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The Battle of Thermopylae was fought in 480
between an alliance of Greek city-states, led by King Leonidas I of Sparta, and
the Achaemenid Empire of Xerxes I over the course of three days, during the
second Persian invasion of Greece. It took place simultaneously with the naval
battle at Artemisium, in August or September 480 BC, at the narrow coastal pass
of Thermopylae ("The Hot Gates"). The Persian invasion was a delayed
response to the defeat of the first Persian invasion of Greece, which had been
ended by the Athenian victory at the Battle of Marathon in 490 BC. By 480 BC
Xerxes had amassed a massive army and navy, and set out to conquer all of
Greece. The Athenian politician and general Themistocles had proposed that the
allied Greeks block the advance of the Persian army at the pass of Thermopylae,
and simultaneously block the Persian navy at the Straits of Artemisium. A Greek
force of approximately 7,000 men marched north to block the pass in the middle
of 480 BC. The Persian army, alleged by the ancient sources to have numbered
over one million, but today considered to have been much smaller (various
figures are given by scholars, ranging between about 100,000 and
150,000)[11][12] arrived at the pass in late August or early September. The
vastly outnumbered Greeks held off the Persians for seven days (including three
of battle) before the rear-guard was annihilated in one of history's most
famous last stands. During two full days of battle, the small force led by
Leonidas blocked the only road by which the massive Persian army could pass.
After the second day, a local resident named Ephialtes betrayed the Greeks by
revealing a small path used by shepherds. It led the Persians behind the Greek
lines. Leonidas, aware that his force was being outflanked, dismissed the bulk
of the Greek army and remained to guard their retreat with 300 Spartans and 700
Thespians, fighting to the death. Others also reportedly remained, including up
to 900 helots and 400 Thebans; most of these Thebans reportedly surrendered.
Themistocles was in command of the Greek Navy at Artemisium when he received
news that the Persians had taken the pass at Thermopylae. Since the Greek
strategy required both Thermopylae and Artemisium to be held, given their
losses, it was decided to withdraw to Salamis. The Persians overran Boeotia and
then captured the evacuated city of Athens. The Greek fleet—seeking a
decisive victory over the Persian armada—attacked and defeated the
invaders at the Battle of Salamis in late 480 BC. Wary of being trapped in
Europe, Xerxes withdrew with much of his army to Asia (losing most to
starvation and disease), leaving Mardonius to attempt to complete the conquest
of Greece. However, the following year saw a Greek army decisively defeat the
Persians at the Battle of Plataea, thereby ending the Persian invasion. Both
ancient and modern writers have used the Battle of Thermopylae as an example of
the power of a patriotic army defending its native soil. The performance of the
defenders is also used as an example of the advantages of training, equipment,
and good use of terrain as force multipliers and has become a symbol of courage
against overwhelming odds.
Belligerents Greek city-states Persian Empire Commanders and leaders King
Leonidas of Sparta † Demophilus † King Xerxes I of Persia Mardonius
Hydarnes II Artapanus[4] Strength Total 5,200 (or 6,100) (Herodotus) 7,400+
(Diodorus) 11,200 (Pausanias) 7,000 (modern est.)[5][6] 2,641,610
(Herodotus)[7] 70,000–300,000 (modern est.)[8][b][9] Casualties and losses
4,000 (Herodotus)[10] c. 20,000 (Herodotus)[5]
Background Main articles: Greco-Persian Wars and Second Persian invasion of
Greece A map of almost all the parts of the Greek world that partook in the
Persian Wars The Greek city-states of Athens and Eretria had aided the
unsuccessful Ionian Revolt against the Persian Empire of Darius I in
499–494 BC. The Persian Empire was still relatively young and prone to
revolts amongst its subject peoples.[23][24] Darius, moreover, was a usurper
and had spent considerable time extinguishing revolts against his rule.[23] The
Ionian revolt threatened the integrity of his empire, and Darius thus vowed to
punish those involved, especially the Athenians, "since he was sure that
[the Ionians] would not go unpunished for their rebellion".[25] Darius
also saw the opportunity to expand his empire into the fractious world of
Ancient Greece.[26] A preliminary expedition under Mardonius in 492 BC, secured
the lands approaching Greece, re-conquered Thrace and forced Macedon to become
a client kingdom of Persia's.[27] The Spartans throw Persian envoys into a well
Darius sent emissaries to all the Greek city-states in 491 BC asking for a gift
of "earth and water" as tokens of their submission to him.[28] Having
had a demonstration of his power the previous year, the majority of Greek
cities duly obliged. In Athens, however, the ambassadors were put on trial and
then executed by throwing them in a pit; in Sparta, they were simply thrown
down a well.[28][29] This meant that Sparta was also effectively at war with
Persia.[28] However, in order to appease the Achaemenid king somewhat, two
Spartans were voluntarily sent to Susa for execution, in atonement for the
death of the Persian heralds.[30] Darius thus put together an amphibious task
force under Datis and Artaphernes in 490 BC, which attacked Naxos, before
receiving the submission of the other Cycladic Islands. The task force then
moved on Eretria, which it besieged and destroyed.[31] Finally, it moved to
attack Athens, landing at the bay of Marathon, where it was met by a heavily
outnumbered Athenian army. At the ensuing Battle of Marathon, the Athenians won
a remarkable victory, which resulted in the withdrawal of the Persian army to
Asia.[32] The site of the battle today. Mount Kallidromon on the left, and the
wide coastal plain formed by accretion of fluvial deposits over the centuries;
the road to the right approximates the 480 BC shoreline. Darius, therefore,
began raising a huge new army with which he meant to completely subjugate
Greece; however, in 486 BC, his Egyptian subjects revolted, indefinitely
postponing any Greek expedition.[24] Darius then died whilst preparing to march
on Egypt, and the throne of Persia passed to his son Xerxes I.[33] Xerxes
crushed the Egyptian revolt and very quickly restarted the preparations for the
invasion of Greece.[34] Since this was to be a full-scale invasion, it required
long-term planning, stockpiling, and conscription.[34] Xerxes decided that the
Hellespont would be bridged to allow his army to cross to Europe, and that a
canal should be dug across the isthmus of Mount Athos (rounding which headland,
a Persian fleet had been destroyed in 492 BC).[35] These were both feats of
exceptional ambition, which would have been beyond any other contemporary
state.[35] By early 480 BC, the preparations were complete, and the army which
Xerxes had mustered at Sardis marched towards Europe, crossing the Hellespont
on two pontoon bridges.[36] According to Herodotus, Xerxes' army was so large
that, upon arriving at the banks of the Echeidorus River, his soldiers
proceeded to drink it dry. In the face of such imposing numbers, many Greek
cities capitulated to the Persian demand for a tribute of earth and water.[37]
The Athenians had also been preparing for war with the Persians since the
mid-480s BC, and in 482 BC the decision was taken, under the guidance of the
Athenian politician Themistocles, to build a massive fleet of triremes that
would be essential for the Greeks to fight the Persians.[38] However, the
Athenians lacked the manpower to fight on both land and sea; therefore,
combating the Persians would require an alliance of Greek city-states. In 481
BC, Xerxes sent ambassadors around Greece requesting "earth and
water" but very deliberately omitting Athens and Sparta.[39] Support thus
began to coalesce around these two leading states. A congress of city-states
met at Corinth in late autumn of 481 BC,[40] and a confederate alliance of
Greek city-states was formed. It had the power to send envoys to request
assistance and dispatch troops from the member states to defensive points,
after joint consultation. This was remarkable for the disjointed and chaotic
Greek world, especially since many of the city-states in attendance were still
technically at war with each other.[41] The "congress" met again in
the spring of 480 BC. A Thessalian delegation suggested that the Greeks could
muster in the narrow Vale of Tempe, on the borders of Thessaly, and thereby
block Xerxes' advance.[42] A force of 10,000 hoplites was dispatched to the
Vale of Tempe, through which they believed the Persian army would have to pass.
However, once there, being warned by Alexander I of Macedon that the vale could
be bypassed through Sarantoporo Pass and that Xerxes' army was overwhelming,
the Greeks retreated.[43] Shortly afterwards, they received the news that
Xerxes had crossed the Hellespont.[42] Themistocles, therefore, suggested a
second strategy to the Greeks: the route to southern Greece (Boeotia, Attica,
and the Peloponnesus) would require Xerxes' army to travel through the very
narrow pass of Thermopylae, which could easily be blocked by the Greek
hoplites, despite the overwhelming numbers of Persians.[44] Furthermore, to
prevent the Persians from bypassing Thermopylae by sea, the Athenian and allied
navies could block the straits of Artemisium. Congress adopted this
dual-pronged strategy.[44] However, the Peloponnesian cities made fall-back
plans to defend the Isthmus of Corinth, should it come to that, whilst the
women and children of Athens would evacuate en masse to the Peloponnesian city
of Troezen.[45]
Prelude Map showing Greek and Persian advances to Thermopylae and Artemisium
The Persian army seems to have made slow progress through Thrace and Macedon.
News of the imminent Persian approach eventually reached Greece in August
thanks to a Greek spy.[46] At this time of year the Spartans, de facto military
leaders of the alliance, were celebrating the festival of Carneia. During the
Carneia, military activity was forbidden by Spartan law; the Spartans had
arrived too late at the Battle of Marathon because of this requirement.[47] It
was also the time of the Olympic Games, and therefore the Olympic truce, and
thus it would have been doubly sacrilegious for the whole Spartan army to march
to war.[47][48] On this occasion, the ephors decided the urgency was
sufficiently great to justify an advance expedition to block the pass, under
one of its kings, Leonidas I. Leonidas took with him the 300 men of the royal
bodyguard, the Hippeis.[49] This expedition was to try to gather as many other
Greek soldiers along the way as possible and to await the arrival of the main
Spartan army.[48] The legend of Thermopylae, as told by Herodotus, has it that
the Spartans had consulted the Oracle at Delphi earlier in the year. The Oracle
is said to have made the following prophecy: O ye men who dwell in the streets
of broad Lacedaemon! Honor the festival of the Carneia!! Otherwise, Either your
glorious town shall be sacked by the children of Perseus, Or, in exchange, must
all through the whole Laconian country Mourn for the loss of a king, descendant
of great Heracles.[50] Herodotus tells us that Leonidas, in line with the
prophecy, was convinced he was going to certain death since his forces were not
adequate for a victory, and so he selected only Spartans with living sons.[49]
The Spartan force was reinforced en route to Thermopylae by contingents from
various cities and numbered more than 7,000 by the time it arrived at the
pass.[51] Leonidas chose to camp at, and defend, the "middle gate",
the narrowest part of the pass of Thermopylae, where the Phocians had built a
defensive wall some time before.[52] News also reached Leonidas, from the
nearby city of Trachis, that there was a mountain track that could be used to
outflank the pass of Thermopylae. Leonidas stationed 1,000 Phocians on the
heights to prevent such a manoeuvre.[53]
Finally, in mid-August, the Persian army was sighted across the Malian Gulf
approaching Thermopylae.[54] With the Persian army's arrival at Thermopylae the
Greeks held a council of war.[55] Some Peloponnesians suggested withdrawal to
the Isthmus of Corinth and blocking the passage to Peloponnesus.[55] The
Phocians and Locrians, whose states were located nearby, became indignant and
advised defending Thermopylae and sending for more help. Leonidas calmed the
panic and agreed to defend Thermopylae.[55] According to Plutarch, when one of
the soldiers complained that, "Because of the arrows of the barbarians it
is impossible to see the sun", Leonidas replied, "Won't it be nice,
then, if we shall have shade in which to fight them?"[56] Herodotus
reports a similar comment, but attributes it to Dienekes.[57] Xerxes sent a
Persian emissary to negotiate with Leonidas. The Greeks were offered their
freedom, the title "Friends of the Persian People", and the
opportunity to re-settle on land better than that they possessed.[58] When
Leonidas refused these terms, the ambassador carried a written message by
Xerxes, asking him to "Hand over your arms". Leonidas' famous
response to the Persians was "Mol?n labé" (????? ?aß? -
literally, "having come, take [them]", but usually translated as
"come and take them").[59] With the Persian emissary returning
empty-handed, battle became inevitable. Xerxes delayed for four days, waiting
for the Greeks to disperse, before sending troops to attack them.[60]
Opposing forces Persian army For a full discussion of the size of the Persian
invasion force, see Second Persian invasion of Greece § Size of the
Persian forces. Soldiers of the Achaemenid army of Xerxes I at the time of the
Battle of Thermopylae. Tomb of Xerxes I, circa 480 BC, Naqsh-e Rustam .[61][62]
Top rank: Persian, Median, Elamite, Parthian, Arian, Bactrian, Sogdian,
Chorasmian, Zarangian, Sattagydian, Gandharan, Hindush (Indians), Scythian.
Bottom rank: Scythian, Babylonian, Assyrian, Arabian, Egyptian, Armenian,
Cappadocian, Lydian, Ionian, Scythian, Thracian, Macedonian, Libyan, Ethiopian.
The number of troops which Xerxes mustered for the second invasion of Greece
has been the subject of endless dispute, most notably between ancient sources,
which report very large numbers, and modern scholars, who surmise much smaller
figures. Herodotus claimed that there were, in total, 2.6 million military
personnel, accompanied by an equivalent number of support personnel.[63] The
poet Simonides, who was a near-contemporary, talks of four million; Ctesias
gave 800,000 as the total number of the army that was assembled by Xerxes.[4]
Modern scholars tend to reject the figures given by Herodotus and other ancient
sources as unrealistic, resulting from miscalculations or exaggerations on the
part of the victors.[64] Modern scholarly estimates are generally in the range
120,000–300,000.[65][b] These estimates usually come from studying the
logistical capabilities of the Persians in that era, the sustainability of
their respective bases of operations, and the overall manpower constraints
affecting them. Whatever the real numbers were, however, it is clear that
Xerxes was anxious to ensure a successful expedition by mustering an
overwhelming numerical superiority by land and by sea.[66] The number of
Persian troops present at Thermopylae is therefore as uncertain as the number
for the total invasion force. For instance, it is unclear whether the whole
Persian army marched as far as Thermopylae, or whether Xerxes left garrisons in
Macedon and Thessaly. Greek army.
Greek army According to Herodotus[51][67] and Diodorus Siculus,[68] the Greek
army included the following forces: Group Number – Herodotus Numbers
– Diodorus Siculus Lacedaemonians/ Perioeci 900?[69] 700 or 1,000 Spartan
hoplites 300[69] 300 Mantineans 500 3,000 (other Peloponnesians sent with
Leonidas) Tegeans 500 Arcadian Orchomenos 120 Other Arcadians 1,000 Corinthians
400 Phlians 200 Mycenaeans 80 Total Peloponnesians 3,100[51] or 4,000[70] 4,000
or 4,300 Thespians 700 – Malians – 1,000 Thebans 400 400 Phocians
1,000 1,000 Opuntian Locrians "All they had" 1,000 Grand total 5,200
(or 6,100) plus the Opuntian Locrians 7,400 (or 7,700) Notes:
Notes: The number of Peloponnesians 5th century hoplite. Diodorus suggests that
there were 1,000 Lacedemonians and 3,000 other Peloponnesians, totalling 4,000.
Herodotus agrees with this figure in one passage, quoting an inscription by
Simonides saying there were 4,000 Peloponnesians.[70] However, elsewhere, in
the passage summarized by the above table, Herodotus tallies 3,100
Peloponnesians at Thermopylae before the battle.[51] Herodotus also reports
that at Xerxes' public showing of the dead, "helots were also there for
them to see",[71] but he does not say how many or in what capacity they
served. Thus, the difference between his two figures can be squared by
supposing (without proof) that there were 900 helots (three per Spartan)
present at the battle.[69] If helots were present at the battle, there is no
reason to doubt that they served in their traditional role as armed retainers
to individual Spartans. Alternatively, Herodotus' "missing" 900
troops might have been Perioeci, and could therefore correspond to Diodorus'
1,000 Lacedemonians.[69] The number of Lacedemonians Further confusing the
issue is Diodorus' ambiguity about whether his count of 1,000 Lacedemonians
included the 300 Spartans. At one point he says: "Leonidas, when he
received the appointment, announced that only one thousand men should follow
him on the campaign".[68] However, he then says: "There were, then,
of the Lacedemonians one thousand, and with them three hundred
Spartiates".[68] It is therefore impossible to be clearer on this point.
Pausanias' account agrees with that of Herodotus (whom he probably read) except
that he gives the number of Locrians, which Herodotus declined to estimate.
Residing in the direct path of the Persian advance, they gave all the fighting
men they had - according to Pausanias 6,000 men - which added to Herodotus'
5,200 would have given a force of 11,200.[72] Many modern historians, who
usually consider Herodotus more reliable,[73] add the 1,000 Lacedemonians and
the 900 helots to Herodotus' 5,200 to obtain 7,100 or about 7,000 men as a
standard number, neglecting Diodorus' Melians and Pausanias' Locrians.[74][75]
However, this is only one approach, and many other combinations are plausible.
Furthermore, the numbers changed later on in the battle when most of the army
retreated and only approximately 3,000 men remained (300 Spartans, 700
Thespians, 400 Thebans, possibly up to 900 helots, and 1,000 Phocians stationed
above the pass, less the casualties sustained in the previous days).[73]
Strategic and tactical considerations A flow map of the battle From a strategic
point of view, by defending Thermopylae, the Greeks were making the best
possible use of their forces.[76] As long as they could prevent a further
Persian advance into Greece, they had no need to seek a decisive battle and
could, thus, remain on the defensive. Moreover, by defending two constricted
passages (Thermopylae and Artemisium), the Greeks' inferior numbers became less
of a factor.[76] Conversely, for the Persians the problem of supplying such a
large army meant they could not remain in the same place for very long.[77] The
Persians, therefore, had to retreat or advance, and advancing required forcing
the pass of Thermopylae.[77] Tactically, the pass at Thermopylae was ideally
suited to the Greek style of warfare.[76] A hoplite phalanx could block the
narrow pass with ease, with no risk of being outflanked by cavalry. Moreover,
in the pass, the phalanx would have been very difficult to assault for the more
lightly armed Persian infantry.[76] The major weak point for the Greeks was the
mountain track which led across the highland parallel to Thermopylae, that
could allow their position to be outflanked. Although probably unsuitable for
cavalry, this path could easily be traversed by the Persian infantry (many of
whom were versed in mountain warfare).[78] Leonidas was made aware of this path
by local people from Trachis, and he positioned a detachment of Phocian troops
there in order to block this route.[79] Topography of the battlefield Map of
Thermopylae area with reconstructed shoreline of 480 BC. It is often claimed
that at the time, the pass of Thermopylae consisted of a track along the shore
of the Malian Gulf so narrow that only one chariot could pass through at a
time.[52] In fact, as noted below, the pass was 100 metres wide, probably wider
than the Greeks could have held against the Persian masses. Herodotus reports
that the Phocians had improved the defences of the pass by channelling the
stream from the hot springs to create a marsh, and it was a causeway across
this marsh which was only wide enough for a single chariot to traverse. In a
later passage, describing a Gaulish attempt to force the pass, Pausanias states
"The cavalry on both sides proved useless, as the ground at the Pass is
not only narrow, but also smooth because of the natural rock, while most of it
is slippery owing to its being covered with streams...the losses of the
barbarians it was impossible to discover exactly. For the number of them that
disappeared beneath the mud was great."[80] It is also said that on the
southern side of the track stood cliffs that overlooked the pass. However, a
glance at any photograph of the pass shows there are no cliffs, only steep
slopes covered in thorny bushes and trees. Although no obstacle to individuals,
such terrain would not be passable by an army and its baggage train.[citation
needed] On the north side of the roadway was the Malian Gulf, into which the
land shelved gently. When at a later date, an army of Gauls led by Brennus
attempted to force the pass, the shallowness of the water gave the Greek fleet
great difficulty getting close enough to the fighting to bombard the Gauls with
ship-borne missile weapons. Along the path itself was a series of three
constrictions, or "gates" (pylai), and at the centre gate a wall that
had been erected by the Phocians, in the previous century, to aid in their
defence against Thessalian invasions.[52] The name "Hot Gates" comes
from the hot springs that were located there.[81] The terrain of the
battlefield was nothing that Xerxes and his forces were accustomed to. Although
coming from a mountainous country, the Persians were not prepared for the real
nature of the country they had invaded. The pure ruggedness of this area is
caused by torrential downpours for four months of the year, combined with an
intense summer season of scorching heat that cracks the ground. Vegetation is
scarce and consists of low, thorny shrubs. The hillsides along the pass are
covered in thick brush, with some plants reaching 10 feet (3.0 m) high. With
the sea on one side and steep, impassable hills on the other, King Leonidas and
his men chose the perfect topographical position to battle the Persian
invaders.[82] Today, the pass is not near the sea, but is several kilometres
inland because of sedimentation in the Malian Gulf. The old track appears at
the foot of the hills around the plain, flanked by a modern road. Recent core
samples indicate that the pass was only 100 metres (330 ft) wide, and the
waters came up to the gates: "Little do the visitors realize that the
battle took place across the road from the monument."[83] The pass still
is a natural defensive position to modern armies, and British Commonwealth
forces in World War II made a defence in 1941 against the Nazi invasion mere
metres from the original battlefield.[84]
Battle First day Contemporary depictions: probable Spartan hoplite (Vix crater,
c.500 BC),[88] and Scythian warrior of the Achaemenid army[61][89] (tomb of
Xerxes I, c.480 BC), at the time of the Second Persian invasion of Greece
(480–479 BC). On the fifth day after the Persian arrival at Thermopylae
and the first day of the battle, Xerxes finally resolved to attack the Greeks.
First, he ordered 5,000 archers to shoot a barrage of arrows, but they were
ineffective; they shot from at least 100 yards away, according to modern day
scholars, and the Greeks' wooden shields (sometimes covered with a very thin
layer of bronze) and bronze helmets deflected the arrows.[90] After that,
Xerxes sent a force of 10,000 Medes and Cissians to take the defenders prisoner
and bring them before him.[60][91] The Persians soon launched a frontal
assault, in waves of around 10,000 men, on the Greek position.[60] The Greeks
fought in front of the Phocian wall, at the narrowest part of the pass, which
enabled them to use as few soldiers as possible.[92][93] Details of the tactics
are scant; Diodorus says, "the men stood shoulder to shoulder", and
the Greeks were "superior in valour and in the great size of their
shields."[94] This probably describes the standard Greek phalanx, in which
the men formed a wall of overlapping shields and layered spear points
protruding out from the sides of the shields, which would have been highly
effective as long as it spanned the width of the pass.[95] The weaker shields,
and shorter spears and swords of the Persians prevented them from effectively
engaging the Greek hoplites.[94][96] Herodotus says that the units for each
city were kept together; units were rotated in and out of the battle to prevent
fatigue, which implies the Greeks had more men than necessary to block the
pass.[97] The Greeks killed so many Medes that Xerxes is said to have stood up
three times from the seat from which he was watching the battle.[98] According
to Ctesias, the first wave was "cut to ribbons", with only two or
three Spartans killed in return.[4] According to Herodotus and Diodorus, the
king, having taken the measure of the enemy, threw his best troops into a
second assault the same day, the Immortals, an elite corps of 10,000
men.[94][96] However, the Immortals fared no better than the Medes, and failed
to make any headway against the Greeks.[96] The Spartans apparently used a
tactic of feigning retreat, and then turning and killing the enemy troops when
they ran after them.[96] Second day The flank exposed by Ephialtes On the
second day, Xerxes again sent in the infantry to attack the pass,
"supposing that their enemies, being so few, were now disabled by wounds
and could no longer resist."[98] However, the Persians had no more success
on the second day than on the first.[98] Xerxes at last stopped the assault and
withdrew to his camp, "totally perplexed".[4] Later that day,
however, as the Persian king was pondering what to do next, he received a
windfall; a Trachinian named Ephialtes informed him of the mountain path around
Thermopylae and offered to guide the Persian army.[99] Ephialtes was motivated
by the desire for a reward.[99] For this act, the name "Ephialtes"
received a lasting stigma; it came to mean "nightmare" in the Greek
language and to symbolize the archetypal traitor in Greek culture.[100]
Herodotus reports that Xerxes sent his commander Hydarnes that evening, with
the men under his command, the Immortals, to encircle the Greeks via the path.
However, he does not say who those men were.[101] The Immortals had been
bloodied on the first day, so it is possible that Hydarnes may have been given
overall command of an enhanced force including what was left of the Immortals;
according to Diodorus, Hydarnes had a force of 20,000 for the mission.[102] The
path led from east of the Persian camp along the ridge of Mt. Anopaea behind
the cliffs that flanked the pass. It branched, with one path leading to Phocis
and the other down to the Malian Gulf at Alpenus, the first town of Locris.[53]
Third day
Third day Leonidas at Thermopylae, by Jacques-Louis David, 1814. This is a
juxtaposition of various historical and legendary elements from the Battle of
Thermopylae. At daybreak on the third day, the Phocians guarding the path above
Thermopylae became aware of the outflanking Persian column by the rustling of
oak leaves. Herodotus says they jumped up and were greatly amazed.[103]
Hydarnes was perhaps just as amazed to see them hastily arming themselves as
they were to see him and his forces.[104] He feared they were Spartans but was
informed by Ephialtes that they were not.[103] The Phocians retreated to a
nearby hill to make their stand (assuming the Persians had come to attack
them).[103] However, not wishing to be delayed, the Persians merely shot a
volley of arrows at them, before bypassing them to continue with their
encirclement of the main Greek force.[103] Learning from a runner that the
Phocians had not held the path, Leonidas called a council of war at dawn.[105]
According to Diodorus, a Persian called Tyrrhastiadas, a Cymaean by birth,
warned the Greeks.[106] Some of the Greeks argued for withdrawal, but Leonidas
resolved to stay at the pass with the Spartans.[105] Upon discovering that his
army had been encircled, Leonidas told his allies that they could leave if they
wanted to. While many of the Greeks took him up on his offer and fled, around
two thousand soldiers stayed behind to fight and die. Knowing that the end was
near, the Greeks marched into the open field and met the Persians head-on. Many
of the Greek contingents then either chose to withdraw (without orders) or were
ordered to leave by Leonidas (Herodotus admits that there is some doubt about
which actually happened).[105][107] The contingent of 700 Thespians, led by
their general Demophilus, refused to leave and committed themselves to the
fight.[108] Also present were the 400 Thebans and probably the helots who had
accompanied the Spartans.[104] Leonidas' actions have been the subject of much
discussion. It is commonly stated that the Spartans were obeying the laws of
Sparta by not retreating. It has also been proposed that the failure to retreat
from Thermopylae gave rise to the notion that Spartans never retreated.[109] It
has also been suggested that Leonidas, recalling the words of the Oracle, was
committed to sacrificing his life in order to save Sparta.[109] The most likely
theory is that Leonidas chose to form a rearguard so that the other Greek
contingents could get away.[109][110] If all the troops had retreated, the open
ground beyond the pass would have allowed the Persian cavalry to run the Greeks
down. If they had all remained at the pass, they would have been encircled and
would eventually have all been killed.[104] By covering the retreat and
continuing to block the pass, Leonidas could save more than 3,000 men, who
would be able to fight again.[110] The Thebans have also been the subject of
some discussion. Herodotus suggests they were brought to the battle as hostages
to ensure the good behavior of Thebes.[49] However, as Plutarch long ago
pointed out, if they were hostages, why not send them away with the rest of the
Greeks?[109] The likelihood is that these were the Theban
"loyalists", who unlike the majority of their fellow citizens,
objected to Persian domination.[109] They thus probably came to Thermopylae of
their own free will and stayed to the end because they could not return to
Thebes if the Persians conquered Boeotia.[104] The Thespians, resolved as they
were not to submit to Xerxes, faced the destruction of their city if the
Persians took Boeotia.[109] However, this alone does not explain the fact that
they remained; the remainder of Thespiae was successfully evacuated before the
Persians arrived there.[109] It seems that the Thespians volunteered to remain
as a simple act of self-sacrifice, all the more amazing since their contingent
represented every single hoplite the city could muster.[111] This seems to have
been a particularly Thespian trait – on at least two other occasions in
later history, a Thespian force would commit itself to a fight to the
death.[109]
At dawn, Xerxes made libations, pausing to allow the Immortals sufficient time
to descend the mountain, and then began his advance.[93] A Persian force of
10,000 men, comprising light infantry and cavalry, charged at the front of the
Greek formation. The Greeks this time sallied forth from the wall to meet the
Persians in the wider part of the pass, in an attempt to slaughter as many
Persians as they could.[93] They fought with spears, until every spear was
shattered, and then switched to xiphe (short swords).[112] In this struggle,
Herodotus states that two of Xerxes' brothers fell: Abrocomes and
Hyperanthes.[112] Leonidas also died in the assault, shot down by Persian
archers, and the two sides fought over his body; the Greeks took
possession.[112] As the Immortals approached, the Greeks withdrew and took a
stand on a hill behind the wall.[113] The Thebans "moved away from their
companions, and with hands upraised, advanced toward the barbarians..."
(Rawlinson translation), but a few were slain before their surrender was
accepted.[113] The king later had the Theban prisoners branded with the royal
mark.[114] Of the remaining defenders, Herodotus says: Crown-wearing Achaemenid
king killing a Greek hoplite. Impression from a cylinder seal, sculpted circa
500 BC–475 BC, at the time of Xerxes I. Metropolitan Museum of Art.
"Here they defended themselves to the last, those who still had swords
using them, and the others resisting with their hands and teeth."[113]
Tearing down part of the wall, Xerxes ordered the hill surrounded, and the
Persians rained down arrows until every last Greek was dead.[113] In 1939,
archaeologist Spyridon Marinatos, excavating at Thermopylae, found large
numbers of Persian bronze arrowheads on Kolonos Hill, which changed the
identification of the hill on which the Greeks were thought to have died from a
smaller one nearer the wall.[115] The pass at Thermopylae was thus opened to
the Persian army, according to Herodotus, at the cost to the Persians of up to
20,000 fatalities.[116] The Greek rearguard, meanwhile, was annihilated, with a
probable loss of 2,000 men, including those killed on the first two days of
battle.[117] Herodotus says, at one point 4,000 Greeks died, but assuming the
Phocians guarding the track were not killed during the battle (as Herodotus
implies), this would be almost every Greek soldier present (by Herodotus' own
estimates), and this number is probably too high.[118]
Aftermath Main articles: Second Persian invasion of Greece and Achaemenid
destruction of Athens A Persian soldier at the time of the Second Achaemenid
invasion of Greece. When the Persians recovered Leonidas' body, Xerxes, in a
rage, ordered that the body be decapitated and crucified. Herodotus observes
this was very uncommon for the Persians, as they traditionally treated
"valiant warriors" with great honour (the example of Pytheas,
captured off Skiathos before the Battle of Artemisium, strengthens this
suggestion).[113][119] However, Xerxes was known for his rage. Legend has it
that he had the very water of the Hellespont whipped because it would not obey
him.[36] After the Persians' departure, the Greeks collected their dead and
buried them on the hill. After the Persian invasion was repulsed, a stone lion
was erected at Thermopylae to commemorate Leonidas.[120] A full 40 years after
the battle, Leonidas' bones were returned to Sparta, where he was buried again
with full honours; funeral games were held every year in his memory.[112][121]
With Thermopylae now opened to the Persian army, the continuation of the
blockade at Artemisium by the Greek fleet became irrelevant. The simultaneous
naval Battle of Artemisium had been a tactical stalemate, and the Greek navy
was able to retreat in good order to the Saronic Gulf, where they helped to
ferry the remaining Athenian citizens to the island of Salamis.[110] The
Capture of the Acropolis and the destruction of Athens by the Achaemenids,
following the battle of Thermopylae. Following Thermopylae, the Persian army
proceeded to sack and burn Plataea and Thespiae, the Boeotian cities that had
not submitted, before it marched on the now evacuated city of Athens and
accomplished the Achaemenid destruction of Athens.[122] Meanwhile, the Greeks
(for the most part Peloponnesians) preparing to defend the Isthmus of Corinth,
demolished the single road that led through it and built a wall across it.[123]
As at Thermopylae, making this an effective strategy required the Greek navy to
stage a simultaneous blockade, barring the passage of the Persian navy across
the Saronic Gulf, so that troops could not be landed directly on the
Peloponnese.[124] However, instead of a mere blockade, Themistocles persuaded
the Greeks to seek a decisive victory against the Persian fleet. Luring the
Persian navy into the Straits of Salamis, the Greek fleet was able to destroy
much of the Persian fleet in the Battle of Salamis, which essentially ended the
threat to the Peloponnese.[125] Fearing the Greeks might attack the bridges
across the Hellespont and trap his army in Europe, Xerxes now retreated with
much of the Persian army back to Asia,[126] though nearly all of them died of
starvation and disease on the return voyage.[127] He left a hand-picked force,
under Mardonius, to complete the conquest the following year.[128] However,
under pressure from the Athenians, the Peloponnesians eventually agreed to try
to force Mardonius to battle, and they marched on Attica.[129] Mardonius
retreated to Boeotia to lure the Greeks into open terrain, and the two sides
eventually met near the city of Plataea.[129] At the Battle of Plataea, the
Greek army won a decisive victory, destroying much of the Persian army and
ending the invasion of Greece.[129] Meanwhile, at the near-simultaneous naval
Battle of Mycale, they also destroyed much of the remaining Persian fleet,
thereby reducing the threat of further invasions.[130]
Thermopylae is arguably the most famous battle in European ancient history,
repeatedly referenced in ancient, recent, and contemporary culture. In Western
culture at least, it is the Greeks who are lauded for their performance in
battle.[132] However, within the context of the Persian invasion, Thermopylae
was undoubtedly a defeat for the Greeks.[133] It seems clear that the Greek
strategy was to hold off the Persians at Thermopylae and Artemisium;[76]
whatever they may have intended, it was presumably not their desire to
surrender all of Boeotia and Attica to the Persians.[76] The Greek position at
Thermopylae, despite being massively outnumbered, was nearly impregnable.[110]
If the position had been held for even a little longer, the Persians might have
had to retreat for lack of food and water.[77] Thus, despite the heavy losses,
forcing the pass was strategically a Persian victory,[110] but the successful
retreat of the bulk of the Greek troops was in its own sense a victory as well.
The battle itself had shown that even when heavily outnumbered, the Greeks
could put up an effective fight against the Persians, and the defeat at
Thermopylae had turned Leonidas and the men under his command into martyrs.
That boosted the morale of all Greek soldiers in the second Persian
invasion.[110] It is sometimes stated that Thermopylae was a Pyrrhic victory
for the Persians[134][135] (i.e., one in which the victor is as damaged by the
battle as the defeated party). However, there is no suggestion by Herodotus
that the effect on the Persian forces was that. The idea ignores the fact that
the Persians would, in the aftermath of Thermopylae, conquer the majority of
Greece,[136] and the fact that they were still fighting in Greece a year
later.[137] Alternatively, the argument is sometimes advanced that the last
stand at Thermopylae was a successful delaying action that gave the Greek navy
time to prepare for the Battle of Salamis.[c] However, compared to the probable
time (about one month) between Thermopylae and Salamis, the time bought was
negligible.[138] Furthermore, this idea also neglects the fact that a Greek
navy was fighting at Artemisium during the Battle of Thermopylae, incurring
losses in the process.[139] George Cawkwell suggests that the gap between
Thermopylae and Salamis was caused by Xerxes' systematically reducing Greek
opposition in Phocis and Boeotia, and not as a result of the Battle of
Thermopylae; thus, as a delaying action, Thermopylae was insignificant compared
to Xerxes' own procrastination.[136] Far from labelling Thermopylae as a
Pyrrhic victory, modern academic treatises on the Greco-Persian Wars tend to
emphasise the success of Xerxes in breaching the formidable Greek position and
the subsequent conquest of the majority of Greece. For instance, Cawkwell
states: "he was successful on both land and sea, and the Great Invasion
began with a brilliant success. ... Xerxes had every reason to congratulate
himself",[140] while Lazenby describes the Greek defeat as
"disastrous".[133] The fame of Thermopylae is thus principally
derived not from its effect on the outcome of the war but for the inspirational
example it set.[138][141] Thermopylae is famous because of the heroism of the
doomed rearguard, who, despite facing certain death, remained at the pass.[132]
Ever since, the events of Thermopylae have been the source of effusive praise
from many sources: "Salamis, Plataea, Mycale and Sicily are the fairest
sister-victories which the Sun has ever seen, yet they would never dare to
compare their combined glory with the glorious defeat of King Leonidas and his
men".[142] A second reason is the example it set of free men, fighting for
their country and their freedom: So almost immediately, contemporary Greeks saw
Thermopylae as a critical moral and culture lesson. In universal terms, a
small, free people had willingly outfought huge numbers of imperial subjects
who advanced under the lash. More specifically, the Western idea that soldiers
themselves decide where, how, and against whom they will fight was contrasted
against the Eastern notion of despotism and monarchy—freedom proving the
stronger idea as the more courageous fighting of the Greeks at Thermopylae, and
their later victories at Salamis and Plataea attested.[143] While this paradigm
of "free men" outfighting "slaves" can be seen as a rather
sweeping over-generalization (there are many counter-examples), it is
nevertheless true that many commentators have used Thermopylae to illustrate
this point.[76]
Militarily, although the battle was actually not decisive in the context of the
Persian invasion, Thermopylae is of some significance on the basis of the first
two days of fighting. The performance of the defenders is used as an example of
the advantages of training, equipment, and good use of terrain as force
multipliers.[144]
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