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The battle of
Cynossema (411
BC) was the first major Athenian victory since their disastrous defeat on
Sicily in 413 BC, and helped restore morale in the city after a series of
setbacks and a period of political upheaval (Great
Peloponnesian
War). The battle was caused by a Peloponnesian decision to transfer their
fleet from Miletus on the west coast of Asia Minor into the Hellespont, where
it could potentially cut Athens off from the grain of the Black Sea. A second
reason for the decision was that the Persian satrap of Western Asia,
Tissaphernes, hadn't
paid the fleet for some time, while
Pharnabazus, his
neighbouring satrap to the north, was requesting their assistance. The
Peloponnesian fleet, commanded by
Mindarus, set out for the
Hellespont with 73 ships. It was delayed by bad weather at Icarus, and then
moved on to Chios. Thrasylus, the Athenian
commander at Samos, responded
by moving 55 ships towards the Hellespont, but when he discovered that the
Peloponnesians had stopped at Chios, he decided to turn aside to besiege the
city of Eresus on Lesbos. There he was joined by a smaller Athenian squadron
under Thrasybulus, and
some other ships, bringing his fleet up to 67 ships. The Peloponnesian fleet
only stopped at Chios for three days, and then managed to get past the
Athenians by sailing between Lesbos and the mainland, reaching Rhoeteum, in the
Hellespont, around midnight on the second day after leaving Chios. There were
already two smaller fleets operating in the Hellespont. The Athenians had
eighteen ships at Sestos, on
the European shore, while the Peloponnesians had sixteen ships at Abydos, on
the Asian shore. The Athenians discovered the arrival of the main Peloponnesian
fleet just in time to escape from a potential trap, although four ships were
lost in a running fight with Mindarus. The Peloponnesian fleets then united at
Abydos, giving Mindarus eighty six ships. The Athenians now had seventy-six
ships. They decided to sail into the Hellespont, sticking close to the European
shore. The Peloponnesians came out from Abydos, and the two sides prepared for
battle. The battle was fought with the two fleets lined up parallel to the
shores of the Hellespont. The Athenians had their backs to the European shore.
Thrasylus commanded on the left, furthest into the Hellespont.
Thrasybulus commanded
on the right, nearest to the open sea. On the other side the Syracusans were on
the right, furthest in, and Mindarus with the fastest ships in the fleet was on
the left. His plan was to outflank the Athenian right, cutting them off from
the open sea, while the rest of his fleet forced the Athenian centre onto the
shore. The Athenians responded to this by extending their right wing, but at
the same time the left continued on up the Hellespont, leaving the centre badly
stretched out. The Peloponnesians took advantage of this, and forced some ships
in the Athenian centre onto the shore. The Athenian soldiers disembarked, and
the Peloponnesians followed them, so the battle spread onto land. The two
Athenian wings were holding their own, but were unable to come to the rescue of
the centre until the Peloponnesian line began to break up as individual ships
broke off to chase retreating Athenians. The two Athenian wings then turned on
their direct enemies, defeating them, before combining to crush the
Peloponnesian centre. Most of the Peloponnesian ships were able to escape into
the Midius River or into Abydos, and only a few ships were captured. Indeed the
two sides losses were comparatively similar - the Athenians captured twenty-one
ships, but lost fifteen ship themselves - but the real significance of the
battle was its impact on Athenian morale, which finally began to recover from
the crushing blow on Sicily.
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