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Military tactics encompasses the
art of organizing and employing fighting forces on or near the battlefield.
They involve the application of four battlefield functions which are closely
related – kinetic or firepower, mobility, protection or security, and
shock action. Tactics are a separate function from command and control and
logistics. In contemporary military science, tactics are the lowest of three
levels of warfighting, the higher levels being the strategic and operational
levels. Throughout history, there has been a shifting balance between the four
tactical functions, generally based on the application of military technology,
which has led to one or more of the tactical functions being dominant for a
period of time, usually accompanied by the dominance of an associated fighting
arm deployed on the battlefield, such as infantry, artillery, cavalry or tanks.
Tactical functions:
Kinetic or firepower:
Beginning with the use of melee and missile weapons such as clubs and spears,
the kinetic or firepower function of tactics has developed along with
technological advances so that the emphasis has shifted over time from the
close-range melee and missile weapons to longer-range projectile weapons.
Kinetic effects were generally delivered by the sword, spear, javelin and bow
until the introduction of artillery by the Romans. Until the mid 19th century,
the value of infantry-delivered missile firepower was not high, meaning that
the result of a given battle was rarely decided by infantry firepower alone,
often relying on artillery to deliver significant kinetic effects. The
development of disciplined volley fire, delivered at close range, began to
improve the hitting power of infantry, and compensated in part for the limited
range, poor accuracy and low rate of fire of early muskets. Advances in
technology, particularly the introduction of the rifled musket, used in the
Crimean War and American Civil War, meant flatter trajectories and improved
accuracy at greater ranges, along with higher casualties. The resulting
increase in defensive firepower meant infantry attacks without artillery
support became increasingly difficult. Firepower also became crucial to fixing
an enemy in place to allow a decisive strike. Machine guns added significantly
to infantry firepower at the turn of the 20th century, and the mobile firepower
provided by tanks, self-propelled artillery and military aircraft rose
significantly in the century that followed. Along with infantry weapons, tanks
and other armoured vehicles, self-propelled artillery, guided weapons and
aircraft provide the firepower of modern armies.
Mobility:
Mobility, which determines how quickly a fighting force can move, was for most
of human history limited by the speed of a soldier on foot, even when supplies
were carried by beasts of burden. With this restriction, most armies could not
travel more than 32 kilometres (20 mi) per day, unless travelling on rivers.
Only small elements of a force such as cavalry or specially trained light
troops could exceed this limit. This restriction on tactical mobility remained
until the latter years of World War I when the advent of the tank improved
mobility sufficiently to allow decisive tactical manoeuvre. Despite this
advance, full tactical mobility was not achieved until World War II when
armoured and motorised formations achieved remarkable successes. However, large
elements of the armies of World War II remained reliant on horse-drawn
transport, which limited tactical mobility within the overall force. Tactical
mobility can be limited by the use of field obstacles, often created by
military engineers.
Protection and security:
Personal armour has been worn since the classical period to provide a measure
of individual protection, which was also extended to include barding of the
mount. The limitations of armour have always been weight and bulk, and its
consequent effects on mobility as well as human and animal endurance. By the
18th and 19th centuries, personal armour had been largely discarded, until the
re-introduction of helmets during World War I in response to the firepower of
artillery. Armoured fighting vehicles proliferated during World War II, and
after that war, body armour returned for the infantry, particularly in Western
armies.
Fortifications, which have been used since ancient times, provide collective
protection, and modern examples include entrenchments, roadblocks, barbed wire
and minefields. Like obstacles, fortifications are often created by military
engineers.
Shock action:
Shock action is as much a psychological function of tactics as a physical one,
and can be significantly enhanced by the use of surprise. It has been provided
by charging infantry, and well as by chariots, war elephants, cavalry and
armoured vehicles which provide momentum to an assault. It has also been used
in a defensive way, for example by the drenching flights of arrows from English
longbowmen at the Battle of Agincourt in 1415 which caused the horses of the
French knights to panic. During early modern warfare, the use of the tactical
formations of columns and lines had a greater effect than the firepower of the
formations alone. During the early stages of World War II, the combined effects
of German machine gun and tank gun firepower, enhanced by accurate indirect
fire and air attack, often broke up Allied units before their assault
commenced, or caused them to falter due to casualties among key unit leaders.
In both the early modern and World War II examples, the cumulative
psychological shock effect on the enemy was often greater than the actual
casualties incurred.
Development over time:
The development of tactics has involved a shifting balance between the four
tactical functions since ancient times, and changes in firepower and mobility
have been fundamental to these changes. Various models have been proposed to
explain the interaction between the tactical functions and the dominance of
individual fighting arms during different periods. J. F. C. Fuller proposed
three "tactical cycles" in each of the classical and Christian eras.
For the latter epoch, he proposed a "shock" cycle between 650 and
1450, a "shock and projectile" cycle 1450–1850, and a
"projectile" cycle from 1850, with respect to the Western and North
American warfare.[5] During World War II, Tom Wintringham proposed six
chronological periods, which alternate the dominance between unarmoured and
armoured forces and highlight tactical trends in each period.
Period:
Dominant fighting arm:
Tactical trends:
First unarmoured period (to the Battle of Plataea (479 BC)) None – both
infantry and cavalry have relatively low kinetic power, chariots provide a
measure of shock action Egyptian, Persian and Greek armies become better
organised and equipped First armoured period (to the Battle of Adrianople (378)
Infantry – the phalanx and Roman legion, experimentation with elephants
for shock action only a limited success Armies and casualties increase
significantly, introduction of siege and field artillery by the Romans Second
unarmoured period (to Charlemagne's victory at Pavia (774)) Light cavalry
– horse archers and shock action defeat infantry Mobility dominates until
checked by armoured cavalry Second armoured period (to the battles of Morgarten
(1315), Crécy (1346) and Battle of Ravenna (1512)) Heavy cavalry –
facilitated by the introduction of the stirrup and armour Expense limits
numbers of armoured cavalry, Swiss infantry armed with halberds and English
longbowmen rebalance the scales Third unarmoured period (to the Battle of
Cambrai (1917) Infantry – with steadily increasing firepower Combined
arms, with artillery firepower becoming predominant Third armoured period (to
the present) Armoured forces restore mobility Armoured combined arms countered
by military aircraft and infantry anti-armour weapons
Massed volley fire by archers brought infantry firepower to the fore in
Japanese warfare in the second half of the 13th century, preceding the rise of
the English longbowman.[7] The mobility and shock action of the Oirat Mongol
army at the Battle of Tumu in 1449 demonstrated that cavalry could still defeat
a large infantry force.[8] In both the European and Oriental traditions of
warfare, the advent of gunpowder during the late Medieval and Early Modern
periods created a relentless shift to infantry firepower becoming "a
decisive, if not dominant" arm on the battlefield,[9] exemplified by the
significant impact of massed arquebusiers at the Battle of Nagashino in 1575.
Combined arms tactics:
The synchronisation of the various fighting arms to achieve the tactical
mission is known as combined arms tactics. One method of measuring tactical
effectiveness is the extent to which the arms, including military aviation, are
integrated on the battlefield. A key principle of effective combined arms
tactics is that for maximum potential to be achieved, all elements of combined
arms teams need the same level of mobility, and sufficient firepower and
protection. The history of the development of combined arms tactics has been
dogged by costly and painful lessons. For example, while German commanders in
World War II clearly understood from the outset the key principle of combined
arms tactics outlined above, British commanders were late to this realisation.
Successful combined arms tactics require the fighting arms to train alongside
each other and to be familiar with each other's capabilities.[11
Impact of air power:
Beginning in the latter stages of World War I, airpower has brought a
significant change to military tactics. World War II saw the development of
close air support which greatly enhanced the effect of ground forces with the
use of aerial firepower and improved tactical reconnaissance and the
interdiction of hostile air power. It also made possible the supply of ground
forces by air, achieved by the British during the Burma Campaign but
unsuccessful for the Germans at the Battle of Stalingrad. Following World War
II, rotary-wing aircraft had a significant impact on firepower and mobility,
comprising a fighting arm in its own right in many armies. Aircraft,
particularly those operating at low or medium altitudes, remain vulnerable to
ground-based air defence systems as well as other aircraft.[11] Parachute and
glider operations and rotary-wing aircraft have provided significant mobility
to ground forces but the reduced mobility, protection and firepower of troops
delivered by air once landed has limited the tactical utility of such vertical
envelopment or air assault operations. This was demonstrated during Operation
Market Garden in September 1944, and during the Vietnam War, in the latter case
despite the additional firepower provided by helicopter gunships and the
ability quickly to remove casualties, provided by aeromedical evacuation.[12]
Concept:
Military tactics answer the questions of how best to deploy and employ forces
on a small scale.[13] Some practices have not changed since the dawn of
warfare: assault, ambushes, skirmishing, turning flanks, reconnaissance,
creating and using obstacles and defenses, etc. Using ground to best advantage
has not changed much either. Heights, rivers, swamps, passes, choke points, and
natural cover, can all be used in multiple ways. Before the nineteenth century,
many military tactics were confined to battlefield concerns: how to maneuver
units during combat in open terrain. Nowadays, specialized tactics exist for
many situations, for example for securing a room in a building. Technological
changes can render existing tactics obsolete, and sociological changes can
shift the goals and methods of warfare, requiring new tactics. Tactics define
how soldiers are armed and trained. Thus technology and society influence the
development of types of soldiers or warriors through history: Greek Hoplite,
Roman Legionary, Medieval Knight, Turk-Mongol Horse Archer, Chinese
Crossbowman, or an Air Cavalry trooper. Each – constrained by his
weaponry, logistics and social conditioning – would use a battlefield
differently, but would usually seek the same outcomes from their use of
tactics. The First World War forced great changes in tactics as advances in
technology rendered prior tactics useless.[14] "Gray-zone" tactics
are also becoming more widely used. These include “everything from
strong-arm diplomacy and economic coercion, to media manipulation and
cyberattacks, to use of paramilitaries and proxy forces.” The title
"gray-zone" comes from to the ambiguity between defense vs. offense,
as well as the ambiguity between peace-keeping vs. war effort.[15]
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Bibliography:
Haskew, Michael; Jorgensen, Christer; McNab, Chris; Niderost, Eric; Rice, Rob
S. (2008). Fighting Techniques of the Oriental World 1200-1860: Equipment,
Combat Skills and Tactics. London, United Kingdom: Amber Books. ISBN
978-1-905704-96-5. Holmes, Richard; Strachan, Hew; Bellamy, Chris; Bicheno,
Hugh (2001). The Oxford Companion to Military History. Oxford, United Kingdom:
Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-866209-9. Johnson, Rob, Michael Whitby,
John France (2010). How to win on the battlefield : 25 key tactics to outwit,
outflank, and outfight the enemy. Thames & Hudson. ISBN 978-0-500-25161-4.
Muhm, Gerhard. "German Tactics in the Italian Campaign". Archived
from the original on 27 September 2007. Retrieved 27 September 2007. Gerhard
Muhm : La Tattica nella campagna ass d’Italia, in LINEA GOTICA AVAMPOSTO
DEI BALCANI, (Hrsg.) Amedeo Montemaggi - Edizioni Civitas, Roma 1993.
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