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Epaminondas was a Greek general of Thebes and
statesman of the 4th century who transformed the Ancient Greek city-state of
Thebes, leading it out of Spartan subjugation into a pre-eminent position in
Greek politics. In the process he broke Spartan military power with his victory
at Leuctra and
liberated the Messenian helots, a group of Peloponnesian Greeks who had been
enslaved under Spartan rule for some 230 years after being defeated in the
Messenian War ending in 600. Epaminondas reshaped the political map of Greece,
fragmented old alliances, created new ones, and supervised the construction of
entire cities. He was also militarily influential and invented and implemented
several major battlefield tactics.
Xenophon, the historian and contemporary, is the main source for Epaminondas
military prowess, and Xenophon describes his admiration for him in his major
work Hellenica (book VII, chap. 5, 19). Accordingly, in later centuries
the roman orator, Cicero called him "the first man of Greece", and
even in modern times Montaigne judged him one of the three "worthiest and
most excellent men" that had ever lived.
The changes Epaminondas wrought on the Greek political order did not long
outlive him, as the cycle of shifting hegemonies and alliances continued
unabated. A mere twenty-seven years after his death, a recalcitrant Thebes was
obliterated by Alexander the Great. Thus Epaminondas—who had been praised
in his time as an idealist and liberator—is today largely remembered for a
decade (371 to 362) of campaigning that sapped the strength of the great
city-states and paved the way for the Macedonian conquest.
Early life:
He [Epaminondas] preferred the society of a grave and austere old man before
that of all those of his own age; nor did he part with him until he so far
excelled his fellow students in learning, that it might easily be perceived he
would in like manner excel them all in other pursuits. —?Cornelius Nepos, Epaminondas, II
Epaminondas was born into the Theban aristocracy in the late 5th century;
estimates for the year of his birth vary widely. Cornelius Nepos claims that
his father, Polymnis, had been left impoverished by his ancestors. He was
educated in his childhood by Lysis of Tarentum, one of the last major
Pythagorean philosophers. Epaminondas excelled as a student, and was devoted to
Lysis. Nepos also tells us that the young Epaminondas worked hard to increase
his physical prowess, and specifically his agility, since "he thought that
strength suited the purposes of wrestlers, but that agility conduced to
excellence in war." He also trained in running and wrestling, but most of
all, he undertook "martial exercises" (presumably training with
weapons).
Epaminondas began serving as a soldier after adolescence; Plutarch refers to an
incident involving Epaminondas that occurred during a battle at Mantinea.
Though not explicitly stated, this was probably the Spartan attack on Mantinea
in 385, as described by Xenophon; Plutarch tells us that Epaminondas was there
as part of a Theban force aiding the Spartans, so this battle fits the
description. Epaminondas was certainly not old enough to have served at the
First Battle of Mantinea which was in
418. It was at this battle, regardless of exactly when and where this occurred,
that a defining moment of Epaminondas's early life would happen. Epaminondas
saved the life of his fellow Theban
Pelopidas; Pelopidas,
after receiving seven wounds in front, sank down upon a great heap of friends
and enemies who lay dead together; but Epaminondas, although he thought him
lifeless, stood forth to defend his body and his arms, and fought desperately,
single-handed against many, determined to die rather than leave Pelopidas lying
there. And now he too was in a sorry plight, having been wounded in the breast
with a spear and in the arm with a sword, when Agesipolis the Spartan king came
to his aid from the other wing, and when all hope was lost, saved them both.
Plutarch says that this incident firmly cemented their friendship, and
Pelopidas would be Epaminondas's partner in politics for the next twenty years.
Epaminondas was considered the greatest warrior-statesmen of ancient Thebes by
many, including the Roman historian Diodorus Siculus. Diodorus does not have
anything to say about the personal affairs of Epaminondas or the Sacred Band,
nor does he say anything about the following account, again from Plutarch
(Amatorius 17). According to Plutarch's dramatic dialogue, Epaminondas had two
male lovers: Asopichus and Caphisodorus. Caphisodorus died with Epaminondas at
Mantineia in battle. They were buried together, something usually reserved for
a husband and wife in Greek society. As for Asopichus, Theopompus (as quoted by
Athenaeus) also confirms his liaison with Epaminondas; the historian describes
him as a fearless warrior who had the trophy at Leuctra, acquired by his lover,
depicted as relief on his shield.
Political and military career:
Background:
Epaminondas lived at a particularly turbulent point in Greek history. Following
her victory in the Peloponnesian War in 404, Sparta had embarked upon an
aggressively unilateralist policy towards the rest of Greece and quickly
alienated many of its former allies. Thebes, meanwhile, had greatly increased
its own power during the war and sought to gain control of the other cities of
Boeotia (the region of ancient Greece northwest of Attica). This policy, along
with other disputes, brought Thebes into conflict with Sparta. By 395, Thebes,
alongside Athens, Corinth, and Argos, found itself arrayed against Sparta (a
former ally) in the Corinthian War. That
war, which dragged on inconclusively for eight years, saw several bloody Theban
defeats at Spartan hands. By the time of its conclusion, Thebes had been forced
to check its expansionist ambitions and return to its old alliance with Sparta.
In 382, however, the Spartan commander
Phoebidas committed an
act that would ultimately turn Thebes against Sparta for good and pave the way
for Epaminondas's rise to power. Passing through Boeotia on campaign, Phoebidas
took advantage of civil strife within Thebes to secure entrance to the city for
his troops. Once inside, he seized the Cadmeia (the Theban acropolis), and
forced the anti-Spartan party to flee the city.
Epaminondas, although associated with that faction, was allowed to remain;
since "his philosophy made him to be looked down upon as a recluse, and
his poverty as impotent". The Spartans installed a puppet government in
Thebes, and garrisoned the Cadmeia to ensure the behaviour of the Thebans.
Early career 378 BC – Theban coup:
In the years following the Spartan takeover, the exiled Thebans regrouped in
Athens and, at the instigation of Pelopidas, prepared to liberate their city.
Meanwhile, in Thebes, Epaminondas began preparing the young men of the city to
fight the Spartans. In the winter of 379, a small group of the exiles, led by
Pelopidas, infiltrated the city. They then assassinated the leaders of the
pro-Spartan government, and supported by Epaminondas and Gorgidas, who led a
group of young men, and a force of Athenian hoplites, they surrounded the
Spartans on the Cadmeia. The following day, Epaminondas and Gorgidas brought
Pelopidas and his men before the Theban assembly and exhorted the Thebans to
fight for their freedom; the assembly responded by acclaiming Pelopidas and his
men as liberators. The Cadmeia was surrounded, and the Spartans attacked;
Pelopidas realised that they must be expelled before an army came from Sparta
to relieve them. The Spartan garrison eventually surrendered on the condition
that they were allowed to march away unharmed. The narrow margin of the
conspirators' success is demonstrated by the fact that the Spartan garrison met
a Spartan force on the way to rescue them as they marched back to Sparta.
Plutarch portrays the Theban coup as an immensely significant event: ...the
subsequent change in the political situation made this exploit the more
glorious. For the war which broke down the pretensions of Sparta and put an end
to her supremacy by land and sea, began from that night, in which people, not
by surprising any fort or castle or citadel, but by coming into a private house
with eleven others, loosed and broke in pieces, if the truth may be expressed
in a metaphor, the fetters of the Lacedaemonian supremacy, which were thought
indissoluble and not to be broken.
378–371 – Aftermath:
When news of the uprising at Thebes reached Sparta, an army under Cleombrotus I
had been dispatched to subdue the city, but turned back without engaging the
Thebans. Another army under
Agesilaus II was then
dispatched to attack the Thebans. However, the Thebans refused to meet the
Spartan army in battle, instead building a trench and stockade outside Thebes,
which they occupied, preventing the Spartans advancing on the city. The
Spartans ravaged the countryside but eventually departed, leaving Thebes
independent. This victory so heartened the Thebans that they undertook
operations against other neighboring cities as well. In short order the Thebans
were able to reconstitute their old Boeotian confederacy in a new, democratic
form. The cities of Boeotia united as a federation with an executive body
composed of seven generals, or Boeotarchs, elected from seven districts
throughout Boeotia. This political fusion was so successful that henceforth the
names Theban and Boeotian were used interchangeably in a nod to the newfound
solidarity of the region. Seeking to crush the Thebans, the Spartans would
invade Boeotia three times over the next few years (378, 377, ? possibly
Leuctra).
At first the Thebans feared facing the Spartans head on, but the conflict gave
them much practice and training, and they "had their spirits roused and
their bodies thoroughly inured to hardships, and gained experience and courage
from their constant struggles". Although Sparta remained the dominant land
power in Greece, the Boeotians had demonstrated that they, too, were a martial
threat and a politically cohesive power. At the same time, Pelopidas, an
advocate of an aggressive policy against Sparta, had established himself as a
major political leader in Thebes. Epaminondas's role in the years to 371 is
difficult to piece together. Certainly, he served with the Theban armies in the
defence of Boeotia in the 370s, and, by 371, he had become a Boeotarch. It
seems safe to assume, given their close friendship, and their close
collaboration after 371, that Epaminondas and Pelopidas also collaborated
closely on Theban policy in the period 378–371.
Peace conference of 371:
The years following the Theban coup had seen desultory fighting between Sparta
and Thebes, with Athens also drawn into the conflict. A feeble attempt at a
common peace had been made in 375, but desultory fighting between Athens and
Sparta had resumed by 373 (at the latest). By 371, Athens and Sparta were again
war-weary, and in 371 a conference was held at Sparta to discuss another
attempt at a common peace. Epaminondas was serving as a Boeotarch for 371, and
led the Boeotian delegation to the peace conference. Peace terms were agreed at
the outset of the conference, and the Thebans presumably signed the treaty in
their own name alone. However, on the following day, Epaminondas caused a
drastic break with Sparta when he insisted on signing not for the Thebans
alone, but for all the Boeotians. Agesilaus refused to allow the change of the
Theban envoys' signature, insisting that the cities of Boeotia should be
independent; Epaminondas countered that if this were to be the case, the cities
of Laconia should be as well. Irate, Agesilaus struck the Thebans from the
document. The delegation returned to Thebes, and both sides mobilized for war.
Battle of Leuctra (371)
Main article: Battle of Leuctra:
Immediately following the failure of the peace talks, orders were sent out from
Sparta to the Spartan king Cleombrotus, who was at the head of an army in
Phocis, commanding him to march directly to Boeotia. Skirting north to avoid
mountain passes where the Boeotians were prepared to ambush him, Cleombrotus
entered Boeotian territory from an unexpected direction and quickly seized a
fort and captured 10 or 12 triremes. Then marching towards Thebes, he camped at
Leuctra, in the territory of Thespiae. Here, the Boeotian army came to meet
him. The Spartan army contained some 10,000 hoplites, 700 of whom were the
elite warriors known as Spartiates. The Boeotians opposite them numbered about
6,000, but were bolstered by a cavalry superior to that of the Peloponnesians.
Epaminondas was given charge of the Boeotian army, with the other six
Boeotarchs in an advisory capacity. Pelopidas, meanwhile, was captain of the
Sacred Band, the elite Theban troops. Before the battle, there was evidently
much debate amongst the Boeotarchs about whether to fight or not. As a
consistent advocate of an aggressive policy, Epaminondas wished to fight, and
supported by Pelopidas, he managed to swing the vote in favour of battle.
During the course of the battle, Epaminondas was to display a grasp of tactics
hitherto unseen in Greek warfare. The phalanx formation used by Greek armies
had a distinct tendency to veer to the right during battle, "because fear
makes each man do his best to shelter his unarmed side with the shield of the
man next him on the right". Traditionally, a phalanx therefore lined up
for battle with the elite troops on the right flank to counter this tendency.
Thus, in the Spartan phalanx at Leuctra, Cleombrotus and the elite 'Spartiates'
were on the right, while the less experienced Peloponnesian allies were on the
left. However, needing to counter the Spartans' numerical advantage,
Epaminondas implemented two tactical innovations. Firstly, he took the best
troops in the army, and arranged them 50 ranks deep (as opposed to the normal
8–12 ranks) on the left wing, opposite Cleombrotus and the Spartans, with
Pelopidas and the Sacred Band on the extreme left flank. Secondly, recognizing,
that he could not have matched the width of the Peloponnesian phalanx (even
before the deepening the left flank), he abandoned all attempts to do so.
Instead, placing the weaker troops on the right flank, he "instructed them
to avoid battle and withdraw gradually during the enemy's attack". The
tactic of the deep phalanx had been anticipated by Pagondas, another Theban
general, who used a 25 man deep formation at the Battle of Delium. However, the
reversing of the position of the elite troops, and an oblique line of attack
were innovations; it seems that Epaminondas was therefore responsible for the
military tactic of refusing one's flank.
The fighting at Leuctra opened with a clash between the cavalry, in which the
Thebans were victorious over the inferior Spartan cavalry, driving them back
into the ranks of the infantry, and thereby disrupting the phalanx. The battle
then became general, with the strengthened Theban left flank marching to attack
at double speed, while the right flank retreated. After intense fighting, the
Spartan right flank began to give way under the impetus of the mass of Thebans,
and Cleombrotus was killed. Although the Spartans held on for long enough to
rescue the body of the king, their line was soon broken by the sheer force of
the Theban assault. The Peloponnesian allies on the left wing, seeing the
Spartans put to flight, also broke and ran, and the entire army retreated in
disarray. One thousand Peloponnesians were killed, while the Boeotians lost
only 300 men. Most importantly, since it constituted a significant proportion
of the entire Spartan manpower, 400 of the 700 Spartiates present were killed,
a loss that posed a serious threat to Sparta's future war-making abilities.
When, after the battle, the Spartans asked if they and the Peloponnesians could
collect the dead, Epaminondas suspected that the Spartans would try to cover-up
the scale of their losses. He therefore allowed the Peloponnesians to remove
their dead first, so that those remaining would be shown to be Spartiates, and
emphasise the scale of the Theban victory. The victory at Leuctra shook the
foundations of the Spartan dominance of Greece to the core. Since the number of
Spartiates was always relatively small, Sparta had relied on her allies in
order to field substantial armies. However, with the defeat at Leuctra, the
Peloponnesian allies were less inclined to bow to Spartan demands. Furthermore,
with the loss of men at Leuctra and other battles, the Spartans were not in a
strong position to reassert their dominance over their erstwhile allies.
Theban hegemony:
Main article: Theban hegemony:
In the immediate aftermath of Leuctra, the Thebans considered following up
their victory by taking their vengeance on Sparta; they also invited Athens to
join them in doing so. However, their Thessalian allies under
Jason of Pherae dissuaded them from shattering what
remained of the Spartan army. Instead, Epaminondas occupied himself with
consolidating the Boeotian confederacy, compelling the previously
Spartan-aligned polis of Orchomenus to join the league. The following year the
Thebans invaded the Peloponnesus, aiming to break Spartan power for good. It is
not clear exactly when the Thebans started to think not just of ending the
Spartan hegemony, but of replacing it with one of their own, but it is clear
that eventually this became their aim. Hans Beck asserts that, unlike Sparta in
the Peloponnesian League and Athens in the Delian League, Thebes made no effort
either to create an empire or to bind its allies in any sort of permanent and
stable organization. Indeed, after Leuctra Thebes devoted its attention to
diplomatic efforts in Central Greece rather than schemes of domination further
afield. By late 370 Thebes' network of alliances in central Greece made her
secure in the area—as she had not been before Leuctra—and offered
scope for further expansion of Theban influence.
First Invasion of the Peloponnese (370):
First Invasion of the Peloponnese (370):
When, in the immediate aftermath of Leuctra, the Thebans had sent a herald to
Athens with news of their victory, the messenger was met with stony silence.
The Athenians then decided to take advantage of the Spartan discomfiture,
holding a conference in Athens, in which the peace terms proposed earlier in
371 were ratified by all cities (except Elis); and this time, the treaty
explicitly made the Peloponnesian cities, formerly under Spartan dominance,
independent. Taking advantage of this, the Mantineans decided to unify their
settlements into a single city, and to fortify it; a decision which greatly
angered Agesilaus. Furthermore, Tegea, supported by Mantinea, instigated the
formation of an Arcadian alliance. This led to the Spartans declaring war on
Mantinea, whereupon the majority of Arcadian cities grouped together to oppose
the Spartans (thus forming the confederation that the Spartans were trying to
prevent), and requested assistance from the Thebans. The Theban force arrived
late in 370, and it was led by Epaminondas and Pelopidas, both at this time
Boeotarchs. As they journeyed into Arcadia, the Thebans were joined by armed
contingents from many of Sparta's former allies, swelling their forces to some
50–70,000 men. In Arcadia Epaminondas encouraged the Arcadians to form
their proposed league, and to build the new city of Megalopolis (as a center of
power opposed to Sparta). Messenia in the classical period Epaminondas,
supported by Pelopidas and the Arcadians, then persuaded the other Boeotarchs
to invade Laconia itself. Moving south, they crossed the Evrotas River, the
frontier of Sparta, which no hostile army had breached in memory. The Spartans,
unwilling to engage the massive army in battle, simply defended their city,
which the Thebans did not attempt to capture. The Thebans and their allies
ravaged Laconia, down to the port of Gythium, freeing some of the Lacedaemonian
perioeci from their allegiance to Sparta. Epaminondas briefly returned to
Arcadia, before marching south again, this time to Messenia, a region which the
Spartans had conquered some 200 years before. Epaminondas freed the helots of
Messenia, and rebuilt the ancient city of Messene on Mount Ithome, with
fortifications that were among the strongest in Greece. He then issued a call
to Messenian exiles all over Greece to return and rebuild their homeland. The
loss of Messenia was particularly damaging to the Spartans, since the territory
comprised one-third of Sparta's territory and contained half of their helot
population. The helots' labor allowed the Spartans to become a
"full-time" army.
Epaminondas' campaign of 370/369 has been described as an example of "the
grand strategy of indirect approach", which was aimed at severing
"the economic roots of her [Sparta's] military supremacy." In mere
months, Epaminondas had created two new enemy states that opposed Sparta,
shaken the foundations of Sparta's economy, and all but devastated Sparta's
prestige. This accomplished, he led his army back home, victorious.
Trial:
In order to accomplish all that he wished in the Peloponnesus, Epaminondas had
persuaded his fellow Boeotarchs to remain in the field for several months after
their term of office had expired. Upon his return home, Epaminondas was
therefore greeted not with a hero's welcome but with a trial arranged by his
political enemies. According to Cornelius Nepos, in his defense Epaminondas
merely requested that, if he be executed, the inscription regarding the verdict
read: Epaminondas was punished by the Thebans with death, because he obliged
them to overthrow the Lacedaemonians at Leuctra, whom, before he was general,
none of the Boeotians durst look upon in the field, and because he not only, by
one battle, rescued Thebes from destruction, but also secured liberty for all
Greece, and brought the power of both people to such a condition, that the
Thebans attacked Sparta, and the Lacedaemonians were content if they could save
their lives; nor did he cease to prosecute the war, till, after settling
Messene, he shut up Sparta with a close siege.
The jury broke into laughter, the charges were dropped, and Epaminondas was
re-elected as Boeotarch for the next year.
Second invasion of the Peloponnesus (369):
In 369 the Argives, Eleans and the Arcadians, eager to continue their war
against Sparta, recalled the Thebans to their support. Epaminondas, at the
height of his prestige, again commanded an allied invasion force. Arriving at
the Isthmus of Corinth, the Thebans found it heavily guarded by the Spartans
and Athenians (along with the Corinthians, Megarans and Pellenians).
Epaminondas decided to attack the weakest spot, guarded by the Lacedaemonians;
in a dawn attack he forced his way through the Spartan position, and joined his
Peloponnesian allies. The Thebans thus won an easy victory and crossed the
Isthmus. Diodorus stresses that this was "a feat no whit inferior to his
former mighty deeds".
However, the rest of the expedition achieved little: Sicyon and Pellene became
allied to Thebes, and the countryside of Troezen and Epidaurus was ravaged, but
the cities could not be taken. After an abortive attack on Corinth and the
arrival of a task force sent by Dionysius of Syracuse to aid Sparta, the
Thebans decided to march home.
Thessaly (368)
When Epaminondas returned to Thebes, he continued to be dogged by his political
enemies who prosecuted him for the second time. They actually succeeded in
excluding him from the office of Boeotarch for the year 368. This was the only
time from the Battle of Leuctra until his death that he did not serve as
Boeotarch. In 368, the Theban army marched into Thessaly to rescue Pelopidas
and Ismenias, who had been imprisoned by Alexander of Pherae while serving as
ambassadors. The Theban force not only failed to overcome Alexander and his
allies, but got into serious difficulties, when it tried to withdraw;
Epaminondas, serving as a private soldier, succeeded in extricating it. In
early 367, Epaminondas led a second Theban expedition to free Pelopidas, and
Ismenias. He finally outmanoeuvred the Thessalians, and secured the release of
the two Theban ambassadors without a fight.
Third invasion of the Peloponnesus (367)
In the spring of 367, Epaminondas again invaded the Peloponnesus. This time an
Argive army captured part of the Isthmus on Epaminondas's request, allowing the
Theban army to enter the Peloponnesus unhindered. On this occasion, Epaminondas
marched to Achaea, seeking to secure their allegiance to Thebes. No army dared
to challenge him in the field, and the Achaean oligarchies therefore acquiesced
to the request that they be allied to Thebes. Epaminondas' acceptance of the
Achaean oligarchies roused protests by both the Arcadians and his political
rivals, and his settlement was thus shortly reversed: democracies were set up,
and the oligarchs exiled. These democratic governments were short-lived, since
the pro-Spartan aristocrats from all the cities banded together and attacked
each city in turn, re-establishing the oligarchies. According to G.L. Cawkwell,
"the sequel perhaps showed the good sense of Epaminondas. When these
exiles recovered the cities, they 'no longer took a middle course'." In
the light of their treatment by Thebes, they abandoned their previously neutral
stance, and thereafter "fought zealously in support of the
Lacedaemonians".
Resistance to Thebes:
The Theban hegemony:
In 366/365 an attempt was made to make a common peace, with the Persian King
Artaxerxes II as
arbiter and guarantor. Thebes organized a conference to have the terms of the
peace accepted, but their diplomatic initiative failed: the negotiations could
not resolve the hostility between Thebes and other states that resented its
influence (such as the Arcadian leader Lycomedes who challenged the right of
the Thebans to hold the congress in Thebes); the peace was never fully
accepted, and fighting soon resumed.
Throughout the decade after the Battle of Leuctra, numerous former allies of
Thebes defected to the Spartan alliance or even to alliances with other hostile
states. By the middle of the next decade, even some Arcadians (whose league
Epaminondas had helped establish in 369 had turned against them. At the same
time, however, Epaminondas managed through a series of diplomatic efforts to
dismantle the Peloponnesian league: the remaining members of the league finally
abandoned Sparta (in 365 Corinth, Epidaurus, and Phlius made peace with Thebes
and Argos), and Messenia remained independent and firmly loyal to Thebes.
Boeotian armies campaigned across Greece as opponents rose up on all sides;
Epaminondas even led his state in a challenge to Athens at sea. The Theban
demos voted him a fleet of a hundred triremes to win over Rhodes, Chios, and
Byzantium. The fleet finally sailed in 364, but modern scholars believe that
Epaminondas achieved no lasting gains for Thebes on this voyage. In that same
year, Pelopidas was killed while campaigning against Alexander of Pherae in
Thessaly. His loss deprived Epaminondas of his greatest Theban political ally.
Fourth invasion of the Peloponnesus (362):
Main article: Battle of Mantinea (362)
In the face of this increasing opposition to Theban dominance, Epaminondas
launched his final expedition into the Peloponnese in 362. The immediate goal
of the expedition was to subdue Mantinea, which had been opposing Theban
influence in the region. Epaminondas brought an army drawn from Boeotia,
Thessaly and Euboea. He was joined by Tegea, which was the center of local
opposition to Mantinea, Argos, Messenia, and some of the Arcadians. Mantinea,
on the other hand, had requested assistance from Sparta, Athens, Achaea and the
rest of Arcadia, so that almost all of Greece was represented on one side or
the other. This time the mere presence of the Theban army was not enough to cow
the opposition. Since time was passing and the Mantinean alliance showed no
signs of capsizing, Epaminondas decided that he would have to break the
stalemate. Hearing that a large Lacedaemonian force was marching to Mantinea,
and that Sparta was practically undefended, he planned an audacious night-time
march on Sparta itself.
However, the Spartan king Archidamus was alerted to this move by an informant,
probably a Cretan runner, and Epaminondas arrived to find the city
well-defended. Although he did attack the city, he seems to have drawn off
relatively quickly on discovering that he had not, after all, surprised the
Spartans. Furthermore, the Lacedaemonian and Mantinean troops which had been
stationed at Mantinea had marched to Sparta during the course of the day, and
dissuaded Epaminondas from attacking again. Now hoping that his adversaries had
left Mantinea defenseless in their haste to protect Sparta, Epaminondas counter
marched his troops back to his base at Tegea, and then dispatched his cavalry
to Mantinea. However, a clash outside the walls of Mantinea with Athenian
cavalry foiled this strategy as well. Realising that the time allotted for the
campaign was drawing to a close, and reasoning that if he departed without
defeating the enemies of Tegea, Theban influence in the Peloponnesus would be
destroyed, he decided to stake everything on a pitched battle. What followed on
the plain in front of Mantinea was the largest hoplite battle in Greek history.
Epaminondas had the larger army, 30,000 strong infantry and 3,000 cavalry,
whilst his opponents numbered 20,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry. Xenophon says
that, having decided to fight, Epaminondas arranged the army into battle order,
and then marched it in a column parallel to the Mantinean lines, so that it
appeared that the army was marching elsewhere, and would not fight that day.
Having reached a certain point in the march, he then had the army down arms, so
it appeared they getting ready to camp. Xenophon suggests that "by so
doing he caused among most of the enemy a relaxation of their mental readiness
for fighting, and likewise a relaxation of their readiness as regards their
array for battle".
The whole column, which had been marching right-to-left past the front of the
Mantinean army then 'right-faced', so that they were now in a battle line,
facing the Mantineans. Epaminondas, who had been at the head of the column (now
the left wing), brought some companies of infantry from the extreme right wing,
behind the battle line, to reinforce the left wing. By this, he recreated the
strengthened left-wing that Thebes had fielded at Leuctra (this time probably
made up by all the Boeotians, and not just the Thebans as at Leuctra). On the
wings he placed strong forces of cavalry strengthened by light-infantry.
Epaminondas then gave the order to advance, catching the enemy off guard, and
causing a furious scramble in the Mantinean camp to prepare for battle. The
battle unfolded as Epaminondas had planned. The cavalry forces on the wings
drove back the Athenian and Mantinean cavalry opposite them. Diodorus says that
the Athenian cavalry on the Mantinean right wing, although not inferior in
quality, could not withstand the missiles from the light-troops that
Epaminondas had placed among the Theban cavalry. Meanwhile, the Theban infantry
advanced. Xenophon evocatively describes Epaminondas's thinking: "[he] led
forward his army prow on, like a trireme, believing that if he could strike and
cut through anywhere, he would destroy the entire army of his
adversaries."
As at Leuctra, the weakened right wing was ordered to hold back and avoid
fighting. In the clash of infantry, the issue briefly hung in the balance, but
then the Theban left-wing broke through the Spartan line, and the entire enemy
phalanx was put to flight. However, at the height of the battle, Epaminondas
was mortally wounded by a Spartan, and died shortly thereafter. Following his
death, the Thebes and allies made no effort to pursue the fleeing enemy; a
testament to Epaminondas's centrality to the war effort.
Xenophon, who ends his history with the battle of Mantinea, says of the
battle's results:
When these things had taken place, the opposite of what all men believed would
happen was brought to pass. For since well-nigh all the people of Greece had
come together and formed themselves in opposing lines, there was no one who did
not suppose that if a battle were fought, those who proved victorious would be
the rulers and those who were defeated would be their subjects; but the deity
so ordered it that both parties set up a trophy as though victorious and
neither tried to hinder those who set them up, that both gave back the dead
under a truce as though victorious, and both received back their dead under a
truce as though defeated, and that while each party claimed to be victorious,
neither was found to be any better off, as regards either additional territory,
or city, or sway, than before the battle took place; but there was even more
confusion and disorder in Greece after the battle than before.
Death:
While pressing forward with the troops at Mantinea, Epaminondas was hit in the
chest by a spear (or, in some accounts, a sword or large knife). Cornelius
Nepos suggests the Spartans were deliberately aiming at Epaminondas in the hope
of killing him, and thereby demoralizing the Thebans. The enemy who struck the
killing blow was variously identified as Anticrates, Machaerion, or Gryllus,
son of Xenophon. The spear broke, leaving the iron point in his body, and
Epaminondas collapsed. The Thebans around him fought desperately to stop the
Spartans taking possession of his body. When he was carried back to camp still
living, he asked which side was victorious. When he was told that the Boeotians
had won, he said "It is time to die." Diodorus suggests that one of
his friends exclaimed "You die childless, Epaminondas" and then burst
into tears. To this Epaminondas is supposed to have replied "No, by Zeus,
on the contrary I leave behind two daughters, Leuctra and Mantinea, my
victories." Cornelius Nepos, whose story is otherwise similar has the last
words of Epaminondas as "I have lived long enough; for I die
unconquered." When the spear point was withdrawn, Epaminondas quickly
expired. In accordance with Greek custom, he was buried on the battlefield.
Assessments:
Character:
In matters of character, Epaminondas was above reproach in the eyes of the
ancient historians who recorded his deeds. Contemporaries praised him for
disdaining material wealth, sharing what he had with his friends, and refusing
bribes. One of the last heirs of the Pythagorean tradition, he appears to have
lived a simple and ascetic lifestyle even when his leadership had raised him to
a position at the head of all Greece. Cornelius Nepos notes his
incorruptibility, describing his rejection of a Persian ambassador who came to
him with a bribe. These aspects of his character contributed greatly to his
renown after his death. Epaminondas never married and as such was subject to
criticism from countrymen who believed he was duty-bound to provide the country
with the benefit of sons as great as himself. In response, Epaminondas said
that his victory at Leuctra was a daughter destined to live forever. He is
known, however, to have had several young male lovers, a standard pedagogic
practice in ancient Greece, and one that Thebes in particular was famous for;
Plutarch records that the Theban lawgivers instituted the practice "to
temper the manners and characters of the youth." An anecdote told by
Cornelius Nepos indicates that Epaminondas was intimate with a young man by the
name of Micythus. Plutarch also mentions two of his beloveds (eromenoi):
Asopichus, who fought together with him at the battle of Leuctra, where he
greatly distinguished himself; and Caphisodorus, who fell with Epaminondas at
Mantineia and was buried by his side.
Military record:
Extant biographies of Epaminondas universally describe him as one of the most
talented generals ever produced by the Greek city-states. Even Xenophon, who
fails to note his presence at Leuctra, says of his Mantinean campaign:
"Now I for my part could not say that his campaign proved fortunate; yet
of all possible deeds of forethought and daring the man seems to me to have
left not one undone." Diodorus is effusive in his praise for Epaminondas's
military record: "For it seems to me that he surpassed his
contemporaries...in skill and experience in the art of war. For among the
generation of Epaminondas were famous men: Pelopidas the Theban, Timotheus and
Conon, also Chabrias and Iphicrates...Agesilaus the Spartan, who belonged to a
slightly older generation. Still earlier than these, in the times of the Medes
and Persians, there were Solon, Themistocles, Miltiades, and Cimon, Myronides,
and Pericles and certain others in Athens, and in Sicily Gelon, son of
Deinomenes, and still others. All the same, if you should compare the qualities
of these with the generalship and reputation of Epaminondas, you would find the
qualities possessed by Epaminondas far superior".
As a tactician, Epaminondas stands above every other general in Greek history,
except kings Philip II and Alexander the Great, although modern historians have
questioned his larger strategic vision. According to Richard A. Gabriel, his
tactics "marked the beginning of the end of traditional Greek methods of
war". His innovative strategy at Leuctra allowed him to defeat the vaunted
Spartan phalanx with a smaller force, and his decision to refuse his right
flank was the first recorded instance of such a tactic. Many of the tactical
innovations that Epaminondas implemented would also be used by Philip of
Macedon, who in his youth spent time as a hostage in Thebes and may have
learned directly from Epaminondas himself.
Legacy:
In some ways Epaminondas dramatically altered the face of Greece during the 10
years in which he was the central figure of Greek politics. By the time of his
death, Sparta had been humbled, Messenia freed, and the Peloponnese completely
reorganized. In another respect, however, he left behind a Greece no different
than that which he had found; the bitter divides and animosities that had
poisoned international relations in Greece for over a century remained as deep
as or deeper than they had been before Leuctra. The brutal internecine warfare
that had characterized the years from 432 onwards continued unabated until all
the states involved were subjugated by Macedon.
At Mantinea, Thebes had faced down the combined forces of the greatest states
of Greece, but the victory brought it no spoils. With Epaminondas removed from
the scene, the Thebans returned to their more traditional defensive policy, and
within a few years, Athens had replaced them at the pinnacle of the Greek
political system. No Greek state ever again reduced Boeotia to the subjection
it had known during the Spartan hegemony, but Theban influence faded quickly in
the rest of Greece. Finally, at Chaeronea in 338, the combined forces of Thebes
and Athens, driven into each other's arms for a desperate last stand against
Philip of Macedon, were crushingly defeated, and Theban independence was put to
an end. Three years later, heartened by a false rumor that Alexander the Great
had been assassinated, the Thebans revolted; Alexander squashed the revolt,
then destroyed the city, slaughtering or enslaving all its citizens. A mere 27
years after the death of the man who had made it preeminent throughout Greece,
Thebes was wiped from the face of the Earth, its 1,000-year history ended in
the space of a few days. Epaminondas, therefore, is remembered both as a
liberator and a destroyer. He was celebrated throughout the ancient Greek and
Roman worlds as one of the greatest men of history. Cicero eulogized him as
"the first man, in my judgement, of Greece," and Pausanias records an
honorary poem from his tomb: By my counsels was Sparta shorn of her glory, And
holy Messene received at last her children. By the arms of Thebes was
Megalopolis encircled with walls, And all Greece won independence and freedom.
Epaminondas's actions were certainly welcomed by the Messenians and others whom
he assisted in his campaigns against the Spartans. Those same Spartans,
however, had been at the center of resistance to the Persian invasions of the
5th century, and their absence was sorely felt at Chaeronea; the endless
warfare in which Epaminondas played a central role weakened the cities of
Greece until they could no longer hold their own against their neighbors to the
north. As Epaminondas campaigned to secure freedom for the Boeotians and others
throughout Greece, he brought closer the day when all of Greece would be
subjugated by an invader.
Victor Davis Hanson has suggested that Epaminondas may have planned for a
united Greece composed of regional democratic federations, but even if this
assertion is correct, no such plan was ever implemented. Simon Hornblower
asserts that Thebes' great legacy to fourth century and Hellenistic Greece was
federalism, "a kind of alternative to imperialism, a way of achieving
unity without force", which "embodies a representative
principle". For all his noble qualities, Epaminondas was unable to
transcend the Greek city-state system, with its endemic rivalry and warfare,
and thus left Greece more war-ravaged but no less divided than he found it.
Hornblower asserts that "it is a sign of Epaminondas' political failure,
even before the battle of Mantinea, that his Peloponnesian allies fought to
reject Sparta rather than because of the positive attractions of Thebes".
On the other hand, Cawkwell concludes that "Epaminondas must be judged not
in relation to these inevitable limitations of Boeotian power. To have
established the power of Boeotia and ended the Spartan domination of the
Peloponnese was the most and the best that a Boeotian could have done."
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