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Battle of Plataea
Part of the Second Persian invasion of Greec Territorial changes Persia loses
control of Attica and Boeotia
Opponents: Greek communities versus the Persian Empire
Commanders and leaders:
Greeks Pausanias
Persians Mardonius
† Artabazos
Strength:
110,000 (Herodotus) 100,000 (Diodorus) 100,000 (Trogus) ~80,000 (modern
consensus) 300,000 (Herodotus) plus 50,000 (estimation by Herodotus) Greek
allies 500,000 (Diodorus) 70,000–120,000 (modern consensus, including
Greek allies and non-combatants such as camp followers)
Casualties and losses:
10,000+ (Ephorus and Diodorus) 1,360 (Plutarch) 159 (Herodotus) 257,000
(Herodotus) 100,000 (Diodorus) 50,000–90,000 (modern consensus)
The battle of Plataea was the final land battle during the second Persian
invasion of Greece. It took place near the city of Plataea in Boeotia, and was
fought between an alliance of the Greek city-states (including Sparta, Athens,
Corinth and Megara), and the Persian Empire of Xerxes I (allied with Boeotians,
Thessalians, and Macedonians). The previous year the Persian invasion force,
led by the Persian king in person, had scored victories at the battles of
Thermopylae
and Artemisium
and conquered Thessaly, Phocis, Boeotia, Euboea and Attica. However, at the
ensuing Battle of Salamis, the Allied
Greek navy had won an unlikely but decisive victory, preventing the conquest of
the Peloponnesus. Xerxes then retreated with much of his army, leaving his
general Mardonius to finish off the Greeks the following year. In the summer of
479 the Greeks assembled a huge (by ancient standards) army and marched out of
the Peloponnesus. The Persians retreated to Boeotia and built a fortified camp
near Plataea. The Greeks, however, refused to be drawn into the prime cavalry
terrain around the Persian camp, resulting in a stalemate that lasted 11 days.
While attempting a retreat after their supply lines were disrupted, the Greek
battle line fragmented. Thinking the Greeks in full retreat, Mardonius ordered
his forces to pursue them, but the Greeks (particularly the Spartans, Tegeans
and Athenians) halted and gave battle, routing the lightly armed Persian
infantry and killing Mardonius. A large portion of the Persian army was trapped
in its camp and slaughtered. The destruction of this army, and the remnants of
the Persian navy allegedly on the same day at the Battle of
Mycale, decisively
ended the invasion. After Plataea and Mycale the Greek allies would take the
offensive against the Persians, marking a new phase of the Greco-Persian Wars.
Although Plataea was in every sense a resounding victory, it does not seem to
have been attributed the same significance (even at the time) as, for example,
the Athenian victory at the Battle of Marathon or the Spartan defeat at
Thermopylae.
The Greek city-states of Athens and Eretria had supported the unsuccessful Ionian Revolt against
the Persian Empire of Darius I in 499–494. The Persian Empire was still
relatively young and prone to revolts by its subject peoples. Moreover, Darius
was a usurper and had to spend considerable time putting down revolts against
his rule.
The Ionian Revolt threatened the integrity of his empire, and he thus vowed to
punish those involved (especially those not already part of the empire). Darius
also saw the opportunity to expand his empire into the fractious Greek
territory. A preliminary expedition under Mardonius, in 492, to secure the land
approaches to Greece ended with the re-conquest of Thrace and forced Macedon to
become a fully subordinate client kingdom of Persia, the latter which had been
a Persian vassal as early as the late 6th century. An amphibious task force was
then sent out under Datis and Artaphernes in 490, using Delos as an
intermediate base at, successfully sacking Karystos and Eretria, before moving
to attack Athens. However, at the ensuing Battle of Marathon, the Athenians won
a remarkable victory, resulting in the withdrawal of the Persian army to Asia.
Darius therefore began raising a huge new army with which he meant to
completely subjugate Greece. However, he died before the invasion could begin.
The throne of Persia passed to his son Xerxes I, who quickly restarted the
preparations for the invasion of Greece, including building two pontoon bridges
across the Hellespont. In 481, Xerxes sent ambassadors around Greece asking for
earth and water as a gesture of their submission, but making the very
deliberate omission of Athens and Sparta (both of whom were at open war with
Persia). Support thus began to coalesce around these two leading states. A
congress of city states met at Corinth in the late autumn of 481, and a
confederate alliance of Greek city-states was formed (hereafter referred to as
"the Allies"). This was remarkable for the disjointed Greek world,
especially since many of the city-states in attendance were still technically
at war with each other. The Allies initially adopted a strategy of blocking
land and sea approaches to southern Greece. Thus, in August 480, after hearing
of Xerxes' approach, a small Allied army led by Spartan King Leonidas I blocked
the Pass of Thermopylae, while an Athenian-dominated navy sailed to the Straits
of Artemisium. Famously, the massively outnumbered Greek army held Thermopylae
for three days before being outflanked by the Persians, who used a little-known
mountain path. Although much of the Greek army retreated, the rearguard, formed
of the Spartan and Thespian contingents, was surrounded and annihilated. The
simultaneous Battle of Artemisium, consisting of a series of naval encounters,
was up to that point a stalemate; however, when news of Thermopylae reached
them, the Greeks also retreated, since holding the straits was now a moot
point. Following Thermopylae, the Persian army proceeded to burn and sack the
Boeotian cities that had not surrendered, Plataea and Thespiae, before taking
possession of the now-evacuated city of Athens. The Allied army, meanwhile,
prepared to defend the Isthmus of Corinth. Xerxes wished for a final crushing
defeat of the Allies to finish the conquest of Greece in that campaigning
season; conversely, the Allies sought a decisive victory over the Persian navy
that would guarantee the security of the Peloponnese. The ensuing naval Battle
of Salamis ended in a decisive victory for the Allies, marking a turning point
in the conflict. Following the defeat of his navy at Salamis, Xerxes retreated
to Asia with the bulk of his army. According to Herodotus, this was because he
feared the Greeks would sail to the Hellespont and destroy the pontoon bridges,
thereby trapping his army in Europe. He left Mardonius, with hand-picked
troops, to complete the conquest of Greece the following year. Mardonius
evacuated Attica and wintered in Thessaly; the Athenians then reoccupied their
destroyed city. Over the winter, there seems to have been some tension among
the Allies. The Athenians in particular, who were not protected by the Isthmus
but whose fleet was the key to the security of the Peloponnese, felt hard done
by and demanded that an Allied army march north the following year. When the
Allies failed to commit to this, the Athenian fleet refused to join the Allied
navy in the spring. The navy, now under the command of the Spartan king
Leotychides, stationed itself off Delos, while the remnants of the Persian
fleet remained off Samos, both sides unwilling to risk battle. Similarly,
Mardonius remained in Thessaly, knowing an attack on the Isthmus was pointless,
while the Allies refused to send an army outside the Peloponnese. Mardonius
moved to break the stalemate by trying to win over the Athenians and their
fleet through the mediation of Alexander I of Macedon, offering peace,
self-government and territorial expansion. The Athenians made sure that a
Spartan delegation was also on hand to hear the offer, and rejected it: The
degree to which we are put in the shadow by the Medes' strength is hardly
something you need to bring to our attention. We are already well aware of it.
But even so, such is our love of liberty, that we will never surrender.Upon
this refusal, the Persians marched south again. Athens was again evacuated and
left to the enemy, leading to the second phase of the Destruction of Athens.
Mardonius now repeated his offer of peace to the Athenian refugees on Salamis.
Athens, along with Megara and Plataea, sent emissaries to Sparta demanding
assistance and threatening to accept the Persian terms if it was not given.
According to Herodotus, the Spartans, who were at that time celebrating the
festival of Hyacinthus, delayed making a decision until they were persuaded by
a guest, Chileos of Tegea, who pointed out the danger to all of Greece if the
Athenians surrendered. When the Athenian emissaries delivered an ultimatum to
the Spartans the next day, they were amazed to hear that a task force was in
fact already en route; the Spartan army was marching to meet the Persians.
Prelude:
When Mardonius learned of the Spartan force, he completed the destruction of
Athens, tearing down whatever was left standing. He then retreated towards
Thebes, hoping to lure the Greek army into territory that would be suitable for
the Persian cavalry. Mardonius created a fortified encampment on the north bank
of the Asopus river in Boeotia covering the ground from Erythrae past Hysiae
and up to the lands of Plataea. The Athenians sent 8,000 hoplites, led by
Aristides, along with 600 Plataean exiles to join the Allied army. The army
then marched in Boeotia across the passes of Mount Cithaeron, arriving near
Plataea, and above the Persian position on the Asopus. Under the guidance of
the commanding general, Pausanias, the Greeks took up position opposite the
Persian lines but remained on high ground. Knowing that he had little hope of
successfully attacking the Greek positions, Mardonius sought to either sow
dissension among the Allies or lure them down into the plain. Plutarch reports
that a conspiracy was discovered among some prominent Athenians, who were
planning to betray the Allied cause; although this account is not universally
accepted, it may indicate Mardonius' attempts of intrigue within the Greek
ranks. Mardonius also initiated hit-and-run cavalry attacks against the Greek
lines, possibly trying to lure the Greeks down to the plain in pursuit.
Although having some initial success, this strategy backfired when the Persian
cavalry commander Masistius was killed; with his death, the cavalry retreated.
Their morale boosted by this small victory, the Greeks moved forward, still
remaining on higher ground, to a new position more suited for encampment and
better watered. The Spartans and Tegeans were on a ridge to the right of the
line, the Athenians on a hillock on the left and the other contingents on the
slightly lower ground between. In response, Mardonius brought his men up to the
Asopus and arrayed them for battle; However, neither the Persians nor the
Greeks would attack; Herodotus claims this is because both sides received bad
omens during sacrificial rituals. The armies thus stayed camped in their
locations for eight days, during which new Greek troops arrived. Mardonius then
sought to break the stalemate by sending his cavalry to attack the passes of
Mount Cithaeron; this raid resulted in the capture of a convoy of provisions
intended for the Greeks. Two more days passed, during which time the supply
lines of the Greeks continued to be menaced. Mardonius then launched another
cavalry raid on the Greek lines, which succeeded in blocking the Gargaphian
Spring, which had been the only source of water for the Greek army (they could
not use the Asopus due to the threat posed by Persian archers). Coupled with
the lack of food, the restriction of the water supply made the Greek position
untenable, so they decided to retreat to a position in front of Plataea, from
where they could guard the passes and have access to fresh water. To prevent
the Persian cavalry from attacking during the retreat, it was to be performed
that night. However, the retreat went awry. The Allied contingents in the
centre missed their appointed position and ended up scattered in front of
Plataea itself. The Athenians, Tegeans and Spartans, who had been guarding the
rear of the retreat, had not even begun to retreat by daybreak. A single
Spartan division was thus left on the ridge to guard the rear, while the
Spartans and Tegeans retreated uphill; Pausanias also instructed the Athenians
to begin the retreat and if possible join up with the Spartans. However, the
Athenians at first retreated directly towards Plataea, and thus the Allied
battle line remained fragmented as the Persian camp began to stir.
Opposing Forces:
Greeks According to Herodotus, the Spartans sent 45,000 men – 5,000
Spartiates (full citizen soldiers), 5,000 other Lacodaemonian hoplites
(perioeci) and 35,000 helots (seven per Spartiate). This was probably the
largest Spartan force ever assembled. The Greek army had been reinforced by
contingents of hoplites from the other Allied city-states, as shown in the
table. Diodorus Siculus claims in his Bibliotheca historica that the number of
the Greek troops approached one hundred thousand. According to Herodotus, there
were a total of 69,500 lightly armed troops – 35,000 helots and 34,500
troops from the rest of Greece; roughly one per hoplite. The number of 34,500
has been suggested to represent one light skirmisher supporting each
non-Spartan hoplite (33,700), together with 800 Athenian archers, whose
presence in the battle Herodotus later notes. Herodotus tells us that there
were also 1,800 Thespians (but does not say how they were equipped), giving a
total strength of 108,200 men. The number of hoplites is accepted as reasonable
(and possible); the Athenians alone had fielded 10,000 hoplites at the Battle
of Marathon. Some historians have accepted the number of light troops and used
them as a population census of Greece at the time. Certainly these numbers are
theoretically possible. Athens, for instance, allegedly fielded a fleet of 180
triremes at Salamis, manned by approximately 36,000 rowers and fighters. Thus
69,500 light troops could easily have been sent to Plataea. Nevertheless, the
number of light troops is often rejected as exaggerated, especially in view of
the ratio of seven helots to one Spartiate. For instance, Lazenby accepts that
hoplites from other Greek cities might have been accompanied by one lightly
armoured retainer each, but rejects the number of seven helots per Spartiate.
He further speculates that each Spartiate was accompanied by one armed helot,
and that the remaining helots were employed in the logistical effort,
transporting food for the army. Both Lazenby and Holland deem the lightly armed
troops, whatever their number, as essentially irrelevant to the outcome of
battle.
City Number of hoplites Sparta 10,000 - Athens 8,000 - Corinth 5,000 - Megara
3,000 - Sicyon 3,000 - Tegea 1,500 - Phlius 1,000 -Troezen 1,000 - Anactorion
& Leukas 800 - Epidaurus 800 - Arcadian Orchomenans Arcadians 600 - Eretria
& Styra - 600 Plataea 600 - Aegina 500 - Ambracia 500 - Chalcis 400 -
Mycenae & Tiryns 400 - Hermione 300 - Potidaea 300 - Cephalonia 200 -
Lepreum 200 - Total 38,700
A further complication is that a certain proportion of the Allied manpower was
needed to man the fleet, which amounted to at least 110 triremes, and thus
approximately 22,000 men. Since the Battle of
Mycale was fought
at least near-simultaneously with the Battle of Plataea, then this was a pool
of manpower which could not have contributed to Plataea, and further reduces
the likelihood that 110,000 Greeks assembled before Plataea.
The Greek forces were, as agreed by the Allied congress, under the overall
command of Spartan royalty in the person of
Pausanias, who was the
regent for Leonidas' young son, Pleistarchus, his cousin. Diodorus tells us
that the Athenian contingent was under the command of Aristides; it is probable
that the other contingents also had their leaders. Herodotus tells us in
several places that the Greeks held council during the prelude to the battle,
implying that decisions were consensual and that Pausanias did not have the
authority to issue direct orders to the other contingents. This style of
leadership contributed to the way events unfolded during the battle itself. For
instance, in the period immediately before the battle, Pausanias was unable to
order the Athenians to join up with his forces, and thus the Greeks fought the
battle completely separated from each other.
Nations under the Achaemenids at Plataea -Number
Persians 40,000 - Bactrians - Indians, Sakae 20,000 - Greek allies: Boeotians
(Thebans), Locrians, Malians, Thessalians, Phocians (1000 men), - Macedonians
20,000 - Phrygians, Thracians, Mysians, Paeonians, Ethiopians, Egyptians.
Smaller contingents
Cavalry: Persians, Bactrians, Indians, Sakae 5,000
Total 100,000
According to Herodotus, the Persians numbered 300,000 and were accompanied by
troops from Greek city states that supported the Persian cause (including
Macedonia, Thessaly and Thebes). Herodotus admits that no one counted the Greek
allies of the Achaemenids, but he guesses that there were about 50,000 of them.
Mardonius' troops consisted of not only Persians and Medes, but also Bactrians,
Scythians, Indians, Boeotians, Locrians, Malians, Thessalians, Macedonians,
Thracians, and 1,000 Phocians. Herodotus described the composition of the
principal troops of Mardonius: Mardonius there chose out first all the Persians
called Immortals, save only Hydarnes their general, who said that he would not
quit the king's person; and next, the Persian cuirassiers, and the thousand
horse, and the Medes and Sacae and Bactrians and Indians, alike their footmen
and the rest of the horsemen. He chose these nations entire; of the rest of his
allies he picked out a few from each people, the goodliest men and those that
he knew to have done some good service... Thereby the whole number, with the
horsemen, grew to three hundred thousand men. —?Herodotus VIII, 113.
Diodorus Siculus claims in his Bibliotheca historica that the number of the
Persian troops was some five hundred thousand.
The figure of 300,000 has been doubted, along with many of Herodotus' numbers,
by many historians; modern consensus estimates the total number of troops for
the Persian invasion at around 250,000. According to this consensus, Herodotus'
300,000 Persians at Plataea would self-evidently be impossible. One approach to
estimating the size of the Persian army has been to estimate how many men might
feasibly have been accommodated within the Persian camp; this approach gives
figures of between 70,000 and 120,000 men. Lazenby, for instance, by comparison
with later Roman military camps, calculates the number of troops at 70,000,
including 10,000 cavalry. Meanwhile, Connolly derives a number of 120,000 from
the same-sized camp. Indeed, most estimates for the total Persian force are
generally in this range. For instance, Delbrück, based on the distance the
Persians marched in a day when Athens was attacked, concluded that 75,000 was
the upper limit for the size of the Persian army, including the supply
personnel and other non-combatants. In his battle account of Plataea,
Delbrück estimated the Persian army, including allied Greeks, as amounting
to 40,000.
Composition and order of battle:
According to modern estimates based on the order of battle described by
Herodotus, the detailed composition of the Achaemenid army consisted in about
40,000 Persian troops on the left of the battle line, facing the Spartans,
about 20,000 Bactrians, Indians and Sakae in the centre, facing various Greek
states, and about 20,000 Greek allies of the Persians (Macedonians,
Thessalians, Beotians, Thebeans), positioned on the right wing facing the
Athenians. The cavalry, which also consisted of Persians, Bactrians, Indians
and Sakae, would total about 5,000. Herodotus described in detail the
dispositions of the two armies: He posted the Persians facing the
Lacedaemonians... Next to the Persians he posted the Medes, fronting the men of
Corinth and Potidaea and Orchomenus and Sicyon; next to the Medes, the
Bactrians, fronting men of Epidaurus, Troezen, Lepreum, Tiryns, Mycenae, and
Phlius. After the Bactrians he set the Indians, fronting the men of Hermione
and Eretria and Styra and Chalcis. Next to the Indians he posted the Sacae,
fronting the Ampraciots, Anactorians, Leucadians, Paleans, and Aeginetans; next
to the Sacae, and over against the Athenians and Plataeans and Megarians, the
Boeotian and Locrians and Malians and Thessalians and the thousand that came
from Phocis... Besides these, he arrayed against the Athenians Macedonians also
and the dwellers about Thessaly. These that I have named were the greatest of
the nations set in array by Mardonius that were of most note and account; but
there was also in the army a mixed multitude of Phrygians, Thracians, Mysians,
Paeonians, and the rest, besides Ethiopians and the Egyptian swordsmen.
—?Herodotus IX-31/32.
Ctesias, who wrote a history of Persia based on Persian archives, claimed there
were 120,000 Persian and 7,000 Greek soldiers, but his account is generally
garbled (for instance, placing this battle before Salamis, he also says there
were only 300 Spartans, 1000 perioeci and 6000 from the other cities at
Plataea, perhaps confusing it with Thermopylae).
Considertions:
In some ways the run-up to Plataea resembled that at the Battle of Marathon;
there was a prolonged stalemate in which neither side risked attacking the
other. The reasons for this stalemate were primarily tactical, and similar to
the situation at Marathon; the Greek hoplites did not want to risk being
outflanked by the Persian cavalry and the lightly armed Persian infantry could
not hope to assault well-defended positions.According to Herodotus, both sides
wished for a decisive battle that would tip the war in their favor. However,
Lazenby believed that Mardonius' actions during the Plataea campaign were not
consistent with an aggressive policy. He interprets the Persian operations
during the prelude not as attempts to force the Allies into battle but as
attempts to force the Allies into retreat (which indeed became the case).
Mardonius may have felt he had little to gain in battle and that he could
simply wait for the Greek alliance to fall apart (as it had nearly done over
the winter). There can be little doubt from Herodotus' account that Mardonius
was prepared to accept battle on his own terms, however. Regardless of the
exact motives, the initial strategic situation allowed both sides to
procrastinate, since food supplies were ample for both armies. Under these
conditions, the tactical considerations outweighed the strategic need for
action. When Mardonius' raids disrupted the Allied supply chain, it forced the
Allies to rethink their strategy. Rather than now moving to attack, however,
they instead looked to retreat and secure their lines of communication. Despite
this defensive move by the Greeks, it was in fact the chaos resulting from this
retreat that finally ended the stalemate. Mardonius perceived this as a full-on
retreat, in effect thinking that the battle was already over, and sought to
pursue the Greeks. Since he did not expect the Greeks to fight, the tactical
problems were no longer an issue and he tried to take advantage of the altered
strategic situation he thought he had produced. Conversely, the Greeks had,
inadvertently, lured Mardonius into attacking them on the higher ground and,
despite being outnumbered, were thus at a tactical advantage.
Battle:
Once the Persians discovered that the Greeks had abandoned their positions and
appeared to be in retreat, Mardonius decided to set off in immediate pursuit
with the elite Persian infantry. As he did so, the rest of the Persian army,
unbidden, began to move forward. The Spartans and Tegeans had by now reached
the Temple of Demeter. The rearguard under Amompharetus began to withdraw from
the ridge, under pressure from Persian cavalry, to join them. Pausanias sent a
messenger to the Athenians, asking them to join up with the Spartans. However,
the Athenians had been engaged by the Theban phalanx and were unable to assist
Pausanias. The Spartans and Tegeans were first assaulted by the Persian
cavalry, while the Persian infantry made their way forward. They then planted
their shields and began shooting arrows at the Greeks, while the cavalry
withdrew. According to Herodotus, Pausanias refused to advance because good
omens were not divined in the goat sacrifices that were performed. At this
point, as Greek soldiers began to fall under the barrage of arrows, the Tegeans
started to run at the Persian lines. Offering one last sacrifice and a prayer
to the heavens in front of the Temple of Hera, Pausanias finally received
favourable omens and gave the command for the Spartans to advance, whereupon
they also charged the Persian lines. The numerically superior Persian infantry
were of the heavy (by Persian standards) sparabara formation, but this was
still much lighter than the Greek phalanx. The Persian defensive weapon was a
large wicker shield and they used short spears; by contrast, the hoplites were
armoured in bronze, with a bronze shield and a long spear. As shown at
Marathon, it was a severe mismatch. The fight was fierce and long, but the
Greeks (Spartans and Tegeans) continued to push into the Persian lines. The
Persians tried to break the Greeks' spears by grabbing hold of them, but the
Greeks responded by switching to swords. Mardonius was present at the scene,
riding a white horse, and surrounded by a bodyguard of 1,000 men; while he
remained, the Persians stood their ground. However, the Spartans closed in on
Mardonius and a Spartan soldier named Arimnestus killed him. According to
Plutarch, Arimnestus killed him by a blow to the head with a stone, a form of
death which had been foretold to Mardonius by an oracle; some modern historians
have called it unlikely that a Spartan would use such a weapon. With Mardonius
dead, the Persians began to flee; although his bodyguard remained, they were
annihilated. Herodotus claims that the reason for their discomfort was a lack
of armour. Quickly the rout became general, with many Persians fleeing in
disorder to their camp. However, Artabazus (who had earlier commanded the
Sieges of Olynthus and Potidea), had disagreed with Mardonius about attacking
the Greeks, and he had not fully engaged the forces under his command. As the
rout commenced, he led these men (40,000, according to Herodotus) away from the
battlefield, on the road to Thessaly, hoping to escape eventually to the
Hellespont.On the opposite side of the battlefield the Athenians had triumphed
in a tough battle against the Thebans. The other Greeks fighting for the
Persians had deliberately fought badly, according to Herodotus. The Thebans
retreated from the battle, but in a different direction from the Persians,
allowing them to escape without further losses. The Greeks, reinforced by the
contingents who had not taken part in the main battle, then stormed the Persian
camp. Although the Persians initially defended the wall vigorously, it was
eventually breached; the Persians, packed tightly together in the camp, were
slaughtered by the Greeks. Of the Persians who had retreated to the camp,
scarcely 3,000 were left alive. According to Herodotus, only 43,000 Persians
survived the battle. The number who died, of course, depends on how many there
were in the first place; there would be 257,000 dead by Herodotus' reckoning.
Herodotus claims that the Greeks as a whole lost only 159 men. Furthermore, he
claims that only Spartans, Tegeans and Athenians died, since they were the only
ones who fought. Plutarch, who had access to other sources, gives 1,360 Greek
casualties, while both Ephorus and Diodorus Siculus tally the Greek casualties
to over 10,000.
Results:
According to Herodotus, the Battle of Mycale occurred on the same afternoon as
Plataea. A Greek fleet under the Spartan king Leotychides had sailed to Samos
to challenge the remnants of the Persian fleet. The Persians, whose ships were
in a poor state of repair, had decided not to risk fighting and instead drew
their ships up on the beach at the feet of Mount Mycale in Ionia. An army of
60,000 men had been left there by Xerxes and the fleet joined with them,
building a palisade around the camp to protect the ships. However, Leotychides
decided to attack the camp with the Allied fleet's marines. Seeing the small
size of the Greek force, the Persians emerged from the camp but the Greek
hoplites again proved superior and destroyed much of the Persian force. The
ships were abandoned to the Greeks, who burned them, crippling Xerxes' sea
power and marking the ascendancy of the Greek fleet. With the twin victories of
Plataea and Mycale, the second Persian invasion of Greece was over. Moreover,
the threat of future invasion was abated; although the Greeks remained worried
that Xerxes would try again, over time it became apparent that the Persian
desire to conquer Greece was much diminished. The remnants of the Persian army,
under the command of Artabazus, tried to retreat
back to Asia Minor. Travelling through the lands of Thessaly, Macedonia and
Thrace by the shortest road, Artabazus eventually made it back to Byzantium,
though losing many men to Thracian attacks, weariness and hunger. After the
victory at Mycale, the Allied fleet sailed to the Hellespont to break down the
pontoon bridges, but found that this had already been done. The Peloponnesians
sailed home, but the Athenians remained to attack the Chersonesos, still held
by the Persians. The Persians in the region, and their allies, made for Sestos,
the strongest town in the region, and the Athenians laid siege to them there.
After a protracted siege Sestos fell to the Athenians, marking the beginning of
a new phase in the Greco-Persian Wars, the Greek counter-attack. Herodotus
ended his Histories after the Siege of Sestos. Over the next 30 years the
Greeks, primarily the Athenian-dominated Delian League, would expel (or help
expel) the Persians from Macedon, Thrace, the Aegean islands and Ionia. Peace
with Persia came in 449 with the Peace of Callias, finally ending a
half-century of warfare.
Significance:
Plataea and Mycale have great significance in ancient history as the battles
that decisively ended the second Persian invasion of Greece, thereby swinging
the balance of the Greco-Persian Wars in favour of the Greeks. They kept Persia
from conquering all of Greece, although they paid a high price by losing many
of their men. The Battle of Marathon showed that the Persians could be
defeated, and the Battle of Salamis saved Greece from immediate conquest, but
it was Plataea and Mycale that effectively ended that threat. However, neither
of these battles is nearly as well known as Thermopylae, Salamis or Marathon.
The reason for this discrepancy is not entirely clear; it might, however, be a
result of the circumstances in which the battle was fought. The fame of
Thermopylae certainly lies in the doomed heroism of the Greeks in the face of
overwhelming numbers; and Marathon and Salamis perhaps because they were both
fought against the odds, and in dire strategic situations. Conversely, the
Battles of Plataea and Mycale were both fought from a relative position of
Greek strength, and against lesser odds; the Greeks, in fact, sought out battle
on both occasions. Militarily, the major lesson of both Plataea and Mycale
(since both were fought on land) was to re-emphasise the superiority of the
hoplite over the more lightly armed Persian infantry, as had first been
demonstrated at Marathon. Taking on this lesson, after the Greco-Persian Wars
the Persian empire started recruiting and relying on Greek mercenaries. One
such mercenary expedition, the "Anabasis of the 10,000" as narrated
by Xenophon, further proved to the Greeks that the Persians were militarily
vulnerable even well within their own territory, and paved the way for the
destruction of the Persian Empire by Alexander the Great some decades later.
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