| |
The Battle of Naupactus was a naval battle in
the Peloponnesian War. The battle, which took place a week after the Athenian
victory at Rhium, set an Athenian fleet of
twenty ships, commanded by Phormio, against a Peloponnesian
fleet of seventy-seven ships, commanded by Cnemus. In the battle, the
Peloponnesians drew the Athenians out from their anchorage at Antirrhium by
sailing into the Gulf of Corinth, moving as if to attack the vital Athenian
base at Naupactus. The Athenians were forced to shadow their movements, sailing
eastward along the northern shore of the gulf. Attacking suddenly, the
Peloponnesians drove nine Athenian ships ashore and pursued the others towards
Naupactus; victory seemed securely in their hands. At the entrance to the
harbor of Naupactus, however, the last Athenian ship to reach the harbor turned
the tide by circling around an anchored merchant ship to ram and sink its
leading pursuer. Confusion set in among the Peloponnesians, and the newly
emboldened Athenians set out after them and routed them. In all, the Athenians
recaptured all but one of their nine grounded ships and seized six
Peloponnesian ships. This surprising victory preserved Athens' naval dominance
and kept Naupactus secure; the arrival of an additional twenty Athenian ships
shortly afterwards secured the victory and put an end to Sparta's attempt to
take the offensive in the Northwest
Opponents: Athens versus Peloponnesians (League of Corinth, Sparta)
Commanders and leaders:
Athenians - Phormio
Peloponnesians -Cnemus, Brasidas, Timocrates †, Lycophron, Machaon,
Isocrates, Agatharchidas
Strength:
Athenians - 20 ships
Peloponnesians - 77 ships
Casualties and losses:
Athenians - 1 ship captured
Peloponnesians - At least 1 ship sunk, 6 ships captured
Prelude:
In 429 the Spartan government had ordered the navarch Cnemus to launch an
offensive in the Corinthian gulf and northwestern Greece aimed at knocking
several Athenian allies out of the Peloponnesian War. Ideally, the Spartans
hoped to capture the Athenian base at Naupactus, from which the Athenians had
been harassing Corinthian shipping. That offensive, however, suffered a severe
setback when Cnemus was turned back on land by the Acarnanians at Stratus,
while a Peloponnesian fleet of forty-seven ships was routed by Phormio's twenty
ships at Rhium. The Spartan government, dismayed by this unexpected reversal,
dispatched several advisors (including the aggressive and talented Brasidas) to
oversee Cnemus as he resumed the offensive. Phormio, meanwhile, sent to Athens
for reinforcements, and twenty ships were sent out to him; these were ordered
to first sail to Crete to attack Cydonia, and as a result did not arrive in
time to participate in the battle. Cnemus and the advisors, combining the ships
that Cnemus had taken with him to Stratus with those retreating from Rhium and
raising more ships levied from Sparta's allies on the gulf, had soon assembled
a fleet of seventy-seven ships. The admirals then advanced with this fleet to
Panormus, in Achaea, where they met up with the Peloponnesian infantry.
Phormio, meanwhile, brought his ships up to Antirrhium, across the strait of
Rhium from the Peloponnesians. Here, he was in position to move against the
enemy fleet if it attempted to sail west into the open sea; if he allowed it to
escape in this way, he would essentially have surrendered Athens' dominance
over the sea, and might well have found himself blockaded in Naupactus.
Battle:
With the fleets at anchor across the strait from each other, it fell to the
Peloponnesians to initiate a battle, as they wished to force an action before
the Athenian reinforcements arrived. After six or seven days at Rhium,
therefore, the Spartan commanders led their fleet eastward into the Corinthian
Gulf. The Athenians, who in the previous battle had been able to take advantage
of their superior maneuverability in the open sea, were reluctant to enter the
constricted waters of the Gulf, but were forced to follow the Peloponnesians in
order to protect Naupactus, which had been left ungarrisoned. The twenty
Athenian ships entered the gulf sailing in single file along the northern
shore; the Messenian hoplites from Naupactus marched along the shore beside
them. On the southern shore, the Peloponnesian fleet was sailing in four lines,
parallel to the shore. On the right of these lines, leading the advance into
the gulf, were the twenty best and fastest ships in the fleet, which had been
assigned the job of preventing the Athenians from escaping when the
Peloponnesians attacked. Seeing the Athenians in the gulf and sailing in single
file, Cnemus gave the signal for his ships to attack. The Peloponnesian fleet
turned at once and raced across the gulf at the Athenians. The Athenians
attempted to flee, but only the eleven leading ships were able to slip around
the Peloponnesian right wing and flee towards Naupactus; the remaining nine
were cornered, driven ashore, and captured, while the twenty elite
Peloponnesian ships from the right wing set out after the fleeing Athenian
eleven. Ten Athenian ships reached Naupactus safely and took up positions at
the mouth of the harbor, prows facing outwards, ready to defend against any
attempt to enter the harbor. The last Athenian ship was fleeing towards the
harbor, with the Peloponnesians (who were already chanting the victory paean)
pursuing it closely, when it came alongside a merchant ship anchored outside
the harbor. Using the merchant ship to protect its flanks while he turned, the
Athenian captain spun his ship 270 degrees and rammed his leading pursuer in
the side, sinking it.
Although the Peloponnesians still held a great numerical advantage, the shock
of this single action, which disheartened the Peloponnesian crews and
reinvigorated the Athenians, proved sufficient to turn the tide of the battle.
Confusion set in among the Peloponnesians; some rowers in leading ships dropped
their oars to allow the main body to catch up with them—thus leaving
themselves immobile and vulnerable in the face of an enemy force; other ships
ran aground as a result of their captains' ignorance of the coastline. The ten
Athenian ships in the harbor rushed out and joined the attack, and the
Peloponnesians were instantly routed. The Athenians captured six ships in the
pursuit, and recovered all but one of their own ships which had been taken
earlier. Although both sides claimed victory and set up trophies, it was clear
who had won the battle; the Peloponnesians, fearing the arrival of the Athenian
reinforcements, retreated to Corinth under cover of darkness several days after
the battle, and the Athenians continued to hold Naupactus and dominate the
gulf.
Aftermath:
The Athenian victory at Naupactus put an end to Sparta's attempt to challenge
Athens in the Corinthian gulf and the Northwest, and secured Athens' dominance
at sea. At Naupactus, the Athenians' backs had been against the wall; a defeat
there would have lost Athens its foothold in the Corinthian gulf and encouraged
the Peloponnesians to attempt further aggressive operations at sea. In 428, the
Spartans would be so cowed by the memory of their defeats at Phormio's hands
that they sent no aid to Athens' rebellious subject Mytilene in that year. In
427, when they finally did send a fleet, the commander was so afraid of being
caught at sea by the Athenians that he fled home without accomplishing
anything.
|
|
