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This is an extract from the Wikipedia
entry.
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Reviewer Comment:
This is a very short biography and limited description of Delbruck's concepts
as shown in the four volumes of the History of War included here. It lacks the
detailed analysis of Delbruck's personal combat in the Franko-Prussian War and
his methods as an historian contained in Arden Bucholz's two revealing books -
Delbruck's Modern Military History and Hans Delbruck & The German
Military Establishment: War Images in Conflict. By 'Images' Prof. Bucholz
means the Total picture - the understanding - of the nature of warfare and of
the methods of historical research required to gain that understanding. From
the publication of his first essays Delbruck faced continued controversy with
both the academic faculties of history at universities and the officers in the
German military history organization.
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Hans Gottlieb Leopold Delbrück; 11 November 1848 – 14 July
1929) was a German historian. Delbrück was one of the first modern
military historians, basing his method of research on the critical examination
of ancient sources, using auxiliary disciplines, like demography and economics,
to complete the analysis and the comparison between epochs, to trace the
evolution of military institutions. Delbrück's writings are chiefly
concerned with the history of the art of war, his most ambitious work being
Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte ("History
of Warfare in the Framework of Political History" in four volumes, third
edition published in 1920). Other works are Die Perserkriege und die
Burgunderkriege (The Persian and Burgundian Wars, 1887), Die Strategie des
Perikles erläutert durch die Strategie Friedrichs des Grossen (The
Strategy of Pericles Described Through the Strategy of Frederick the Great,
1890) and Das Leben des Feldmarschalls Grafen Neithardt von Gneisenau (Life of
Marshal Count Neithardt von Gneisenau, 1894).
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Biography:
Delbrück was born in Bergen on the island of Rügen; he studied at the
universities of Heidelberg and Bonn. As a soldier, he fought in the
Franco-Prussian War and in 1874, he became for some years tutor to Prince
Waldemar of Prussia (1868–1879) of the German imperial family, a brother
of Wilhelm II, heir to the imperial throne.
He served in the Reichstag from 1882 to 1883 and in 1883, he became an editor
of the Preussische Jahrbücher, a noted political magazine.
He assumed charge of this publication in 1889 and kept working on it in that
capacity until 1920. In 1885, he became professor of modern history in the
University of Berlin, where his lectures were very popular. He was a member of
the German Reichstag from 1884 to 1890.
Delbrück vigorously opposed the policy of the Prussian government in
dealing with the Danes and the Poles, with the result that he was twice
subjected to disciplinary penalties as a professor and a civil servant in
Prussia. One of his American students Arthur L. Conger became a senior military
historian at the United States Army Command and General Staff College, where he
modelled American military historiography after Delbrück's approaches.
His role as editor of Preussen Jahrbücher provided a platform for a
growing interest in Germany's diplomatic relationship with Russia. This took
the form of a roving commission to Herr Paul Rohrbacher to enquire about German
opinion. The findings from the 1890s tours formed a racial policy of
dismemberment of Russia by seizing Slavic territory that belonged to them. The
controversialist Fritz Fischer argued that they were socialists forcing
extremists into the hands of revolutionaries.
At an early stage of the First World War, he became pessimistic regarding the
possibility of victory, except by a military and political strategy and tactics
of a purely defensive character. He was, on tactical rather than on moral
grounds, a strenuous opponent of intensified submarine warfare and did not
conceal his conviction that it would bring America into the war. He was a
member of the German Delegation during the Versailles Peace Conference that
ended the war, where he mainly endeavoured to prove that Germany could not be
made solely responsible for the outbreak of war.
He died in Berlin. He was the father of Max Delbrück, who did pioneering
work in physics and also won the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine in 1969.
He was mentioned in the movie Young Frankenstein as the correct brain for Igor
to get to put into the monster.
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Hypotheses:
Hans Delbrück later in life
Hans Delbrück:
Delbrück's works tried to place military history in the framework of
general history. He regarded warfare as a cultural feature of societies,
subject to evolution and influenced by the economy and the political system.
His works were not translated into English for some time, hence his reputation
among professional military theorists in English-speaking countries is not held
in the same esteem or significance as Clausewitz.
Ancient warfare:
Singular conclusions on ancient warfare challenged historiography in so far as
he tried to show that the figures for armies in antiquity were inflated in the
original sources, and that, contrary to what is stated in most writings, the
winner in a battle usually had more troops than the loser. Consequently, he
gave completely different interpretations to some of the most famous battles in
history, like Marathon, Gaugamela, and Zama by concluding that Rome's vaunted
advantage over "barbarians" rested, not so much in their discipline
and refined tactics, but rather in their superior logistical support.
The Romans were able to raise and maintain huge armies on the field, while the
"barbarians" were unable to match their numbers.
Medieval warfare:
Regarding medieval warfare, Delbrück's findings were more controversial.
He made a distinction between knights, mounted warriors, and cavalry, an
organized mass of mounted troops. He regarded the medieval warrior as an
independent fighter, unable to join others and form units with any decisive
tactical significance. His conclusions were tested by later scholars, in
particular the Belgian historian J. F. Verbruggen.
Modern warfare:
About modern warfare, Delbrück showed his intellectual origins in
Clausewitz by making a distinction between two possible strategies
respectively: exhausting the enemy and throwing down the enemy (German:
Ermattungsstrategie and Niederwerfungsstrategie, often mistakenly translated as
"attrition" and "annihilation"). They were derived from
Clausewitz's distinctions between strategies seeking limited objectives and
strategies aimed at rendering one's opponent militarily helpless, the latter
being often confused with the concept of "total war" advocated by
Ludendorff and rejected by Delbrück during wartime. The choice depended on
the nature of the political objectives, the existing political and economic
limitations and the correlation of force numbers. He applied the analytical
tool to the wars of Frederick the Great and concluded that their numerical
inferiority made the Prussians pursue a strategy of exhaustion.
His overall treatment of the era, however, partially overlooked the Spanish
wars. He was very critical of his country's strategic thinking, and he averred
it would have been preferable to seek victory in the East, gain minor
objectives in the West and then sue for peace. That was one example of the
general principle that he maintained: military and political manoeuvres should
be integrated.
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Works:
Other works of Delbrück, besides those mentioned above, are the following:
Books:
Historische und politische Aufsätze (1886)
Erinnerungen, Aufsätze und Reden (1902)
Die Polenfrage (1894)
Numbers in History (1913)
Regierung und Volkswille (1914)
Bismarcks Erbe (1915)
Krieg und Politik (1918)
Kautsky und Harden (1920)
Ludendorff, Tirpitz, Falkenhayn (1920)
History of the Art of War, (1920) University of Nebraska Press; Reprint
edition, 1990. Translated by Walter, J. Renfroe. 4 Volumes.
In his book Regierung und Volkswille (1914), Delbrück attempted a defence
of the old system of government in Germany and Prussia with particular
reference to its "dualism," parliamentary representation and
simultaneously a certain degree of autocracy on the part of the sovereign in
Prussia and of the federated government in the empire.
A succinct statement of Delbrück's views on Germany's responsibility for
World War I and an English reply can be found in articles by Delbrück and
J. W. Headlam-Morley in the Contemporary Review (March 1921).[3] Journals
Preuss Jahrbucher, vol.149, (Aug 1912) Die Differenzen der uber die Kriegsziele
huben und druben, in Krieg und Politik, vol.1 (Sep 1914)
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