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Pagondas; son of Aeolidas, was a
Theban general and statesman, who is best known for his command of the Boeotian
forces at the Battle of Delium in 424 during the Peloponnesian War. His
modification of the standard hoplite formation and his use of reserve cavalry
in that battle constitute what most historians agree is the first recorded use
of formal military tactics in human history. Little is known of Pagondas's
life. He is mentioned by Pindar as having been born to a noble Theban family,
and we know that he was in his early sixties at Delium. He was evidently a
fiery and persuasive speaker, purportedly moving the disparate Boeotian
contingents to unify and attack their Athenian enemies through rhetoric alone.
Apart from a brief mention by Thucydides, however, there is very little extant
information about Pagondas or his life. He seems to have appeared and abruptly
disappeared solely for the Battle of Delium.
Delium:
Battle of Delium:
At the battle, the Boeotians faced off against a group of Athenians led by
Hippocrates. The Boeotians charged down a hill at the Athenian army, while the
Athenians, having been surprised by their sudden appearance, got themselves
together and charged up the hill. On the Boeotian left were men from the town
of Thespiae. On their right, Pagondas had placed his own Thebans. Remarkably
though, he chose to stack his Thebans twenty-five shields deep, rather than the
standard eight, to give them more pushing-power and punch. This marks the first
recorded instance of any Greek general ever changing the standard depth of a
hoplite unit. This novel technique worked wonders, as the Thebans rapidly broke
through the Athenian left, and moved to encircle the rest of the Athenian army.
However, the Thespians on the Boeotian left were up against the Athenians'
crack troops, and were themselves quickly overwhelmed, surrounded, and killed
almost to a man. Sensing that his victorious Thebans could not outflank the
enemy before the Athenian right broke into his rear, Pagondas chose to do
something utterly unprecedented in the annals of Greek warfare. He called in a
reserve force (the mere creation of which was itself unprecedented) of several
hundred cavaliers to support the now decimated Thespians. The Athenians on the
right were stunned by this—so much so that they apparently fell into a
confusion and turned tail. This was perhaps fortunate for Pagondas's cavaliers,
as Greek cavalry, made up of light-armed aristocrats without saddles or
stirrups, was no match for a company of hoplites. Nevertheless, the use of the
cavalry reserve broke the Athenian right and, because the Thebans had by now
moved into the Athenian rear, caused a general Athenian rout. Pagondas's
victory at Delium helped guarantee Boeotian security, and prevented further
Athenian incursions into their territory for the remainder of the Peloponnesian
War.
After effects:
Pagondas's theretofore unseen employment of tactics in combat set the stage for
his fellow Theban Epaminondas's brilliant
command at Leuctra in 371, considered one of
the most astounding tactical victories in the history of warfare. How much
Epaminondas learned directly from Pagondas and Delium is lost to history - he
was not yet born when the battle was fought, and given Pagondas's age at the
battle of Delium it is unlikely the two ever met. Visually, the similarity of
their tactics suggests a link, but the 53 year interval raises the question as
to whether the use of a deeper phalanx became a staple of Theban tactical lore
or had to be reinvented by Epaminondas, perhaps after reading an account of the
battle? Furthermore, the tactic of a deeper phalanx had been used by
Pelopidas, a compatriot
of Epaminondas, at the Battle of Tegyra four
years before the Battle of Leuctra. In turn, Philip of Macedon, who was raised
in Boeotia as a hostage, was apparently taught by Epaminondas himself and,
after Epaminondas's death, by other Theban generals and was a student of the
Peloponnesian War, would go on to develop further the tactical ideas originated
by Pagondas. In turn, his legacy would be followed and expanded by his son,
Alexander the Great. Historian Victor Davis Hanson, among others, therefore
argues that Pagondas's simple use of cavalry reserves and altered troop
formations set the stage for the entire military history of the West, and, by
extension, the world.
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