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Born c. 450 Classical Athens
Died 404 Mount Elafos, Phrygia, Achaemenid Empire
Allegiance
Athens (415–412)
Sparta (412–411)
Persia
Rank General (Strategos)
Battles/wars
Sicilian Expedition (415)
Battle of Abydos
(410)
Battle of Cyzicus
(410)
Siege of Byzantium (408)
Summary
Alcibiades, son of Cleinias (c. 450–404), from the deme of Scambonidae,
was a prominent Athenian statesman, orator, and general. He was the last famous
member of his mother's aristocratic family, the Alcmaeonidae, which fell from
prominence after the Peloponnesian War.
He played a major role in the second half of that conflict as a strategic
advisor, military commander, and politician. During the course of the
Peloponnesian
War, Alcibiades changed his political allegiance several times. In his
native Athens in the early 410s, he advocated an aggressive foreign policy and
was a prominent proponent of the
Sicilian
Expedition, but he fled to Sparta after his political enemies brought
charges of sacrilege against him. In Sparta, he served as a strategic adviser,
proposing or supervising several major campaigns against Athens. In Sparta too,
however, Alcibiades soon made powerful enemies and felt forced to defect to
Persia. There he served as an adviser to the satrap
Tissaphernes until his
Athenian political allies brought about his recall. He then served as an
Athenian general (Strategos) for several years, but his enemies eventually
succeeded in exiling him a second time. Scholars have argued that had the
Sicilian expedition been under Alcibiades's command instead of that of
Nicias, the expedition might
not have met its eventual disastrous fate. In the years when he served Sparta,
Alcibiades played a significant role in Athens's undoing; the capture of
Decelea and the revolts of several critical Athenian subjects occurred either
at his suggestion or under his supervision. Once restored to his native city,
however, he played a crucial role in a string of Athenian victories that
eventually brought Sparta to seek a peace with Athens. He favored
unconventional tactics, frequently winning cities over by treachery or
negotiation rather than by siege.
Alcibiades's military and political talents frequently proved valuable to
whichever state currently held his allegiance, but his propensity for making
powerful enemies ensured that he never remained in one place for long; and by
the end of the war that he had helped to rekindle in the early 410s, his days
of political relevance were a bygone memory.
Alcibiades was born in Athens. His father was Cleinias, who had distinguished
himself in the Persian War both as a fighter himself and by personally
subsidizing the cost of a trireme. The family of Cleinias had old connections
with the Spartan aristocracy through a relationship of xenia, and the name
"Alcibiades" was of Spartan origin. Alcibiades' mother was
Deinomache, the daughter of Megacles, head of the powerful Alcmaeonid family,
and could trace her family back to Eurysaces and the Telamonian Ajax.
Alcibiades thereby, through his mother, belonged to the powerful and
controversial family of the Alcmaeonidae; the renowned
Pericles and his brother
Ariphron were Deinomache's cousins, as her father and their mother were
siblings. His maternal grandfather, also named Alcibiades, was a friend of
Cleisthenes, the famous
constitutional reformer of the late 6th century.] After the death of Cleinias
at the Battle of
Coronea
(447), Pericles and Ariphron became his guardians. According to
Plutarch, Alcibiades had
several famous teachers, including Socrates, and was well trained in the art of
Rhetoric. He was noted, however, for his unruly behavior, which was mentioned
by ancient Greek and Latin writers on several occasions. It was believed that
Socrates took Alcibiades as a student because he believed he could change
Alcibiades from his vain ways. Xenophon attempted to clear Socrates' name at
trial by relaying information that Alcibiades was always corrupt and that
Socrates merely failed in attempting to teach him morality.
Alcibiades took part in the Battle of
Potidaea in 432,
where Socrates was said to have saved his life and again at the Battle of
Delium in 424.
Alcibiades had a particularly close relationship with Socrates, whom he admired
and respected. According to Plutarch, Alcibiades "feared and reverenced
Socrates alone, and despised the rest of his lovers". Alcibiades was
married to Hipparete, the daughter of Hipponicus, a wealthy Athenian. His bride
brought with her a large dowry, which significantly increased Alcibiades'
already substantial family fortune. According to Plutarch, Hipparete loved her
husband, but she attempted to divorce him because he consorted with courtesans
but prevented her from appearing at court. He seized her in court and carried
her home again through the crowded Agora. She lived with him until her death,
which came soon after, and gave birth to two children, a son named Alcibiades
the Younger and a daughter. Alcibiades was famed throughout his life for his
physical attractiveness, of which he was inordinately vain.
Rise to prominence
Alcibiades first rose to prominence when he began advocating aggressive
Athenian action after the signing of the Peace of Nicias. That treaty,
an uneasy truce between Sparta and Athens signed midway through the
Peloponnesian War, came at the end of seven years of fighting during which
neither side had gained a decisive advantage. Historians Arnold W. Gomme and
Raphael Sealey believe, and Thucydides reports, that Alcibiades was offended
that the Spartans had negotiated that treaty through Nicias and Laches,
overlooking him on account of his youth. Disputes over the interpretation of
the treaty led the Spartans to dispatch ambassadors to Athens with full powers
to arrange all unsettled matters. The Athenians initially received these
ambassadors well, but Alcibiades met with them in secret before they were to
speak to the ecclesia (the Athenian Assembly) and told them that the Assembly
was haughty and had great ambitions. He urged them to renounce their diplomatic
authority to represent Sparta, and instead allow him to assist them through his
influence in Athenian politics. The representatives agreed and, impressed with
Alcibiades, they alienated themselves from Nicias, who genuinely wanted to
reach an agreement with the Spartans. The next day, during the Assembly,
Alcibiades asked them what powers Sparta had granted them to negotiate and they
replied, as agreed, that they had not come with full and independent powers.
This was in direct contradiction to what they had said the day before, and
Alcibiades seized on this opportunity to denounce their character, cast
suspicion on their aims, and destroy their credibility. This ploy increased
Alcibiades's standing while embarrassing Nicias, and Alcibiades was
subsequently appointed General. He took advantage of his increasing power to
orchestrate the creation of an alliance between Argos, Mantinea, Elis, and
other states in the Peloponnese, threatening Sparta's dominance in the region.
According to Gomme, "it was a grandiose scheme for an Athenian general at
the head of a mainly Peloponnesian army to march through the Peloponnese
cocking a snook at Sparta when her reputation was at its lowest". This
alliance, however, would ultimately be defeated at the Battle of
Mantinea.
Somewhere in the years 416–415, a complex struggle took place between
Hyperbolos on one side and Nicias and Alcibiades on the other. Hyperbolos tried
to bring about the ostracism of one of this pair, but Nicias and Alcibiades
combined their influence to induce the people to expel Hyperbolos instead. This
incident reveals that Nicias and Alcibiades each commanded a personal
following, whose votes were determined by the wishes of the leaders. Alcibiades
was not one of the Generals involved in the capture of Melos in 416–415,
but Plutarch describes him as a supporter of the decree by which the grown men
of Melos were killed and the women and children enslaved. An oration urging
Alcibiades' ostracism, "Against Alcibiades" (historically attributed
to the orator Andocides but not in fact by him), alleges that Alcibiades had a
child by one of these enslaved women.[34] Sicilian Expedition Roman copy of a
late fifth-century BC Athenian herma. Vandalizing hermai was one of the crimes
of which Alcibiades was accused.
Sicilian
Expedition
In 415, delegates from the Sicilian city of Segesta (Greek: Egesta) arrived at
Athens to plead for the support of the Athenians in their war against Selinus.
During the debates on the undertaking, Nicias was vehemently opposed to
Athenian intervention, explaining that the campaign would be very costly and
attacking the character and motives of Alcibiades, who had emerged as a major
supporter of the expedition. On the other hand, Alcibiades argued that a
campaign in this new theatre would bring riches to the city and expand the
empire, just as the Persian Wars had. In his speech Alcibiades predicted
(over-optimistically, in the opinion of most historians) that the Athenians
would be able to recruit allies in the region and impose their rule on
Syracuse, the most powerful city of Sicily. In spite of Alcibiades's
enthusiastic advocacy for the plan, it was Nicias, not he, who turned a modest
undertaking into a massive campaign and made the conquest of Sicily seem
possible and safe. It was at his suggestion that the size of the fleet was
significantly increased from 60 ships to "140 galleys, 5,100 men at arms,
and about 1300 archers, slingers, and light armed men".
Philosopher Leo Strauss underscores that the Sicilian expedition surpassed
everything undertaken by Pericles. Almost certainly Nicias's intention was to
shock the assembly with his high estimate of the forces required, but, instead
of dissuading his fellow citizens, his analysis made them all the more eager.
Against his wishes Nicias was appointed General along with Alcibiades and
Lamachus, all three of
whom were given full powers to do whatever was in the best interests of Athens
while in Sicily. One night during preparations for the expedition, the hermai,
heads of the god Hermes on a plinth with a phallus, were mutilated throughout
Athens. This was a religious scandal, resulted in a charge of asebaia (impiety)
against Alcibiades, and was seen as a bad omen for the mission. Plutarch
explains that Androcles, a political leader, used false witnesses who accused
Alcibiades and his friends of mutilating the statues, and of profaning the
Eleusinian Mysteries. Later his opponents, chief among them being Androcles and
Thessalus, Cimon's son, enlisted orators to argue that Alcibiades should set
sail as planned and stand trial on his return from the campaign. Alcibiades was
suspicious of their intentions, and asked to be allowed to stand trial
immediately, under penalty of death, in order to clear his name. This request
was denied, and the fleet set sail soon after, with the charges unresolved.
As Alcibiades had suspected, his absence emboldened his enemies, and they began
to accuse him of other sacrilegious actions and comments and even alleged that
these actions were connected with a plot against the democracy. According to
Thucydides, the Athenians were always in fear and took everything suspiciously.
When the fleet arrived in Catania, it found the state trireme Salaminia waiting to bring
Alcibiades and the others indicted for mutilating the hermai or profaning the
Eleusinian Mysteries back to Athens to stand trial. Alcibiades told the heralds
that he would follow them back to Athens in his ship, but in Thurii he escaped
with his crew; in Athens he was convicted in absentia and condemned to death.
His property was confiscated and a reward of one talent was promised to whoever
succeeded in killing any who had fled. Meanwhile, the Athenian force in Sicily,
after a few early victories, moved against Messina, where the Generals expected
their secret allies within the city to betray it to them. Alcibiades, however,
foreseeing that he would be outlawed, gave information to the friends of the
Syracusans in Messina, who succeeded in preventing the admission of the
Athenians. With the death of Lamachus in battle some time later, command of the
Sicilian Expedition fell into the hands of Nicias, admired by Thucydides
(however a modern scholar has judged him to be an inadequate military leader.
Defection to Sparta
After his disappearance at Thurii, Alcibiades quickly contacted the Spartans,
"promising to render them aid and service greater than all the harm he had
previously done them as an enemy" if they would offer him sanctuary. The
Spartans granted this request and received him among them. Because of this
defection, the Athenians condemned him to death in absentia and confiscated his
property. In the debate at Sparta over whether to send a force to relieve
Syracuse, Alcibiades spoke and instilled fear of Athenian ambition into the
Spartan ephors by informing them that the Athenians hoped to conquer Sicily,
Italy, and even Carthage.
Yale historian Donald Kagan believes that Alcibiades knowingly exaggerated the
plans of the Athenians to convince the Spartans of the benefit they stood to
gain from his help. Kagan asserts that Alcibiades had not yet acquired his
"legendary" reputation, and the Spartans saw him as "a defeated
and hunted man" whose policies "produced strategic failures" and
brought "no decisive result". If accurate, this assessment
underscores one of Alcibiades's greatest talents, his highly persuasive
oratory. After making the threat seem imminent, Alcibiades advised the Spartans
to send troops and most importantly, a Spartan commander to discipline and aid
the Syracusans. "Our party was that of the whole people, our creed being
to do our part in preserving the form of government under which the city
enjoyed the utmost greatness and freedom, and which we had found existing. As
for democracy, the men of sense among us knew what it was, and I perhaps as
well as any, as I have the more cause to complain of it; but there is nothing
new to be said of a patent absurdity—meanwhile we did not think it safe to
alter it under the pressure of your hostility." Alcibiades' Speech to the
Spartans, as recorded by Thucydides (VI, 89); Thucydides disclaims verbal
accuracy
Alcibiades served as a military adviser to Sparta and helped the Spartans
secure several crucial successes. He advised them to build a permanent fort at
Decelea, just over ten
miles (16 km) from Athens and within sight of the city. By doing this, the
Spartans cut the Athenians off entirely from their homes and crops and the
silver mines of Sunium. This was part of Alcibiades's plan to renew the war
with Athens in Attica. The move was devastating to Athens and forced the
citizens to live within the long walls of the city year round, making them
entirely dependent on their seaborne trade for food. Seeing Athens thus
beleaguered on a second front, members of the Delian League began to
contemplate revolt. In the wake of Athens's disastrous defeat in Sicily,
Alcibiades sailed to Ionia with a Spartan fleet and succeeded in persuading
several critical cities to revolt. In spite of these valuable contributions to
the Spartan cause, Alcibiades fell out of favor with the Spartan government at
around this time, ruled by Agis
II. Leotychides, the son born by Agis's wife Timaea, Queen of Sparta,
shortly after this, was believed by many to be Alcibiades's son. An alternate
account asserts that Alcibiades took advantage of King Agis' absence with the
Spartan Army in Attica and seduced his wife, Timonassa. Alcibiades's influence
was further reduced after the retirement of Endius, the ephor who was on good
terms with him. It is alleged that
Astyochus, a Spartan
Admiral, was sent orders to kill him, but Alcibiades received warning of this
order and defected to the Persian satrap
Tissaphernes, who had
been supporting the Peloponnesian forces financially in 412.
Defection to Achaemenid Empire in Asia Minor
On his arrival in the local Persian court, Alcibiades won the trust of the
powerful satrap and made several policy suggestions which were well received.
According to Thucydides, Alcibiades immediately began to do all he could with
Tissaphernes to injure the Peloponnesian cause. At his urging, the satrap
reduced the payments he was making to the Peloponnesian fleet and began
delivering them irregularly. Alcibiades next advised Tissaphernes to bribe the
Generals of the cities to gain valuable intelligence on their activities.
Lastly, and most importantly, he told the satrap to be in no hurry to bring the
Persian fleet into the conflict, as the longer the war dragged out the more
exhausted the combatants would become. This would allow the Persians to more
easily conquer the region in the aftermath of the fighting. Alcibiades tried to
convince the satrap that it was in Persia's interest to wear both Athens and
Sparta out at first, "and after docking the Athenian power as much as he
could, forthwith to rid the country of the Peloponnesians". Although
Alcibiades's advice benefited the Persians, it was merely a means to an end;
Thucydides tells us that his real motive was to use his alleged influence with
the Persians to effect his restoration to Athens. Alcibiades was one of several
Greek aristocrats who took refuge in the Achaemenid Empire following reversals
at home, other famous ones being Themistocles, Demaratos or Gongylos. According
to Thucydides (Thuc.8.47), Alcibiades also advised the Achaemenid king (Darius
II), and therefore he may also have traveled to Susa or Babylonia to
encounter him.
Recall to Athens
Negotiations with the Athenian oligarchs
Alcibiades seemed to assume that the "radical democracy" would never
agree to his recall to Athens. Therefore, he exchanged messages with the
Athenian leaders at Samos and suggested that if they could install an oligarchy
friendly to him he would return to Athens and bring with him Persian money and
possibly the Persian fleet of 147 triremes. Alcibiades set about winning over
the most influential military officers, and achieved his goal by offering them
a threefold plan: the Athenian constitution was to be changed, the recall of
Alcibiades was to be voted, and Alcibiades was to win over Tissaphernes and the
King of Persia to the Athenian side. Most of the officers in the Athenian fleet
accepted the plan and welcomed the prospect of a narrower constitution, which
would allow them a greater share in determining policy. According to
Thucydides, only one of the Athenian Generals at Samos,
Phrynichus, opposed the
plan and argued that Alcibiades cared no more for the proposed oligarchy than
for the traditional democracy. The involvement in the plot of another General,
Thrasybulus, remains
unclear. These officers of the Athenian fleet formed a group of conspirators,
but were met with opposition from the majority of the soldiers and sailors;
these were eventually calmed down "by the advantageous prospect of the pay
from the king". The members of the group assembled and prepared to send
Pisander, one of their
number, on an embassy to Athens to treat for the restoration of Alcibiades and
the abolition of democracy in the city, and thus to make Tissaphernes the
friend of the Athenians. Phrynichus, fearing that Alcibiades if restored would
avenge himself upon him for his opposition, sent a secret letter to the Spartan
Admiral, Astyochus, to
tell him that Alcibiades was ruining their cause by making Tissaphernes the
friend of the Athenians, and containing an express revelation of the rest of
the intrigue. Astyochus went up to Alcibiades and Tissaphernes at Magnesia and
communicated to them Phrynichus's letter. Alcibiades responded in kind, sending
to the authorities at Samos a letter against Phrynichus, stating what he had
done, and requiring that he should be put to death. Phrynichus in desperation
wrote again to Astyochus, offering him a chance to destroy the Athenian fleet
at Samos. This also Astyochus revealed to Alcibiades who informed the officers
at Samos that they had been betrayed by Phrynichus. Alcibiades however gained
no credit, because Phrynichus had anticipated Alcibiades's letter and, before
the accusations could arrive, told the army that he had received information of
an enemy plan to attack the camp and that they should fortify Samos as quickly
as possible. Despite these events, Pisander and the other envoys of the
conspirators arrived at Athens and made a speech before the people. Pisander
won the argument, putting Alcibiades and his promises at the center. The
Ecclesia deposed Phrynichus and elected Pisander and ten other envoys to
negotiate with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades. At this point, Alcibiades's scheme
encountered a great obstacle. Tissaphernes would not make an agreement on any
terms, wanting to follow his policy of neutrality. As Kagan points out,
Tissaphernes was a prudent leader and had recognized the advantages of wearing
each side out without direct Persian involvement. Alcibiades realized this and,
by presenting the Athenians with stiffer and stiffer demands on Tissaphernes's
behalf, attempted to convince them that he had persuaded Tissaphernes to
support them, but that they had not conceded enough to him. Although the envoys
were angered at the audacity of the Persian demands, they nevertheless departed
with the impression that Alcibiades could have brought about an agreement among
the powers if he had chosen to do so. This fiasco at the court of Tissaphernes,
however, put an end to the negotiations between the conspirators and
Alcibiades. The group was convinced that Alcibiades could not deliver his side
of the bargain without demanding exorbitantly high concessions of them and they
accordingly abandoned their plans to restore him to Athens.
Reinstatement as an Athenian General
See also: Athenian coup of 411
In spite of the failure of the negotiations, the conspirators succeeded in
overthrowing the democracy and imposing the oligarchic government of the
Four Hundred, among the leaders of which were Phrynichus and Pisander. At
Samos, however, a similar coup instigated by the conspirators did not go
forward so smoothly. Samian democrats learned of the conspiracy and notified
four prominent Athenians: the generals Leon and Diomedon, the trierarch
Thrasybulus, and Thrasyllus, at that time a
hoplite in the ranks. With the support of these men and the Athenian soldiers
in general, the Samian democrats were able to defeat the 300 Samian oligarchs
who attempted to seize power there. Further, the Athenian troops at Samos
formed themselves into a political assembly, deposed their generals, and
elected new ones, including Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus. The army, stating that
they had not revolted from the city but that the city had revolted from them,
resolved to stand by the democracy while continuing to prosecute the war
against Sparta. After a time, Thrasybulus persuaded the assembled troops to
vote Alcibiades's recall, a policy that he had supported since before the coup.
Then he sailed to retrieve Alcibiades and returned with him to Samos. The aim
of this policy was to win away Persian support from the Spartans, as it was
still believed that Alcibiades had great influence with Tissaphernes. Plutarch
claims that the army sent for Alcibiades so as to use his help in putting down
the tyrants in Athens. Kagan argues that this reinstatement was a
disappointment to Alcibiades, who had hoped for a glorious return to Athens
itself but found himself only restored to the rebellious fleet, where the
immunity from prosecution he had been granted "protected him for the time
being but not from a reckoning in the future"; furthermore, the recall,
which Alcibiades had hoped to bring about through his own prestige and
perceived influence, was achieved through the patronage of Thrasybulus. At his
first speech to the assembled troops, Alcibiades complained bitterly about the
circumstances of his exile, but the largest part of the speech consisted of
boasting about his influence with Tissaphernes. The primary motives of his
speech were to make the oligarchs at Athens afraid of him and to increase his
credit with the army at Samos. Upon hearing his speech the troops immediately
elected him General alongside Thrasybulus and the others. In fact, he roused
them so much that they proposed to sail at once for Piraeus and attack the
oligarchs in Athens. It was primarily Alcibiades, along with Thrasybulus, who
calmed the people and showed them the folly of this proposal, which would have
sparked civil war and led to the immediate defeat of Athens. Shortly after
Alcibiades's reinstatement as an Athenian general, the government of the Four
Hundred was overthrown and replaced by a broader oligarchy, which would
eventually give way to democracy. Presently Alcibiades sailed to Tissaphernes
with a detachment of ships. According to Plutarch, the supposed purpose of this
mission was to stop the Persian fleet from coming to the aid of the
Peloponnesians. Thucydides is in agreement with Plutarch that the Persian fleet
was at Aspendus and that Alcibiades told the troops he would bring the fleet to
their side or prevent it from coming at all, but Thucydides further speculates
that the real reason was to flaunt his new position to Tissaphernes and try to
gain some real influence over him. According to the historian, Alcibiades had
long known that Tissaphernes never meant to bring the fleet at all.
Battles of Abydos
and Cyzicus
Further information: Battle of Abydos and Battle of Cyzicus The Athenian
strategy at Cyzicus. Left: Alcibiades's decoy force (blue) lures the Spartan
fleet (black) out to sea. Right: Thrasybulus and Theramenes bring their
squadrons in behind the Spartans to cut off their retreat towards Cyzicus,
while Alcibiades turns to face the pursuing force.
Alcibiades was recalled by the "intermediate regime" of The Five
Thousand, the government which succeeded the Four Hundred in 411, but it is
most likely that he waited until 407 to actually return to the city. Plutarch
tells us that, although his recall had already been passed on motion of
Critias, a political ally of his, Alcibiades was resolved to come back with
glory. While this was certainly his goal, it was again a means to an end, that
end being to avoid prosecution upon his return to Athens. The next significant
part he would play in the war would occur at the Battle of Abydos. Alcibiades
had remained behind at Samos with a small force while Thrasybulus and
Thrasyllus led the greater part of the fleet to the Hellespont. During this
period, Alcibiades succeeded in raising money from Caria and the neighboring
area, with which he was able to pay the rowers and gain their favor. After the
Athenian victory at Cynossema, both
fleets summoned all their ships from around the Aegean to join them for what
might be a decisive next engagement. While Alcibiades was still en route, the
two fleets clashed at Abydos, where the Peloponnesians had set up their main
naval base. The battle was evenly matched, and raged for a long time, but the
balance tipped towards the Athenians when Alcibiades sailed into the Hellespont
with eighteen triremes. The Persian satrap
Pharnabazus, who had
replaced Tissaphernes as the sponsor of the Peloponnesian fleet, moved his land
army to the shore to defend the ships and sailors who had beached their ships.
Only the support of the Persian land army and the coming of night saved the
Peloponnesian fleet from complete destruction. Shortly after the battle,
Tissaphernes had arrived in the Hellespont and Alcibiades left the fleet at
Sestos to meet him, bringing
gifts and hoping once again to try to win over the Persian governor. Evidently
Alcibiades had gravely misjudged his standing with the satrap, and he was
arrested on arrival. Within a month he would escape and resume command. It was
now obvious, however, that he had no influence with the Persians; from now on
his authority would depend on what he actually could accomplish rather than on
what he promised to do.
After an interlude of several months in which the Peloponnesians constructed
new ships and the Athenians besieged cities and raised money throughout the
Aegean, the next major sea battle took place the spring of 410 at Cyzicus.
Alcibiades had been forced to flee from Sestos to Cardia to protect his small
fleet from the rebuilt Peloponnesian navy, but as soon as the Athenian fleet
was reunited there its commanders led it to Cyzicus, where the Athenians had
intelligence indicating that Pharnabazus and
Mindarus, the
Peloponnesian fleet commander, were together plotting their next move.
Concealed by storm and darkness, the combined Athenian force reached the
vicinity without being spotted by the Peloponnesians. Here the Athenians
devised a plot to draw the enemy into battle. According to Diodorus Siculus,
Alcibiades advanced with a small squadron in order to draw the Spartans out to
battle, and, after he successfully deceived Mindarus with this ploy, the
squadrons of Thrasybulus and Theramenes came to join him, cutting off the
Spartans' retreat. The Spartan fleet suffered losses in the flight and reached
the shore with the Athenians in close pursuit. Alcibiades's troops, leading the
Athenian pursuit, landed and attempted to pull the Spartan ships back out to
sea. The Peloponnesians fought to prevent their ships from being towed away,
and Pharnabazus's troops came up to support them. Thrasybulus landed his own
force to temporarily relieve pressure on Alcibiades, and meanwhile ordered
Theramenes to join up with Athenian land forces nearby and bring them to
reinforce the sailors and marines on the beach. The Spartans and Persians,
overwhelmed by the arrival of multiple forces from several directions, were
defeated and driven off, and the Athenians captured all the Spartan ships which
were not destroyed. A letter dispatched to Sparta by Hippocrates, vice-admiral
under Mindarus, was intercepted and taken to Athens; it ran as follows:
"The ships are lost. Mindarus is dead. The men are starving. We know not
what to do". A short time later Sparta petitioned for peace, but their
appeals were ultimately rejected by the Athenians.
Further military successes
Alcibiades traveled to the Chersonese in 408 and attacked the city of Selymbria
on the north shore of the Propontis. After their victory, Alcibiades and
Thrasybulus began the siege of Chalcedon in 409 with about 190 ships. Although
unable to attain a decisive victory or induce the city to surrender, Alcibiades
was able to win a small tactical land battle outside of the city gates and
Theramenes concluded an agreement with the Chalcedonians. Afterwards they
concluded a temporary alliance with Pharnabazus which secured some much needed
immediate cash for the army, but despite this Alcibiades was still forced to
depart in search for more booty to pay the soldiers and oarsmen of the fleet.
In pursuit of these funds he traveled to the Thracian Chersonese and attacked
Selymbria. He plotted with a pro-Athenian party within the city and offered the
Selymbrians reasonable terms and imposed strict discipline to see that they
were observed. He did their city no injury whatsoever, but merely took a sum of
money from it, set a garrison in it and left. Epigraphical evidence indicates
the Selymbrians surrendered hostages until the treaty was ratified in Athens.
His performance is judged as skillful by historians, since it saved time,
resources, and lives and still fully achieved his goal. From here Alcibiades
joined in the siege of Byzantium along with Theramenes and Thrasyllus. A
portion of the citizens of the city, demoralized and hungry, decided to
surrender the city to Alcibiades for similar terms as the Selymbrians had
received. On the designated night the defenders left their posts, and the
Athenians attacked the Peloponnesian garrison in the city and their boats in
the harbor. The portion of the citizenry that remained loyal to the
Peloponnesians fought so savagely that Alcibiades issued a statement in the
midst of the fighting which guaranteed their safety and this persuaded the
remaining citizens to turn against the Peloponnesian garrison, which was nearly
totally destroyed.
Return to Athens, dismissal, and death
It was in the aftermath of these successes that Alcibiades resolved to finally
return to Athens in the spring of 407. Even in the wake of his recent
victories, Alcibiades was exceedingly careful in his return, mindful of the
changes in government, the charges still technically hanging over him, and the
great injury he had done to Athens. Thus Alcibiades, instead of going straight
home, first went to Samos to pick up 20 ships and proceeded with them to the
Ceramic Gulf where he collected 100 talents. He finally sailed to Gytheion to
make inquiries, partly about the reported preparations of the Spartans there,
and partly about the feelings in Athens about his return. His inquiries assured
him that the city was kindly disposed towards him and that his closest friends
urged him to return. Therefore, he finally sailed into Piraeus where the crowd
had gathered, desiring to see the famous Alcibiades. He entered the harbor full
of fear till he saw his cousin and others of his friends and acquaintance, who
invited him to land. Upon arriving on shore he was greeted with a hero's
welcome. Nevertheless, some saw an evil omen in the fact that he had returned
to Athens on the very day when the ceremony of the Plynteria (the feast where
the old statue of Athena would get cleansed) was being celebrated. This was
regarded as the unluckiest day of the year to undertake anything of importance.
His enemies took note of this and kept it in mind for a future occasion. All
the criminal proceedings against him were canceled and the charges of blasphemy
were officially withdrawn. Alcibiades was able to assert his piety and to raise
Athenian morale by leading the solemn procession to Eleusis (for the
celebration of the Eleusinian Mysteries) by land for the first time since the
Spartans had occupied Decelea. The procession had been replaced by a journey by
sea, but this year Alcibiades used a detachment of soldiers to escort the
traditional procession. His property was restored and the ecclesia elected him
supreme commander of land and sea (strategos autokrator).
Battle of Notium
In 406 Alcibiades set out from Athens with 1,500 hoplites and a hundred ships.
He failed to take Andros and then he went on to Samos. Later he moved to
Notium, closer to the enemy at Ephesus. In the meanwhile Tissaphernes had been
replaced by Cyrus the Younger (son of Darius II of Persia) who decided to
financially support the Peloponnesians. This new revenue started to attract
Athenian deserters to the Spartan navy. Additionally the Spartans had replaced
Mindarus with Lysander, a
very capable admiral. These factors caused the rapid growth of the
Peloponnesian fleet at the expense of the Athenian. In search of funds and
needing to force another decisive battle, Alcibiades left Notium and sailed to
help Thrasybulus in the siege of Phocaea. Alcibiades was aware the Spartan
fleet was nearby, so he left nearly eighty ships to watch them under the
command of his personal helmsman
Antiochus, who was given
express orders not to attack. Antiochus disobeyed this single order and
endeavored to draw Lysander into a fight by imitating the tactics used at
Cyzicus. The situation at Notium, however, was radically different from that at
Cyzicus; the Athenians possessed no element of surprise, and Lysander had been
well informed about their fleet by deserters. Antiochus's ship was sunk, and he
was killed by a sudden Spartan attack; the remaining ships of the decoy force
were then chased headlong back toward Notium, where the main Athenian force was
caught unprepared by the sudden arrival of the whole Spartan fleet. In the
ensuing fighting, Lysander gained an entire victory. Alcibiades soon returned
and desperately tried to undo the defeat at Notium by scoring another victory,
but Lysander could not be compelled to attack the fleet again. Responsibility
for the defeat ultimately fell on Alcibiades, and his enemies used the
opportunity to attack him and have him removed from command, although some
modern scholars believe that Alcibiades was unfairly blamed for Antiochus's
mistake. Diodorus reports that, in addition to his mistake at Notium,
Alcibiades was discharged on account of false accusations brought against him
by his enemies. According to Anthony Andrewes, professor of ancient history,
the extravagant hopes that his successes of the previous summer had created
were a decisive element in his downfall. Consequently, Alcibiades condemned
himself to exile. Never again returning to Athens, he sailed north to the
castles in the Thracian Chersonese, which he had secured during his time in the
Hellespont. The implications of the defeat were severe for Athens. Although the
defeat had been minor, it occasioned the removal of not only Alcibiades but
also his allies like Thrasybulus, Theramenes and Critias. These were likely the
most capable commanders Athens had at the time, and their removal would help
lead to the Athenian surrender only two years later, after their complete
defeat at Aegospotami. With one exception, Alcibiades's role in the war ended
with his command.
Prior to the Battle of
Aegospotami,
in the last attested fact of his career, Alcibiades recognized that the
Athenians were anchored in a tactically disadvantageous spot and advised them
to move to Sestus where they could benefit from a harbor and a city. Diodorus,
however, does not mention this advice, arguing instead that Alcibiades offered
the Generals Thracian aid in exchange for a share in the command. In any case,
the Generals of the Athenians, "considering that in case of defeat the
blame would attach to them and that in case of success all men would attribute
it to Alcibiades", asked him to leave and not come near the camp ever
again. Days later the fleet would be annihilated by Lysander. After the Battle
of Aegospotami, Alcibiades crossed the Hellespont and took refuge in
Hellespontine
Phrygia, with the object of securing the aid of the Achaemenid King
Artaxerxes against Sparta. Alcibiades was one of several Greek aristocrats who
took refuge in the Achaemenid Empire following reversals at home, other famous
ones being Themistocles, Hippias, Demaratos or Gongylos. In general, those were
generously welcomed by the Achaemenid kings, and received land grants to
support them, and ruled in various cities of Asia Minor. Much about
Alcibiades's death is now uncertain, as there are conflicting accounts.
According to the oldest of these, the Spartans and specifically Lysander were
responsible. Though many of his details cannot be independently corroborated,
Plutarch's version is this: Lysander sent an envoy to Pharnabazus who then
dispatched his brother to Phrygia where Alcibiades was living with his
mistress, Timandra. In 404, as he was about to set out for the Persian court,
his residence was surrounded and set on fire. Seeing no chance of escape he
rushed out on his assassins, dagger in hand, and was killed by a shower of
arrows. According to Aristotle, the site of Alcibiades's death was Elaphus, a
mountain in Phrygia.
Political career
In ancient Greece, Alcibiades was a polarizing figure. According to Thucydides,
Alcibiades, being "exceedingly ambitious", proposed the expedition in
Sicily in order "to gain in wealth and reputation by means of his
successes". Alcibiades is not held responsible by Thucydides for the
destruction of Athens, since "his habits gave offence to every one, and
caused the Athenians to commit affairs to other hands, and thus before long to
ruin the city". Plutarch regards him as "the least scrupulous and
most entirely careless of human beings". On the other hand, Diodorus
argues that he was "in spirit brilliant and intent upon great
enterprises". Sharon Press of Brown University points out that Xenophon
emphasizes Alcibiades's service to the state, rather than the harm he was
charged with causing it. Demosthenes defends Alcibiades's achievements, saying
that he had taken arms in the cause of democracy, displaying his patriotism,
not by gifts of money or by speeches, but by personal service. For Demosthenes
and other orators, Alcibiades epitomized the figure of the great man during the
glorious days of the Athenian democracy and became a rhetorical symbol. One of
Isocrates' speeches, delivered by Alcibiades the Younger, argues that the
statesman deserved the Athenians' gratitude for the service he had given them.
Lysias, on the other hand, argued in one of his orations that the Athenians
should regard Alcibiades as an enemy because of the general tenor of his life,
as "he repays with injury the open assistance of any of his friends".
In the Constitution of the Athenians, Aristotle does not include Alcibiades in
the list of the best Athenian politicians, but in Posterior Analytics he argues
that traits of a proud man like Alcibiades are "equanimity amid the
vicissitudes of life and impatience of dishonor". Alcibiades excited in
his contemporaries a fear for the safety of the political order. Therefore,
Andocides said of him that "instead of holding that he ought himself to
conform with the laws of the state, he expects you to conform with his own way
of life". Central to the depiction of the Athenian statesman is Cornelius
Nepos' famous phrase that Alcibiades
"surpassed all the Athenians in grandeur and magnificence of living".
Even today, Alcibiades divides scholars. For Malcolm F. McGregor, former head
of the Department of Classics in the University of British Columbia, Alcibiades
was rather a shrewd gambler than a mere opportunist. Evangelos P. Fotiadis, a
prominent Greek philologist, asserts that Alcibiades was "a first class
diplomat" and had "huge skills". Nevertheless, his spiritual
powers were not counterbalanced with his magnificent mind and he had the hard
luck to lead a people susceptible to demagoguery. K. Paparrigopoulos, a major
modern Greek historian, underlines his "spiritual virtues" and
compares him with Themistocles, but he then asserts that all these gifts
created a "traitor, an audacious and impious man". Walter Ellis
believes that his actions were outrageous, but they were performed with
panache. For his part, David Gribble argues that Alcibiades's actions against
his city were misunderstood and believes that "the tension which led to
Alcibiades's split with the city was between purely personal and civic
values". Russell Meiggs, a British ancient historian, asserts that the
Athenian statesman was absolutely unscrupulous despite his great charm and
brilliant abilities. According to Meiggs his actions were dictated by selfish
motives and his feud with Cleon and his successors undermined Athens. The same
scholar underscores the fact that "his example of restless and
undisciplined ambition strengthened the charge brought against Socrates".
Even more critically, Athanasios G. Platias and Constantinos Koliopoulos,
professors of strategic studies and international politics, state that
Alcibiades's own arguments "should be sufficient to do away with the
notion that Alcibiades was a great statesman, as some people still
believe". Writing from a different perspective, psychologist Anna C.
Salter cites Alcibiades as exhibiting "all the classic features of
psychopathy." A similar assessment is made by Hervey Cleckley at the end
of chapter 5 in his The Mask of Sanity.
Military achievements
Despite his critical comments, Thucydides admits in a short digression that
"publicly his conduct of the war was as good as could be desired".
Diodorus and Demosthenes regard him as a great general. According to Fotiadis,
Alcibiades was an invincible general and, wherever he went, victory followed
him; had he led the army in Sicily, the Athenians would have avoided disaster
and, had his countrymen followed his advice at Aegospotami, Lysander would have
lost and Athens would have ruled Greece. On the other hand, Paparrigopoulos
believes that the Sicilian Expedition, prompted by Alcibiades, was a strategic
mistake. In agreement with Paparrigopoulos, Platias and Koliopoulos underscore
the fact that the Sicilian expedition was a strategic blunder of the first
magnitude, resulting from a "frivolous attitude and an unbelievable
underestimation of the enemy". For his part, Angelos Vlachos, a Greek
Academician, underlines the constant interest of Athens for Sicily from the
beginning of the war. According to Vlachos, the expedition had nothing of the
extravagant or adventurous and constituted a rational strategic decision based
on traditional Athenian aspirations. Vlachos asserts that Alcibiades had
already conceived a broader plan: the conquest of the whole West. He intended
to conquer Carthage and Libya, then to attack Italy and, after winning these,
to seize Italy and Peloponnesus. The initial decision of the ecclesia provided
however for a reasonable military force, which later became unreasonably large
and costly because of Nicias's demands. Kagan criticizes Alcibiades for failing
to recognize that the large size of the Athenian expedition undermined the
diplomatic scheme on which his strategy rested. Kagan believes that while
Alcibiades was a commander of considerable ability, he was no military genius,
and his confidence and ambitions went far beyond his skills. He thus was
capable of important errors and serious miscalculations. Kagan argues that at
Notium, Alcibiades committed a serious error in leaving the fleet in the hands
of an inexperienced officer, and that most of the credit for the brilliant
victory at Cyzicus must be assigned to Thrasybulus. In this judgement, Kagan
agrees with Cornelius Nepos, who said that the Athenians' extravagant opinion
of Alcibiades's abilities and valor was his chief misfortune. Press argues that
"though Alcibiades can be considered a good General on the basis of his
performance in the Hellespont, he would not be considered so on the basis of
his performance in Sicily", but "the strengths of Alcibiades's
performance as a General outweigh his faults".
Skill in oratory
Plutarch asserts that "Alcibiades was a most able speaker in addition to
his other gifts", while Theophrastus argues that Alcibiades was the most
capable of discovering and understanding what was required in a given case.
Nevertheless, he would often stumble in the midst of his speech, but then he
would resume and proceed with all the caution in the world. Even the lisp he
had, which was noticed by Aristophanes, made his talk persuasive and full of
charm. Eupolis says that he was "prince of talkers, but in speaking most
incapable"; which is to say, more eloquent in his private discourses than
when orating before the ecclesia. For his part, Demosthenes underscores the
fact that Alcibiades was regarded as "the ablest speaker of the day".
Paparrigopoulos does not accept Demosthenes's opinion, but acknowledges that
the Athenian statesman could sufficiently support his case. Kagan acknowledges
his rhetorical power, whilst Thomas Habinek, professor of Classics at the
University of Southern California, believes that the orator Alcibiades seemed
to be whatever his audience needed on any given occasion. According to Habinek,
in the field of oratory, the people responded to Alcibiades's affection with
affection of their own. Therefore, the orator was "the institution of the
city talking to—and loving—itself". According to Aristophanes,
Athens "yearns for him, and hates him too, but wants him back".
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