DELBRUCK'S MODERN MILITARY HISTORY

ARDEN BUCHOLZ, TRANS AND ED.

Univ. of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 1997, 244 pgs., index, notes, paperback

Reviewer Comments.
This is an excellent and important book that expands the student's available writing by Delbruck and its context in European politics and war from 1870's to the 1920's, a time in which Delbruck was very active not only as a military historian, but also as a politician in German legislatures, and as a widely read commentator on politics and World War I. All this is made clear and relevant by the author's comments on the selections he has produced from Delbruck's extensive published and unpublished papers and other materials.
Dr. Bucholz's selection is brilliant. It serves four purposes: 1 it demonstrates the skill of the learned military historian to draw on the experience of military history to analyze correctly contemporary events: 2 it provides today's students of World War I much needed insights into the realities of war when they study; 3 It provides the timeless lessons of war and politics essential today for political and military leaders, if only they will learn. 4. It demonstrates that these lessons will not be found only in this book but urges expanded study of all of Delbruck's publications, and hints that much more may be found in the mass of such writing that is yet to be translated into English. We can hope.

Dr. Bucholz spent several years studying the widely separated official archives and privately held family holdings and in interviewing knowledgable individuals. From this extensive study he must be the most authoritative current scholar describing and expanding our understanding of Delbruck's conception of both the actual historical events and military ideas throughout Western European history and of Delbruck's conception of the influential role of historical study on the decisions and actions of political/military leaders in the 19th-20th centuries.
It is a fine companion piece to Dr. Bucholz's other publications including his Hans Delbruck & the German Military Establishment. In both books he informs the readers of Delbruck's continual conflict with the two entrenched bureaucracies - German university faculties and professional military staff historians. In this book he also includes extensive explanatory notes very useful for students.
Readers today of Delbruck's four massive military histories have no inkling about the author's contentious relationship with his contemporaries.
In this book Dr. Bucholz has selected 24 of Delbruck's writings, liberally translated and with excellent commentary. His purpose is to bring to the current American audience a fuller understanding of Delbruck - the man - and Delbruck as the combination historian-political observer. Section 3 is interesting as the ability of a military historian, steeped in the subject from ancient times, to analyze and comment on the contemporary during a war taking place all about him. The published comments were restricted by wartime censorship and by the author's understandable patriotism for Germany. His publication had a role in supporting German public morale.
Delbruck based considerable analysis on comparisons with German strategy during the war with Frederick The Great's strategies during the Seven Year's War in which he also faced multiple enemies on multiple fronts. His analysis expressed in section 12 below should be studied today. He is a dedicated historian who can relate specific contemporary reality and responses of leaders with cogent examples of similar historic reality and responses of their time.

In particular for today's efforts to formulate military doctrine he contrasts the strategies of attrition and annihilation and the contrasts between war of maneuver and war of position.

There remains a large volume of Delbruck's writing that has not be published and of that which has been published has not been translated into English.

Introduction: Delbruck's Life and Work

Part I: The Making of a Military Historian, 1870 - 1904
From his personal contacts with Delbruck's family and associates Dr. Bucholz provides the reader with an intimate portrait of Delbruck's life and its influence on his ideas about history in general and military history specifically.

1. Letters from the Franco-Prussian War (1870)
Maring on the Moselle, 29 July 1870
Field Postcard, 9 August 1870
Bivouac, 11 August 1870
Gravelotte, 19 August 1870
Camp near Metz, 24 August 1870
Camp near Chatel in front of Metz, 5 September 1870
Jony aux Arches near Metz, on the Moselle River, 11 September 1870
These letters 'from the front lines in combat' show their author's direct, personal, understanding of the reality of combat, war, that formed a life-long basis for his historical study. He observed that the published reporting on the war and public understanding was distorted. He viewed combat at the personal, individual, level and concluded that it was discipline above all that motivated the soldier to accept and endure the discomforts and real traumas experienced on the battlefield.

2. Prince Frederick Charles (1885)
Dr. Bucholz selected Delbruck's essay written on the death of Prince Frederick Charles, nephew of Kaiser Wilhelm I and both a senior commander in the wars and author of extensive essays on war. Delbruck uses the occasion to publish his own ideas about real war and the typical writing about it. This is a lengthy and enlightening example of Delbruck's early observations and conclusions.
He disagrees. "But war is never the subject matter of the leading intellectuals, and it can never be." The essay is full of specific examples of the problems of leadership that he cites from battles including those faced by Prince Frederick Charles. The essay also is about the importance of the personal attributes and capabilities of individual leaders, and of the soldiers.

3. A Little Military History (1887)
Dr. Bucholz tells us he has selected a Delbruck review of books by Prince Kraft zu Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, who commanded the reserve artillery at Koniggratz in 1866 and the Prussian Guard Artillery in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. Delbruck found much interesting and valuable insight in the Prince's publications. He notes that they were written for fellow military officers, and contain information for military leaders but is unknown or ignored by historians. He uses this opportunity to critique the failures of academic historians to study, and hence know, the facts of military affairs.
He comments: "Soldiers who consult our history books are rightly mistrustful". As usual, he included many specific examples of such failures. Among these examples he applauds Hohenlohe's inclusion of the life and actions of General Gustav Eduard von Hindersin. Dr. Bucholz mentions this, in itself, as a valuable contribution to our knowledge.

Already, in 1887, Delbruck zeroed in on the problem - the separation of the military officer historians from the university academic historians both institutionally and in their attitudes toward their subjects. Neither group seeks to consider the whole subject, do the required broadly based sources of research, or provide their readers with the full story.

4. Moltke (1890-1900)
For this chapter Dr. Bucholz compiled three of Delbruck's essays. It is Delbruck's description and evaluation of the elder Moltke's lengthy career as the commander of the Prussian-German military general staff in which he designed and orchestrated the great victories in wars against Austria and France. Dr. Bucholz is, himself, particularly qualified to consider Delbruck on this subject, as he has studied Moltke and published the authoritative treatment of the subject.

Part 2. The Cold War 1914-1941:
In this section Dr. Bucholz jumps into what he terms 'contemporary history' as he points out it is a contradiction but essential since Delbruck was an active analyst and commentator ( a critical one) on the events of his time. Delbruck was forced to abandon his own mantra of requiring historical analysis be based on thorough understanding of the primary references and an objective attitude toward them. But he was not only an historian but also the editor of the leading periodical on contemporary political- military events, The Prussian Yearbook from which he selected his examples..

5. The Russo-Japanese War (1904)
In his commentary of this contemporary war, Delbruck compares it to the Crimean War. "Was the war unavoidable?" He 'doubts it'. His analysis uses what insights he can make based on contemporary publications. He finds 'major mistakes' on all sides.

6. International Tension (1908)
Dr. Bucholz selected Delbruck's commentary on the increasing potential for a major war resulting from the increases in conflicts over seemingly isolated issues. Delbruck draws attention to the sequence of diplomatic moves and mobilizations. He predicts who will ally with whom and against whom.
He specifically identifies 'fear'. "This fear is a read fact and a real power. It is a basic and foundational source of war danger."

Interesting is that neither Delbruck nor Bucholz notes that this, fear, is the same source that Thucydides identified as the source of the Peloponnesian War. Is it a contributor to war today?

7. Danger of War (1908):
Dr. Bucholz selects Delbruck's continued focus on 'fear' in his commentary on the Bosnian crisis of 1980. He identifies the political goals of each 'power' and their concerns about what the other 'powers' are up to. He notes the different role England will play, comparing it to the British -French conflict over North America that influenced their decisions and actions in the Prussian- Austrian conflict in the Seven Year's War. Of special interest today is Delbruck's identification of the international aspects of European financial institutions and investments. His analysis of the beliefs and policies that will dictate their positions in the event of war is cogent and very complex as are the realities that he is describing.

Here is a valuable insight for today. "If politics depended completely on the diplomats, we could sleep peacefully. But, to return to our starting point, they depend also on public opinion, which enters into every aspect and must be considered in every reckoning."

8. The Second Moroccan Crisis (1911):
Dr. Bucholz has selected prescient writing by Delbruck during another wave of increased tension from this crisis in far off Morocco. He is increasingly concerned about the nature of warfare between industrial countries now possessing both masses of destructive weapons and mass armies.

Some remarks: "There are enough people in Germany today who look on this {war} possibility without dread". " War engenders heroism, but it destroys culture". "Economic life will come to a standstill". "The war will come like a thief in the night."
Delbruck studied and then made specific recommendation about the contemporary German problem of allocation of finances and manpower toward increasing either its navy or army. He favored increasing the army.

9. Pan-Germans (1913)
In 1913 Delbruck was increasingly concerned about the role of public opinion in bringing on a disastrous war and pointed to the role of the media is generating 'fear' and war. He publicly stated that the chief internal danger in Germany lay with the 'pan-Germans' and not with the Social Democrats. For this he was denounced in the media. And, as usual, then issued a rejoinder. He claims that the expansionary demands of the 'pan-Germans' only increase the preemptory defense increases of the other powers. Yet, he writes: "The political goal of Germany in the world can be nothing less than to strive unflinchingly for a larger colonial empire and not to tolerate further partitions or shearing off of special- interest areas unless we are consulted."
This at a time when German colonial endeavors in Africa were pitiful and only a source of wasted finance.

Part 3. World War I, 1914 -1918 

10. The War: Origins, Possibilities and Goals (1914)
Dr. Bucholz has selected Delbruck's 'first public pronouncement on World War I.' As editor of the leading weekly paper on current political- military events and trends, Delbruck exercised a powerful influence among the elite class. From the start he was critical of the war planning and became more so of its execution during the war (curtailed in public by the censor) but more outright after 1918. In observation of the initial mobilizations and movements he explains why the 'violation' of Belgium was 'necessary', from a military strategic view point. He cites population and other resources to write that Germany might possibly be victorious, despite being outnumbered. He considers German morale to be high..

11. The War from August through September (1914) Dr. Bucholtz has selected Delbruck's first 'war essay' now that the initial combat is degenerating into near stalemate. He begins analyzing the possibilities for negotiations and a peace treaty. For that he was castigated as being 'unpatriotic' by the advocates for war. He gives his public a clear analysis of the situation on both the French and Russian fronts. He notes that the power of modern weapons has shifted the superiority from offense to defense. Historians today can benefit from his 'eye-witness' account.

12. The Strategic Situation in December (1914) Now (December) Delbruck has enough current 'history' to work with in order to compare the events with those of Frederick the Great in the Seven Year's War. He sees that the entire strategic reality has shifted dramatically from that of the Napoleonic wars. Napoleon instituted or developed the revolution from 18th century war of position and attrition to that of grand maneuver and annihilation. He writes:" e now have a strategic situation that has been unknown since the days of Frederick The Great: the impregnable position. ... "For Napoleon and Moltke there were no impregnable positions. If the center could not be broken through, they could go around one or the other flank." He quotes the great Frederick's own analysis. He concludes: "On the basis of this and other essays I concluded that there is a fundamental difference between the Strategy of Frederick the Great and his predecessors Prince Eugene, Marlborough and Gustavus Adolphus on the one hand and Napoleon and Moltke on the other hand."

He faced opposition from the German officers who considered Frederick their national hero and therefore quite in tune with Napoleon, but did find a few who agreed with him.
He continues to describe 18th Century strategy. "Frederick's system... was double-poled: it used two methods to achieve its goals, according to changing circumstances and the insights and wisdom of the commander. Here they used the bold blow of battle to destroy the enemy; there they used marches, maneuvers, and besieging magazines and forts to exhaust the enemy. The longer the Seven Years' war continued, the further the king moved away from the pole of battle and closer to the pole of attrition."

He continues with detailed descriptions of each encounter, from which he draws analysis based on comparisons of contemporary conditions with those that faced strategists in the 18th century. .

13. The War in April and May (1915)
The war has now been going on for 9 months during which significant events have revealed contemporary reality to Dr. Delbruck. He analyzes the battle at Gorlice in the context of the strategic situation in the war and notes the very significant difference in geography between west and east fronts. Each encounter, incident, brings fresh ideas from Delbruck.

But the high commanders are not listening. For instance: "If we look at these experiences theoretically, we conclude that an attack of unprotected troops against protected dug-in positions will not succeed. "The main goal of strategy is to be stronger at the decisive point."... "Offensive field battles that are the result of long, careful preparation are rare in military history."

14. The War in August (1915):
In his report Dr. Delbruck turns to description and analysis of the personnel, the German and Russian soldier. He focuses on strength-to-casualty statistics. He concludes with one of his fundamental concepts (from ancient Greeks and Romans to the present) that military institutions - 'infrastructure' is important today just as it was when Romans fought German tribes. He describes the encounters between German - Austrian forces and the Russians, who were initially successful in the Carpathians, but in a 'great battle', in Galica suddenly gained the victory. He credits this NOT to German leadership BUT to 'the overwhelming superiority of the troops.' Why are the German troops superior? Because from pre-war preparations and expenditures they have been provided with capabilities and capacities that the Russians lack.

15. America between Germany and England (1916)
Dr. Delbruck gives prophetic warning against resort to submarine warfare. He believes it would bring the United States into the war (which of course it did) with masses of troops and war materials. For this he was castigated by the censors and forced to have all future writing approved prior to publication. But his detailed exposition and analysis it, itself, a valuable source for historians. For instance: "The longer the war goes no, the more it becomes a finance war." He even discusses the American Constitution and the nature of the political structure and powers of the presidency and Congress, as well as the power of American pubic opinion.
Ultimately he notes: "Wilson's politics well be determined by his desire to be reelected in this coming November election:'.

16. The War in March (1916):
The terrible struggle at Verdun takes center stage, just as it has ever since. Delbruck is constrained by his official need (shared by his own patriotism) to support the German war effort despite his significant disagreement with and objections to the strategy of the German high command. He analyzes the German strategy at Verdun and concludes that it is not based on an expectation of a breakthrough , but as a means to exhaust the French manpower and munitions resources with relatively little loss and thus strike at French morale He considers this to be a new form of battle. The French have no choice but to continue defending. "The longer it goes on, the larger becomes the distinction between its casualties and its value." He devotes some space to analysis also of the Russians and coming potentials from the English.

17. The War in February and March (1917):
The Germans finally recognized the power of defense. They took the initiative to withdraw they armies from the front line for which they had fought so hard to extensive prepared positions. This despite outraged public opinion. But their strategic purpose was to present the French with an option to expend significant casualties by attacking. Which the French promptly took with the huge losses and the dismissal of General Mivelle who had ordered it.
Delbruck's comment: "if there is a fundamental rule that all the actions in a campaign should be united, a principle difficult to carry out in practice, we have had a movement in the last few weeks on the north-west front that is completely new. So much in this war is new, even though we try to find a historical counterpart to it."
He again notes that the close similarity is the wars of position and attrition conducted by Frederick the Great. He considers a voluntary retreat to a new defense - 'is rare in military history."
"An attack against a well-prepared modern position needs a very long period of preparation." "The method and power of the modern breakthrough tactics depend on technical preparation, and to that category belongs the new Hindenberg method of voluntary withdrawal." He notes that a new possibility of a war of movement is being discussed but that one 'symptom of the genius of Hindenberg' is that the allied command is clueless as to what to expect of do.

18. The War in May and June (1917)
Enough time of war has passed for Delbruck to attempt comparisons between 1914 and 1917. He again brings up his consideration of strength-to-casualty ratios and defense-offense strategies. He opines that little of strategic value has been gained despite continued attempts to try new methods. Yet from the level of tactics and technology much has developed. For one thing the strength of the trench fortifications systems has increased. But this actually also increases the ability to take to the offense. He sees a coming return from a war of position to one of maneuver. But, he remarks, only by counting the strength-to-casualty ratio can any overall assessment be made.

He makes a fundamental assessment that pertains to warfare and should be memorized by military leaders today. "The defense is superior to the attack. Defense is the stronger form of war, but with completely negative outcomes. The attack as the positive outcome. The attacker chooses his position with careful planning and is confident that sooner or later he will breakthrough an win, whereas the defender, even when he repulses many attacks, has not achieved anything positive." "In world history successful defensive battles are extremely rare". Success is obtained by the defense-offense combination.
It seems to me that this applies not only in cases of extensive fortifications. The offense is pro-active, the defense is re-active.

19. The War from July to November (1917) :
In this article Delbruck discusses the Caporetto campaign in Italy and related ideas Clausewitz published on mountain warfare. He notes that the actions on the Western Front lacked strategic purpose or results. But the actions in northern Italy provide something of interest. As usual he includes a clear summary of the events and ideas behind them.
His conclusion was: "Favorable geography, the element of surprise, superior leadership, superior operational and tactical execution, and the morale deficiency of the Italian army explain the ease and greatness of the Austrian-German victory." Quite a list. He continues: "To fully understand these events, we must ask the question, Why did this breakthrough succeed when Cadorna's breakthrough attempts failed?" Delbruck always seeks to understand facts in order to find causes. In this case he contrasts the examples of breakthroughs that do achieve initial success but ultimately fail in exploitation. He explains that in mountain warfare it is more difficult to bring forward reserves to contain the initial breakthrough. He turns to Clausewitz for his theoretical discussion. It is a matter of the differences that mountain topography give to attacker or defender in the contexts of small, narrow; versus large scale operations. He cites Clausewitz: The Clauewitzian view that mountains are favorable for an attacker who sought a great decision was proved right for General von Below."

20. The Military Collapse (1918):
Dr. Delbruck opens with a litany of strategic losses from Syria to Balkans to the Western Front. All of this is in sharp contrast to German successes during the previous spring offensives.
Dr. Bucholz notes that there also was a change in German thinking in that Delbruck's article then passed through the censors without objection, whereas that few months past it would have put him in jail. Delbruck finds the problem lies in the German political system which fails to train and promote leaders with sufficient political understanding and courage. This observation is directly consistent with his long-held belief in the intimate connection between the military and political in all aspects.
He states the bitter truth. "It must be clear that the catastrophe that has now overwhelmed us is in its origins, a consequence of our constitutional system, and deep-seated change is unavoidable. Above all, we must subordinate military authority to civilian political control." He lays the lack of political versus military control to the decision to which he, himself, had objected in 1917, namely the use of submarine warfare. "generally a great strategic decisions have political consequences."

Part 4: Postwar, 1918 -1929:

21. Armistice, Revolution, Defeat, Republic (1918):
Mea culpa - Delbruck expresses his hopes, which failed, that the German military - political system had sufficient inner strength to sustain an orderly transition to the new system that he had expected as possible. Alas, the disaster is complete. A favorable armistice has actually been a 'capitulation". He feels beaten: "Truthfully such a outcome I never dreamed of in my darkest hours and worst fears." He wants to exonerate as much as possible his generally patriotically favorable wartime articles by citing the censorship of his real feelings. The authorities withheld many facts from the German public. "Foreign and domestic politics worked together to produce this disastrous outcome." He upholds the army - the troops - for their staunch morale and continued bravery in the face of the new overwhelming enemy superiority in all aspects with the arrival of a million Americans. He believes: "The campaign and the war were lost not because morale had sunk, but instead, morale sank after the troops began to feel that the war was no longer winnable." He fingers the intervention of the Social Democratic Party which undermined all remaining possibility to attain an armistice with a survivable result.
He continues to try. "I will put away all feelings of pain, shame, and despair and try to give a clear overall picture of how this came about." He terns to an analysis of the break between professional officers and conscripted men in the navy. This then spread to the army.
As an historian he ends with an analogy: "how powerful, proud, and confident Athens was as she entered these wars under the leadership of Pericles."

22. Seventieth Birthday Reminiscence (1918):
Dr. Bucholz publishes a speech of reminiscences that Delbruck uttered on the occasion of his 70th birthday party.

23. Ludendorff's Self Portrait (1922):
Dr. Bucholz notes that during the post-war years Delbruck published many articles and essays and also participated in German political life. This, he writes, is the most famous of these widely read and influential publications. It is a commentary that questions Lundendorff's self defense about the German General Staff war plans. In this one he dissects the real role Ludendorff played in the immediate pre-war General Staff planning and was one, at least, of the authors of the revision to the 'Schlieffen plan' which added (or diverted) army forces from the north to southern sector, clear to the Swiss border. Delbruck reminds us: "If Clausewitz taught anything, it was that in war there is only one success and that is the final success."

Print and post that phrase on your wall.

He continues: "The beginning success is nothing; the final success is everything". And: A beginning success that reduces the chances for a final success is a loss."
The thrust of the argument over strategy is Ludendorff's insistence that it was correct to conduct the first offensive against the French and defense against the Russians. Military strategist critics consider that the opposite should have been the plan. Delbruck considers and analyzes both options with description of the remarkable ability of the Russians to increase their effective military capacity after their loss in the Russo-Japanese War. Delbruck faults the change from the original 'Schlieffen plan' - "By this means the Schlieffen plan lost its soul, whose essence was a strengthening of the right wing of the army and a withholding of the left." Delbruck turns to criticize Ludendorff's thinking in planning the 1918 offensive. He wonders what was Ludendorff's thinking, if any. He describes Ludendorff's grand strategic goal as Napoleonic - that is war of annihilation. He then turns to analyze the contrasts in English strategy proposed by Lloyd George and General Robertson. The Entente suffered from lack of unity due to the jealousy of each participating national leadership.

Delbruck analyzes the results of the personal conflicts between the English political - military leadership and the similar conflicts in Germany and notes the results were opposite. The English political leadership won and opted for the correct strategy of attrition but the German military leaders won and opted for the incorrect strategy of annihilation.
But Ludendorff's March offensive began with a great victory over the English armies due in part to this separation of English and French commands each looking toward its own priority -English channel ports and French Paris.
Ludendorff claimed his victory but he did not capture Amiens.
Delbruck claims that: "A German victory was indeed nearly achieved. it escaped us. because the Ludendorff plan itself suffered under a fundamental error, which in no way was to be made up for: the lack of logistic capability essential for continuing to exploit the initial success. The very same condition that plagued both sides throughout the war.

After further examples, Delbruck is decisive: 'The attempt at a Napoleonic strategy of annihilation was completely false". Y contrast, Delbruck considers that in Italy in 1917 the Germans should have adopted a strategy of annihilation when the opportunity existed there. But even so, a victory in Italy would not have directly influenced the results in France. Even with annihilation of Italy the overall strategic goal had to be limited. But it might have created the conditions necessary for a negotiated peace. He continues with much more analysis important for the student today.

24. The Peace of Versailies (1929):
Here Dr. Bucholz gives the readers Delbruck's last speech just prior to his death. He mourns for Germany, committed, he says, to a future of economic slavery by the false accusations and demands in the Versailies treaty. He reviews the actual results. He finds faults all around but especially fingers Serbia. He describes the chronological sequence of the national mobilizations. He considers all the accusations against the Central Powers to be 'unfounded'. But he does blame the French and also the Russians.