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Mr. Lind insists on beginning many of his thought provoking articles in
the GAZETTE on maneuver warfare (Mar80, Sep81, et al.) by suggesting that
Marines are confused concerning this subject. Since almost every issue of the
GAZETTE includes an article or reference to an article on maneuver warfare and
it is the focus of attention in many FMF commands, it is logical to conclude
that Marines are beginning to grasp the basic thesis.
Not only do many Marines understand the thesis, many have actually come to
believe something is missing from it. Mr. Lind states that the “Boyd
Theory” is the heart of maneuver warfare. As explained by him, however, it
is difficult to understand how theories derived from air combat tactics apply
directly to ground combat. How valid is the Boyd Theory to ground combat? I
suggest that it is valid if the role of intelligence can be identified within
the theory. Since the theory was based on air combat tactics it is essential to
examine the platform from which the theory was developed from an aircraft.
Does this platform have the necessary intelligence capability to allow the
theory to work? Yes it does. The instrumentation of an aircraft is for all
practicality an onboard combat information center that gives the pilot and the
computerized guidance and firing system the necessary intelligence to go
through repeated cycles of observation-orientationdecision-action. On the
ground, given a triple canopy and other terrain where the enemy’s actions
are masked, the Boyd Theory is valid only if the observation segment of this
theory is first translated into an effective intelligence system. Without it, a
ground commander will never see the opportunities before him in a combat
situation. The dissemination of intelligence in maneuver warfare is key. Unless
it is accomplished expeditiously and thoroughly, a rapid
observationorientation-decision-action cycle cannot be maintained at lower
levels of command. Procedures and techniques must be developed to speed the
flow of intelligence to units at the company and battalion level over secure
voice communications nets. Identification of intelligence as an element of the
Boyd Theory, adds credibility to the maneuver warfare thesis and diminishes the
abstract nature of Mr. Lind’s explanations. Regardless of the style of
warfare employed, intelligence is and always will be a key element. We must
know our enemy, his capabilities, his limitations, and ultimately, his intent
if we expect to be victorious.
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