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Military logistics is the
discipline of planning and carrying out the movement, supply, and maintenance
of military forces. In its most comprehensive sense, it is those aspects or
military operations that deal with: Design, development, acquisition, storage,
distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel. Transport
of personnel. Acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and
disposition of facilities. Acquisition or furnishing of services. Medical and
health service support.
History:
The word "logistics" is derived from the Greek adjective logistikos
meaning "skilled in calculating". The first administrative use of the
word was in Roman and Byzantine times when there was a military administrative
official with the title Logista. At that time, the word apparently implied a
skill involved in numerical computations. Historically supplies for an army
were first acquired by foraging or looting, especially in the case of food and
fodder, although if traveling through a desolated region or staying in one
place for too long resources could quickly be exhausted. A second method was
for the army to bring along what was needed, whether by ships, pack animals,
wagons or carried on the backs of the soldiers themselves. This allowed the
army some measure of self-sufficiency, and up through to the 19th century most
of the ammunition a soldier needed for an entire campaign could be carried on
their person. However, this method led to an extensive baggage train which
could slow down the army's advance and the development of faster-firing weapons
soon outpaced an army's ability to supply itself. Starting with the Industrial
Revolution new technological, technical and administrative advances led to a
third method, that of maintaining supplies in a rear area and transporting them
to the front. This led to a "logistical revolution" which began in
the 20th century and drastically improved the capabilities of modern armies
while making them highly dependent on this new system.
5th to 15th century Military supply transport of arms and wine for the Norman
Invasion, 1066, from the Bayeux Tapestry Depiction of soldiers pillaging a
town, carrying away their loot by the barrow-load, 14th century The De re
militari, written by Publius Flavius Vegetius Renatus in the late 4th-century,
is an authoritative text which Illuminates the logistics, strategies and
tactics, as well as the training regimen for soldiers at the end of the Roman
Empire, some of which was maintained and modified throughout the medieval
period. It became used widely as a military guide during the medieval period
and demonstrates the medieval inheritance and adaptation of the Roman military
infrastructure. One of the most significant changes in military organization
after the fall of the Roman Empire in the 5th century was the shift from a
centrally organized army to a combination of military forces made up of local
troops. According to the De ordine palatii--composed in the late 8th century as
a reflection of the organization of courts under Louis III of France and
Carloman II--local troops often worked within the household during peace time
and were provided food and drink from the high officials in the house. The
magnates of the households drew upon their own resources for their men, and
during Charlemagne's reign and the reign of the Ottonian dynasty in Germany,
some heads of house built permanent storages and dwellings to house men or
supplies.[4] While on campaign, soldiers through the medieval period (the 5th
to 15th century in Europe) were responsible for supplying themselves, either
through foraging, looting (more common during sieges), or purchases from
markets along the campaign route. Even so, military commanders often provided
their troops with food and supplies, but this would be provided in lieu of the
soldiers' wages if they worked within the king's household, or soldiers would
be expected to pay for it from their wages if they did not work in the king's
household, either at cost or even with a profit.[5] Some early governments,
such as the Carolingians in 8th century, required soldiers to supply their own
food for three months, but would feed soldiers thereafter for free if the
campaign or siege was ongoing. Later, during the German civil war in the early
1070s, Saxon soldiers were required to bring supplies enough for the entire
campaign.[6] As for food transportation for soldiers and the beasts which
accompanied the army on the campaigns, approximately 2,500 kilograms of food
supplies were needed for the soldiers, roughly 9,000 kilograms of food for
horses and 19,000 kilograms (nearly 1/2 of which was grain), and 19,000
kilograms was needed for other beasts of burden (donkeys and oxen, for example)
per day.[7] Commanders could also bring along herds of cattle to provide their
men with fresh meat while traveling. A herd of roughly 1,000 cattle could feed
14,000 or so men for roughly ten days.[8]
Beasts of burden were used as vehicular transport for the food and supplies,
either by carrying the supplies directly on their backs—the average
medieval horse and mule could carry roughly 100 kilograms—or by pulling
carts or wagons, depending on the weather conditions.[9] Commanders also made
use of water transport throughout the medieval period as it was often more
efficient than ground transport. Prior to the crusading period, mid-scale sea
vessels could carry several dozen tons of supplies. Cargo ships were also used,
and were most commonly of the Nordic-type, the Utrecht-type, or the proto-cog
crafts. Similar to the proto-cogs, river boats resembling simple log-boats were
also used, as the larger crafts could carry up to 15 metric tons of supply and
animal cargo. These ships made transporting supplies, and often soldiers, much
easier and more reliable for the commander; but, the ability to use water
transport was limited by geographic location, weather, and the availability of
such ships.[10] Outside of food and fodder, commanders and soldiers also
carried with them their arms and armor. In a letter from Charlemagne to Abbot
Fulrad, the king states that horsemen must come prepared with their own arms
and gear: including, "a shield, lance, sword, dagger, bow, and quivers
with arrows".[11] Likewise, according the Visigoth legal code (c.680),
soldiers were required to come equipped for campaign with armor and shields.
This practice was common throughout the pre-crusading period. Soldiers could
often obtain the needed supplies from local craftsmen: smiths, carpenters, and
leather workers often supplied the local militia troops with cooking utensils,
bows and arrows, and horse shoes and saddles.[12] Archaeologists have also
found evidence of goods production in excavations of royal houses, suggesting
that the Roman infrastructure of central arms and equipment factories was
inherited, even if such factories were more decentralized. Further, all estates
during Charlemagne's reign were required to have carpenters staffed to produce
weapons and armor, according to the Capitulare de villis.[13] The construction
of large-scale weapons systems, particularly those designed for siege warfare,
was also an important part of military logistics. In the pre-crusading period,
Vikings and Saxons would often use lever-action stone-throwing technology; but,
the torsion-powered spear-throwing ballistae was also common, though it
required much more technological expertise to build. The most difficult of the
large-scale weapons systems to construct was the siege tower, which was meant
to provide besieging soldiers with the ability to shoot at the level of their
opponents in the tower or allow them to roll up to the tower itself and climb
over the wall, breaching the fortress. The first recorded construction of a
siege tower is in 984 during King Lothair IV's siege of Verdun. These siege
engines were often constructed on site, rather than being constructed before
the campaign and transported with the soldiers. In the 11th century, Emperor
Otto III ordered siege engines to be built only once he had arrived at the
fortress of Tivoli to begin his siege, and Emperor Henry II did the same upon
arriving at Troia. It is generally assumed that the materials for the siege
engines were transported along with the food, fodder, and arms and that
specialized craftsmen from the military households travelled with the army to
build the engines on site.[14]
In 1294, the same year John II de Balliol of Scotland refused to support Edward
I of England's planned invasion of France, Edward I implemented a system in
Wales and Scotland where sheriffs would acquire foodstuffs, horses and carts
from merchants with compulsory sales at prices fixed below typical market
prices under the Crown's rights of prise and purveyance. These goods would then
be transported to Royal Magazines in southern Scotland and along the Scottish
border where English conscripts under his command could purchase them. This
continued during the First War of Scottish Independence which began in 1296,
though the system was unpopular and was ended with Edward I's death in 1307.[5]
Starting under the rule of Edward II in 1307 and ending under the rule of
Edward III in 1337, the English instead used a system where merchants would be
asked to meet armies with supplies for the conscripts to purchase. This led to
discontent as the merchants saw an opportunity to profiteer, forcing conscripts
to pay well above normal market prices for food.[5] As Edward III went to war
with France in the Hundred Years' War (starting in 1337), the English returned
to a practice of foraging and looting to meet their logistical needs. This
practice lasted throughout the course of war, extending through the remainder
of Edward III's reign into the reign of Henry VI.[5]
16th century Starting in the late sixteenth century, armies in Europe greatly
increased in size, upwards of 100,000 or more in some cases. This increase in
size came not just in the number of actual soldiers but also camp
followers—anywhere from half to one and a half the size of the army
itself—and the size of the baggage train—averaging one wagon for
every fifteen men.[15] However, very little state support was provided to these
massive armies, the vast majority of which consisted of mercenaries. Beyond
being paid for their service by the state (an act which bankrupted even the
Spanish Empire on several occasions), these soldiers and their commanders were
forced to provide everything for themselves. If permanently assigned to a town
or city with a working marketplace, or traveling along a well-established
military route, supplies could be easily bought locally with intendants
overseeing the exchanges. In other cases an army traveling in friendly
territory could expect to be followed by sutlers, whose supply stocks were
small and subject to price gouging, or a commissioner could be sent ahead to a
town to make arraignments, including quartering if necessary.[16] When
operating in enemy territory an army was forced to plunder the local
countryside for supplies, a historical tradition meant to allow war to be
conducted at the enemy's expense. However, with the increase in army sizes this
reliance on plunder became a major problem, as many decisions regarding where
an army could move or fight were made based not on strategic objectives but
whether a given area was capable of supporting the soldiers' needs. Sieges in
particular were affected by this, both for any army attempting to lay siege to
a location or coming to its relief. Unless a military commander was able to
implement some sort of regular resupply, a fortress or town with a devastated
countryside could be effectively immune to either operation.[16] Conversely,
armies of this time had little need to maintain lines of communication while on
the move, except insofar as it was necessary to recruit more soldiers, and thus
could not be cut off from non-existent supply bases. Although this
theoretically granted armies freedom of movement, the need for plunder
prevented any sort of sustained, purposeful advance. Many armies were further
restricted to following waterways due to the fact that what supplies they were
forced to carry could be more easily transported by boat. Artillery in
particular was reliant of this method of travel, since even a modest number of
cannons of the period required hundreds of horses to pull overland and traveled
at half the speed of the rest of the army.[17]
17th century Painting of marauding soldiers, Vrancx, 1647, showing people and
the landscape being devastated by military campaigns The first half of the
seventeenth century saw the Thirty Years' War devastate large parts of Europe
where waves of large invading armies repeatedly plundered the same locations
for supplies.[18] By the mid-seventeenth century, the French under Secretary of
State for War Michel Le Tellier began a series of military reforms to address
some of the issues which had plagued armies previously. Besides ensuring that
soldiers were more regularly paid and combating the corruption and
inefficiencies of private contractors, Le Tellier devised formulas to calculate
the exact amount of supplies necessary for a given campaign, created
standardized contracts for dealing with commercial suppliers, and formed a
permanent vehicle-park manned by army specialists whose job was to carry a few
days' worth of supplies while accompanying the army during campaigns. With
these arrangements there was a gradual increase in the use of magazines which
could provide a more regular flow of supply via convoys. While the concepts of
magazines and convoys was not new at this time, prior to the increase in army
sizes there had rarely been cause to implement them.[19] Despite these changes,
French armies still relied on plunder for a majority of their needs while on
the move. Magazines were created for specific campaigns and any surplus was
immediately sold for both monetary gain and to lessen the tax burden. The
vehicles used to form convoys were contracted out from commercial interests or
requisitioned from local stockpiles. In addition, given warfare of this era's
focus on fortified towns and an inability to establish front lines or exert a
stabilizing control over large areas, these convoys often needed armies of
their own to provide escort. The primary benefits of these reforms was to
supply an army during a siege. This was borne out in the successful campaign of
1658 when the French army at no point was forced to end a siege on account of
supplies, including the Siege of Dunkirk.[19] Le Tellier's son Louvois would
continue his father's reforms after assuming his position. The most important
of these was to guarantee free daily rations for the soldiers, amounting to two
pounds of bread or hardtack a day. These rations were supplemented as
circumstances allowed by a source of protein such as meat or beans; soldiers
were still responsible for purchasing these items out-of-pocket but they were
often available at below-market prices or even free at the expense of the
state. He also made permanent a system of magazines which were overseen by
local governors to ensure they were fully stocked. Some of these magazines were
dedicated to providing frontier towns and fortresses several months' worth of
supplies in the event of a siege, while the rest were dedicated to supporting
French armies operating in the field.[20] With these reforms French armies
enjoyed one of the best logistical systems in Europe, however there were still
severe restrictions on its capabilities. Only a fraction of an army's supply
needs could be met by the magazines, requiring that it continue to use plunder.
In particular this was true for perishable goods or those too bulky to store
and transport such as fodder. The administration and transportation of supplies
remained inadequate and subject to the deprivations of private contractors. The
primary aim of this system was still to keep an army supplied while conducting
a siege, a task for which it succeeded, rather than increase its freedom of
movement.[21]
18th century:
The British were seriously handicapped in the American Revolutionary War by the
need to ship all supplies across the Atlantic, since the Americans prevented
most local purchases. The British found a solution after the war by creating
the infrastructure and the experience needed to manage an empire. London
reorganized the management of the supply of military food and transport that
was completed in 1793–94 when the naval Victualling and Transport Boards
undertook those responsibilities. It built upon experience learned from the
supply of the very-long-distance Falklands garrison (1767–72) to
systematize needed shipments to distant places such as Australia, Nova Scotia,
and Sierra Leone. This new infrastructure allowed Britain to launch large
expeditions to the Continent during the French Revolutionary War and to develop
a global network of colonial garrisons.[22]
19th century Napoleon Military train of the French Imperial Guard Before the
Napoleonic wars, military supply was based on contracts with private companies,
looting and requisition (legal taking of whatever the army needed, with minimal
compensation). Napoleon made logistical operations a major part of French
strategy.[23] During the Ulm Campaign in 1805, the French army of 200,000 men
had no need for time-consuming efforts to scour the countryside for supplies
and live off the land, as it was well provided for by France's German
allies.[23] France's ally, the Electorate of Bavaria, turned the city of
Augsburg into a gigantic supply center, allowing the Grande Armée,
generously replenished with food, shoes and ammunition, to quickly invade
Austria after the decisive French victory at Ulm.[24] Napoleon left nothing to
chance, requesting the Bavarians to prepare in advance a specified amount of
food at certain cities such as Würzburg and Ulm, for which the French
reimbursed them.[25] When French demands proved excessive for the German
principalities, the French army used a system of vouchers to requisition
supplies and keep the rapid French advance going.[26] The agreements with
French allies permitted the French to obtain huge quantities of supplies within
a few days' notice.[27] Napoleon built up a major supply magazine at Passau,
with barges transporting supplies down the Danube to Vienna to maintain the
French army prior to the Battle of Austerlitz in combat readiness.[24] In 1807,
Napoleon created the first military train regiments—units entirely
dedicated to the supply and the transport of equipment. The French system fared
poorly in the face of a guerrilla warfare that targeted supply lines during the
Peninsular War in Spain, and the British blockade of Spanish ports. The need to
supply a besieged Barcelona made it impossible to control the province and
ended French plans to incorporate Catalonia into Napoleon's Empire.[28] The
first theoretical analysis of this was by the Swiss writer, Antoine-Henri
Jomini, who studied the Napoleonic wars. In 1838, he devised a theory of war
based on the trinity of strategy, tactics, and logistics.
Railways US Military Railroad engineers monitor the first use of a wooden
trestle they have hastily built to replace the masonry bridge destroyed by
Confederates, O&A railroad, Northern Virginia, c. 1863 Railways and
steamboats revolutionized logistics by the mid-19th century. In the American
Civil War (1861–65), both armies used railways extensively, for transport
of personnel, supplies, horses and mules, and heavy field pieces. Both tried to
disrupt the enemy's logistics by destroying trackage and bridges.[29] Military
railways were built specifically for supporting armies in the field. During the
Seven Weeks War of 1866, railways enabled the swift mobilization of the
Prussian Army, but the problem of moving supplies from the end of rail lines to
units at the front resulted in nearly 18,000 tons trapped on trains unable to
be unloaded to ground transport.[30] The Prussian use of railways during the
Franco-Prussian War is often cited as a prime example of logistic
modernizations, but the advantages of maneuver were often gained by abandoning
supply lines that became hopelessly congested with rear-area traffic.[31] 20th
century
World War I German horse-drawn supply bottleneck in front of provisional
bridges near Étricourt, France, during Operation Michael, 24 March 1918
With the expansion of military conscription and reserve systems in the decades
leading up to the 20th century, the potential size of armies increased
substantially, while the industrialization of firepower (bolt-action rifles
with higher rate-of-fire, larger and more artillery, plus machine guns) was
starting to multiply the potential amount munitions each required. Military
logistical systems, however, continued to rely on 19th century technology. When
World War I started, the capabilities of rail and horse-drawn supply were
stretched to their limits. Where the stalemate of trench warfare took hold,
special narrow gauge trench railways were built to extend the rail network to
the front lines. The great size of the German Army proved too much for its
railways to support except while immobile.[32] Tactical successes like
Operation Michael devolved into operational failures where logistics failed to
keep up with the army's advance over shell-torn ground.[33] On the seas, the
British blockade of Germany kept a stranglehold on raw materials, goods, and
food needed to support Germany's war efforts, and is considered one of the key
elements in the eventual Allied victory in the war.[34] At the same time,
Germany's unrestricted submarine warfare showed the vulnerability of shipping
lanes despite Allied naval superiority.
World War II A "Deuce-and-a-half" truck of the Red Ball Express stuck
in mud, 1944 Allied cargo ship convoy crosses the Atlantic, c. 1944 The
mechanization of warfare, starting at the tail end of World War I, added
increasing ammo, fuel, and maintenance needs of tanks and other combat vehicles
to the burden on military logistics. The growing needs of more powerful and
numerous military ships and aircraft increased this burden even further. On the
other hand, mechanization also brought trucks to logistics; though they
generally require better roads and bridges, trucks are much faster and far more
efficient than fodder-bound horse-drawn transport. While many nations,
including Germany, continued to rely on wagons to some extent,[35] the US and
UK readily switched to trucks wherever possible. Military logistics played a
significant role in many World War II operations, especially ones far from
industrial centers, from the Finnish Lapland to the Burma Campaign, limiting
the size and movement of any military forces. In the North African Campaign,
with a lack of rail, few roads, and hot-dry climate, attacks and advances were
timed as much by logistics as enemy actions. Poor logistics, in the form of
Russia's vast distances and its state of road and rail networks, contributed to
the fate of Germany's invasion of the USSR: despite many battlefield victories,
the campaign lost momentum before the gates of Moscow. Breaking the logistics
supply line became a major target for airpower; a single fighter aircraft could
attack dozens of supply vehicles at a time by strafing down a road, many miles
behind the front line. Air superiority became critical for almost any major
offensive in good weather. Allied air forces took out German-controlled bridges
and rail infrastructure throughout northern France to help ensure the success
of the Normandy landings, but after the breakout from Normandy, this now
limited the Allies' own logistics. In response, the Red Ball Express was
organized—a massive truck convoy system to supply the advance towards
Germany. During the Battle of Stalingrad, Supplying by air, called an
airbridge, was attempted by Germany to keep its surrounded 6th Army supplied,
but they lacked sufficient air transport. Allied airbridges were more
successful, in the Burma Campaign, and in "The Hump" to resupply the
Chinese war effort. (A few years after the war, the Berlin Air Lift was
successful in supplying the whole non-Soviet half of the city.) At sea, the
Battle of the Atlantic began in the first days of the war and continued to the
end. German surface raiders and U-boats targeted vital Allied cargo ship
convoys supplying English, US, and Russian forces, and became more effective
than in World War I. Technological improvements in both U-boats and
anti-submarine warfare raced to out-do each other for years, with the Allies
eventually keeping losses to U-boats in check. Logistics was a major challenge
for the American war effort, since wartime material had to be supplied across
either the Atlantic or the even wider Pacific Ocean. Germany undertook an
aggressive U-boat campaign against American logistics on the Atlantic, but the
Japanese neglected to attack shipping in the Pacific, using their submarines to
fight alongside the surface Navy in large-scale battles.[36][37][38]
Long logistical distances dominated the Pacific War. For the attack on Pearl
Harbor, the Japanese required numerous oiler ships to refuel the attacking
fleet at sea on-route. Massive numbers of transports, including thousands of US
Liberty ships, were required to sustain the Allied forces fighting back towards
the Japanese homeland. As in the Atlantic, submarine warfare accounted for more
losses than naval battles, with over 1,200 merchant ships sank.[39]
Gulf War:
During Operation Desert Storm, US forces faced the daunting task of keeping
over 500,000 American military personnel supplied in a geographically remote
harsh environment with no pre-existing presence or basing arraignment.[40] This
challenge was only further underscored by the logistical needs of the forces
involved. A typical US armored division was composed of 350 tanks, 200 Bradley
fighting vehicles and 16,000 soldiers. Together their daily supply requirement
could amount to 5,000 tons of ammunition, 555,000 gallons of fuel, 300,000
gallons of water, and 80,000 meals. To meet these needs the division was
equipped with nearly a thousand trucks carrying cargo, fuel and ammunition, and
3,500 of the division's soldiers had logistical responsibilities. Despite these
resources though, the division could only sustain itself for three to five days
before requiring resupply from an external source.[41] Likewise, a typical
squadron of 24 fighter aircraft would require the equivalent of 20 C-141
Starlifters carrying supplies to support its initial deployment and operational
capability.[42]
Modern developments See also: airlift and sealift Iraqi Army Explosive Ordnance
Disposal (EOD) specialist. Mobile workshop of the French Army. Roll-on/roll-off
ship USNS Pililaau during Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore (JLOTS) exercise.
Logistics, occasionally referred to as "combat service support", must
address highly uncertain conditions. While perfect forecasts are rarely
possible, forecast models can reduce uncertainty about what supplies or
services will be needed, where and when they will be needed, or the best way to
provide them. Ultimately, responsible officials must make judgments on these
matters, sometimes using intuition and scientifically weighing alternatives as
the situation requires and permits. Their judgments must be based not only upon
professional knowledge of the numerous aspects of logistics itself but also
upon an understanding of the interplay of closely related military
considerations such as strategy, tactics, intelligence, training, personnel,
and finance. However, case studies have shown that more quantitative,
statistical analysis are often a significant improvement on human judgment. One
such recent example is the use of Applied Information Economics by the Office
of Naval Research and the Marine Corps for forecasting bulk fuel requirements
for the battlefield.[43] In major military conflicts, logistics matters are
often crucial in deciding the overall outcome of wars. For instance, tonnage
war—the bulk sinking of cargo ships—was a crucial factor in World War
II. The successful Allied anti-submarine campaign and the failure of the German
Navy to sink enough cargo in the Battle of the Atlantic allowed Britain to stay
in the war and the ability to maintain a Mediterranean supply chain allowed the
maintenance of the second front against the Nazis in North Africa; by contrast,
the successful U.S. submarine campaign against Japanese maritime shipping
across Asian waters effectively crippled its economy and its military
production capabilities and the Axis were unable to consistently maintain a
supply chain to their North African forces with on average 25% fewer supplies
than required being landed and critical fuel shortages dictating strategic
decisions. In a tactical scale, in the Battle of Ilomantsi, the Soviets had an
overwhelming numerical superiority in guns and men, but managed to fire only
10,000 shells against the Finnish 36,000 shells, eventually being forced to
abandon their heavy equipment and flee the battlefield, resulting in a Finnish
victory. One reason for this was the successful Finnish harassment of Soviet
supply lines.
More generally, protecting one's own supply lines and attacking those of an
enemy is a fundamental military strategy; an example of this as a purely
logistical campaign for the military means of implementing strategic policy was
the Berlin Airlift. Military logistics has pioneered a number of techniques
that have since become widely deployed in the commercial world. Operations
research grew out of WWII military logistics efforts. Likewise, military
logistics borrows from methods first introduced to the commercial world. The
Kargil Conflict in 1999 between India and Pakistan also referred to as
Operation Vijay (Victory in Hindi) is one of the most recent examples of high
altitude warfare in mountainous terrain that posed significant logistical
problems for the combating sides. The Stallion which forms the bulk of the
Indian Army's logistical vehicles proved its reliability and serviceability
with 95% operational availability during the operation.
Loss of Strength Gradient Main article: Loss of Strength Gradient Geographic
distance is a key factor in military affairs. The shorter the distance, the
greater the ease with which force can be brought to bear upon an opponent. This
is because it is easier to undertake the supply of logistics to a force on the
ground as well as engage in bombardment. The importance of distance is
demonstrated by the Loss of Strength Gradient devised by Kenneth Boulding. This
shows the advantage of supply that is forward based.[44]
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U.S. Armed Forces classes of supply Main
article: Classes of supply The United States Military logistics support is
grouped into 10 classes of supply:[45] Class Description Consumer Class Class I
Subsistence (food), gratuitous (free) health and comfort items. Troops Class II
Clothing, individual equipment, tent-age, organizational tool sets and kits,
hand tools, unclassified maps, administrative and housekeeping supplies and
equipment. Troops Class III Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants (POL) (package and
bulk): Petroleum, fuels, lubricants, hydraulic and insulating oils,
preservatives, liquids and gases, bulk chemical products, coolants, deicer and
antifreeze compounds, components, and additives of petroleum and chemical
products, and coal. Equipment Class IV Construction materials, including
installed equipment and all fortification and barrier materials. Troops Class V
Ammunition of all types, bombs, explosives, mines, fuzes, detonators,
pyrotechnics, missiles, rockets, propellants, and associated items. Equipment
Class VI Personal demand items (such as health and hygiene products, soaps and
toothpaste, writing material, snack food, beverages, cigarettes, batteries,
alcohol, and cameras—nonmilitary sales items) and paperclips. Troops Class
VII Major end items such as launchers, tanks, mobile machine shops, and
vehicles. Equipment Class VIII Medical material (equipment and consumables)
including repair parts peculiar to medical equipment. (Class VIIIa –
Medical consumable supplies not including blood & blood products; Class
VIIIb – Blood & blood components (whole blood, platelets, plasma,
packed red cells, etc.). Troops Class IX Repair parts and components to include
kits, assemblies, and sub-assemblies (repairable or non-repairable) required
for maintenance support of all equipment. Equipment Class X Material to support
nonmilitary programs such as agriculture and economic development (not included
in Classes I through IX). Civilians Miscellaneous Water, salvage, and captured
material. Troops Supply chain management in military logistics often deals with
a number of variables in predicting cost, deterioration, consumption, and
future demand. The US Military's categorical supply classification was
developed in such a way that categories of supply with similar consumption
variables are grouped together for planning purposes. For instance peacetime
consumption of ammunition and fuel will be considerably less than wartime
consumption of these items, whereas other classes of supply such as subsistence
and clothing have a relatively consistent consumption rate regardless of war or
peace. Troops will always require uniform and food. More troops will require
equally more uniforms and food. In the table above, each class of supply has a
consumer. Some classes of supply have a linear demand relationship—as more
troops are added more supply items are needed—as more equipment is used
more fuel and ammo is consumed. Other classes of supply must consider a third
variable besides usage and quantity: time. As equipment ages more and more
repair parts are needed over time, even when usage and quantity stays
consistent. By recording and analyzing these trends over time and applying to
future scenarios, the US military can accurately supply troops with the items
necessary at the precise moment they are needed.[46] History has shown that
good logistical planning creates a lean and efficient fighting force. Lack
thereof can lead to a clunky, slow, and ill-equipped force with too much or too
little supply.
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