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The battle of Pylos in 425 was the first part of a two-part battle most
famous the surrender of a force of Spartan hoplites trapped on the island of
Sphacteria (Great
Peloponnesian War). The occupation of Pylos wasn't the result of an
official Athenian policy. In 425 the city if Messina on Sicily had revolted
against Athens, and in response the Athenians decided to send a fleet to
Sicily. Demosthenes was
not one of the generals appointed to command this fleet, but he was allowed to
accompany the fleet and suggest operations that they could carry out while
sailing around the Peloponnese. Demosthenes already had a plan in mind when he
joined the fleet. He wanted to occupy the rocky headland of Pylos in the
south-west of the Peloponnese, fortify it and use it as a base to raid Spartan
territory. The headland was forty-five miles to the west of Sparta in territory
that had once belonged to the Messenia, a city that had been Sparta's great
local rival two centuries earlier before being conquered and destroyed.
Demosthenes believed that the Messenians would provide a garrison for the
stronghold, which was also close to a good natural harbour and well provisioned
with building materials. Demosthenes first suggested this plan while the fleet
was at sea, but the two generals rejected it. Bad weather then forced the fleet
to take shelter at Pylos. Demosthenes repeated his suggestion, and was again
rebuffed. According to Thucydides the plan was saved by the Athenian soldiers,
who without prompting from Demosthenes began to fortify the headland, largely
because they were bored during the enforced delay. The close proximity of the
city of Sparta and its famed warriors may have had more to do with their sudden
enthusiasm for building work, but once the fortifications had been completed
the generals relented, and gave Demosthenes five ships and their crews to act
as his garrison. The occupation of Pylos took place during the annual
Peloponnesian invasion of Attica. When the news reached the Spartan king Agis,
he decided to end the invasion early (after only fifteen days) and return home
to deal with the new threat. His army was also running short of provisions and
suffering from unseasonably wet weather, so the landing at Pylos wasn't the
only reason for the short campaign in Attica. After returning from Attica Agis
sent a force of Spartans from the city and surrounding communities to Pylos,
while his army followed behind. A Spartan fleet based further north at Corcyra
was also summoned, and managed to slip past an Athenian squadron based on
Zakynthos. Demosthenes was aware that he was about to be besieged, and in turn
summoned the fleet from Zakynthos. The Spartans decided on both a short-term
and a long-term plan. The short-term plan was simply to attack the Athenian
fortifications, in the belief that they would easily fall. The long-term plan
took advantage of one weakness of the Athenian position. The rocky headland at
Pylos was at one end of Pylos Bay. The island of Sphacteria runs north-south
across the mouth of the bay, creating a good natural harbour, but also limited
access to the narrow channels at either end of the island (the northern channel
had room for two ships to pass, the southern was wider, with room for eight or
nine). The Spartans decided to moor their ships in rows in these two channels,
with the prows facing outwards. Part of their army would blockade the Athenians
on the mainland and part would be posted on the island. Demosthenes was faced
with an unexpected situation. He should have expected to have been outnumbered
on land, but he couldn't have expected to be outnumbered at sea. He decided to
leave most of his troops in the land fortifications, but selected sixty
hoplites to defend what he believed was the most likely landing point.
Demosthenes himself joined the beach party. The Spartans attacked exactly where
Demosthenes had expected. The naval force consisted of 43 ships led by the
Spartan Thrasymelidas son of Cratesciles, but the beach was too small for all
of them to attack at once. Only a few ships could attack at any one time,
negating the Spartan's numerical advantage, although it did allow them to
rotate their troops. The future Spartan general
Brasidas came to the fore
during this stage of the fighting, but despite his best efforts the Spartans
were unable to establish a foothold on the beach. The attacks on the land walls
also failed, and after two days of attacks the Spartans decided to pause and
construct siege engines. The tables were soon to be turned. While the Spartans
were waiting for their siege engines the Athenian fleet was approaching. By the
time it arrived it contained fifty ships, more than enough to defeat the
Spartan fleet. To make things worst the Spartans had failed to carry out the
naval part of their plan, so their fleet was beached inside the Bay of Pylos.
Nothing happened on the day that the Athenians arrived, but on the following
day they sailed into the bay and inflicted a heavy defeat on the Spartans. The
Spartans were able to prevent them from towing some empty ships off the beach,
but that was the limit of their success. The Athenian naval victory meant that
the last detachment of Spartans on Sphacteria was now trapped. This force of
420 Spartan hoplites, under the command of Epitades son of Molobrus, soon found
itself under attack, and much to the shock of the Greek world chose to
surrender rather than fight to the death (battle of Sphacteria).
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Pylos and Sphacteria 425 BC, William Shepherd . Looks at one of
the most significant Athenian victories of the Great Peloponnesian War, most
notable for the unexpected surrender of a large number of full Spartiates.
Covers the overall campaign, the Spartan attack on the Athenian camp on Pylos,
the naval battle that isolated a force of Spartans on the island of Sphacteria
and the a mphibious assault that forced them to surrender. All supported by
excellent photos of the local area, which really help set the scene.
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