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The naval Battle of Cynossema took place in
411 during the Second Peloponnesian War. In the battle, an Athenian fleet
commanded by Thrasybulus and
Thrasyllus, although
initially thrown on the defensive by a numerically superior Spartan fleet, won
a narrow victory. This victory had an impact out of proportion to its tactical
significance, coming when Athens' traditional democratic government had been
replaced by an oligarchy and an Athenian defeat could have ended the war. The
newly confident Athenian fleet proceeded to win two more victories in the
Hellespont in quick succession, the second being the dramatic rout at Cyzicus,
which ended the immediate Spartan threat to Athens' Black Sea lifeline.
Opponents: Athenians versus Spartans
Commanders and leaders:
Athenians - Thrasyllus, Thrasybulus
Spartans -Mindarus
Strength:
Ahenians - 76 ships
Spartans - 86 ships
Casualties and losses:
Athenians - 15 ships
Spartans - 21 ships
Prelude In the wake of Athens' defeat in the Sicilian Expedition in 413, a
small Spartan fleet commanded by Chalcideus, who was advised and assisted by
Alcibiades, succeeded in bringing a number of critical Ionian cities into
revolt from the Athenian Empire. After the revolt of the critical city of
Miletus, the Persian satrap Tissaphernes concluded an alliance against Athens
with Sparta. The Spartans remained unwilling to challenge the Athenians at sea,
and an Athenian fleet succeeded in recapturing several cities and besieging
Chios during the later months of 412. In 411, however, further rebellions at
Rhodes and Euboea, and the capture of Abydos and Lampsacus on the Hellespont by
a Peloponnesian army that had marched there overland, forced the Athenians to
disperse their forces to meet these various threats. The Spartan fleet could
now move freely in the Aegean, and took advantage of its newfound superiority
by lifting the blockade of Chios and bottling up the Athenians' Aegean fleet at
Samos. By withdrawing their ships from the Hellespont to Samos, the Athenians
were able to reestablish their naval superiority in the Aegean, but in doing so
they opened the door for Sparta to shift the theater of war. Accordingly, in
late July, the Spartan commander Clearchus made an attempt to slip 40 ships
past the Athenian fleet to the Hellespont. These were turned back by a storm,
but shortly afterwards 10 ships under the Megarian general Helixus reached the
Hellespont, where they triggered revolts in Byzantium, Chalcedon and other
important cities. Several months later, the new Spartan navarch Mindarus,
deciding that the promises of support made by Pharnabazus, the
Persian satrap of Anatolia, were more promising than those of
Tissaphernes in Ionia,
slipped his entire fleet past the Athenians. He joined up with the
Peloponnesian ships already operating in the Hellespont and established his
base at Abydos, forcing the small Athenian fleet at Sestos to flee, with
losses, to Imbros and Lemnos.
Battle:
With a substantial Peloponnesian fleet operating in the Hellespont, the crucial
trade route through which Athens' grain supply passed, the Athenian fleet had
little choice but to pursue Mindarus. Accordingly, Thrasybulus, assuming
overall command, led the fleet to Elaeus on the tip of the Gallipoli peninsula,
where the Athenians spent five days preparing to challenge the 86 Spartan ships
at Abydos with their 76 ships. The Athenian fleet sailed in column into the
Hellespont, following the northern shore, while the Spartans put out from
Abydos on the southern shore. When the Athenian left had rounded the point of
Cynossema, the Spartans attacked, planning to outflank the Athenian right and
trap the fleet in the Hellespont while driving the center aground on Cynossema.
The Athenian center was quickly driven aground, and the left under Thrasyllus,
beset by Syracusan ships and unable to see the rest of the fleet around the
sharp point, was unable to come to its aid. Thrasybulus on the right,
meanwhile, was able to avoid encirclement by extending his line westward, but
in doing so lost touch with the center. With the Athenians divided and a
substantial portion of their fleet incapacitated, a Spartan victory seemed
assured. At this critical juncture, however, the Peloponnesian line began to
fall into disorder as ships broke line to pursue individual Athenian vessels.
Seeing this, Thrasybulus turned his ships abruptly and attacked the Spartan
left. After routing these ships, the Athenian right bore down on the
Peloponnesian center, and, catching them in a state of disorganization, quickly
routed them as well. The Syracusans on the right, seeing the rest of their
fleet in flight, abandoned their attack on the Athenian left and fled as well.
The narrowness of the straits, which ensured that the Peloponnesians had only a
short way to go to safety, limited the damage the Athenians could inflict, but
by day's end they had captured 21 Spartan ships to the 15 of theirs that the
Spartans had taken in the early fighting. The Athenians set up a trophy on
Cynossema and put in at Sestos, while the Peloponnesians made their way back to
Abydos.
Aftermath:
In the days after the battle, the Athenians refitted their ships at Sestos and
dispatched a small detachment to Cyzicus, recapturing that town and seizing 8
triremes encountered along the way. A trireme was dispatched to Athens, where
the unexpected good news restored the people's confidence in the war effort.
Historian Donald Kagan has emphasized the effect this victory had on the
Athenians. Forced to fight on terms chosen by their enemies, at a time when the
city lacked the resources to build another fleet, the Athenians could have lost
the war on that day at Cynossema. Instead, they won a victory that allowed them
to continue fighting, with victory still seeming possible.
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The battle of
Cynossema (411
BC) was the first major Athenian victory since their disastrous defeat on
Sicily in 413 BC, and helped restore morale in the city after a series of
setbacks and a period of political upheaval (Great
Peloponnesian
War). The battle was caused by a Peloponnesian decision to transfer their
fleet from Miletus on the west coast of Asia Minor into the Hellespont, where
it could potentially cut Athens off from the grain of the Black Sea. A second
reason for the decision was that the Persian satrap of Western Asia,
Tissaphernes, hadn't
paid the fleet for some time, while
Pharnabazus, his
neighbouring satrap to the north, was requesting their assistance. The
Peloponnesian fleet, commanded by
Mindarus, set out for the
Hellespont with 73 ships. It was delayed by bad weather at Icarus, and then
moved on to Chios. Thrasylus, the Athenian
commander at Samos, responded
by moving 55 ships towards the Hellespont, but when he discovered that the
Peloponnesians had stopped at Chios, he decided to turn aside to besiege the
city of Eresus on Lesbos. There he was joined by a smaller Athenian squadron
under Thrasybulus, and
some other ships, bringing his fleet up to 67 ships. The Peloponnesian fleet
only stopped at Chios for three days, and then managed to get past the
Athenians by sailing between Lesbos and the mainland, reaching Rhoeteum, in the
Hellespont, around midnight on the second day after leaving Chios. There were
already two smaller fleets operating in the Hellespont. The Athenians had
eighteen ships at Sestos, on
the European shore, while the Peloponnesians had sixteen ships at Abydos, on
the Asian shore. The Athenians discovered the arrival of the main Peloponnesian
fleet just in time to escape from a potential trap, although four ships were
lost in a running fight with Mindarus. The Peloponnesian fleets then united at
Abydos, giving Mindarus eighty six ships. The Athenians now had seventy-six
ships. They decided to sail into the Hellespont, sticking close to the European
shore. The Peloponnesians came out from Abydos, and the two sides prepared for
battle. The battle was fought with the two fleets lined up parallel to the
shores of the Hellespont. The Athenians had their backs to the European shore.
Thrasylus commanded on the left, furthest into the Hellespont.
Thrasybulus commanded
on the right, nearest to the open sea. On the other side the Syracusans were on
the right, furthest in, and Mindarus with the fastest ships in the fleet was on
the left. His plan was to outflank the Athenian right, cutting them off from
the open sea, while the rest of his fleet forced the Athenian centre onto the
shore. The Athenians responded to this by extending their right wing, but at
the same time the left continued on up the Hellespont, leaving the centre badly
stretched out. The Peloponnesians took advantage of this, and forced some ships
in the Athenian centre onto the shore. The Athenian soldiers disembarked, and
the Peloponnesians followed them, so the battle spread onto land. The two
Athenian wings were holding their own, but were unable to come to the rescue of
the centre until the Peloponnesian line began to break up as individual ships
broke off to chase retreating Athenians. The two Athenian wings then turned on
their direct enemies, defeating them, before combining to crush the
Peloponnesian centre. Most of the Peloponnesian ships were able to escape into
the Midius River or into Abydos, and only a few ships were captured. Indeed the
two sides losses were comparatively similar - the Athenians captured twenty-one
ships, but lost fifteen ship themselves - but the real significance of the
battle was its impact on Athenian morale, which finally began to recover from
the crushing blow on Sicily.
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