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The Aetolian campaign, often referred to as
"Demosthenes' Aetolian campaign", was a failed Athenian offensive in
northwestern Greece during the Archidamian War. In 426, Demosthenes was
dispatched from Athens to the Corinthian Gulf in command of a fleet of 30
ships. Arriving in the northwest, he quickly assembled a coalition force from
Athens' allies in the region and besieging the city of Leucas. Before that
siege reached a conclusion, however, he was persuaded to abandon it in favor of
an attack on the tribal region of Aetolia. Leaving Leucas, he set out towards
Aetolia, losing along the way several major contingents from his army, whose
leaders were apparently unhappy with his change in strategy. At first the
invasion met with little resistance, and several towns fell easily, but before
long an effective Aetolian force was gathered by summoning tribesmen from
throughout the region. Demosthenes, meanwhile, having alienated his Acarnanian
allies and failed to rendezvous as scheduled with reinforcements from Locris,
was critically short of the peltasts (spear throwers) whose range and mobility
could prove decisive in the rough terrain of Aetolia. After seizing the town of
Aegitium, Demosthenes's army came under heavy attack from high ground and was
driven into a retreat that soon became a rout. A great number of his men
perished, and any notion of taking Aetolia had to be abandoned. The battle
emboldened Sparta's allies in the region, meanwhile, and lasting damage to
Athenian interests was avoided only through a tactically brilliant defense of
Naupactus and Acarnania (which fully restored Demosthenes' military
reputation).
Opponents: Athens, Naupactus, Cephallonia, Zacynthus versus Aetolian tribal
forces
Commanders and leaders:
Athenians - Demosthenes,
Procles †
Aetolians - Unknown
Strength:
Athenians - 2,500
Aetolians - 3,000
Casualties and losses:
Athenains - Severe; 120 of 300 Athenians, unknown for other allies
Aetolians - Relatively few
Prelude:
In the summer of 426, Athens, having ended the immediate threat to its security
by quashing the Mytilenean revolt in the previous year, took a more aggressive
stance than in previous campaigning seasons. A major fleet of 60 ships,
commanded by Nicias, was sent to attack first Melos and then Boeotia (resulting
in the Battle of Tanagra). Demosthenes and
Procles, meanwhile, with a fleet of half that size, were dispatched to round
the Peloponnese and operate in the northwest and the Corinthian Gulf. Upon its
arrival in the northwestern theatre, this relatively small Athenian force was
substantially augmented by the addition of Messenian hoplites from Naupactus,
15 Corcyraean ships, a great number of Acarnanian soldiers, and smaller
contingents from a number of Athens' other allies in the region. With this
formidable force, Demosthenes fell upon and destroyed a garrison of Leucadian
troops, then attacked and blockaded the city of Leucas itself. Leucas was a
significant Peloponnesian base in the region, and the Acarnanians
enthusiastically advocated besieging and taking the city. Demosthenes, however,
chose instead to follow the advice of the Messenians, who wished to attack and
subdue the tribal region of Aetolia, which they asserted was threatening
Naupactus.
Thucydides notes that Demosthenes made this decision partly to please his
Messenian allies, but also states that he also wished to, if possible, pass
through Aetolia, increase his army on the march by adding to it the men of
Phocis, and attack Boeotia from the lightly defended western approach.
Furthermore, as Nicias was simultaneously engaging in operations in eastern
Boeotia, Demosthenes may have considered the possibility of forcing the
Boeotians to fight on two fronts. Accordingly, he pulled up stakes at Leucas
and set out for Aetolia. Before he arrived there, however, his force was
appreciably diminished by the departure of several major contingents; the
Acarnanians, upset that their preferred strategy of taking Leucas had been
spurned, returned to their home country, and the Corcyraean ships also departed
(apparently out of unwillingness to participate in an operation that offered
their city no clear benefits).
Campaign:
If Demosthenes was daunted by these significant breaches in his coalition, he
did not reveal it with his immediate actions. Establishing a base at the city
of Oeneon in Locris, he began to advance into Aetolia, after making plans to
rendezvous with a Locrian force in the Aetolian interior. His army advanced
successfully for three days, reaching the town of Tichium on the third day.
Here, Demosthenes called a halt while the plunder captured up to that point was
transported back to his base. Some modern scholars have also suggested that the
Locrian force that Demosthenes had planned to meet up with had been scheduled
to join him at or before Tichium, and that his delay there was in part caused
by his concern over their absence. The Locrians practiced a style of warfare
similar to that of their Aetolian neighbors, and could have provided
Demosthenes with skilled javelin throwers; in their absence, the Athenian-led
force was critically deficient with regard to light missile troops, where its
opponents were strongest. Nonetheless, his confidence bolstered by the
Messenians, who assured him that the element of surprise would guarantee
success as long as he continued to strike before the Aetolians had a chance to
combine their forces against him, Demosthenes continued inland. The Messenians'
advice, however, was already out of date. The Aetolians had learned of
Demosthenes' plans even before he invaded, and by this time they had assembled
a substantial force from throughout the region. Demosthenes advanced to the
town of Aegitium, which he took easily, but he would go no further. The
inhabitants of Aegitium retreated to the hills around the town, where they
joined the main Aetolian army, and soon Demosthenes' force came under assault
from the surrounding high ground. Moving with relative ease over the rough
terrain, the Aetolian javelin throwers were able to fling their weapons and
retreat easily before the heavily encumbered Athenian hoplites could reach
them; without the Locrians, Demosthenes could rely only on a contingent of
archers to keep the Aetolian skirmishers at bay. Even with the archers
defending them, the Athenians were receiving the worst of the struggle; when
the captain of the archers was killed, his men scattered, and the rest of the
army shortly followed them. A bloodbath ensued. Demosthenes' co-commander
Procles was killed, as was the Messenian guide. Leaderless troops of fleeing
soldiers raced into exitless dry canyons or became lost on the battlefield,
while the fast moving Aetolians mowed them down; the largest escaping
contingent became lost in a forest, which was then set on fire around them. 120
of the 300 Athenians who had marched with Demosthenes were killed; casualties
among the allies are not known, but were presumably of a similar order. Such
losses were particularly exorbitant when contrasted with the toll of a
traditional hoplite battle, in which casualty rates of over 10% were highly
unusual.
Aftermath:
After returning to Naupactus, the defeated Athenian force sailed for home,
leaving behind it a newly precarious strategic situation and a commander with a
severely shaken reputation; the Aetolians were emboldened by their victory and
began preparing for an offensive against Naupactus, and Demosthenes was so
concerned about his potential reception in Athens (where the assembly was known
to deal harshly with disgraced generals) that he chose not to return home with
his fleet. In the upcoming months, however, the strategic situation would be
stabilized and Demosthenes' reputation restored by his spectacular victory at
Olpae.
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