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The Battle of the Granicus River in May 334
was the first of three major battles fought between Alexander the Great and the
Persian Empire. Fought in northwestern Asia Minor, near the site of Troy, it
was here that Alexander defeated the forces of the Persian satraps of Asia
Minor, including a large force of Greek mercenaries led by
Memnon of Rhodes. The battle took place on
the road from Abydos to Dascylium (near modern-day Ergili, Turkey), at the
crossing of the Granicus River (modern-day Biga Çayi)
Opponents: Macedonia & Hellenic League versus Achaemenid Empire &
Achaemenid Empire Satrapies of Asia Minor
Commanders and leaders:
Macedon - Alexander the Great, Parmenion, Cleitus the Black, Hephaestion,
Calas, Hegelochus, Ptolemy
Persians - Arsames. Rheomithres. Niphates. † Petenes. † Spithridates.
† Mithrobuzanes. † Arbupales. † Mithridates. † Pharnaces.
† Omares. † Arsites. Rhoesaces. † Memnon of Rhodes
Strength:
Macedon - 32,000 infantry (12,000 Macedonians, 5,000 mercenaries, 7,000 Greeks,
7,000 Odrysians, Triballians and Illyrians, and 1,000 archers) 5,100 cavalry
(1,800 Macedonians, 1,800 Thessalians, 600 other Greeks, and 900 Thracians and
Paeonians) Total: 37,100
Persians - 10,000–20,000 cavalry, 5,000–20,000 Greek hoplite
mercenaries Total: 20,000–30,000 (modern estimate)
Casualties and losses:
Macedonians - 300 to 400 killed 1,150–1,380 to 3,500–4,200 wounded
Persians - 3,000 infantry killed1,000 cavalry killed 2,000 captured
Background:
After the death of Phillip of Macedon, many of his newly conquered territories
desired to take advantage of the perceived weakness of the new young king.
These nations included the Illyrians, Thracians, and some southern Greek
city-states. Alexander had to prove the strength of his rule before leaving for
his Persian expedition, and crushed several nascent rebellions within Greece
and the northern tribes. After extensive planning in Macedonia, Alexander
started to prepare for his next major conquest: the invasion of Asia. Before
leaving Macedon, Alexander appointed his father’s experienced general
Antipater as regent in
his absence, leaving him with 9,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry to maintain
control over Macedonia's holdings in Europe. In the spring of 334, Alexander
took 2,600 cavalry and went on a 20-day march from Macedon to Hellespont, to
join Parmenion in Asia.
Deployment of Persian troops:
Before Alexander and his army were able to cross at Hellespont, the Persian
provincial governors, and others in power at that time in Persia, assembled
their forces of 10-20,000 cavalry and 5-20,000 infantry to the town of Zelea.
Memnon was a high-ranking Greek mercenary employed by the Persians, and he
advised the Persians to lay waste to the land that Alexander would have to
pass, depriving his army of food and supplies. This would make it harder for
Alexander and his army to survive on their long journey before the battle. The
satraps did not trust Memnon because of his nationality, and did not ravage
their territories.The Persians had two major objectives; first, they would try
to force Alexander toward a position of their choosing before he could continue
inland, and second, the Persians hoped to be able to be in a defensive position
that would minimize Alexander's advantage in infantry.The Persians advanced
from Zelea to the Granicus River, which would be an obstacle for Alexander and
his army. The Persians hoped that his army would not be able to hold formation,
which would severely cripple its effectiveness, as maintaining the closely
packed and mutually supportive formation typically employed by the Greeks was
central to their strategy. The Persians awaited the arrival of the Macedonians
with all their cavalry in the front line. Alexander, after crossing into Asia
at the Hellespont, then marched 100 km back to the north to meet the Persian
armies.
The battle:
According to Alexander's biographer Arrian, Alexander's army met the Persians
on the third day of May from Abydos. Alexander's second-in-command, Parmenion,
suggested crossing the river upstream and attacking at dawn the next day, but
Alexander attacked immediately. This tactic caught the Persians off guard. The
Macedonian line was arrayed with the heavy phalanxes in the middle, and cavalry
on either side. Alexander was with the Companions on the right flank. The
Persians expected the main assault to come from Alexander's position and moved
units from their center to that flank. The battle started with a cavalry and
light infantry feint from the Macedonian left, from Parmenion's side of the
battle line. The cavalry squadron was led by the officer Ptolemy, son of
Philip. The Persians heavily reinforced that side, and the feint was driven
back, but at that point, Alexander led the horse companions in their classic
wedge-shaped charge, and smashed into the center of the Persian line. The
Persians countercharged with a squadron of nobles on horse, and accounts show
that in the melee, several high-ranking Persian nobles were killed by Alexander
himself or his bodyguards, although Alexander was stunned by an axe-blow from a
Persian nobleman named Rhoisakes. A second Persian nobleman named Spithridates
attempted to attack Alexander from behind while he was still reeling; however,
he was himself killed by
Cleitus the
Black, who severed his outstretched arm. Alexander quickly recovered.
Eventually the Macedonian horse were able to gain the advantage over their
Persian counterpart, owing to the superiority of their lance over the Persian
javelin for melee fighting, as well as the close support of the light infantry
interspersed among their squadrons. The Greek cavalry then turned left and
started rolling up the Persian cavalry, which was engaged with the left side of
the Macedonian line after a general advance. A hole opened in the recently
vacated place in the battle line, and the Macedonian infantry charged through
to engage the poor-quality Persian infantry in the rear. The Macedonian phalanx
then attacked the Greek mercenaries. With many of their leaders already dead,
and their infantry routed, both flanks of the Persian cavalry retreated, seeing
the collapse of the center. The infantry routed too, many being cut down as
they fled.
That account of the battle is directly contradicted by Diodorus Siculus who
states "When Alexander learned of the concentration of the Persian forces,
he advanced rapidly and encamped opposite the enemy, so that the Granicus
flowed between the encampments. The Persians, resting on high ground, made no
move, intending to fall upon the foes as he crossed the river, for they
supposed they could easily carry the day when the Macedonian phalanx was
divided. But Alexander at dawn boldly brought his army across the river and
deployed in good order before they could stop him. In return, they posted their
mass of horsemen all along the front of the Macedonians since they had decided
to press the battle with these. Memnon of Rhodes and satrap Arsamenes held the
left wing each with his own cavalry; Arsites was stationed next with the
horsemen from Paphlagonia; then came Spithrobates satrap of Ionia at the head
of the Hyrcanian cavalry. The right wing was held by a thousand Medes and two
thousand horsemen with Rheomithres as well as Bactrians of like number. Other
national contingents occupied the centre, numerous and picked for their valour.
In all, the cavalry amounted to more than ten thousand. The Persian foot
soldiers were not fewer than one hundred thousand, but they were posted behind
the line and did not advance since the cavalry was thought to be sufficient to
crush the Macedonians." The record of Arrian and Diodorus on the battle of
Granicus can't be reconciled so historians usually prefer Arrian, although some
revisionists try to reconcile the two accounts.
Revisionist view:
Historian Peter Green, in his 1974 book Alexander of Macedon, proposed a way to
reconcile the accounts of Diodorus and Arrian. According to Green's
interpretation, the riverbank was guarded by infantry, not cavalry, and
Alexander's forces sustained heavy losses in the initial attempt to cross the
river and were forced to retire. Alexander then grudgingly accepted Parmenion's
advice and crossed the river during the night in an uncontested location, and
fought the battle at dawn the next day. The Persian army hurried to the
location of Alexander's crossing, with the cavalry reaching the scene of the
battle first before the slower infantry, and then the battle continued largely
as described by the Arrian and Plutarch accounts. Green accounts for the
differences between his account and the ancient sources by suggesting that
Alexander later covered up his initial failed crossing. Green devotes an entire
appendix in support of his interpretation, taking the view that for political
reasons, Alexander could not admit even a temporary defeat. Thus, the initial
defeat was covered up by his propagandists by a very heroic (and Homeric)
charge into the now well-deployed enemy. In his preface to the 2012 reprint,
Green states: "on the evidence as it stands that theory remains untenable
and the contradiction inexplicable."
Result:
Total casualties for the Greeks were between 300 and 400. The Persians had
roughly 1,000 cavalry and 3,000 infantry killed, mostly in the rout. Towards
the end of this battle, Alexander buried the Persian commanders and the Greek
mercenaries who were killed fighting on the side of the enemy. The Greek
mercenaries, under the command of Memnon of Rhodes, who fought for the
Persians, were abandoned after the cavalry retreat. They attempted to broker a
peace with Alexander but to no avail, because, although they were Greeks, they
were fighting against Greece on behalf of the foreigners, in opposition to
decrees which the Greeks had made in their federal council. As a result, after
the battle Alexander ordered the mercenaries to be enslaved. Out of the 18,000
Greek mercenaries, half were killed and 8,000 enslaved and sent back to Macedon
to till the soil. To Athens, he also sent 300 suits of Persian armour to be
hung up in the Parthenon of the Acropolis as a votive offering or oblation to
Athena, and ordered this inscription to be fixed over them so as to mark the
absence of the Spartans in his united Greek army: "Alexander, son of
Philip, and the Greeks, except of Lacedaemonians, present this offering of the
spoils taken from the barbarians who live in Asia".
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