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The Battle of Ipsus was fought between some
of the Diadochi (the successors of Alexander the Great) in 301 near the town of
Ipsus in Phrygia. Antigonus I Monophthalmus, ruler of Phrygia, and his son
Demetrius I of Macedon were pitted against the coalition of three other
companions of Alexander: Cassander, ruler of Macedon; Lysimachus, ruler of
Thrace; and Seleucus I Nicator, ruler of Babylonia and Persia.
Opponents: Antigonids + Lysimachids versus Antipatrids + Seleucids
Commanders and leaders:
Antigonus I Monophthalmus † Demetrius
Poliorcetes Lysimachus
Seleucus I Nicator Antiochus I Soter Cassander Prepelaus Pleistarchus
Strength:
Antigonus -70,000 infantry 10,000 cavalry 75 elephants (Plutarch)
Opponents -64,000 infantry 15,000 cavalry 400 elephants 120 scythed chariots
(Plutarch)
Casualties and losses:
Antigonus - All but 5000 Infantry and 4000 cavalry (Plutarch)
Opponent - Unknown
Opposing forces:
According to Plutarch, Antigonus's army before the battle numbered around
70,000 infantry, 10,000 cavalry and 75 war elephants. The majority of this
number were presumably supplied by Antigonus's army that marched from Syria,
since Demetrius's army in Greece had no elephants and only 1,500 cavalry.
Diodorus claims that Demetrius's had approximately 56,000 infantry in Greece
(8,000 Macedonian phalangites, 15,000 mercenaries, 25,000 troops from Greek
cities and 8,000 light troops), but it is unclear what proportion of this
infantry accompanied him to Asia.
Based on other battles between the Diadochi, modern experts estimate that of
the 70,000 Antigonid infantry, perhaps 40,000 were phalangites and 30,000 were
light troops of various kinds.
Allies: Plutarch gives a total of 64,000 infantry for the allies, with 10,500
cavalry, 400 elephants and 120 scythed chariots.
Diodorus claims that Seleucus brought 20,000 infantry, 12,000 cavalry
(including mounted archers), 480 elephants and more than a hundred scythed
chariots with him from the eastern satrapies. The numbers of elephants and
chariots supposed to be present at the battle are therefore relatively
consistent between these sources. However, Seleucus's cavalry component
according to Diodorus is alone larger than Plutarch's claims for the whole
allied cavalry, and Lysimachus must have had at least some cavalry; he sent at
least 1,000 horsemen with Prepelaus the previous year.
Modern experts thus estimate the total number of allied cavalry at 15,000. Of
the 44,000 non-Seleucid infantry, it is unclear what proportion were supplied
by Cassander and Lysimachus respectively. Cassander sent 12,000 men under
Pleistarchus, of which two-thirds were lost in crossing the Black Sea, but it
is not clear how many men were in the initial dispatch of troops send under
Prepelaus.
Modern experts estimate that, of the allies' total infantry, perhaps
30,000–40,000 were phalangites, with the remainder being light troop
types.
Background:
Main articles: Diadochi and Wars of the Diadochi
In the aftermath of the
Second War of
the Diadochi (315), the aging satrap Antigonus Monophthalmus had been left
in undisputed control of the Asian territories of the Macedonian empire (Asia
Minor, Syria and the vast eastern satrapies). This left Antigonus in prime
position to claim overall rule over the Macedonian empire. Antigonus's growing
power alarmed the other major Successors, resulting in the eruption of the
Third War of the Diadochi in 314, in which
Antigonus faced a coalition of Cassander (ruler of Macedonia), Lysimachus
(ruler of Thrace) and Ptolemy (ruler of Egypt). This war ended in a compromise
peace in 311, after which Antigonus attacked Seleucus, who was attempting to
re-establish himself in the eastern Satrapies of the empire. The resulting
Babylonian War lasted from 311 to 309, and resulted in defeat for Antigonus,
allowing Seleucus to re-claim the satrapy of Babylonia and overlordship of the
territories to the east. While Antigonus was distracted elsewhere, Ptolemy had
been expanding his power into the Aegean Sea and to Cyprus. Antigonus thus
resumed the war with Ptolemy in 308, beginning the
Fourth War of the Diadochi. Antigonus sent
his son Demetrius to regain control of Greece, and in 307 he took Athens,
expelling Demetrius of Phaleron, Cassander's governor, and proclaiming the city
free again.
Demetrius then turned his attention to Ptolemy, invading Cyprus and defeating
Ptolemy's fleet at the Battle of Salamis-in-Cyprus. In the aftermath of this
victory, Antigonus and Demetrius both assumed the crown of Macedon, in which
they were shortly followed by Ptolemy, Seleucus, Lysimachus, and eventually
Cassander. The successor kingdoms before the battle of Ipsus, 303. In 306,
Antigonus attempted to invade Egypt, but storms prevented Demetrius's fleet
from supplying him, and he was forced to return home. With Cassander and
Ptolemy both weakened, and Seleucus still occupied by attempting to assert his
control over the East, Antigonus and Demetrius now turned their attention to
Rhodes, which was besieged by Demetrius's forces in 305. The island was
reinforced by troops from Ptolemy, Lysimachus, and Cassander. Ultimately, the
Rhodians reached a compromise with Demetrius – they would support
Antigonus and Demetrius against all enemies, save their ally Ptolemy. Ptolemy
took the title of Soter ("Savior") for his role in preventing the
fall of Rhodes, but the victory was ultimately Demetrius's, as it left him with
a free hand to attack Cassander in Greece. Demetrius thus returned to Greece
and set about liberating the cities of Greece, expelling Cassander's garrisons,
and the pro-Antipatrid oligarchies. This occupied much of Demetrius's efforts
in 303 and 302. Seeing that Demetrius's war effort was aimed at destroying his
power in Greece, and ultimately in Macedonia, Cassander tried to come to terms
with Antigonus. However, Antigonus rejected these advances, intent on forcing
Cassander's complete surrender. Cassander therefore held counsel with
Lysimachus, and they agreed on a joint strategy that included sending envoys to
Ptolemy and Seleucus, asking them to join in combatting the Antigonid threat.
Seeking to take the initiative, Cassander sent a significant portion of the
Macedonian army under Prepelaus to Lysimachus, which was to be used in joint
operations in Asia Minor. Meanwhile, Cassander took the rest of the Macedonian
army into Thessaly to confront Demetrius.
Prelude:
Main article: Fourth War of the Diadochi
Lysimachus crossed over the Hellespont in 302, intending to take advantage of
Antigonus's absence in Syria by overrunning Asia Minor. The cities of Lampsakos
and Parion submitted to him, but he had to storm Sigeion, after which he
installed a garrison there. He then sent Prepelaus with 7,000 men to attack
Aeolis and Ionia, while he besieged Abydos. This siege was unsuccessful
however, since Demetrius sent the city reinforcements from Greece by sea.
Lysimachus instead went on to win over Hellespontine Phrygia, and then captured
the major administrative centre of Synnada. Meanwhile, Prepelaus captured
Adramyttion, Ephesos, Teos, and Colophon; he could not however capture Erythrae
or Clazomenae, again due to sea-borne reinforcements. Finally, Prepelaus moved
inland and captured Sardis, another major administrative centre. When Antigonus
received news of the invasion, he abandoned preparations for a great festival
to be held in Antigonia, and quickly began to march his army northwards from
Syria, through Cilicia, Cappadocia, Lycaonia, and into Phrygia.
Lysimachus, hearing of the approach of Antigonus's army, held counsel with his
officers, and decided to avoid open battle until Seleucus's arrival. The allies
thus defended their camp with entrenchments and palisades, and when Antigonus
arrived offering battle, they remained within the camp. Antigonus therefore
moved to cut off the allies provisions, forcing Lysimachus to abandon the camp
and make a night-time march of some 40 miles to Dorylaion. There, the allies
built a new, triple-palisaded camp amongst the hills, with relatively easy
access to food and water.
Antigonus followed closely behind, and laid siege to the allied camp, bringing
up catapults for the assault. Lysimachus sent sorties to try and disrupt the
siege-works, but the Antigonid forces always ended with the upper hand in
ensuing skirmishes. With the siege works nearing completion and food running
low, Lysimachus decided to abandon the camp, and marched away during a
night-time storm. Antigonus again attempted to follow, but as winter approached
with further rain, conditions became difficult, and he abandoned pursuit and
dispersed his men into winter quarters instead. The allied army marched on into
Bithynia and went into winter quarters in and around the city of Heraclea.
Demetrius, son of Antigonus Whilst settling his army for the winter, Antigonus
heard the news that Seleucus was en route from the eastern satrapies to support
Lysimachus. He therefore dispatched messengers to Demetrius, ordering him to
bring his army over to Asia to reinforce the Antigonid forces.
Demetrius had in the meantime continued his campaign in Greece, and although
Cassander had blocked the land-passes, Demetrius had entered Thessaly by sea.
There had followed a somewhat inconsequential campaign of manoeuvre between the
two armies in Thessaly, before Demetrius received his father's messages asking
for reinforcements. Demetrius thus hastily arranged a truce with Cassander, and
took his army by sea across the Aegean to Ephesos. He recaptured Ephesos, and
marched north to the Hellespont, where he established a strong garrison and
fleet to prevent European reinforcements reaching the allied army in Asia.
Demetrius then also dispersed his army into winter quarters.
In the absence of Demetrius, Cassander now felt able to send further
reinforcements to Lysimachus, under the command of his brother, Pleistarchus.
Since Demetrius was guarding the easy crossing points at the Hellespont and the
Bosphorus, Pleistarchus attempted to ship his men directly across the Black Sea
to Heraclea, using the port of Odessos. The men had to be sent in batches due
to a lack of ships, and although the first batch arrived safely, the second
shipment was intercepted by Demetrius's fleet, and the third wrecked in a
storm. Pleistarchus himself narrowly survived the wreck of his command ship,
eventually being carried to Heraclea to recuperate over the winter.
Similarly, the concentration of Antigonid forces in Asia now made Ptolemy feel
secure enough to bring an army out of Egypt to try to conquer Coele Syria. He
captured a number of cities, but while laying siege to Sidon, he was brought
false reports of an Antigonid victory, and told that Antigonus was marching
south into Syria. He thus garrisoned the cities he had captured, and retreated
into Egypt. At around the same time, Seleucus appears to have finished his
march from the east, arriving in Cappadocia with his army, which he then sent
into winter quarters.
Diodorus completes book XX of his Library at this point, saying that he will
describe the battle between the Kings at the start of the next book. However,
only fragments remain of books XXI onwards, and although some fragments of his
description of the battle do remain, they do not form a coherent narrative. In
his description of the battle, Plutarch does not describe the preliminary
manoeuvring that must have occurred in 301 before the battle, so it is unclear
how events unfolded. Lysimachus and Seleucus were probably anxious to bring
Antigonus to battle, since their respective power-centres in Thrace and Babylon
were vulnerable in their prolonged absence. The armies eventually met in battle
around 50 miles north-east of Synnada, near the village of Ipsus.
Antigonus was aware of Ptolemy's raid on Syria the previous year, and thus
would have been loath to be cut off from Syria and his capital in Antigonia,
and thus moved to intercept the allied army. The exact location of the battle
is unknown, but it occurred in a large open plain, well-suited for both the
allied preponderance of elephants and the Antigonid superiority in cavalry
numbers and training.
Strategic and tactical considerations:
In terms of overall strategy, it is clear that both sides had resolved on
battle; for the allies, it represented the best chance of stopping Antigonid
expansion, rather than allowing themselves to be defeated piecemeal. For
Antigonus, the chance to defeat all his enemies at once could not be passed up,
even if he would have preferred to defeat them individually. However, little is
known about the specific strategic considerations facing the two sides before
the battle, as the precise circumstances and location of the engagement remain
uncertain. As mentioned above, it has been suggested that the allied army was
trying to cut Antigonus's lines of communication with Syria, in order to prompt
him into battle, but this is only one of several possible scenarios.
Tactically, both sides faced the common problem of the wars fought amongst the
Successors; how to defeat an army equipped in the same manner and using the
same basic tactics. The Diadochi seem to have been inherently conservative, and
continued to favour a strong attack with cavalry on the right wing of the
battle-line (tactics commonly used by both Philip and Alexander) as the
principal tactical thrust – even though they must have been aware of the
likelihood their opponents would perform the same maneuver on the opposite side
of the battlefield.
When armies were numerically even and deploying the same tactics, gaining a
clear advantage was difficult. The use of novel weapons, such as war elephants
and scythed chariots, to change the tactical balance was one approach used by
the Diadochi, but such innovations were readily copied. Thus, both sides at
Ipsus had war elephants, although thanks to Seleucus, the allies were able to
field an unusually high number, in addition to scythed chariots. Both sides
therefore sought an open battlefield; the allies in order to use their
elephants to full potential, and the Antigonids to allow full use of their
strong cavalry arm.
For the Antigonids, strong in both infantry and cavalry, the tactical situation
was straightforward, and followed the template Successor tactic of a massive
cavalry assault on the right wing.[
For the allies, weaker in infantry, the tactics would have been to maximize
their overwhelming superiority in elephants, though it is not clear exactly how
they intended to do this. Nevertheless, the elephants played a pivotal role in
the battle.
Battle:
Deployment Both sides probably deployed their troops in a standard Macedonian
formation, with the phalanx of heavy infantry in the centre of the battle line.
In front, and to the sides of the phalanx, light infantry were deployed to act
as skirmishers and to protect the flanks of the phalanx; cavalry was split
between the two wings. In the Antigonid line, Demetrius commanded the best of
the cavalry, stationed on the right wing. Antigonus, with his personal
bodyguard was positioned in the centre behind the phalanx. The 75 elephants
were deployed in front of the battle-line with their infantry guards. The
situation with the allied deployment is less clear. Plutarch states that
Seleucus's son Antiochus was in command of the cavalry on the left wing,
traditionally the weaker wing in the Macedonian system, intended only to
skirmish. However, it has been suggested that on this occasion the allied
cavalry were evenly split between the two wings.
We do not know who commanded the right wing, nor where Lysimachus, Seleucus or
Pleistarchus were stationed. It is clear that some of Seleucus's elephants were
placed in front of the battle line, but not how many, though a figure of 100 is
often suggested. It has been suggested that Seleucus retained command of the
majority of his elephants in a tactical reserve, but the use of such a large
reserve would have been unprecedented in battles amongst the successors.
Furthermore, it would have meant shunning an opportunity to deploy the major
tactical advantage held by the allies. As modern sources point out,
understanding this 'elephant problem' is key to understanding the outcome of
the battle, but the ancient sources do not allow the point to be resolved.
Initial phase:
The battle seems to have begun in earnest with a clash of the elephants from
both sides. Diodorus says that "the elephants of Antigonus and Lysimachus
fought as if nature had matched them equally in courage and strength",
suggesting that they were also equal in number (and supporting the idea of a
large reserve of elephants on the allied side). Demetrius then launched the
principal Antigonid thrust, manoeuvering his cavalry round the elephants, and
attacking the allied cavalry under Antiochus. Plutarch says that Demetrius
"fought brilliantly and routed his enemy". However it is also clear
that Demetrius allowed the pursuit of the routed allied cavalry to go too far,
resulting in his men becoming isolated from the battlefield.
Second phase"
It is not explicitly stated by Plutarch, but it has been assumed that the two
phalanxes engaged each other during the battle. If this was the case, then the
Antigonid strategy would have been for Demetrius to take his cavalry and attack
the rear of the allied phalanx; or alternatively, return to station on the
right wing and protect the Antigonid phalanx's flank. However, Demetrius found
himself unable to return to the battlefield because of the deployment of 300
elephants in his path. The ancient sources repeatedly emphasise the effect of
elephants on horses, which are alarmed by the smell and noise of elephants and
are loath to approach them. Demetrius would not have been able to take his
horses through the line of elephants, nor manoeuvre around such a large
quantity of elephants. This 'elephant manoeuvre' was the decisive moment in the
battle, but it is not clear how it came about; Plutarch only says that
"the [allied] elephants were thrown in his way". If the elephants had
indeed been held in reserve, then it might have been relatively straightforward
to deploy them, but as discussed, it is not clear why so many elephants would
have been held in reserve. However, it is also possible that the deployment of
the elephants was a piece of improvisation during the battle, though moving
such a large number of elephants in such a coordinated manoeuvre in the middle
of the battle would have been difficult. Since he was the only allied commander
with significant experience of handling elephants, it has been assumed that
Seleucus was responsible for this manoeuvre. With Demetrius now isolated from
the battlefield, the Antigonid phalanx was exposed on its right flank. Plutarch
describes what followed: Seleucus, observing that his opponents' phalanx was
unprotected by cavalry, took measures accordingly. He did not actually charge
upon them, but kept them in fear of a charge by continually riding around them,
thus giving them an opportunity to come over to his side. And this was what
actually came to pass. —?Plutarch, Demetrius 29, 3
The Antigonid phalanx and Allied phalanx engaged in a stiff and chaotic fight.
This move against the Antigonid right flank probably involved detaching cavalry
from the allies own right wing, including Seleucus's horse-archers, who could
rain down missiles on the immobile phalanx. The morale of the troops appears to
have collapsed, and it seems that some of the heavy infantry either defected to
the allied side or otherwise fled. Antigonus, stationed in the centre, tried to
rally his men, hoping for Demetrius's return. However, he was gradually
surrounded by allied infantry and eventually killed by several javelins thrown
by allied skirmishers. With the death of its commander, the Antigonid
battle-line dissolved, and the battle effectively ended.
Aftermath:
Kingdoms of the Diadochi after the battle of Ipsus, c. 301 BC. Kingdom of
Seleucus Other diadochi Kingdom of Cassander Kingdom of Lysimachus Kingdom of
Ptolemy Epirus From the wreck of the Antigonid army, Demetrius managed to
recover 5,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry, and escaped with them to Ephesos.
Despite the expectation that he would raid the Ephesian treasury, Demetrius
instead immediately set sail for Greece "putting his chief remaining hopes
in Athens". However, he was to be disappointed; the Athenians had voted
not to allow any of the kings into Athens. Concealing his wrath, he asked the
Athenians for the return of his ships that were moored there, and then sailed
on to the Isthmus of Corinth. He found that everywhere his garrisons were being
expelled, and his erstwhile allies defecting to the other kings. He left
Pyrrhus of Epirus (at that time part of the Antigonid faction) in charge of the
Antigonid cause in Greece, and himself sailed to the Thracian Chersonesos. The
last chance to reunite the Alexandrine Empire had already been passed when
Antigonus lost the Babylonian War and two thirds of his empire. Ipsus confirmed
this failure. As Paul K. Davis writes, "Ipsus was the high point of the
struggle among Alexander the Great’s successors to create an international
Hellenistic empire, which Antigonus failed to do." Instead, the empire was
carved up between the victors, with Ptolemy retaining Egypt, Seleucus expanding
his power to eastern Asia Minor, and Lysimachus receiving the remainder of Asia
Minor. Eventually Seleucus would defeat Lysimachus at the Battle of Corupedium
in 281, but he was assassinated shortly afterward. Ipsus finalized the breakup
of an empire, which may account for its obscurity; despite that, it was still a
critical battle in classical history and decided the character of the
Hellenistic age.
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