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The following are my notes taken during the formal presentation
delivered by General Slipchenko at the recent conference at NDU. The meeting
was shortly after the conclusion of Desert Storm - Ist Iraq War -They have not
been checked against the information contained in SASONET items 760, 777, and
others and are therefore an independent version of what transpired. I am sure
they suffer greatly from my extreme difficulty in hearing, but I had the
benefit of hearing everything twice, once from Slipchenko and again from the
excellent translation, so perhaps I got the gist of what was said. I have
inclosed some doubtful points and my questions and comments in brackets. It was
my impression throughout that he was delivering a classic Marxist analysis of
the dynamics of military change straight out of the pages of Savkin and
Ogarkov. In the question period I pointed out that Ogarkov had presented
essentially this same analysis and Slipchenko agreed. He said that what is so
startling to the Soviets is the rapidity in which their prediction of the
future is now upon them.
John Sloan
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FUTURE CHANGES AND RESULTS OF MILITARY REFORMS AND VIEWS ON THE
RECENT WAR WITH IRAQ
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General principles
Military doctrine is an historical phenomena. That is, it changes and develops
in accordance to the changes in the technological means of struggle. {Obviously
a straight Marxist precept.} The Soviet Union embarked on the development of a
new military doctrine since 1987, but is not yet fully established. And now
this doctrine also has to take account of the changes in the military-political
situation in the world and Europe, that are still changing themselves. It must
accord with the {post 1987} change in the strategic position of the USSR and
the break-up of the Warsaw Pact. It must also relate to specific ongoing
changes in military affairs.
Military doctrine can rapidly go out of date as a result of the rapid
development in the means of war. The U.S. mass production of deep strike - high
accuracy weapons is an example of this kind of rapid development. Military
doctrine is influenced by the advent of new armaments based on new physical
characteristics and the military exploitation of space. An analysis of the
trends in current developments leads to the conclusion that in the very near
future "air-space" warfare will be a reality.
The new types of strategic offensive weapons will enable the implementation of
broad scale military actions from space with the use of robotic weapons. The
adaption by the U.S. of new means of strategic offensive weaponry will enable
broad air and space offensive actions. The application of micro-electronic
technology enables the US to raise its offensive potential even with the 50%
reduction in quantity of forces.
{Next point unclear - did he mean U.S. ability to stop Soviet?} - According to
Soviet data the air defense potential in the year 2000 will enable the
detection and stopping of 50% of ballistic missiles and the degradation of
strategic nuclear forces.
The new principles in new military doctrine:
-- defensive nature
-- defensive in practice, not dogmatic sense;
The country does not plan to attack, but the armed forces are directed at
preparing defense.
The political idea is to renounce war. This leads to the military action in the
initial phase of war being strictly defensive operations. If the enemy has
begun aggression then the USSR can use whatever forms of combat actions are
best suited to the situations. {ie. counter-offensives}
At the organizational level, defensive doctrine is not the equivalent of
defensive strategy. The numbers of forces, their quantity, is based on the
principle of sufficiency, which means no larger than essential.
People don't understand the content of the phrase, "reasonable
sufficiency". From the political point of view the principle is clear. It
means a policy of not having offensive capability but a sufficiently large
force to ward off all threats. Some people consider it from the economic point
of view and believe it means the reduction of military expenditures, but this
is doubtful in practice. The military point of view is that "reasonable
sufficiency" must be based on a deep analysis and study of the possible
character of war.
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Nuclear weapons
Like it or not we are in a nuclear age. There is a debate over the possibility
and likelihood of nuclear war - some say yes and some say no. But the very
existence of nuclear weapons means that nuclear war can break out. Therefore
everything else must consider nuclear war as a foundation or fundamental fact
of life. The real interest must be in protecting against nuclear war. In this
regard military doctrine rests on three principles:
-- parity of capabilities;
-- ability to answer any nuclear blow;
-- possibility to bring about damage to the enemy.
So the doctrine of "reasonable sufficiency" rests on these three
principles. One needs sufficient forces to deliver a heavy strike under any
circumstances. This is a complicated situation that demands careful study to
determine just what "reasonable sufficiency" is. It is essential that
competent military specialists agree on the facts and conclusions.
Up to the present the greatest potential war, underlying military analysis, was
the possibility of a NATO - Warsaw Pact War. Even the new military doctrine as
of 1987 proceeded from the idea of a possible European war. The basis of the
doctrine was the adoption of the principle of reasonable sufficiency for the
USSR. This was based on the policy of "no first strike" but the
capability for warding off the enemy attack. Thus a reasonable sufficiency
level was that level of military forces required for this warding off of the
enemy strike.
{Question - does "warding off" have the usual Soviet connotation of
preemptive strike on warning?}
Soviet military doctrine was based on the military political circumstances of
the time. The armed forces of the two parties {ie WP and NATO} were located
physically close together. It was considered that in case of war NATO would
attempt to invade the WP territory with ground forces.
The military-political situation in Europe assumed that in Europe a sudden
attack on the WP was the greatest danger. The WP armed forces would conduct
defensive operations. The basic task was not to permit {ie to prevent} NATO to
invade successfully. The doctrine considered defensive operations to be a
series of frontal operations. This general scenario was the basis and
foundation for calculations on the size, training level, and organization of
the forces. It was a stereotype operation for planning purposes. It led to the
assessment of the specific content of "reasonable sufficiency" as a
result of quantitative calculations of the forces required to ward of the enemy
attack.
On the other hand other specialists responded to the idea of an enemy first
strike concentrated on a strong initial strike against the troops and on
measures exactly to reduce WP ability to ward off the enemy blow. There was
much discussion of this. The recent war in the Persian Gulf confirms the view
that a surprise attack focused on the enemy key elements can indeed succeed in
altering the overall balance. No longer can we say we have equal military-
political groupings of forces. The situation that exists now is that the NATO
grouping has preserved and supplemented itself with the addition of a united
Germany, while the Warsaw Pact has broken up and does not exist. Now we have a
correlation of forces with a shift to a Western advantage. The figures are:
1.5 to 1 in tanks; 1.3 to 1.5 to 1 in artillery; 1.3 to 1 in aircraft and AT
helicopters; and naval forces have also not parity. {I am not sure I got these
numbers associated with the right categories of weapons.} So the USSR has lost
parity of forces in Europe. The USSr has withdrawn its forces to its own
borders or is in the process of doing so. The strategic situation has changed
radically; in essence immediate contact is no longer possible. Between the
military forces there is 800-1000 km gap of countries whose relations to the
USSR are difficult to predict. So the threat to the USSR in the case of future
war has changed. No longer is the threat that of sudden invasion of ground
forces.
Now the initial stage of war will be quite different. The initial stage may be
conducted not as a series of front and army operations as before.
Specialists say the military threat of NATO must first overcome the 1000 km gap
and occupy East Europe. This is not possible to accomplish easily or quickly.
The experience of the Near East War shows the nature of the attack has changed
and with it the nature of war itself. Previously we were oriented on the area
the enemy would have to use to accomplish a ground force invasion and his
preparation to do this would itself be a sign of the immanence of war. But now
there is no need for such preliminary preparations. The enemy can initiate war
with exclusively air attacks and attacks with drone aircraft in the initial air
war. The idea of an air war was first conceived and popularized by the Italian,
Douhey< in the 1920's and then taken up by the English. The theory of air
war was applied by the US in WW II, but did not produce positive results
because the theory did not have a sufficient material base. The World War II
potential of forces for air attack was not sufficient. However, now air forces
are stronger, so the idea of an air war can be put into practice. The means of
air operations have intensified. The recent air operation confirms this
capability. Agreements are needed on limitations of nuclear forces and also sea
and air based cruise missiles. Analysis shows that in future years, by 2000AD,
the US will have sufficient means to conduct an air war that could destroy 1000
targets deep in the enemy rear territory. The use of cruise missiles in the
Gulf was a foretaste of this.
The general nature of an air war will be a series of massive strikes of precise
delivery weapons. In intervals between these massive strikes there could be
precise strikes and group strikes against critical targets. {This is an exact
replication of Soviet concepts for nuclear strikes.} In order to align air
defenses we need all the means available including missiles, and to use
electronics and radio electronic warfare. Also must use all space means of
intelligence and communications to accomplish this goal.
The nature of war is changing. The ability to limit is problematical and we
cannot stabilize the situation. This trend may make aggressors confident. In
order not to force oneself into a bad situation one needs to stabilize the
situation.
The problem of the prevention of war.
This must be on the agenda for the next round of talks.
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Specific aspects of future war.
War will not require or even prefer the use of large groups of ground forces.
Massive strikes will use drone weapons and reconnaissance strike systems to
select and hit specific key targets. The entire country finds itself subject to
precise strikes. War will indeed be without borders or front and rear. The
current front is in effect a divide between areas subject to strike and those
not so subject. In the future strikes can be made against state government and
military targets and the opponent's means of strikes in order to concentrate
{focus} power on the enemy critical nodes. This makes it possible not only to
gain operational, but also strategic results rapidly. War might start and end
by a powerful strike of weapons. however, we consider that defense is still
possible.
In usual operations during the course of a war in the concluding stages one
reached the classical concept of victory. In past wars it was possible to
destroy the enemy and undermine his potential only by occupying his territory.
In the future occupation may not be necessary. New "smart" armaments
can deliver a blow to destroy the economic potential so devastating that actual
invasion may not be required.
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Lines of development of ground forces
This is a large question. The qualitative improvement is the way for
development so that while the number of forces is reduced their capabilities
are increased. The task of defense is to decrease the numbers of armed forces
while improving their military capabilities. We consider that ground forces
will be the fundamental component. Although numbers will be reduced we will
preserve the ability for rapid development. The basis for development is the
new armament and new technology. This will provide for reorganized corps and
elevate their defensive potential and ability to conduct operations. In
developing the ground forces we won't duplicate or imitate possible enemies.
The Soviet Union is a very large state with extensive boundaries. This
establishes military requirements. We don't need to change the structural basis
of the armed forces but to qualitatively improve them.
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Composition of the armed forces
The question of a draft army versus a professional army system is being
discussed. An army of conscripted service people has defects in its
professional level and discipline and {? in international and national
relations?} The strong point is in sufficient reserves and a general patriotic
attitude instilled with the idea of national service plus courage and
fortitude. The likely result will be a combination of both principles and both
will be in parts of the army.
The importance of surprise is increasing. In the past the ground forces lacked
the technology giving them the potential to conduct first strikes by surprise.
Now we are in a transitional period in warfare in which air strikes are
becoming more crucial. The possibility of surprise attack is real and actual
now, to achieve both strategic and political goals.
In the recent war Iraq applied the concepts of past wars while the US practiced
the concepts of future war. The past concepts would have resulted in a long and
bloody war before eventual victory. In the initial stage the US achieved
absolute air superiority and suppressed air defenses. Precise weaponry such as
the Tomahawk showed the technological approach to war. The Soviet analysts are
especially amazed at the number of air sorties sustained - 2000 to 3000 per day
over such a long period. It shows a very high level of technical support as
well as good pilots.
Iraq thought there would be a 3-5 day air war during which they would suffer
sustainable losses and then a classical ground war. They thought in two
dimensions, while the US concept of war is three dimensional.
The nature of the war in Afghanistan bears no relation to the kind of war in
Iraq.
In order to influence war the technological means must be present in sufficient
quantity - in space, radioelectronics, etc. - All these are developed in time
to be deployed in sufficient quantity.
The Soviet analysts modeled warfare in accordance with the Pentagon war plan
"Dropshot". They examined the outcome by modeling and decided that
not only would the Soviet Union have suffered, but also the US would have
eventually suffered from radiation effects 40 -60 times as massive as the
Chernobal accident. There are now about 12 to 13 other nuclear countries.
The coming third generation nuclear weapons pose an ecological danger. They can
destroy the ground based national infrastructure. The new stage weapons are
dangerous in that they can actually be used in war. States having such weapons
may become aggressive against their enemies. We need agreements against such
new weapons.
In the Soviet Union the ground forces will resist changes and the military-
industrial complex will resist reform and want to keep old production lines and
their role in society.
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Comment from JS:
All of this will be familiar to readers of Soviet military press. I did not
hear anything I thought was new. In the question period I pointed out that
Soiet writers have been giving this picture of future war since at least
Ogarkov. Slipchenko agreed and said what is new is the US ability to put the
"future" into practice NOW.
I suggested that the gap in the result in the recent war was much greater than
the apparent gap in the quality of the technology available on each side and
suggested that this was due to the cultural and social gap and inability of the
Iraqi to employ the technology they had. He agreed. I remarked further that
perhaps the Soviet general staff had identified a similar shortcoming in Soviet
society years ago and were seeking to close it. This brought the reply that
such evaluations were political and beyond the purvue of the speaker.
When he had the chance to ask questions Slipchenko posed two: How did the US
manage to sustain such a high sortie rate in aircraft for so long? and What was
the nature of US radio electronic warfare? These questions were met with a
resounding silence in the hall.
John Sloan
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