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Demosthenes (died 413), son of Alcisthenes,
was an Athenian general during the Peloponnesian War.
Early military actions:
The military activities of Demosthenes are first recorded from 426 when he led
an Athenian invasion of Aetolia. This was a failure. Demosthenes lost about 120
Athenians along with his second in command, Procles. Demosthenes' allies also
suffered heavy losses. As a result of this loss, Demosthenes did not return to
Athens, fearing for his life. However, later that year, Ambracia invaded
Acarnania. The Acarnanians sought help from Demosthenes, who was now patrolling
the coast of the Ionian Sea with twenty Athenian ships. He landed at Olpae and
defeated a Spartan army under Eurylochus, which had come to assist the
Ambraciots. Eurylochus was killed in the Battle of Olpae and the Acarnanians
and Ambraciots signed a peace treaty. Success in the Peloponnese In 425, while
still with his fleet in the Ionian Sea, he was ordered by Cleon to join a fleet
sent from Athens to put down a revolt in Sicily.
Due to a storm, Demosthenes instead landed at Pylos in the Peloponnese. In
order to keep his soldiers busy, he had them fortify the port, giving Athens a
strong base close to Sparta. Sparta, meanwhile, landed an army on the nearby
island of Sphacteria, and Demosthenes moved his men to the beach to prevent the
Spartans, commanded by Thrasymelidas and Brasidas, from landing there. The
Spartan landing was repulsed, and the main Athenian fleet (having turned back
from its journey to Sicily) arrived in time to chase off the Spartan ships.
Back in Athens, the Spartans tried to negotiate a peace. This failed, and Cleon
went to assist Demosthenes, who was planning an invasion of Sphacteria. The
Athenian forces successfully attacked Sphacteria, forcing the Spartans to
surrender a very unusual event. See Battle of Pylos and Battle of
Sphacteria.
Further action during the Peloponnesian War:
In 424, Demosthenes and Hippocrates attempted to capture Megara, but were
defeated by Brasidas. Demosthenes then went to Naupactus to support the
democratic revolution there and to gather troops for an invasion of Boeotia.
Demosthenes and Hippocrates were unable to coordinate their attacks and
Hippocrates was defeated at the Battle of Delium. Demosthenes instead attacked
Sicyon and was defeated as well. Demosthenes was one of the signatories of the
Peace of Nicias in 421, which ended the first half of the Peloponnesian War. (A
different Demosthenes was also a signatory for Sparta.) In 417, Demosthenes was
responsible for evacuating the Athenian troops from Epidaurus following the
Battle of Mantinea. He is said to have organized athletic games and the
Athenian troops escaped while the Epidaurans were distracted by the games.
The Sicilian Expedition:
After Athens invaded Sicily in 415, a Spartan fleet arrived to reinforce their
allies in Syracuse, with a stalemate ensuing. In 413, Demosthenes and Eurymedon
were sent with a new fleet of seventy-three ships and 5000 hoplites.
Demosthenes landed his troops and led a bold night attack on Syracusan forces.
After initial success, the Athenians became disorganized in what became a
chaotic night operation, and were thoroughly routed by Gylippus, the Spartan
commander. After the defeat, and upon seeing the disease-ridden Athenian camp,
Demosthenes suggested that they immediately give up the siege and return to
Athens, where they were needed to defend the city against a Spartan invasion of
Attica. Nicias, the Athenian commander in charge, at first refused, until
still, more Spartans arrived. However, while preparing to leave, there was a
lunar eclipse, which delayed the departure as this was considered a bad omen.
The delay allowed the Syracusans and Spartans to trap the Athenian forces in
the harbour and Eurymedon was killed in the ensuing battle. The Spartans forced
the Athenians to return their forces to the land. Demosthenes thought they
could still flee by ship, but Nicias wanted to find refuge on land. After a few
days of marching, Demosthenes and Nicias became separated; Demosthenes was
ambushed by the Syracusans and was forced to surrender. Nicias was soon
captured as well, and both were executed despite the contrary orders of
Gylippus, who had hoped Demosthenes and Nicias could be brought back to Sparta
as prisoners.
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Demosthenes (general) Demosthenes (413 ): important Athenian
commander during the Archidamian War and the Sicilian Expedition. l In 431 ,
the Spartans and Athenians went to war. Both sides thought they were ready, but
soon discovered that they were wrong. The Spartan strategy was to exhaust the
Athenians by endlessly ravaging the Athenian countryside; the invaders did so
under command of king Archidamus II, after whom the first phase of the
Peloponnesian War is called Archidamian War. The Athenians, on the other hand,
retreated behind their Long walls, received food supplies from overseas,
accepted the loss of their land, and used their fleet to strike at the coastal
towns of the Peloponnese. This strategy, which was designed by Pericles, soon
proved to be too expensive. Pericles' death, however, saved Athens from
bankruptcy. New leaders like Cleon came to power, reorganized the city's
finances, and embarked upon a more ambitious strategy to bring down the
Spartans. One of the men who rose to importance was a military commander named
Demosthenes, the son of Alcisthenes. Thucydides, the author of the History of
the Peloponnesian War, mentions him for the first time as commander in 426.
Demosthenes commanded a fleet that was sent to the Athenian naval base
Naupactus in the west, where the Athenians obstructed any ship that was sailing
to or from Corinth, Sparta's main naval ally. In the preceding years, the
Athenian admiral Phormio had already achieved spectacular successes, and had
gotten involved in a conflict between the inland tribes. When Demosthenes
appeared on the scene, there were two places where he could intervene: the isle
of Leucas, the only island in the region that supported the Spartan case; the
Ambracians wanted Demosthenes to do this and promised help. Aetolia, a
relatively backward area that threatened Naupactus. Demosthenes preferred the
second option, because Naupactus was absolutely vital to Athenian interests,
and its inhabitants had to know that they could always rely upon their powerful
ally.
And so, Demosthenes ignored Leucas and invaded Aetolia, only to discover that
his Ambracian allies refused to follow him. To them, Leucas was the only thing
that really mattered. Other allies, the Locrians, did not turn up either when
Demosthenes attacked Aetolia, from where he wanted to proceed to Boeotia, which
was, at the same moment, under attack from the Athenian general Nicias.
Although Demosthenes was at first successful, he soon found out that his
heavy-armed hoplites were too slow for a fight fight against the light-armed
Aetolians; had the Locrian javelin throwers been there, things would have been
different, but in the end, Demosthenes had to admit that he had made a big
mistake. By the end of the season, he had lost 120 of his 300 marines, lost an
opportunity to capture Leucas, and lost the possibility to return to Athens,
where he would be accused. During the winter of 426/425, the Aetolians invited
the Spartans to join them. With some justification, they believed Naupactus was
now vulnerable, and indeed, it was hard to see where it could find allies now
that the Ambracians had refused help. But the Aetolians and Spartans had
underestimated Demosthenes. While they were laying waste the Naupactian
countryside, Demosthenes managed to reach the Ambracians and -surprisingly-
convinced them to join him. With an Ambracian army, he returned to Naupactus.
The Spartans knew that they could not storm the city and retreated. They
decided to attack a town called Amphilochian Argos, a town of the Acarnanians
that was also claimed by the Ambracians, who became natural allies for the
Spartans. Demosthenes, now a private citizen, immediately followed the Spartans
to the north with a group of volunteers. Near Argos, the two armies met, but
for five days, they did nothing. Finally, the Spartan commander Eurylochus
decided to move. The troops joined battle, and the Spartans discovered that
Demosthenes had used the previous days to create a perfect ambush. He left his
left flank deliberately weak, allowed the Spartans to encircle him, and then
ordered a hidden reserve to attack the Spartans, who panicked. Demosthenes'
victory was complete. The Spartan army had lost two of its three commanders.
The remaining general, Mendaeus, and the surviving Spartans were besieged, and
decided to surrender. Demosthenes offered them a safe passage, but continue the
war against the allies of the Spartans: the Ambracians. This was a brilliant
psychological trick, because in the long run, no one in this region trusted the
Spartans any more. Map of Sphacteria Map of Sphacteria Not much later, an
Ambracian army arrived - too late to help the Spartans, but they did not know.
Demosthenes was able to surprise the Ambracians and wiped out the entire army.
Thucydides comments that this was the greatest disaster that befell any Greek
city during the war. The western theater of operations was now completely
dominated by Athens, and Demosthenes returned home, where he was hailed as a
hero. Even better was to come. On his way home, Demosthenes spotted a port
called Pylos in the southwest of the Peloponnese. He noticed that it could
easily be fortified, and that the Athenians could use it as a base for further
raids in the area. Moreover, this part of the Peloponnese, Messenia, was
hostile towards the Spartans, who had subdued the inhabitants, had made helots
of them, and terrorized them. The Athenian garrison at Pylos offered them an
opportunity to escape, which would greatly damage the Spartan economy. It was
an imaginative plan, and the statesman Cleon was able to see to its financing.
When Demosthenes had landed at Pylos in the spring of 425, the Spartans
immediately sent an army, which included their future commander Brasidas. They
used the isle of Sphacteria as their base, and were isolated on this island
when the Athenian navy defeated the Spartan ships. No less than 292 Spartan
soldiers, including 120 elite Spartiates, were now cut off. Sphacteria from the
east Sphacteria from the east This was a very, very important victory.
Immediately, the Spartans offered a truce, because they were unwilling to
sacrifice their men. They proposed a peace treaty and good will for the future,
but Cleon immediately brushed it aside. There was no guarantee that the
Spartans would not change their mind later. If they wanted peace, they needed
to offer something better, including some sort of guarantee for future peace.
So, the war was resumed, but it was a different war: it had been shown that
Sparta would stop fighting when its own people were imperiled, and would betray
its allies by concluding a peace treaty. Still, many Athenians thought that
Cleon had made a mistake, and he was more or less forced to create an even
bigger victory. And so he did. He went to Pylos, spoke to Demosthenes, and
attacked the Spartans on the island, who in the end surrendered. This was
another blow for the Spartans and sincerely handicapped them, because they
could no longer attack Athens - the hostages would be executed.. In 424, the
Athenians embarked upon a more ambitious strategy. In the spring, they tried to
capture Megara by surprise; however, the Spartan commander Brasidas happened to
be in the neighborhood and was able to foil the attempt. Not beaten yet, the
Athenians tried a second plan. One of Sparta's allies was Thebes, the capital
of a federation of towns that was called Boeotia. If Athens could force Thebes
out of the war, it had the security it needed to sign a peace treaty with
Sparta. The Athenian plan was brilliant: from two sides, Boeotia would be
invaded - from the northeast, at Delium, and from the south, where Demosthenes
was to be in charge of the attack. Unfortunately, the plan was betrayed, and
when Demosthenes arrived at Siphae, where he was supposed to find a friendly
garrison, he was unable to reach his goal. The other army was defeated at
Delium. It was not a disaster, but more or less at the same time, the Athenians
lost Amphipolis to the Spartan general Brasidas. The combination of this defeat
and the unsuccessful attacks forced the Athenians to reconsider their
possibilities. Demosthenes was discredited, and when his ally Cleon was killed
in action during an attempt to recapture Amphipolis, Athens was willing to
agree to a peace treaty. In March 421, the Peace of Nicias was signed.
Demosthenes, who had been out of favor for some time, was still important
enough to be one of those who swore the oaths. The Archidamian War was over.
Although the Peace of Nicias had been forced upon two exhausted enemies, it was
an Athenian victory. Sparta had gone to war to dissolve the Athenian alliance,
the Delian League, and had failed. Moreover, the Athenian finances were better
than those of Sparta. Athens was soon full of energy again and, led by
Alcibiades, allied itself to towns on the Peloponnese (discussed here).
Demosthenes was not one of the main war leaders, but we know that he still
played a role in the Athenian politics. In 418/417, when a major battle was
fought at Mantinea (text) and Sparta restored its prestige, he conducted a
minor operation in Epidauros. Sicily in Antiquity Sicily in Antiquity In 415,
the Athenians sent an armada to Sicily, commanded by Nicias (who fell ill),
Alcibiades (who was recalled), and Lamachus (who was killed in action). The
Sicilian Expedition was a great strategic mistake, but the Athenians did not
realize it until it was too late. The war culminated in the siege of Syracuse,
which was lost by the Athenians because they were unable to surround the city
with a palisade. The Syracusans, commanded by Gylippus of Sparta and
Hermocrates of Syracuse, were able to build counterwalls and keep open their
lines of communication. Still, the Athenians decided to continue the siege, and
sent reinforcements, commanded by Demosthenes. This was a bold move, because
early in 413, the Spartan king Agis II occupied Decelea near Athens, which
marked the beginning of the Decelean or Ionian War. Perhaps the Athenians
believed that success at Syracuse might deter other enemies. Demosthenes
arrived in the summer of 413. The Syracusans, who had already come to believe
that they would win the war, were shocked, but Demosthenes' attempt to take
their counterwall by surprise was unsuccessful. Map of the siege of Syracuse,
stage 3 Map of the siege of Syracuse, stage 3 Demosthenes now realized that the
war at Sicily could no longer be won, and he suggested to retreat. It was a
disgrace, but there was still a chance to minimize the losses, and at least
return the soldiers to Athens, where they were needed. Nicias, however, was
against it, and the two commanders decided to wait a bit longer, to see if the
Syracusan resistance might collapse - after all, there were reports that
besieged had become weary of the war and were willing to come to terms with the
reinforced Athenian army. However, the Syracusans continued to fight, and
Nicias accepted Demosthenes' proposal. Unfortunately, during the night of 27
August 413, when the Athenians were supposed to sail away, there was a lunar
eclipse, which Nicias thought was a very bad omen. He ordered to stay another
month. It became almost immediately apparent that this was a serious mistake.
The Syracusans now blocked the entrance of the harbor and the Athenians could
no longer leave. Finally, Nicias decided to abandon his position. In fact,
almost everything was now lost, because the Athenians had no ships to return
home. Still, they tried to reach the safety of Catana in the north, but they
were attacked by the Syracusan cavalry and were unable to make much progress.
On the sixth day of their march, they gave up, and decided to move to the south
- something that the Syracusans had not expected them to do. But it did not
improve the situation for the Athenians. Demosthenes' troops fell behind and
surrendered on the condition that the soldiers would not be killed. Even
slavery was now acceptable. On the seventh day, Nicias was able to defeat his
pursuers one more time, but in the end, his men were unable to continue, and
surrendered as well (text). The Athenian POWs were forced to work in a stone
quarry, where they died from malnutrition and exposure. Demosthenes and Nicias
were put to death. This page was created in 2005; last modified on 6 May 2019.
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