to man 60 additional ships, provisioned the fortresses at Syracuse and
Leontini with soldiers and supplies, and hired 1000 mercenaries from
Greece.[11] He moved his army and fleet to Catana to attack the Carthaginians.
Due to the rash tactics of his brother Leptines, the Greek fleet was heavily
defeated at the Battle of Catana (397 BC), over 20,000 soldiers/rowers and 100
ships were lost before the surviving Greek ships could retreat.[13]
Opposing forces Himilco led the Carthaginian army (50,000 men, 400 triremes,
and 600 transports) to Sicily in 397 BC.[14] When the Carthaginians reached
Syracuse, their war fleet had shrunk to 208 ships, though 2,000 transports had
been employed to carry supplies to the army.[15] The number of soldiers in
Syracuse is unknown, as some garrisoned the Carthaginian possessions, and the
Carthaginians had been reinforced by Sicels, Sikans and Elymians after arriving
in Sicily. Dionysius had an army of 30,000 foot and 3,000 horsemen at Catana
along with 180 quinqueremes.[16] After the defeat of his navy and the desertion
of his allies Dionysius' forces had shrunk to 80 ships. He managed to hire some
mercenaries to make up for these losses, and the population of Syracuse
supplied a number of soldiers to augment his forces. 30 triremes later joined
him from Greece. Carthaginian cohorts The Libyans supplied both heavy and light
infantry and formed the most disciplined units of the army. The heavy infantry
fought in close formation, armed with long spears and round shields, wearing
helmets and linen cuirasses. The light Libyan infantry carried javelins and a
small shield, same as Iberian light infantry. Campanian, Sardinian and Gallic
infantry fought in their native gear,[17] but often were equipped by Carthage.
Sicels and other Sicilians were equipped like Greek Hoplites. The Libyans,
Carthaginian citizens and the Libyo-Phoenicians provided disciplined, well
trained cavalry equipped with thrusting spears and round shields. Numidia
provided superb light cavalry armed with bundles of javelins and riding without
bridle or saddle. Iberians and Gauls also provided cavalry, which relied on the
all out charge. The Libyans also provided bulk of the heavy, four horse war
chariots for Carthage, but Carthage at this point of time did not make use of
war elephants.[18] Himilco had lost his chariots when 50 of his transports were
sunk by the Greeks off Eryx and none seemed to have served at Syracuse.
Carthaginian officer corps held overall command of the army, although many
units may have fought under their chieftains. The Punic navy was built around
the trireme, Carthaginian citizens usually served as crew alongside recruits
from Libya and other Carthaginian domains. Carthaginian forces had captured a
number of Quinqueremes from the Greeks at Catana, it is unknown if
Carthaginians were constructing this type of ships themselves at this point. 40
Quinqueremes were present at Syracuse. Although the initial Punic armada at
Syracuse contained 208 warships and 3,000 transports, it is unknown how many
were permanently stationed there for the siege. Greek forces The mainstay of
the Greek army was the Hoplite, drawn mainly from the citizens by Dionysius,
had a large number of mercenaries from Italy and Greece as well. Sicels and
other native Sicilians also served in the army as hoplites and also supplied
peltasts, and a number of Campanians, probably equipped like Samnite or
Etruscan warriors,[19] were present as well. The Phalanx formation was the
standard fighting formation of the army. Dionysius also had the option of using
old men and women as peltasts if needed. The cavalry was recruited from
wealthier citizens and mercenaries. The Syracuse navy was built around the
Quinquereme, an invention attributed to Dionysius, and the trireme. Dionysius
also transport ships available, but the number is unknown. Citizen rowers
manned the fleet.
Prelude to the siege The defeat at Catana put Dionysius in a difficult
position. With the Greek fleet beaten, Mago had gained the option of making a
dash at Syracuse itself, repeating the feat the Carthaginians had pulled at
Messene on Syracuse. On the other hand, if Dionysius could now attack and
defeat the army of Himilco, Mago would be compelled to fall back to a secure
base. However, Dionysius also had to keep in mind the possibility of political
trouble in Syracuse in deciding his strategy. The Greek army was opposed to
facing a siege, and at first Dionysius was inclined to seek the Carthaginian
army out and measure swords with Himilco. When his advisers pointed out the
threat of Mago and his fleet capturing Syracuse in the absence of the Greek
army, Dionysius decided to break camp, leave Catana and march south to
Syracuse.[20] At this juncture, Mother Nature intervened for the embattled
Greeks, as worsening weather forced Mago to beach his ships, thus making the
Punic fleet vulnerable to the Greek army attacks.[21] However, luck seems to
have favoured the Carthaginians, because Dionysius commenced his retreat prior
to this, with the remnant of his fleet sailing parallel along the coast. This
decision to face a siege proved so unpopular among the Sicilian Greek allies
that they deserted the army and made for their respective cities. Once there,
they manned the countryside castles and awaited the Carthaginians.[20] Himilco
arrived at Catana two days after the battle with the Carthaginian army[22]
after a 110 km trek around Mt. Etna, and his presence ensured security of the
Punic fleet. Both the Punic army and navy were accorded a few days rest, during
which time Mago repaired his damaged ships and refitted the captured Greek
ships. Himilco took the time to negotiate with the Campanians at Aetna,
offering them to switch sides. They had given Dionysius hostages and their best
troops were serving with the Greek army, so they chose to stay loyal.[23]
Preparations for the siege Dionysius and the Greek army reached Syracuse first
and began preparations for withstanding the inevitable Carthaginian siege. The
forts around Leontini and Syracuse were fully manned and provisioned.
Dionysius, shaken by the desertions of the Greek allies, also sent agents to
hire mercenaries from Italy and Greece (Corinth, the mother city of Syracuse
and Sparta, a fellow Doric ally were especially approached), including his
kinsman Polyxenos. The fortresses were either to protect the harvest and serve
as bases for harassing Carthaginian foragers[24] or were to serve as bait and
draw the Carthaginian army away from Syracuse, and gain time for Dionysius
while Himilco reduced them. The fortresses would surrender easily and retain
part of the Carthaginian force as garrisons.[25] Himilco ignored Leontini and
the forts, and his army slowly marched to Syracuse. They moved round the
Epipolae Plateau and concentrated on building their encampment. The Punic
war-fleet, made up of 250 triremes and captured Greek quinqueremes, sailed into
the Great Harbour at the same time and in perfect order sailed past Syracuse,
displaying the spoils captured from the Greeks. 2000–3000 transports then
moored in the harbour, bringing in soldiers and supplies. Himilco was ready to
begin the siege. The Syracusan navy, which had initially mobilised 180
ships[16] but lost 100 ships[26] at the Catana, remained at port.[citation
needed]
Fortifications of Syracuse A generic representation of the Carthaginian siege
of Syracuse in 397 BC. Not to exact scale. The original city of Syracuse stood
on the island Ortyga with some structures around the Agora in the mainland
before the Sicilian Expedition in 415 BC, when walls were built around the
Tycha and Archadina areas. After Dionysius finished adding to the existing
structures, Syracuse possessed walls with the greatest circuit in the Greek
world.[27] Dionysius had rebuilt the walls around Ortygia so that they
surrounded the whole island and the isthmus connecting the mainland with a
robust wall complete with towers at regular intervals which were strongly
built.[28] The isthmus had docks on the west side and the little harbour,
Laccius on the east side. Screens and walls were put up to enclose Laccius, and
it could accommodate 60 triremes, and a gate was provided between the sea
screens that would let one trireme pass at a time.[29] Two castles were also
built on Ortygia, one near the isthmus, which was the home of Dionysius,[29]
and one further south. Two walls were built on the isthmus itself, one
separating the island from the isthmus and one the mainland from the
isthmus.[30] A series of five gates built on the isthmus, the Pentaplya,
controlled access between the mainland and Ortygia.[31] Dionysius then
populated the island of Orytiga with loyal mercenaries and close supporters. A
massive castle with underground structures was built at Euryalos which guarded
the main access to the route to the Plateau. He incorporated the walls built
during the Athenian Expedition for settling the people in Achradina. The walls
around the plateau, made entirely of stone may have had a thickness between 2
and 4.5 meters and a height of 6 meters.[32] The Carthaginian camp Himilco
chose to camp next to the Great Harbour in the Polichana area. The camp was
either 10 stadia[33] from the Syracuse city walls, which would place it north
of the Anapus river, or 12 stadia from the walls, totally south of the
river.[20] Himilco chose the temple of Zeus as his quarters.[34] The main camp
was probably situated on the marshy ground east of the temple of Zeus,[35] and
adjacent to the Dascon bay and the Lysimeleia marsh. The berthing facilities
for the ships formed part of the camp, and the camp was surrounded by a moat
and palisade. Preliminary activities Himilco marched north from his camp and
formed up for battle near the city after the camp was put in order. One hundred
Carthaginian warships also sailed out and took position on both sides of
Ortygia,[34] ready to counter any Greek ships should they sally forth. The
Greeks stayed put inside Syracuse despite the jeers of the Punic soldiers.
Himilco chose not to assault the walls, and it is unclear if he had siege
engines with him at that time. Himilco then unleashed his soldiers around
Syracuse to strip the land of all possible supplies, and ravaged the area for
30 days, possibly to intimidate the Greeks into surrendering before winter set
in,[20] and when this failed the Carthaginians went to winter quarters and
began siege preparations.
Carthaginian preparations The Carthaginians now began preparing for a siege in
earnest, Himilco built a fort near the temple of Zeus (it is unclear if the
temple was inside the fort).[36] Another fort was built at Dascon and one at
Plemmyrion to safeguard the main camp and provide safer anchorage for his
ships. The camp itself was surrounded by a regular wall in addition to the
existing moat and palisade.[37] The tombs of Gelon and his wife were demolished
in the process of building the wall.[38] Part of the fleet was dispersed while
transport ships were sent to Sardinia and Africa to bring in more provisions.
The forts were stocked with wine, corn, and all needful items, Himilco seemed
to have spared no expense to look after his soldiers needs.[23][39]
Carthaginian strategy The Carthaginians had successfully besieged Greek cities
in the past. In 409, they had stormed Selinus using siege engines, Himera was
also a victim of Carthaginian besieging skills that same year, and in 406 the
Carthaginians straddled Akragas by encamping on both sides of the city. The
size of the Syracusan defences made building a circumventing wall impractical.
Himilco either wished to keep his forces concentrated or lacked the numbers to
straddle Syracuse by building another camp, which also would have exposed
Carthaginians to sudden attacks from Greeks in Syracuse or to a relief force
without circumventing walls linking both camps. A direct assault on the
southern side exposed the attacking soldiers to a flank attack from the fort at
Eryelus. The height of the walls on top of the plateau meant it might be
impossible to assault the walls without building siege ramps.[40] Himilco
basically adopted the same strategy that the Athenian leader Nicias had in 415
BC, staying put and awaiting favourable developments inside Syracuse. He went
to winter quarters after completing his preparations and while Syracuse was
under siege, it was not fully cut-off, Greek ships could sail in and out of the
Laccius unless challenged by the Punic ships. Spring 397 BC: Carthage commences
operations Nothing of consequence happened during the winter of 397 BC as the
adversaries played the waiting game from their respective positions. In the
spring of 396 BC, Himilco began attacking the suburbs of Syracuse. There is no
mention of Carthaginians breaching the city wall,[41] but Punic soldiers
captured a city section that contained several temples including one dedicated
to Demeter and Kore, all of which were plundered. Dionysius also acted
aggressively, sending out sorties to attack Carthaginian patrols and winning
several skirmishes, but the overall tactical situation remained unchanged. In
the meantime, Polyxenos had managed to gather a naval squadron in Greece, and
under the command of Pharakidas of Sparta, 30 triremes managed to reach
Syracuse.[37] The Spartan had apparently captured a number of Punic ships, and
the Carthaginian blockade ships had let his ships through thinking a Punic
squadron was returning from patrol.[42] The Greeks as well as the Carthaginians
were now dependent on overseas supplies for sustaining their efforts. Danger of
success[43] Shortly after this event, Dionysius, along with his brother
Leptines, sailed forth with a flotilla to escort a supply convoy crucial for
Syracuse. It is not known who the commander was in Syracuse in their absence,
but his actions netted a significant success for the Greeks. Firstly, after
spotting an unescorted Punic corn ship in the Great Harbour, five Syracusan
ships sailed out and captured it. While the prize was being brought in, 40
Punic ships sailed forth, and promptly the whole Syracusan navy (number of
ships not mentioned, but probably outnumbering the Carthaginian contingent,
there is no mention of who the admiral was) engaged the Punic squadron, sinking
4 ships and capturing 20 including the flagship. The Greek ships then advanced
on the main Punic anchorage but Carthaginians declined the challenge. The
Greeks then returned to Syracuse with their spoils. This success was obtained
without the leadership of Dionysius, and some of his political enemies tried to
depose him upon his return at the citizen's assembly. The Spartans declined to
support the dissenters and this caused the coup attempt to collapse.[44] Some
historians speculate that the sea battle and subsequent events never actually
took place and are the work of anti-tyranny authors.[45]
Summer 396: the siege fails A generic representation of Greek attacks on
Carthaginian camps at Syracuse in 396 BC. Not to exact scale. Whether the
alleged naval battle took place or not, the strategic situation had not changed
for the combatants when summer arrived in Sicily. Himilco had not been able to
take Syracuse, Dionysius had failed to defeat the Punic forces, and both
parties were reliant on overseas supplies. At this juncture a plague broke out
among the Carthaginian troops, who had been suffering from the intense heat as
well. Plague[46] The plague, bearing similarities with the Athenian plague, may
have been caused by bad hygienic practices on marshy grounds, and malaria may
have played a part also. The result was that scores of soldiers and sailors
succumbed to the disease, burial parties were overwhelmed, bodies were hastily
buried, new burials were almost impossible, and the stench of decaying bodies
hung in the air. Fear of infection may have prevented proper care being given
to the sick.[6] The cause of this calamity was attributed to the desecration of
Greek temples and tombs. At the Siege of Akragas (406 BC) Himilco had dealt
with a similar situation by sacrificing a child and various animals to appease
this alleged divine anger. Whatever measures (if any) Himilco took at Syracuse
to combat the plague proved ineffective; Punic forces were decimated and the
fleet readiness was diminished. Himilco and the Carthaginians stubbornly stood
their ground and remained in the camp, but the morale of the Carthaginians
plummeted as a result of the plague, along with the combat effectiveness of
their forces. Dionysius strikes Dionysius planned to take advantage of the
situation by launching a combined land and sea attack on the Punic forces
before they recovered or received reinforcements. Eighty ships were manned and,
under the command of Leptines and Pharakidas,[47] were to attack the Punic
ships beached at the Bay of Dascon. Dionysius elected to command the soldiers
attacking the Punic camp. He planned to march out on a moonless night with his
army, and instead of going directly south to the Punic camp, march in a
roundabout way to the Temple of Cyan and attack the Carthaginian fortifications
at first light. The Greek fleet was to attack after Dionysius had engaged the
Carthaginians. The success of the plan largely depended on the timely
coordination between the fleet and the army, the absence of which had doomed
another complicated battle plan of Dionysius in 405 BC at Gela. Subtle
treachery Dionysius successfully completed his night march and reached Cyan. At
daybreak, he sent his cavalry and 1,000 mercenaries to attack the camp directly
from the west. This was a diversion, Dionysius had secretly ordered his
horsemen to abandon the rebellious, untrustworthy mercenaries after they
engaged the Carthaginians.[48] The combined force attacked the camp, and the
mercenaries were slaughtered after the Greek horsemen suddenly fled the field.
Dionysius had succeeded in distracting the enemy and getting rid of some
unreliable soldiers all at once. Attack on the Punic forts[49] While the
mercenaries were being butchered, the main Greek army launched attacks towards
the forts near the temple of Zeus at Polichana and Dascon. The cavalry, after
deserting the mercenaries, joined the attack on Dascon while part of the Greek
fleet also sallied forth and attacked the Punic ships beached nearby. The
Carthaginians were caught by surprise, and before they could put up a
coordinated resistance, Dionysius managed to defeat the force outside the
camp[50] and then storm the fort at Polichana successfully, after which his
force began to attack the Carthaginian camp and the temple. The Carthaginians
managed to hold off the Greeks until nightfall, when the fighting stopped.
Punic fleet decimated at Dascon
Punic fleet decimated at Dascon The Punic fleet was undermanned as some of the
crews had perished in the plague, and many of their ships were deserted. The
Greek ships had also achieved total surprise, the Punic ships at Dascon, which
included 40 quinqueremes,[51] could not be manned and launched in time to face
the assault and soon the whole Syracuse navy joined the attack. Greek ships
rammed and sunk some as they lay at anchor, some ships were boarded and
captured by Greek soldiers after a brief skirmish, while the horsemen, now led
by Dionysius, set fire to some of the ships, some of which drifted away when
their anchor cables burnt. Punic soldiers and sailors leapt into the water and
swam ashore. The fire spread to the camp but was put out after part of the camp
was burnt.[52] The Punic army could not offer assistance as they were busy
fending off attacking Greek soldiers. Some Greeks from Syracuse manned some of
the merchant vessels and boats, sailed to Dascon and towed some of the derelict
Punic ships away, along with whatever spoils they could scavenge. Meanwhile,
the fort at Dascon had also fallen into Greek hands.[46] Dionysius encamped
with his army near the temple of Zeus at Polichana while the fleet returned to
Syracuse. A good days work The Greeks had managed to capture the fort at
Polichana and Dascon, but after a day's battle had ended, the Punic camp and
temple of Zeus was still in Carthaginian hands, while a substantial part of
their fleet also had survived. The initiative now lay with Dionysius, and
barring reinforcements or unlooked for developments, a disaster comparable to
the one at Himera might befall the Carthaginians unless Himilco acted to avert
it. Strange political bedfellows Greek tyrants, especially Gelo, Hiero and
Dionysius are often credited with saving the Western civilization from
barbarian machinations, especially by 16th -18th century historians. However,
some of their activities have more to do with saving their rule than saving
western civilization, as the actions of Dionysius were to show in 396 BC.
Himilco's dilemma The Carthaginian forces had managed to survive the Greek
attack, but they were still suffering from the plague, and to regain the
initiative they had either to defeat the Greek army or the fleet, which was an
impossible task at this stage. The Greek navy now probably outnumbered the
Carthaginian one, which was devastated by the Greek raid and unable to man
available ships due to crew shortage.[53] The army was in no better condition
to fight a successful pitched battle. Himilco was aware of the situation and
opted to open secret negotiations with Dionysius that very night, while other
Greek commanders were kept in the dark as the Italian and mainland Greek
contingents were in favor of totally destroying the surviving Punic forces.[54]
Duplicity of Dionysius Dionysius was also ready to make a deal although he had
a good chance of totally destroying the stricken Carthaginians. It has been
alleged that as a tyrant, he needed to keep the threat of Carthage alive to
keep the citizens of Syracuse in control;[54] saving the west was not what he
was trying to achieve. He responded to Himilco's overtures, but declined to let
the Carthaginians simply sail away. After some haggling, the following terms
were agreed on:[55] Carthaginians would pay Dionysius 300 talents immediately
Himilco was free to depart with the Carthaginian citizens unmolested at night.
Dionysius could not guarantee their safety during the day. The Carthaginian
departure would take place on the fourth night. Himilco secretly sent 300
talents either to the fort at Polichana or to Syracuse itself. Dionysius
withdrew his army to Syracuse as part of his bargain, and on the appointed
night Himilco manned forty ships with the citizens of Carthage and sailed away.
As this fleet passed the Great Harbour mouth, the Corinthians spotted them and
informed Dionysius, who made a great show of arming his fleet but delayed
calling his officers to give Himilco time to get away.[54] The Corinthians,
unaware of the secret pact, manned their ships and sailed out, managing to sink
a few laggards, but the majority of Carthaginians ships managed to escape to
Africa. Dionysius marshalled his army after Himilco's departure and approached
the Carthaginian camp, by which this time the Sicels had already slipped away
to their homes[54] and most of the remaining Punic soldiers surrendered to
Dionysius. Some soldiers trying to flee were captured by the Greeks. The
Iberians, who stood at arms ready to resist, were hired by Dionysius for his
own army. The rest of the Punic prisoners were enslaved. Aftermath Dionysius
did not immediately march against the Punic possessions in Sicily but took time
to order his realm. He probably did not wish to provoke Carthage more than
necessary. The Sicilian Greek cities, which had thrown off the Carthaginian
over-lordship, were more or less friendly with Syracuse.[56] Solus was betrayed
and sacked in 396 BC. Later, 10,000 mercenaries of Dionysius revolted after
Dionysius arrested their commander Aristoteles of Sparta,[57] and was placated
only after their leader was sent to Sparta for judgement and the mercenaries
received the city of Leontini to rule for themselves. Next Dionysius
repopulated the ruined city of Messana with colonists from Italian and mainland
Dorian Greeks, then founded Tyndaris with the original inhabitants of
Messana[58] who had been driven out after the Carthaginian sack of their city
in 397 BC. Dionysius in 394 BC unsuccessfully besieged Tauromenium, then held
by Sicels allied to Carthage. In response, Mago of Carthage led an army to
Messana in 393 BC, and the war was renewed. Carthage: plagued by problems
Carthage: plagued by problems The return of Himilco, after abandoning his
troops at the mercy of Dionysius, did not sit well with the Carthaginian
citizens or their African subjects. Although the council of 104 did not crucify
him, as unsuccessful Carthaginian commanders normally were, Himilco decided to
do the deed himself. He publicly took full responsibility for the debacle,
visited all the temples of the city dressed in rags and pleading for
deliverance, and finally bricked himself inside his house and starved himself
to death.[13] Later, despite the sacrifice done to placate the Carthaginian
gods, a plague swept through Africa, weakening Carthage. To top things off, the
Libyans, angered by the desertion of their kinsmen in Africa, rebelled. They
gathered an army of 70,000 and besieged Carthage. Mago, the victor of Catana,
took command. The standing Punic army was in Sicily and recruiting a new one
was time consuming and probably very costly (Himilco's misdeed would have made
mercenaries wary), so he rallied Carthaginian citizens to man the walls while
the Punic navy kept the city supplied. Mago then used bribes and other means to
quell the rebels. Carthaginians also built a temple for Demeter and Kore in the
city and had Greeks offer proper sacrifice to atone for the destruction of the
temple at Syracuse.[57] Mago next moved to Sicily, where he did not try to
recover lost territory. Instead he adopted a policy of cooperation and
friendship, giving aid to Greeks, Sikans, Sicels, Elymians and Punics
regardless of their prior standing with Carthage.[59] The Greeks' cities, who
had thrown off Carthaginian over-lordship after the war started, now moved from
a pro-Syracuse position to a more neutral one, either feeling threatened by
Dionysius or because of the activities of Mago.[60] This peaceful policy
continued until Dionysius attacked the Sicels in 394 BC.
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