MEDIEVAL WARFARE

HANS DELBRUCK

History of the Art of War, Vol. III, trans by Walter J. Renfroe, Jr., Univ. of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 1982, 709 pgs., illustrations, index, paperback

Reviewer Comment:
This is a direct continuation of Delbruck's volume II as a cultural history - the interaction of a society's culture and its warfighting capacity and the changes in warfighting ethos and its culture.
Some recent critics complain that Delbruck only picked and included some events or subjects out of all history of the Middle Ages. That he was selective is true. It was because he was focused on the close interrelation of politics and warfare and selected examples which he believed would represent the fundamental changes during that era. Critics also complain about specific mistakes. Again, they are correct, he could only study was was known, circa 1900. In the recent 120 years a huge volume of source material has become available, which scholars have used to change, significantly, many ideas about society, culture and warfare in this period. This is not a history of battles, which the chapter titles indicate. The theories about the entire history and nature of 'feudalism' has been changed. I include a list of the more recent references. There are many books that describe battles, and others that focus on arms and armor - technology. Delbruck had different objectives.
1 was to show that the accounts of the size of armies were wrong - too large.
2 was to show the direct interrelationship between political policy and warfare.
3 was to show that there are more than one type of strategic method and 'annihilation' is not the only one.
He did describe individual battles or campaigns selected as examples (not merely for their own sake). Each battle was significant for much more than its particular result - study and analysis can reveal that it is an example of Delbruck's larger subject. While all the campaigns and battles that he includes are all caused by the goals of the individual rulers, he does not point this out.

Book I: Charlemagne and His Successors:

I: Charlemagne:
The chapter is all about the interrelations between the military structure organization, armament, tactics and campaigns as the social-political-economic environment - that is the culture. He mentions battles and campaigns with dates but does not describe them. Dr. Delbruck begins with his explanation of the method and role of a transformation of the invading Germans in the Frankish Kingdom. He believes the 'warrior class' of these tribes were converted into the 'feudal system' as vassals 'obligated by the granting of Fiefs". I don't believe historians today agree with this concept. He continues, "These warriors were predominately mounted men and had to bring their own supplies with them. Consequently, the equipping of even one such warrior was a very heavy burden." He lists the prices of arms and armor in terms of cows. His usual method of using data is fine. And he does note that there was a significant difference between those early Frankish warriors and Carolingian military men. But he claims that the latter were paid by the introduction of Fiefs. His general description is to tie military to social conditions. One of his fundamental points is to show how small the armies of Charlemagne were. The chapter text is followed by extensive motes with more details.

II: The Subjugation of the Saxons:
The question which he answers is how did the small military force of the Carolingian's succeed in subduing the Saxons while the much larger and better equipped and organized Roman army could not do so 750 years previously. He answers by pointing out that by the latter time the Saxon geographic area was much smaller. But more significant is that the Saxon's of Charlemagne's time were different than those of Augustus Caesar's time - much different from the ancient real barbarian warrior. By the later era the Saxon's were no longer all warriors but farmers and 'burghers' without warlike ideas. He continues: "But with this basic difference not only are the numbers changed but also the other strategic conditions of waging war." Throughout his analysis he compares the Roman campaigns with Charlemagne's. They took place in the same geographic location, but the area was actually quite different due to the economic development during 750 years. And the nature of the society, its culture and the beliefs of the population were different.
Delbruck does not mention Charlemagne's policy of taking Saxon youth for 'reeducation' in Frank families or court. He does mention, but without stress that the Carolingians had something that the Romans lacked, an ideological campaign based on religious conversion. He does not mention that for the Romans expanding their empire across the Rhine into un economic territory simply was not worth the effort..

III: The Carolingian Empire, the Normans, and the Hungarians:
In this brief chapter Delbruck again uses comparisons. The question he answers is why the Carolingian domain with a very large population was so weak militarily in its confrontations with the Normans and Hungarians. Again, as with the later Roman Empire it was a contest between a peaceful mass of peasantry and town folk and small but very warlike raiding forces that were highly mobile.

Book II: The Feudal State at the Height of Its Development

I: The Formation of Nations on the Remains of the Carolingian Empire:
The subject is the relationship of war and politics, not narrowly focused only on war.
Delbruck uses the terms 'state' and 'nation' neither of which I believe were ideas that the people of the 10th century recognized. He does note that the rulership of Merovingians and Carolingians was held by family ownership which collapsed after Charlemagne's death. But while the central authority dissolved, the role of political-military leader in the localities remained in the hands of families. He ascribes the development of more effective military forces at the local level to the continual conflicts between these dukes, counts, bishops and kings in which all devoted attention to improving their personal military power. Again, a comparison, as he sees a similarity between these local civil wars in 10th century west Europe to the local civil wars between classical Greek cities which enabled them to produce military forces sufficient to defeat the larger Persian Empire.

II: The Battle on the Lechfeld:
Delbruck selected this battle as, 'The first national German battle against a foreign enemy."
In other words a military event having political significance. But Germany at the time was not a nation. Delbruck, himself, notes that King Otto had to call for contingents from a number of separate rulers. He writes: "The first battle in which this new nation proved itself, a battle in which warriors of all the peoples cooperated...". He provides as full of an account as his primary sources enable. He notes that one contingent was NOT German but Bohemian, and others were Saxons or Franks, and Swabians and Bavarians. He devotes much space and discussion to the question about from which direction King Otto reached the battlefield. This may be because Delbruck likes to discount the reliability of primary sources. He focuses on deciding where Otto assembled his different contingents because it reveals true strategic thinking. Instead, he writes, of Otto assembling at a location to block further Hungarian advance westward, but to assemble at a location to enable him to attack the Hungarians from their rear, blocking their line of retreat. This is to show that medieval commanders did think strategically, something that some historians discount. Moreover, he reveals further strategic thinking in the role assigned to the Lorranian army. He credits this astute strategic plan with the achievement of the total victory. Among his analytic results is to overthrow the written opinion of other German historians that King Otto was not a great commander. But quite to the contrary.

Delbruck includes a rule: "For the battle is the only true test that decides whether the strategy has been correctly determined."

Notice that he does NOT describe the actual battle at all. He, as often, does follow the main text with an 'excurus' in which he examines the primary sources.

III: The Battles of Emperor Henry IV:
Delbruck opens with the Battle at Homburg on the Unstrut 9 June 1075, for which he has three accounts, but two are 'tendentious'. He finds the entire story of the battle to be full of various errors.

Next is the War between Henry IV and the Counterking Rudolf. Rudolf had declared himself king while Henry was doing penance before Pope Gregory VII and Tuscan Count Matilda at her fortress, Cannosa. After months of marching back and forth and of negotiations the battle finally took place on 7 August 1078 at Melichstadt. Again, the armies involved were contingents of various dukes against the royal army of the King. Among the rebels supporting Duke Rudolf of Swabia we see Duke Welf of Bavaria, a name that generated support in Italy for centuries. Delbruck selected this battle as an illustration of one between mounted knights in which some were victorious and some promptly fled the scene. It is an example he wished to consider typical of knightly contests.
He writes: "the particular significance is that it is almost impossible to stop knights, once they have started to flee. Even with disciplined cavalry, it is very difficult, to do so, and with knights it is not only more difficult psychologically, but particularly because it is impossible to take up a rallying position in order to clarify the situation...".
This inherent feature of knights is one of his contentions that has been disputed by recent historians. The immediate result of the battle was that King Henry IV lost but achieved his strategic goal of keeping the Swabian and Saxon armies separated. While Counterking Rudolf had won but didn't realize it and withdrew to Saxony. His ally, Palatine Count Frederick of Saxony won in that he retained possession of the battlefield. It took time to reassemble a force of knights.

The next up is the Battle of Flarchheim on 27 January 1080. Melichstadt showed that Rudolf was fundamentally too weak to assume an offensive, while Henry then appeared strong enough for other local rulers to risk joining him for a winter offensive. The battle resulted in a draw.
Battle of Elstere, 15 October 1080. This occurred after Pope Gregory VII again excommunicated Henry. All the contending rulers in and around Germany (larger description) recognized that negotiations were not possible, so set about assembling as large a force as they could. Henry assumed the offensive. After maneuvering to assemble their forces, they met near the Elstere River. Politics played a part in determining which rulers would support with 'kings'. The Saxons trapped Henry with his back to the river.

Delbruck offers another rule." An army that depends almost entirely on close-combat weapons and primarily on mounted men at that, finds it too difficult to fight delaying rear guard actions in order to gain time for an orderly withdrawal by the main body." The result was that Henry lost but was rescued by the Duke of Bohemia while Rudolf won but was killed while fighting as a 'heroic' knight. Delbruck's attention and analysis is on the reasons for Henry's choosing his route of march and planned location for assembly of his disparate contingents. He considers the answer to be logistics, specifically food supply.

Delbruck's conclusion: "The fact that Henry IV failed in his attempt to overcome this difficulty (food supply), helps us to understand why, in the Middle Ages, attempts to force great decisive actions on the battlefield with assembled large armies were made so seldom." He again provides an extensive 'excursus' in which he makes a comparison, "As we know ever since Marathon the popular imagination has no inclination toward strategic accomplishment whose triumph is based on making the opposing forces unequal."

IV: The Subjugation of the Anglo-Saxons by the Normans:
From the chapter title it is clear that Delbruck is not writing about William I conquering England, nor a description of the Battle of Hastings or the other engagements that William I and his successors required to complete Norman control of England. The subject is the supplanting of Anglo-Saxon culture by the Norman-Frankish continental culture.

He discounts other descriptions of Hastings.

V: The Norman Military Organization in England:
This, again, is cultural - social life generating a military structure that would dominate a subject population.

VI: The Norman Nation in Italy:
The theme is to show how and why a very small group of Normans could overthrow much larger military establishment (actually several - Arab, Byzantine, Italian) that maintained political control over very large populations. The specifics involving the Byzantines and Arabs are described in the following two chapters.

VII: Byzantium
Delbruck discounts the validity of many of the primary sources. A sample is: "The Byzantine historical accounts of wars and battlers, to - for instance, those of Bryennios and Anna Komnena - are in the highest degree fantastic and unreliable, but we may learn enough from the comparison and mutual control provided by these sources to be certain of the fact that a disciplined infantry like the Roman legions was just as nonexistent in the Greek Empire as in the Occident."
The chapter is about the organization of the Byzantine military forces and contrasts between them and those in western Europe. "As strong as the analogies with the Occident were, the Orient never arrived at the development of a complete feudal hierarchy."
He also discusses the changes that evolved during the reigns of various emperors such as Justinian and Mauritius. He notes the important contributions from various foreign ethnic groups. "The principal difference between the oriental armies and those of the Occident lay first of all in the fact that the foreign barbarian mercenaries played a much larger role in the east than among the Occidentals, who waged their own wars, and also in the fact that the mounted archers, along with the heavily armed horseman, made up a large part of the army."
He ascribes the longevity of the Byzantine Empire in contrast with the western Roman to the geographic location of its capital, Constantinople verus that of Rome which gave the former its formidable military fortifications and location on water supply routes. He lists 14 unsuccessful sieges between A.D. 616 and A.D. 914.
In his 'excursus' he credits Oman's History of the Art of War rather more favorably that most other authors, but nevertheless find some points on which to disagree. One major issue is Delbruck's insistence that infantry played a very minor part in Byzantine warfare. He cites, page by page, other discrepancies between Oman and the primary sources, such as Leo VI and Mauritius, on the numerical strength of Byzantine units.

VIII: The Arabs
Again, this chapter is about the results of culture on military belief and action. He discusses the very significant difference between the cultural, political, social, hence military, organization of Arab society (that is Islamic society) and western Europe. In Islam religion of politics are one - there is no separation between 'church and state' that is between the political ruler and religious ruler. Also, the 'barbarian's who invaded and conquered western Europe were, for Delbruck, pure warriors. But the Arabs were both Bedouin warriors and city merchants united in religion and nationality. "All these elements and tendencies were brought together by Mohammed into a political-religious unity." Delbruck notes also that the various Germanic tribes did not work (that is fight) together. But Mohammed managed to unify even more formerly separate Arab tribes into a cultural-religious-social mass of dedicated warriors. Delbruck, as usual, criticizes the reported manpower strengths of Arab armies. He discusses other significant differences between Arab society and Germanic. The Arabs has a working political organization while the Germans destroyed readily much of that which collapsed with Rome. The Arabs did not destroy the commercial, hence financial, system that they now ruled, hence the taxation system to support military operations remained. The conquering Arabs remained separated from the ruled societies for a longer time than the Germans who were absorbed more readily. But eventually, the Arab unified political organization collapsed into individual polities just as had the Carolingian Empire.
In the 'excursus' Delbruck discusses in more detail some battles and some descriptions of Arab -Turk arms and armor. He addresses both the original primary sources and some 'modern' commentators.
Delbruck totally dismisses the account of the main battle, for which he includes a lengthy description.

IX: General View of the Crusades
Dr. Delbruck discusses the methodological problems he faces in including the Crusades in this study. They extend over 175 years, witness many changes, are very different in content and from wars fought within either west European or within Arab societies.

Book III: The High Middle Ages

I: Knighthood as a Caste::
The chapter is obviously social, cultural history. Delbruck discusses such toics and 'fief', economic base, He makes many comparisons between medieval knights and Romans and Greek leaders and military men. He discusses the differences between medieval knights and the equally heavily armed and armored horsemen of ancient societies. The medieval knight was unique, differentiated from his contemporary foot soldiers.

II: Military Aspects of Knighthood

III: Mercenaries

IV: Strategy

V: The Italian Communes and the Hohenstauffens

VI: The German Cities

VII: The Conquest of Prussia by the Teutonic Order

VIII: English Archery. The Conquest of Wales and Scotland by Edward I

IX: Individual Campaigns, Battles and Engagements

Book IV The Late Middle Ages

Preface

I: Phalanx Battles, Burgher Forces and Militia Levies

II: Dismounted Knights and Marksmen

III: The Ottoman Turks

IV: The Hussites

V: Condotierre, Compagnies, d'Ordnnance, and Frieshutsen

VI: The Battles of Tannenberg, Monl'hery ,and a Few Other Engagements of the Period

Book V: The Swiss

I: Introduction

II: Battle on the Morgarten

III: Battle of Lalupen

IV: Battle of Sempach

V: Battle of Doffingen

VI: Military Organization of the Confederation

VII: The Burgundian Wars

VIII: Military Theory in the Middle Ages

IX: Conclusion

Appendix 1 - Chronological Listing of the Battles Referred to in this Volume

Appendix 2 - Lattin text of the Oath in the Capitulare missorum

Appendix 3. Latin Text of the Carolingian and Other Capitularies on Military Service

Appendix 4. Latin Texts of the Assises of Arms

References

J. F. Verbruggen, The art of Warfare In Western Europe During the Middle Ages

Susan Reynolds, Fiefs and Vassals: The Medieval Evidence Reinterpreted, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994

Sir Charles Oman, A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages, 2 vol., Burt Franklin N.Y., 1924

Michael Prestwich, Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages: The English Experience Yale Univ. Press, 1996

Derek Wilson, Charlemagne, Doubleday, N.Y., 2006, 226 pgs., index, bibliography, notes, illustrations, time line, genealogy

Antonio Santosuosso, Barbarians, Marauders, and Infidels, Westview Press, 2004,

Maurice Keen, ed., Medieval Warfare: A History, Oxford Univ. Press, 1999, Individual subject essays by 12 specialists

Matthew Bennett, and others, Fighting Techniques of the Medieval World, AD 500 - AD 1500, Equipment, Combat Skills, and Tactics

John Sloan, Charlemagne - article from encyclopedia entry

Arthur William Holland, "Charlemagne', article from Encyclopedia Britannica

John Sloan, 'Crusades", essay on these

Michel Decker, The Byzantine Art of War, Westholme, 2013,

Edward Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire, Harvard Univ. Press, 2009