SOVIET VOROSHILOV ACADEMY LECTURES
ARMY OPERATIONS

I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE ARMY'S OFFENSIVE OPERATION

The Role of the Combined Arms Army in Offensive Operations of the Front

The offensive operation of the army is normally a part of the offensive operation of the front.  In some situations, when operating on separate axes, the army may conduct independent offensive operations.
When executing missions in support of a front offensive operation, the army may conduct one or more operations. In exceptional cases, when the depth of front offensive operation is not great and the enemy has no strong reserves at his disposal, the army may conduct only one offensive operation to achieve the goals of the front offensive operation. The second-echelon army of the front conducts only one offensive operation.

The army executes its missions in the front's offensive operation in close coordination with adjacent armies, air army, large units and units of rocket and artillery troops, air defense troops, operational air, seaborne troops and other elements of the front. When operating on maritime axes, the army will coordinate its operation with the naval units operating from the sea.

The role and place of the army in the front's offensive operation is determined by its missions envisaged in the operational concept of the front commander. In the front's operational formation the combined arms army and the tank army may operate: in either first or second-echelon, on the main axis or other axes, in the center of front forces, or on the flanks of the main grouping of front forces.

The first-echelon armies constitute the bulk of front forces. The successful accomplishment of their missions is essential to achieving the aim set for the offensive operation of the front. First-echelon armies have several missions:
---- - to destroy the confronting enemy groupings, as well as their nuclear delivery means;
---- - to exploit the offensive to the depth of the front's immediate mission, and then to the limits of the front's offensive mission;
---- - to seize vital areas (terrain features);
---- - to consolidate (fortify) the objectives once achieved.

The combined arms army may act as part of the main attack of the front or in other, secondary directions of attack. The tank army is normally employed on the main offensive axis as part of the main striking forces of the front.

Armies operating on the main axis of attack of the front are reinforced by supporting units and equipment. Also the bulk of nuclear weapons and front air strikes are concentrated on their offensive axes. Moreover, the employment of operational air assault forces, large river crossing units, and the commitment of reserves of the front are planned in the areas of operation. Consequently, the first-echelon armies operating in the main striking axis of the front are capable of: destroying the confronting enemy; advancing rapidly into the enemy's depth; and, usually, operating independently of the other first-echelon armies of the front.

The combined arms army and the tank army operating in the second-echelon of the front may exploit the offensive along the main striking axis and sometimes act offensively along a new axis. The offensive commitment of the second-echelon is normally made after the accomplishment of the front's immediate mission but sometimes this commitment may be made earlier.

The types of weapons and the means of destruction employed in the offensive operations affect to a large degree the role of the army in the accomplishment of front missions. The front offensive operation could be conducted with or without the employment of nuclear weapons. At the beginning of offensive operations conventional weapons only may be employed, but later on, in a specific phase, nuclear weapons may be employed. The offensive operation of the front may be conducted from beginning to end without the employment of nuclear weapons, while the permanent danger of the use of nuclear weapons by the enemy always exists. In each case the role of the army in the destruction of the enemy and the achievement of the front offensive operation aim would be different.

In an offensive operation of the front with the employment of nuclear weapons, the combined arms army and the tank army should accomplish the destruction of the main enemy grouping, mop up the enemy forces that survived strategic and front nuclear strikes, and also destroy other enemy groupings to the depth, which have not been hit by these strikes. The armies accomplish these missions by widely exploiting the use of nuclear weapons and by the combat action of their infantry and tank large units, and other units.

In front offensive operations conducted without the employment of nuclear weapons the armies with their reinforcements and supporting arms (the large units of the air army of the front) are required to destroy all the enemy units in their entire operational depth inside the allotted areas specified for each army's offensive operation and to seize the vital and important areas and features located inside the army's specified boundaries. The army will play an important role in repelling the surprise attacks of the enemy as well as in repelling the counterstrikes of superior enemy forces. The army can play this vital role because it has sufficient forces and means and usually accomplishes its mission in close cooperation with national air defense forces, air forces, and, when operating in naval areas, with the naval forces.

When operating in maritime areas, the role of the army would be determined by the importance of that area, the nature and character of the army's mission to destroy the coastal groupings of the enemy, and the occupation of peninsulas, coastal islands, ports, naval military bases, and other important objectives (areas) along the seashore, as well as the conditions of cooperation with the naval forces.

The role and place of each army in the course of front offensive operations may be changed by alterations made to the mission of the front and in operational situations, particularly when the main effort of the front is shifted from one axis to another. The aim of the army's operation and the missions of the army are determined by the front commander in close consideration of the following:
---- - operational concept of the front related to the missions the strategic and frontal forces will accomplish in that army's area;
---- - front's capabilities to reinforce and support the army;
---- - operational status of units and the moral and political standards of the personnel;
---- - missions and conditions of cooperation with adjacent armies and operational formations of other services of the armed forces (navy, air forces etc);
---- - composition of the enemy groupings and character of its possible actions;
---- - supply reserves at the beginning of the operation and the possibilities of further supplies in the course of combat operations;
---- - geographic, physical and economic characteristics of the TSMA and the characteristics of specific areas where combat operations either will take place or which should be occupied during the offensive operations.

The army's aim in offensive operations and the army missions are determined directly by the concept of the operation as it is described in the front commander's decision. Components include:
---- - aim of the operation and specific missions;
---- - composition of forces in the operation;
---- - character of coordination with the adjacent units and airborne units;
---- - operational formations of other services of the armed forces;
---- - number of nuclear and chemical rounds and the quantities of conventional ammunition and other information.

The aim of the operation is the final result the army should achieve by the end of the operation. The aim of the operation is normally the destruction of a specific enemy grouping, including its nuclear weapons, and the seizure of areas and terrain features that facilitate the accomplishment of one of the front's missions in a specific operational axis and create favorable conditions for the accomplishment of subsequent operations.

In a front offensive operation carried out in a normal TSMA (European type terrain), which could be 600-800 km or more in depth, the first-echelon army mostly conducts two operations.  The first army operation would be continued up to the depth of the immediate mission of the front; the second operation up to the depth of the subsequent (final) mission of the front.

The aims of the first and second operations of the army emerge from the nature of the immediate and subsequent missions of the front offensive operation as well as the character of the areas where the army will conduct its operation. The immediate mission of the front in offensive operations is to destroy the enemy's nuclear weapons and the main forces of its army group and air forces (OTAK--Operational-Tactical Air Corps), to seize vital areas and terrain features, depriving the enemy of the basing areas suitable for its air forces concentrations (air bases) and rocket installations, disintegrate the operational steadiness (firmness) of the enemy's defense, and finally, to facilitate the successful continuation of the offensive for friendly formations. The depth of the immediate mission of the front is 250-350 km and more.

The aim of the offensive operation of the front's first- echelon army is to destroy the confronting enemy grouping and its reserves, including its nuclear weapons in the whole depth of the enemy's group of army deployment and to seize vital areas and terrain features, which deprive the enemy of basing areas of air forces and missile concentration and destroy the operational integration and firmness of its defenses, and finally create suitable conditions for exploitation deep into the enemy's rear.  The depth of this operation is the same as front's immediate objective i.e. 250-350 km and more.

The subsequent operation of the army is usually executed in order to destroy newly-located enemy nuclear weapons systems and the enemy reserves located in depth, in close cooperation with the rockets, air forces, and other armies and to seize vital terrain features and areas that facilitate the accomplishment of front's subsequent (final) mission on that axis. The depth of the army's subsequent operation is the same as the depth of the front's subsequent mission in the offensive operation, i.e., 350-500 km or more. When executing offensive operations in maritime areas and in special conditions of a theater of military operations, the depth of the army operation may be reduced. In such areas the execution of special missions are required, such as the occupation of peninsular regions, islands, coastal areas, the consolidation of gains and the organization of coastal defense. In mountainous areas and regions with many rivers and marshes the enemy will have more advantages especially in organizing a strong defense, creating great obstructions in a short period of time, and inundating the ground with water. In mountainous areas (terrain) special importance is given to the destruction of separate enemy groupings and to the main axes of advance that lead to the basic ground communication centers, main road junctions, mountain passes, defiles and passages through impassable terrain, since the seizure of such features provides access to valleys and plains. These features normally set the aim of an army offensive operation. In deserts and steppe, the depth of the army operation may increase to some extent. To facilitate planning and coordination among army units, the army is assigned three main missions: participation in the initial nuclear strike of the front, the immediate mission, and the subsequent mission. Further, the first-day mission and missions concerning the repulse of the enemy attack could also be assigned to the army.

At present the army is reinforced with a variety of capabilities for inflicting heavy losses on the enemy with or without the employment of nuclear weapons. For each type of combat environment (nuclear or non-nuclear), different forms of operations will be conducted; however, the aim of the army operation and its immediate and subsequent missions are identical in nuclear and non-nuclear environments. This illustrates the fact that it is very difficult to determine in advance what types of weapons (nuclear or non-nuclear) would be employed as the operation (especially the initial operation) begins. What is certain is that there will be a specific grouping of the enemy forces in the army's operation area, whose destruction is intended. There are also terrain features and objectives that should be seized by the army in the course of offensive operation, regardless of the types of weapons which are going to be used.

The army's mission during the initial nuclear strike of the front is to destroy the enemy's nuclear delivery means and to inflict heavy casualties on the enemy especially on its tank groupings, command posts, and vital targets in enemy rear services areas that are located within the limits of the army's offensive operation. The army rocket brigade and the rocket battalions of first-echelon divisions are employed for the execution of this mission.

The immediate mission of the first-echelon army is to destroy the enemy's nuclear delivery means, the main forces of the enemy's first-echelon army corps, and its immediate operational reserves; and to seize the areas and lines (terrain features) in order to destroy the operational resistance of the enemy's defense and create suitable conditions for the successful continuation of the army's offensive operation. Considering the characteristics and dispositions of the enemy's field army defenses, the depth of the immediate mission of the army is l00-l50 km. The first-day mission of the army may be the destruction of the main forces of the enemy's first-echelon divisions and corps reserves.

The subsequent mission of the army is to destroy newly-located enemy nuclear weapons, to complete the destruction of confronting enemy forces and its reserves, and to seize the areas by which the aim of the army's offensive operation is achieved. The depth of the subsequent objective is l50-200 km. The aim of the operation and the character of offensive missions are determined by the scale of the army's offensive operation. The scale of the operation includes the depth, width, average unit's advance rate, and the duration of the operation. The depth of the operation is the distance between the line of contact (state boundary) to the line (area) of the final advance of the army, where the aim of the operation is reached. Since the aim of various operations are different the depth of operations is variable too. The frontage (width) of the army's area in offensive operations is determined by the army's missions, the composition of confronting enemy force and its probable courses of action, the requirements to establish quantitative and qualitative superiority over the enemy in forces and means and to create proper conditions for maneuver, terrain conditions, and other elements of the combat situation.

Experiences in war and scientific calculations show that in order successfully to accomplish the offensive missions, a two to three fold superiority must be established over the enemy on the attack (strike) axes, considering the whole depth of the assigned mission. The frontage of the attack zone is determined by the nature of the deployment of own troops, the requirements of protecting friendly troops from the nuclear weapons, and the responsibility to destroy the enemy in assigned areas.

When there are five to six divisions at the army's disposal, with four divisions in the first-echelon, the frontage of the army attacking on the main offensive axis of the front in normal (European-type) terrain could be 60-80 km. On other axes, where the enemy has no sufficient forces and means, and in the areas with much impassable terrain the army's frontage can reach up to l00 km and more. Rates of advance in offensive operations are related to (dependent on) the following:
---- - the degree of resistance of the confronting enemy forces and the firepower of the army units;
---- - the possibilities of maneuvers to reinforce offensive blows in depth and to maintain superiority on the enemy;
---- - the capabilities of forces to quickly restore their combat abilities;
---- - the elimination of the impacts of the enemy's blows;
---- - crossing natural and artificial obstacles;
---- - the possibilities of restoring combat support measures to facilitate the combat operation of the units;
---- - continuous troop control.

The experience of field exercises, command post exercises (commanders and staff exercises) (CPX), and calculations indicate that the rate of advance will not be identical on different days of offensive operations. In frontal attack when penetrating the enemy's prepared defenses in a breakthrough without the employment of nuclear weapons, the average rate of daily (24 hours') advance would be 25-30 km; when attacking strong (fortified) defenses, it will be 20-25 km. During the offensive in the depth of the enemy's defenses, the daily rate of advance could be increased up to 60-70 km and more. Generally, the average rate of advance with the employment of conventional means in normal terrain could be 40-60 km daily. In mountains, marshes, jungles, and arctic areas the average rate of advance decreases to 30-50 km daily, while in deserts and steppes it increases substantially. In a nuclear environment the following factors will have a great impact on the rate of advance:
---- - the effects of nuclear strikes;
---- - the requirements to restore the units' combat abilities;
---- - the probabilities of troops being forced to bypass destroyed and radioactive contaminated areas, flooded areas, areas of fire and other obstacles.

After the mass nuclear strike, much time will be required for the restoration of units' combat capabilities (effectiveness), eliminating the effects of the enemy's nuclear blows, waiting for the reduction of radiation, and reconstruction of roads and column routes. The process of restoring the combat capabilities of troops after the mutual initial nuclear strike and the organization of forces to launch the offensive in compliance with the new situation might take one to two days or even longer. The engineer units of the army and divisions (organic units) construct two column routes for each division through the contaminated areas at a rate of 30-50 km per day. If the units are bypassing contaminated areas the rate of construction column routes will be 50-60 km per day. In open terrain with less vegetation and fewer built-up areas, where the impact of nuclear weapons will not be great, the rate of constructing column routes will be much greater, while in mountains and jungles it will be substantially smaller. Consequently, it is advised that for practical purposes the rate of advance in offensive operations should be planned and considered identically for immediate and subsequent missions and for both nuclear and non-nuclear environments. Thus the average rate of advance in the army's offensive operation will be 40-60 km per day. By this token, if the depth of the operation is 250-350 km, it could be accomplished in 6-9 days.

The Probable Composition and Combat Capabilities of Combined Arms Army and Tank Army

The army has no permanent organization (especially as far as the number of organic divisions is concerned). The composition of the army is determined by its mission in the execution of the front's offensive operations, the nature of its assigned missions, the composition of the confronting enemy and its probable courses of action, the scale of the employment of nuclear, chemical, and other mass destruction weapons by the front, or the volume of the support missions executed by the front air forces in favor of the army's offensive operations in a non-nuclear environment, the physical and geographical nature of the theater of military operations, and the importance of the operational direction, along which the army is committed to conduct the offensive operations.

The combined arms army may have five to six divisions, including one to two tank divisions, an army rocket (missile) brigade (SSM Bde.), artillery air defense units, and units (subunits) of combat support units. The tank army normally has three to four tank divisions, an army rocket brigade (SSM Bde.), artillery, air defense and combat support units. In some cases motor rifle divisions may be included in the tank army.

As the experience of field exercises indicates, 80-l00 nuclear rounds, including 20-30% nuclear bombs and 70-90% nuclear rockets (missiles) and 60-80 chemical rockets are allocated to the army operating in the first-echelon of the front in the main direction. Moreover, a large quantity of front nuclear rounds are employed, according to the plans of the front command in the army's sector of attack. The army may be reinforced by an artillery division, antitank artillery brigade, assault crossing engineer units, and units (sub units) of radio electronic warfare (P35) type A, C, and F. (See chapt. II-11). Fifteen to twenty flights of a fighter-bomber regiment are allocated for the support of combat operations of army forces during the offensive operation. For the employment of tactical airborne assaults (desant) four to five flights of a helicopter regiment could be allocated to the army by the front.

For the purpose of destroying the main grouping of the enemy, the army may be reinforced with airborne assault units (large units). In the sector of the army's operation, operational airborne units could be employed.

The combat capabilities of the combined arms army (four motorized rifle divisions, one tank division) and the tank army (four tank divisions) are shown in the following table.

Elements Combined Arms Army Tank Army

Divisions Rifle Div 4-5 Tank Div 4
Tank Div 1

Personnel About 50,000 About 40,000

Artillery and Mortars 744 pieces 400 pieces

Tanks l266 - l252

Operational SSM (launchers) 9 9

Tactical SSM l2-l5 l2-l6 (launchers)

AT Weapons (ATGM,Guns 486 l08
(RL's)
(RPG-9, PTO, PTURS)

Means---- Hectares -----Hectares

Firepower: Arty ----380 -----------200
-------------Tank---- l70---------- --l60
--------- Nuclear --9l50-l0400 ---8400-9400

Total --------------9700-l0950 ----8760-9760

Note: Firepower is calculated in area neutralized for 20 minutes preparatory fire. The 82 mm mortars are not included.


Maneuver Capability 250-300 km -------------250-300 km
----------------(-daily rate of march) ----------(out of contact)

Depth of operation 250-350 km ----------250-500 km

Daily rate of advance 40-60 km -----------40-60 km

---------- Combined Arms Army ------------Tank Army

Duration of operation: 6-9 days ----------------6-9 days

frontage in offense: 60-80 km -----------45-60 km

As illustrated in the table, the capabilities and combat abilities of contemporary armies has increased substantially compared to the armies of the final phase of the Great Patriotic War (World War II). Reasons for this are the introduction of nuclear weapons into the army's organization (operational- tactical and tactical rocket troops), the increase in the number of tanks, qualitative modernization of artillery, complete motorization of units, the successes achieved in the combat effectiveness and logistics supply, and the quantitative and qualitative increase in the means of troop control of units.

The army's organic weapons enable it to hit the enemy to a depth of 250-280 km with massive, grouped, and individual nuclear strikes. The army is able to destroy up to one enemy corps (two divisions), including its organic nuclear delivery means, simultaneously, with nuclear strikes. The army also has high capabilities in the employment of chemical weapons. Employing the organic artillery during 20 minutes of preparatory fire, the army can destroy l0-l2 Honest John weapons systems and can neutralize four to six battalions, or l2-l4 artillery batteries. The army artillery can support the penetration of the enemy prepared defense without the employment of nuclear weapons on a front of 6-8 km and concentrate on that frontage 90-l00 guns and mortars per km. Considering the organic and supporting artillery, the width of the army's penetration zone in frontal attack may be eight to ten km. In the attack sectors of the combined arms army (taking into account the first-echelon divisions) 40-50 tanks could be concentrated in one km of the front.

The tank army composed of four tank divisions will have about l,250 tanks and 400 guns and mortars at its disposal, giving it the capability to concentrate a large density of armor in areas suitable for armor blows and tank maneuvers.

The capabilities of the army in defense against enemy air attack means is determined by the composition of the units, protective means and measures, and other relevant factors.

Table 2 illustrates the air defense units and weapons organic to the army.

LARGE NUMBER SAM SYSTEM AIR DEFENSE ARTY UNITS & SAM S-75 STRELA 2M S-60 ZSU-23-4
UNITS guns Shilka S-75 SAM 1 3 units - - -

REGT 18 launchers

Small caliber
Air Defense 1-2 - - 6-12 -
Arty Regt 36 - 72

Radio Technical
Air Defense 1 - - - - Bn.

MR Div 4 - 396 16 64 96

Tank Div 1 - 51 4 16 24

Total 3 450 26-32 80 18 156-192

Note: The numbers of weapons systems or batteries are shown in the numerators and numbers of weapons are shown in denominators.

As the table indicates, the army has a large number of modern air defense weapons (468 SAM systems and l56-l92 antiaircraft artillery pieces).

According to scientific calculations, including modern computer predictive models and arithmetic calculations, the army is capable of destroying 35-45 enemy aircraft in daytime and l2-l5 in nighttime with one fire strike of its organic air defense means (taking in account the coefficient of participants, combat readiness, satisfactory troop control, and probable losses in air defense means), and is capable of covering its main striking force satisfactorily during the preparation and execution of offensive operations. In this case it should be noted that the "Strela 2M" weapons system is effective only when visual observation of the target is possible.

To support the combat operations of the army, a number of engineer, chemical, and other combat support units are organic to the army. The organic engineer support elements of the army are:
----- - combat engineer regiment;
----- - road and bridge construction engineer regiment;
----- - pontoon bridging regiment;
----- - engineer assault crossing battalion;
----- - engineer obstacle battalion (in the tank army, engineer obstacle crossing battalion);
----- - engineer company for command post construction;
----- - engineer company for repairs and evacuation.

The combat engineer regiment is employed to reinforce the first-echelon divisions and in support of the execution of the army's missions. The combat engineer regiment can create 54 lanes through minefields during one night. At the same time (during ten hours) it can construct l50-300 km of column routes, dig 30-35 km of trench for the troops, and 250-300 km of trench for tanks and infantry fighting vehicles.

The road and bridge construction engineer regiment normally constructs and maintains the frontal main line of communications and "rokade" roads (roads parallel to the front) for the army. The regiment can reconstruct (repair) l20-200 km of roads and construct l60-300 km of column routes in ten hours, employing its road construction engineer battalions.

The pontoon bridging regiment constructs the crossings for the army over water obstacles. In one hour the regiment can construct a 443-meter bridge with a 60-ton capacity, or construct a 760-meter-long bridge with a 20-ton capacity. The regiment could be employed to construct rafts in the following combinations:
----- - twenty 60-ton rafts;
----- - sixteen 80-ton rafts;
----- - twelve ll0-ton rafts.

The engineer assault crossing battalion is allocated to the first-echelon divisions or kept in reserve. In one wave the battalion can cross two tank companies and one-and-a-half artillery battalions, with towing vehicles, not exceeding ten tons.

The engineer obstacle battalion is normally employed to establish the Mobile Obstacles Detachment (POZ). The battalion is capable of laying mines on a five kilometers of front, using one set of mines. Each set includes 3,600 mines. Additionally the battalion can lay l8 sets of remote-controlled mines in 2 hours, covering up to 2 km of front.

The army may be reinforced by more road construction, combat engineer, trench-digging, pontoon bridge, assault crossing, and other engineer units. The above-mentioned organic and allocated engineer units insure the accomplishment (execution) of basic engineering tasks in offensive operations.

The combined arms army and the tank army have sufficient organic chemical units: two independent chemical protection battalions, one independent terrain decontaminating battalion, one independent clothing and equipment decontaminating battalion, one independent chemical and radiation reconnaissance company, one independent rear services chemical protection company, a nuclear burst calculation station (RAS), and an air radioactive reconnaissance company (three MI-4 helicopters). Each rifle and tank division has an independent chemical protection company. One chemical protection platoon is organic to each regiment.

The organic chemical units enable the army to detach simultaneously 80-l00 chemical observation posts or the same number of chemical reconnaissance patrols in order to conduct radioactive, chemical, and biological reconnaissance. At the same time army chemical units can decontaminate (special decontamination level) the personnel, weapons, and equipment of up to 25-30 battalions in one-and-a-half to two hours. In some situations the army is reinforced with more chemical units by the front.

The organization and increased combat capabilities of the army require that the army should execute the offensive operation decisively, in great depth, with a high rate of advance, and move forward rapidly while maneuvering from one direction to another.

The successful accomplishment of the army's missions and the achievement of the aim of the operation is (related) dependent to a great degree on the training level of large units and their personnel and their political and moral status. The political and moral status of the troops is the most important factor in their combat effectiveness. The actual combat missions (in combat and in operations) are accomplished by personnel who know how to use the weapons and equipment. The high political and moral status of the troops, their firmness and sustainability, their strong faith in the cause of their struggle for communism, and finally, the high standards of their combat training (field training) is, and will be, the vital and most important factor in defeating the enemy. This fact is especially important in the operations executed with the employment of nuclear weapons.

Political and party indoctrination is vital to achieving high morale among the troops. The basic mission in political and moral training of the personnel is to insure loyalty toward communism, country, and people, hatred of the enemy, devotion, strong will, resistance and everlasting firmness in defeating the enemy regardless of hardships, and to provide the units with a high standard of combat training to succeed in any mission in all situations of combat operations. These and other political and party tasks are the duties and responsibilities of all commanders and staffs of political and party organizations of the army.

The Forms of Executing Offensive Operations and the Destruction of the Enemy

The forms of executing offensive operations portray (embody) the forms and methods of employing the units and weapons, and the character (nature) of troop actions in the destruction of the enemy's main groupings in the army's attack sector to the full depth of offensive operations.

The forms of the destruction of enemy groupings portray the method and nature of employment of troops and means and the character of the army's forces in destroying the enemy's individual groupings. These individual enemy groupings may consist of one to two or more divisions, nuclear delivery means, and other assets, which conduct defensive, offensive, counterattack, and counteroffensive (counterblow) missions.

The forms of executing offensive operations and the forms of the destruction of the enemy are closely related to the types of weapons employed (nuclear or non-nuclear). If the execution of the offensive operation and the destruction of the enemy grouping is going to be conducted by employing nuclear and chemical weapons, the following must be determined:
---- - the method of employment of mass-destructive weapons (mass strikes, groups of strikes) to destroy the enemy main grouping;
---- - the direction of the main attack and supporting attacks;
---- - the areas where decisive losses (destruction) are to be inflicted on the enemy;
---- - the nature of combat operations of the army groupings.

In a non-nuclear environment, when determining the method of executing offensive operations and the destruction of the enemy, the following must be determined:
---- - the method of employment of the artillery, air forces, and other means of destruction;
---- - the axis of the main attack and supporting attacks;
---- - the nature of combat operations of motorized and tank major units;
---- - the method of destroying the enemy's main grouping in terms of frontage and depth;
---- - the areas where the greatest losses are to be inflicted on the enemy.

The decision concerning the forms of executing offensive operations and the destruction of the enemy is related to the operational concept of the front, the numbers of higher echelon units and weapons (means) to be employed in the army attack sector, the army combat composition, operational disposition of friendly troops, the composition and probable course of the enemy's actions, terrain, and other factors.

In operations employing nuclear weapons, the following forms of executing offensive operations and destruction of the enemy are employed: (See diagrams)
---- - inflict decisive losses (casualties) on the enemy by nuclear and chemical mass strikes (groups of strikes), the rapid advance of army units along the specified axis in cooperation with the airborne troops, and the airborne assault (raiding) units (large units) to complete the destruction of surviving enemy units and to seize the final objective of the operation;
---- - inflict heavy losses on the enemy by nuclear and chemical weapons, with army units attacking from different convergent axes to encircle and destroy the main grouping of the enemy along with simultaneous advance to the enemy's depth;
---- - inflict heavy casualties on the enemy by nuclear and chemical weapons and the attack of motorized and large tank units to the flank and rear of the enemy's main grouping in order to press it toward a natural obstacle and, subsequently, destroy it.

The basis of all the above-mentioned forms of executing offensive operations is inflicting decisive losses on the enemy's main grouping by nuclear weapons, the decisive and rapid combat operations of motorized, tank, airborne and airborne assault (raiding) units to complete the destruction of enemy forces, and to achieve the aim of the operation with a high rate of speed.

In operations without the employment of nuclear weapons, the following forms of executing offensive operations and the destruction of the enemy are employed: (See diagrams)
---- - Delivering a heavy, rupturing blow on one axis as far as the whole defensive depth of the confronting enemy grouping, while simultaneously widening the gap to the flanks and destroying the enemy units divided into separate groups. This form is usually employed when the army executes the breakthrough of strong and deep prepared defenses of the enemy at the beginning of the operation.
---- - Launching two, and sometimes more, rupturing blows to disintegrate the main grouping of the enemy and break it into individual groups. This form is employed preferably when the enemy's defense is of a hasty nature (hasty defense) with less depth and when the enemy has no large reserves at his disposal on that axis.
---- - Launching heavy blows along the convergent (axes) areas in the enemy's defense in order to encircle the main grouping of the enemy, along with the simultaneous exploitation of the attack to the depth. This form is employed when the army has sufficient means to launch two blows and the trace of the front line (line of contact) facilitates the encirclement and quick destruction of the enemy's main grouping (a salient-type front line).
---- - Delivering the blow on one flank of the army's attack sector in order to encircle the main enemy grouping in cooperation with other front formations or to get into the enemy's rear and subsequently destroy him by flanking blows and attacks from the rear.

The basis of the forms of executing offensive operations and the destruction of the enemy without the employment of nuclear weapons is the massive employment of units and destructive means on the selected axes (areas), inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy by fire, and decisive attack of units, along with the employment of airborne and airborne assault (raiding) units.

Operational Formation of the Army for Offensive Operation

The operational formation of the army is established for executing operational missions. The operational formation should first of all insure successful actions under conditions of nuclear weapons' employment and, at the same time, facilitate rapid changes in groupings of units to execute their missions with the employment of non-nuclear weapons. The operational formation of the army for offensive operations must comply with the determined form of the destruction of the enemy main grouping. It should also facilitate the continuous preparation of the troops to accomplish assigned missions. Above all, it should facilitate the delivery of the initial nuclear strikes, establishment of superiority over the enemy on the axes of attacks, the launching of strong, surprise attacks at the beginning of the operation and its rapid exploitation to the depth, sustained and continuous activity, necessary deployment and dispersion of the units, stability and firmness in repelling the enemy's surprise attacks and blows, satisfactory air defense, troop control, and must ensure the advantageous use of the terrain features. The manner in which army units are grouped is determined with careful consideration of the following:
---- - the likely composition of the enemy forces and character of operations;
---- - the possibilities for conducting combat along the border;
---- - the requirements for breaking through the enemy's prepared defensive lines;
---- - the need to repel the blows of strong enemy land and air force groupings with or without the employment of nuclear weapons.

To execute offensive operations, the army will establish its operational formation in two echelons and will have other elements in its operational formation such as army rocket troops, army artillery group (AAG), grouping of air defense troops, airborne units, (naval assault units when attacking in maritime areas), antitank reserves, mobile obstacle detachments, and special reserves.

Depending on the mission, army composition, frontage of attack, the composition and likely method of the enemy's actions, and the form determined for the enemy's destruction, the army's first-echelon may include three to four and even five divisions and the second-echelon one or two divisions. In some situations the army may maintain (establish) a combined arms reserve.

In situations in which the enemy is deployed in a deliberate defense and has fortified his defense with engineer constructions, it is advisable that the motorized infantry divisions attack in the first-echelon and the tank division follow up in the second-echelon in order that it can be committed after the first-echelon has broken through the enemy's prepared defense, and to exploit the offensive to the full depth of the enemy country. When a meeting engagement is anticipated the tank units are employed in the first-echelon to strike at the flanks and rear of the enemy's main grouping (main body) and to exploit the attack to the full depth.

The army rocket brigade, as well as the division's rocket battalions, are maintained in constant readiness to negate and weaken to a maximum degree the enemy's nuclear attack, to inflict heavy casualties on the main enemy grouping, especially his tanks, command posts, and operationally-important communications centers, and to destroy the enemy air defense means and his vital (targets) positions in the rear services area.

The army artillery group (normally in a non-nuclear environment) is composed of seven to nine gun and multiple rocket launcher artillery battalions and, according to the number of divisions operating in the main attack, is divided into sub-groups. During operations in which the employment of the army artillery group in support of the main grouping is not anticipated, the artillery units and large units instead are attached to those divisions in support of which the abovementioned artillery units initially operated as part of the army artillery group, or these artillery units are attached to divisions newly committed into combat.

The army's antitank reserve is established in order to repel the likely enemy tank attacks and the enemy's counterattacks and counterblows and to consolidate the captured lines (areas) during the operation. The composition of the army's antitank reserve may differ in different situations. Normally it is composed of an antitank artillery regiment, or several antitank artillery battalions organic to the antitank brigade of higher echelons.

The structure of the army's operational formation may change when new situations make it necessary.

II. Preparation of the Army Offensive Operation

Contents and Sequence of Preparing the Operation

The preparation of an offensive operation consists of a number of actions and measures taken by the commander, staff, chiefs of branches of forces (combat arms) and services, political and party organizations, and rear services units and organs to organize, plan, and fully to support the combat operations of the army. The most important actions taken to prepare for the operation are the following:
---- - making the decision and planning the operation;
---- - conveying missions to the troops, the organization of coordination (interaction), and preparing the troops for combat operations;
---- - engineering preparation of the starting (ishodnii raion) area;
---- - supply and deployment of supplies and stores;
---- - organizing and conducting political measures;
---- - organizing full support of combat activities (obsespecheniye boyevykh deystivyi) and command posts;
---- - maintaining the constant high readiness of the troops in support of the execution of assigned missions.

The initial (starting) data in preparing the offensive operation are the following:
---- - aim of the operation and the army's missions as assigned to the army by the directive of the front;
---- - composition of the army's forces and means;
---- - assessment of all factors affecting the situation.

The preparation of initial operations is usually taken in peacetime prior to the outbreak of war, and part of them is conducted during the period of tension at the outset of war. Some preparations are made in the course of the beginning of the combat operations in the initial phase of war.

Since the organization and planning of initial operations are carried out while the situation is not very clear (it is very difficult to anticipate all the details of the form and characteristics of future war, the duration of combat operations without the employment of nuclear weapons if the war is going to begin only with the employment of conventional weapons, and the form of the enemy attack and other details), it is very important that the initial operation should be planned in full consideration of the successful accomplishment of assigned missions in any forthcoming situation with or without the employment of nuclear weapons.

In order to ensure the successful accomplishment of assigned missions in the initial army operation under various conditions of the beginning phase of a war initiated by the enemy, it is necessary to anticipate the execution of the initial army operation in a pattern of the following forms:
---- - The destruction of the enemy by the massive employment of nuclear weapons and, subsequently, by the combat action of army units. The requirements of this form is to outstrip (overtake) the enemy in the delivery of meeting engagement blows by the maneuver units, massive air strikes, and the rapid movement (approach) of motorized and tank large units.
---- - The destruction of the major enemy grouping, without employing nuclear weapons, by meeting engagements, breaking through the enemy's prepared defenses, and conducting a defensive action on some (secondary) axes.
---- - Combat operation of army units to repel the attacks of superior forces of the enemy (surprise [neozhidannaya ataka] attacks).

In each of the above, it is necessary that all measures and actions that insure the precedence of combat operations of army units to halt deliberate enemy aggression, in close cooperation with the other armies, rocket troops and front air forces, should be planned and organized in much detail.

Obviously, the conditions for preparing subsequent army operations would be different; therefore the content and sequence of actions and measures to prepare the offensive operation would have different specifications.

The experience of the Great Patriotic War (World War II) indicates that during the successful exploitation of the offensive, preparations for the army's subsequent operation had been started in the course of the accomplishment of the previous operation's mission without any operational pause.

Today, because of nuclear weapons and the developing nature of units' capabilities in launching attacks, delivering blows, and conducting rapid maneuvers, it is more likely that the preparation of subsequent operations in the course of the offensive operation would be in the same manner. That obviously constitutes a basically difficult task. At the end of the initial operation, one of the important tasks of the army's commander and staff would be the organization and execution of all measures to provide favorable conditions for starting the subsequent army operation. In this context the most important measures are:
---- - organizing and carrying out reconnaissance, not only to facilitate accomplishment of the initial operation but also in support of the subsequent operation;
---- - making a timely decision by the army commander for the subsequent operations, issuing operational missions to units at least twenty-four hours before the beginning of the new operation, and organizing the coordination (interaction) in the shortest possible time;
---- - conducting the necessary regrouping of forces and means at an earlier stage;
---- - supplying and distributing nuclear and conventional ammunition, fuel, and other material and technical supplies to the units;
---- - closing in (bringing forward) the rear services echelons to the troops;
---- - restoring the combat capabilities of large units and units that suffered heavy casualties, or relieving them with units in the second-echelon and reserves, or replacing them by units and large units allocated by the front commander from the front reserves.

One main difference between initial and subsequent operations is that in the latter the conditions and situations under which the operation will be executed are more clear and specified, especially knowledge of whether or not the operation will be executed with the employment of nuclear weapons. Therefore, it is necessary that at the end of the initial operation, and in the shortest possible time the assigned missions should be confirmed, the situation estimated, and the decision should be made. Then all other actions for the preparation of the new operation must be taken in full conformity with the decision.

Making the Decision

The army commander's decision for the offensive operation is the basis of all other actions taken in support of the preparation and execution of the operation. Therefore, the army commander should employ all of his knowledge, art, and experience to make a decision for the operation that is the most rational, comprehensive, and practical. This could only be achieved after a thorough understanding of the front commander's concept of operation and army's aim and missions, and after a complete evaluation of the different aspects of the situation and finally the operational anticipations by the army commander.

The clarification of the assigned mission is the correct understanding of the operational aim and army's missions, the role and place of the army in front operations, the missions of adjacent armies, rocket troops, air forces, and other cooperating forces. For this purpose the army commander is required to study and understand the following:
---- - general political and military situation in the theatre of war and in the army's operational area (zone);
---- - aim and missions of the army in the operation: what groupings of the enemy should be destroyed and what terrain (areas) must be seized, what methods and forms of accomplishing mission should be used in conformity with the concepts of the front commander;
---- - what forces and means of the front and higher echelons are to be employed to destroy targets and enemy groupings in the attack zone of the army, with or without the employment of nuclear weapons;
---- - on which direction the front concentrates its main attack, and which form is employed by the front to accomplish its mission;
---- - length of time allotted for the accomplishment of the mission and the scale of operation;
---- - conditions of coordination with forces and means of the front and higher echelon and also with adjacent forces;
---- - time available to the army for the preparation and execution of the operation.

In the estimate (assessment) of the situation, the following factors are estimated and analyzed: the enemy; friendly forces, including those adjacent; terrain; radioactive, chemical, and biological situations; national composition and opinions and tendencies of local population in the operation area, their political status and their relations with own (friendly) forces; economic situation in the combat operation area; meteorological conditions; and the season and the duration of days and nights.  When studying and analyzing these factors, the army commander estimates to what extent (to what degree) they influence the accomplishment of the operation's missions, and consequently he determines the forms of the employment of his forces and means in close consideration of the existing situation.

The most important thing in the estimate of the situation is to reach rational conclusions that are also based upon a deep and thorough analysis of all information collected up to the time of receiving the army's mission for the operation, and in close consideration of possible changes in the situation at the beginning of the attack and during the execution of the offensive operation. This requires that a deep and clear operational anticipation be made at the time of making the estimate of the situation by the army commander. When estimating the enemy, the commander should determine the following:
---- - enemy's capabilities in the employment of nuclear and non-nuclear weapons;
---- - composition, disposition, status, and nature of actions of the enemy's land, naval, and air forces;
---- - possible concepts of the enemy's operations, the forms of starting war with the enemy, the strong and weak points of the enemy;
---- - main grouping of the enemy and the forms of its destruction;
---- - favorable directions for the main attack and supporting attacks in close consideration of strong and weak points in the enemy's dispositions;
---- - targets to be destroyed during initial nuclear strikes and requirements to achieve superiority ratios, in forces and means, in the attack directions;
---- - capabilities of the enemy to reinforce his groupings during the execution of the operation (in the course of operation) and other related facts.

In estimating friendly forces (own forces), the commander should assess the following:
---- - capabilities of friendly forces in combat operations with and without the employment of nuclear weapons;
---- - operational disposition, status, and supply standards of the large units and their impact in determining main attack and supporting attack directions, operational formation of the forces (organization for combat) and timely establishment (forming) of strike groupings, methods of initiating the attack, and the nature of their action during the accomplishment of operational missions;
---- - number of forces and means required generally for the whole zone of advance and specifically for each attacking direction; the correlation of forces and means in quantity and quality to assess the force ratios on the main axis, across the entire zone of the planned action, and to the full depth of assigned mission; and other related facts.

The methods of command and staff procedures in the clarification of the assigned mission, the estimate of the situation, and determination of the contents of the decision might be different.

The army commander initially clarifies the assigned mission and estimates the situation personally and hears the reports and suggestions of the chiefs of operations, reconnaissance, and combat and combat support arms and services. Later on, after the exchange of opinions with the members of the military council and chief of staff, the army commander can determine precisely the concept of the operation and troops' missions. Only a limited number of persons are briefed, and then only about the parts of the decision that may concern them. The units are issued brief combat instructions based on the contents of the army commander's decision. This method of command and staff procedure requires that the commander should estimate and assess the situation and make the decision in the shortest possible time. This method favors the secrecy of the concept of the operation.

In the practice of the operational training of staffs and staff procedures another method could be seen by which the commander clarifies the assigned mission and estimates the situation together with all staff members, commanders, and chiefs of combat and combat support arms and services. In this case the army commander listens to the conclusions about the situation made by the chiefs and commanders of combat and combat support arms and services and their suggestions concerning the employment of the related forces and means, and hears the suggestion of the chief of staff about the decision of army for offensive operation, and then the army commander in their presence announces his decision. This method requires that additional measures, which concern the secrecy of the concept of operation and the decision, must be taken by the army staff.

If the army commander knows the situation in the operational zone (area) of the front thoroughly, he may make the decision for the army's offensive operation without hearing the reports and suggestions of his staff. Principally, the methods and procedures employed in making the decision are dependent on the situation, the experience and qualifications of the commander himself, and also the coordination status of the field command and control procedures of the army. The contents of the army commander's decision on the offensive operation are:
---- - concept of the operation;
---- - missions, targets, and methods of employment of the nuclear weapons;
---- - missions of motorized and tank divisions (army corps), rocket and artillery troops, supporting air forces, and airborne assault elements;
---- - missions of air defense troops and different reserves;
---- - items related to coordination, measures to support the combat actions of the troops, and command and control.

The basis of the concept of the operation is determining the main grouping of the enemy, the form and method of his destruction with or without the employment of nuclear weapons, the main and supporting attacking directions and the establishment of the operational formation for the attack.

In operations conducted with the employment of nuclear weapons, the destruction of the enemy groupings, including its nuclear delivery means, is generally achieved by nuclear weapons. In this case the establishment of a great superiority over the enemy and the concentration of large densities of artillery, tanks, and motorized units on the attack axes are not necessary.

When the army is to accomplish its operational missions without the employment of the nuclear weapons, the firing capabilities of the army in range and effectiveness on the enemy's targets should be considered in more detail than is the case in operations in which nuclear weapons are employed. For example, the basic mass of the army's artillery can destroy enemy targets only in l5-l8 km depth, and only a small portion of the artillery can engage targets beyond 20 km. The limited capabilities of conventional weapons makes it necessary to try to achieve the destruction of the enemy successively (not simultaneously) in front and in depth, and to concentrate strong groupings of friendly forces on the decisive axes of attack in order initially to destroy the first-echelon large units of the enemy and, subsequently, exploit the achieved gains, destroying the enemy's groupings located in the depth.

When conducting a breakthrough, the army initially should achieve the decisive destruction of the enemy on the main attack direction on a relatively narrow front (l0-l2 km), and then exploit to the flanks and to the depth. The main efforts of the army must be concentrated on the destruction of such a specific grouping of the enemy that it will facilitate the timely achievement of the operation's aim.

To accomplish successfully the operational missions, large concentrations of artillery, tanks and motorized units and decisive superiority in forces and means are required on the main attack axes. This will enable the army to deliver heavy blows on the enemy at the outset and facilitate the quick arrival of the units to the enemy's flanks and rear, force the enemy to fight in unfavorable conditions, and finally make it impossible for the enemy to continue an organized resistance along a stable defensive front.

The experiences of the Great Patriotic War (World War II), the field exercises of the troops after the war until the introduction of nuclear weapons in the forces, along with the experiences of field exercises carried out in recent years with troops equipped with nuclear weapons, indicate that in order to accomplish the assigned mission in offensive operations without the employment of nuclear weapons, it is required that the following superiority ratios should be established on the attacking axes.

------------------------- Last Operations Concepts of of WWII:1944-45 ----------------1945-1953

Troops General Main General Main and Means Attack Attack

Motorized 1.4-6.5:1----- 3.0------8.5:1 ---------1-1.5:1---------- 3-4.0:1 -----Battalions

Tanks -----1.1-6.0:1 -----4.5-----9.0:1---------- 1.5-2.0:1 --------3-4.0:1

Artillery--- 1.5-6.5:1 ----4.2-8.0:1 --------------1.5-2.0:1 --------3-4.0:1

Aircraft ---2.0-3.5:1 -----2.0-3.5:1 -------------1.5-2.0:1 --------1.5-2.0:1
-----------------------------------------------------------------

----- With -------------------------------------------------------------------Without

Troops General ---Main------------------ General ----------Main and Means Attack Attack

Motorized -------1.0-2.5:1-------- 2.0-3.0:1 --------------------1-1.5:1 -----------------3-4.0:1 Battalions

Tanks ------------1.0-1.5:1 --------2.0-3.0:1 --------------------1-1.5:1 -----------------3-4.0:1

Artillery--------- 1.0:1------------- 1.5-2.0:1 --------------------1-1.5:1 -----------------3-5.0:1

Aircraft ---------1.0:1 -------------1.0:1 -------------------------1.2-2:1 -----------------1.2-2:1
----------------------------------------------------------------

Establishing a superiority in force ratios requires the concentration of troops and means on relatively narrow frontages. However, it must be noted that such concentrations constitute vulnerable targets for the enemy's nuclear weapons. In order to reduce the possibility of incurring large casualties as a result of likely enemy nuclear strikes on such concentrations, it is necessary to construct engineer protective works in the assembly areas (FUP-starting up positions), to insure units' dispersion in those positions, and to provide them with sufficient concealment and camouflage.

Additionally, the personnel, vehicles, and equipment should be emplaced in protective constructions sufficient to protect them against the effects of enemy nuclear weapons. When the method of attacking from the march is used to initiate offensive operations, the troops are dispersed in assembly (FUP) areas with safety intervals and distances. In such cases the concentration for breaking through enemy defenses is achieved by the timely advance of attacking elements from widely dispersed axes to concentrate for breaking through on a narrower front, and then, after penetrating the enemy defenses, they exploit the attack to the flanks and advance quickly to the depth of the enemy's dispositions. The army commander specifies the following when determining the missions, targets, and methods of employing nuclear and chemical weapons:
---- - enemy's groupings and targets to be destroyed by the army and the divisions' means during the initial and subsequent nuclear and chemical strikes;
---- - form and the degrees of destruction of the enemy's groupings by nuclear and chemical weapons;
---- - forces and means to be employed for the delivery of initial nuclear strikes;
---- - allocation of nuclear and chemical ammunition to the missions and their distribution to the large units;
---- - reserves of nuclear and chemical ammunition.

When determining the combat missions of the divisions, their combat composition, the enemy groupings, the nature of the enemy's defenses, the degrees of their neutralization by the means of the front, and, finally, the terrain should be considered in detail.

The offensive frontage of the first-echelon division could be l5-20 km. In the depth of the enemy's defenses, it may be increased to some extent. The breakthrough of the enemy's defensive positions is normally conducted on up to four km of frontage by the division. In some situations (breaking through the enemy's prepared defense) the offensive frontage of the division attacking in the main attack axis of the army may conform with the penetration frontage (breakthrough frontage).

In assigning combat missions to the first-echelon division, the attachment, the attack direction, immediate and subsequent missions, the mission of the day, and, in some cases, the lines that should be seized by the forward detachment of the division at the end of the day, the number and yields of nuclear rounds allocated to the division, and the targets to be destroyed by the division during the initial nuclear strikes, are specified.

The division commander should also be briefed about the next day's mission, about the methods of the employment of the nuclear and chemical weapons, and air force operations executed by front means in the division's zone of offense. The second-echelon divisions are assigned the immediate mission and the direction for continuing the attack.

The immediate mission of the division is to penetrate as far as the rear boundaries of the enemy first-echelon brigade defenses and to seize the defensive positions of brigade reserves; the subsequent mission is to penetrate and breakthrough the entire depth of the enemy's first-echelon division, destroy division reserves, and seize favorable terrain that facilitates the exploitation of the breakthrough to the flanks and to the depth. The daily mission of the division could be the destruction of enemy corps reserves, in close cooperation with other adjacent large units, and the seizure of terrain features (lines, targets) in depth up to 40-60 km. The first-echelon divisions may also be assigned to support and insure the deployment and commitment into combat of the army's second- echelon. To accomplish the latter mission, one reinforced regiment is normally allocated by each first-echelon division.

When attacking the enemy without employing nuclear weapons, the first-echelon divisions should also be assigned the penetration frontage and given missions to inflict heavy casualties on the enemy by fire during the preparatory fire for the attack. In order to concentrate the necessary groupings of forces and means in the penetration zone in the shortest possible time, by commencement of the combat operations, the boundaries and missions of the first-echelon divisions might be reconfirmed, and the commitment of one of the second-echelon divisions may be anticipated.

The second-echelon divisions are assigned the waiting areas located 40-60 km to the rear of the first-echelon divisions, the method (form) of advance (movement), the likely lines of their commitment into combat, the advance sector l2-20 km wide on two or three axes, the estimated immediate mission, and the direction for continuing the attack.

The basic mission of the second-echelon forces of the army in the offensive operation is the exploitation of the attack in the direction of the main attack. Therefore, the contents of the mission of the second-echelon large units are the destruction of approaching enemy reserves and the seizure of the enemy's defensive lines in depth from the march. In the missions of the army's rocket brigade the following are determined:
---- - targets to destroy during the initial nuclear and chemical strikes;
---- - numbers and yields of nuclear weapons allocated to destroy each target, type of burst, time of preparation and launching the weapons, and the time of the distribution of nuclear and chemical or conventional warheads;
---- - measures to be taken in order to maintain the constant combat readiness of rocket troops for delivering the nuclear strikes;
---- - form and timing of the deployment of rocket troops at the beginning of the operation and their movement during the operation.

The artillery is assigned:
---- - artillery groupings;
---- - missions (tasks) concerning the repulse of the enemy's attacks and his destruction in the security zone; missions in support of the breakthrough (artillery density, the duration and method of the preparatory fires, attack supporting fires and rates of ammunition expenditure);
---- - missions during the operation, particularly in support of the commitment of the army's second-echelon into combat;
---- - composition of the army's artillery group (AAG); the method and timing of its deployment at the beginning of the operation and its movement in the course of the operation.

The supporting air forces are assigned missions concerning their participation in the preparatory fires and supporting fires in favor of the army's offensive operation, and the allocation of combat sorties to different missions.
The air defense forces are assigned:
---- - areas in which the main efforts of air defense forces are concentrated to cover the main groupings and installations of the army;
---- - method of repelling the enemy's air strikes;
---- - forms and methods of coordination (interaction) with fighter aircraft and front air defense troops;
---- - composition (size) of combat duty forces and means;
---- - method and timing of the deployment of the air defense troops at the beginning of the operation and their maneuvers during the operation.

Airborne units should be assigned:
---- - area, time, and means of landing;
---- - combat missions in the depth of the enemy;
---- - method of delivering nuclear and air strikes in the landing zones and further combat operation areas of the airborne units;
---- - method of coordination (interaction) with the supporting air forces and link-up units;
---- - assembly (FUP) areas and the time of being positioned; the preparation time of each airborne landing unit for embarkation;
---- - organization of troop control.

The army commander should determine the composition and missions of the reserves, their areas of location (emplacement), methods of their movements; area and time of command posts' deployment and their axes of advance, and finally, he should nominate his successor in command.

Additionally, the army commander determines (specifies) political missions and tasks and gives combat instructions concerning the organization and execution of political affairs and strengthening the morale of the units in favor of the forthcoming operation.

The army commander instructs the chief of staff and the chiefs of combat arms and services on matters pertaining to the method of operation planning, the issuing of missions to subordinates, the organization of coordination (interaction), measures to take in favor of the maintenance of higher standards of units' combat readiness, the organization of all types of combat support, and the organization of command posts.

Planning the Operation

Planning the offensive operation is executed by the army staff on the basis of the army commander's decision and his instructions concerning planning the operation.

Planning is conducted in order to determine and set the methods of execution and the most feasible forms for the accomplishment of the army's operational missions, in close consideration of the expected results of the employment of the destructive means of the higher echelons in the army's sector; the distribution of the efforts produced by the forces and means to the missions (tasks) and attacking directions; and to specify the details of close coordination (interaction) among the troops during the execution of operational missions and the organization of all types of combat support measures and troop control.

In planning the operation the army staff is required to exert the greatest initiative in creating and setting the most rational and practical sequences in the execution of operational missions and should get the commander's confirmations about the staff's suggested courses of action.

The methods and techniques of execution of the rocket troops mission in the initial nuclear strikes of the front, and the combat operations of the army units on the first day of the operation and during the accomplishment of the immediate mission of the army, both with or without the employment of nuclear weapons, are planned in more detail during the preparation of the operation.

To repel enemy surprise attacks, the groupings are assigned special tasks, lines (positions) located in the attack starting areas, and covering troops with specific missions are detached.  The plan also includes the methods of units' advance to the attack starting areas and the volume of engineer works, especially the construction of engineer obstacles.

The initial nuclear strikes of the front are planned to destroy the enemy's nuclear delivery means, inflict decisive casualties on enemy troops, air forces, air defense means, command posts, and other targets located in the army's sector of offensive operations. In this phase the targets and the sequence of delivering strikes are determined in conformity with the front plan of operations. Accordingly, the use of nuclear weapons on each assigned target is planned, in which it is described which large unit (unit) should engage which targets. The plan also indicates the center of explosion, the number and yields of nuclear weapons, the altitude of airburst, and the safety distance between friendly forces and the center of explosion.

The combat actions of the troops after the initial nuclear strikes, the methods of preparatory fire (the method and sequence of destroying each enemy grouping by artillery fire and air strikes), the form of destroying the enemy's covering troops and important groupings, according to the likely nature of their action (meeting engagement, breakthrough of the forward edge of battle area, and so on) are anticipated in the operation's plan.

The method of combat against the enemy's air forces during the repulse of the enemy's surprise attack, during the advance and occupation of the attack starting areas, launching the attack, and also during the destruction of each enemy grouping, is organized in full detail. Measures necessary to destroy the enemy's nuclear weapons, command posts, and vital rear services targets are anticipated. Additionally, the method of seizing the vital terrain features and lines in the enemy defense are anticipated. To destroy the enemy's rocket-launching pads, nuclear artillery, nuclear weapons depots (stocks), nuclear demolition munitions and other targets, a number of air force and artillery units are allocated, and the employment of deep reconnaissance and sabotage (subversion) groups, airborne landing units, and special detachments of motorized and tank divisions are organized.

After the mutual initial nuclear strikes, the situation, status, and combat capabilities of the large units and units that suffered from the enemy's nuclear strikes should be re-evaluated in detail, which might sometimes change completely the planning of the troops' combat actions. Obviously, this could be effected in the phase of restoration of troop control and the revival (restoration) of the troops' combat effectiveness and elimination of the impact of the enemy's nuclear strikes. Actually, assumptions related to determining the likely impact of the enemy's nuclear strikes would be very difficult to make during the operation's preparation phase. The experience of field exercises and scientific calculations indicate that collecting information about the impact of the nuclear strikes and the restoration of the units' combat capabilities might take much time. During this time, a review of operational plans, issuing of the reviewed missions to the subordinate units, and then preparations for the execution of these missions should also be effected.

During planning of the operation, detailed calculations of the correlation of forces (force ratios) are made across the entire zone of the army's offensive sector and separately in each attack direction, including the analysis of the quantity and quality of the opposing forces as well as the effectiveness of the nuclear and non-nuclear weapons. The breakthrough of the enemy's prepared defense without the employment of nuclear weapons is planned in greater detail, to include also the establishment (concentration) of necessary groupings of troops and means to break the enemy's defense in all its depth. The preparatory and attack supporting fires are planned in great detail based on available information, and further reconnaissance is organized to achieve a full picture. The exact location of each enemy strongpoint (normally platoon size strongpoint), particularly armor-protected targets, and the density of artillery, tanks, and motorized units is calculated. Additionally, the number of artillery pieces, tanks, and aircraft to be employed in the preparatory and supporting fires is determined. The targets to be destroyed are distributed to the firing units (artillery and air forces), and other fire support is coordinated with the maneuver of the infantry and tank large units and units in terms of time, place, and objectives (targets) during the attack and the breakthrough. The necessary measures concerning the satisfactory covering of the troops against enemy air strikes are organized. All types of combat supporting measures (especially insuring surprise, protection from mass destructive weapons, and radio-electronic warfare, etc.) and troop control, are organized. Necessary measures to support the development of the penetration toward the flanks and to the depth are anticipated. Methods for repelling the enemy's counterattacks and counterblows and for consolidation of captured lines (objectives) are also anticipated.

It is necessary that fires on the enemy are planned in terms of time and place. Additionally, it is important that artillery fires from covered positions, air strikes, the fires of combat helicopters, and fire from direct-fire weapons should be tailored to the types of targets and their ranges. Tank units and infantry fighting vehicles should be assigned targets that are in range of their flat trajectory fires.

The planning of the operation is shown on the offensive operation plan, which gives the detailed version of the commander's decision and is depicted on the map with the necessary notations on the map legend as well as some calculations and rationales. The offensive operation plan may be prepared in written form with the map annex showing the army commander's decision. Appendices of the operation plan include:
---- - plan of the army's participation in initial nuclear strikes;
---- - plan of preparation and occupation of the attack starting areas;
---- - plan for restoring the combat capabilities of the troops and eliminating the impact of the enemy's strikes;
---- - other documents.

On the basis of the commander's decision and the plan of operation, the chiefs of the combat and combat support arms organize the plans of combat employment of related arms and the plans for combat support measures. The chief of the army's political affairs organizes the plan of political affairs for the army's offensive operation. The deputy commander for rear services organizes the plan of rear services to support the operation.

The plan of the army's offensive operation is drawn on a l:200,000 or l:l00,000 scale map with written instructions on the map legend. The graphic part of the plan as drawn on the map, includes:
---- - Groupings of enemy forces and their possible courses of action;
---- - Operational formation of the army's units for the operation at the attack assembly (FUP) area. The immediate and subsequent missions of the army, their contents, depths, the time of their accomplishment and the rates of unit advances;
---- - Directions of main and supporting attacks;
---- - Targets to be destroyed during the initial nuclear strikes;
---- - Missions and targets of chemical weapons;
---- - Missions of first-echelon divisions (corps), the time of their accomplishment, and the boundaries;
---- - Method of commitment of the second-echelon divisions into combat;
---- - Composition, missions, landing areas, and the time of insertion of airborne and seaborne units;
---- - Locations of army and divisional command posts at the beginning of the operation and the axes of their advance during the operation;
---- - Scale of the operation (depth, front, rate of advance, and duration).

The remaining instructions, information, and calculations are given in the written part of the plan, which normally includes:
---- - best estimate (brief estimate) of the enemy alignment of forces, his capabilities, intentions, and possible actions;
---- - aim and concept of the army offensive operation and targets to be destroyed during the initial nuclear strikes;
---- - combat composition and combat capabilities of army units and attachments of support arms (distribution of supporting means);
---- - existence of nuclear and chemical ammunition, the time of their delivery, and their distribution;
---- - allocation of supporting aircraft flights to the missions and to the divisions;
---- - correlation of troops and means of opposing forces and the method of the occupation of attack starting areas by army units;
---- - means of insuring the safety of friendly forces during the delivery of initial nuclear strikes;
---- - method of executing preparatory and attack supporting fires;
---- - existence and distribution of supplies;
---- - other matters.

The plan of the army's participation in the initial nuclear strikes is drawn graphically on a l:200,000 or l:l,000,000 scale map with written instructions on the map or could be prepared in written form with a map annex illustrating the targets, characteristics and methods of their destruction.

The plan for preparing and occupying the attack assembly (FUP) areas is an important and necessary document. It's importance is based on the facts concerning the conditions of possible outbreak of war, the requirements of maintaining the combat capabilities of the troops under the impacts of mass destruction weapons employment, and the need to be in constant readiness to repel the enemy's possible attack. It is recommended that this plan be prepared in graphic form on the 1:100,000 scale map with descriptive instructions written on the map, including the graphic of movement of the units into the attack starting areas. This document illustrates:
---- - combat formation of first echelon divisions, regiments, and artillery battalions and the method of their movement into specified areas;
---- - composition and groupings of covering troops;
---- - locations of second-echelon and army reserves and their areas of responsibility;
---- - fire position areas of rocket and artillery troops;
---- - positions of air defense units and large units;
---- - command posts of the army and the divisions;
---- - areas and lines of construction engineer obstacles and demolitions;
---- - other information (instructions).

In the written instructions of the same plan the following are illustrated:
---- - estimate of the enemy's possible actions in the directions of future attacks, with and without the employment of nuclear weapons;
---- - missions of army units to repel possible enemy invasion (attack);
---- - object of preparing the assembly (FUP) areas for the troops and basic measures to be taken in their construction;
---- - character (nature) of engineer construction;
---- - troops and means to conduct engineer works and the time of their execution;
---- - method of movement into and occupation of the assembly (FUP) areas by the army units.

Planning the offensive operation is a very complicated task in the field, and therefore requires precise coordination and decisive troop control by the army commander and chief of staff.

The vital role in planning the operation is played by the army's chief of operations who organizes and carries out this task in close coordination with the chiefs of the combat arms and services, as well as with the representatives of the front's air army.

To insure the required order in preparing the starting data for making the decisions, to organize all documents concerning planning the operation, and to take other timely measures to insure effective and practical planning, it is recommended that a calendar plan for preparation of the operation is worked out in which all measures, including each document of the operation or plan, the specified time and the responsible person for preparing each document, the time of ratification by the chief of staff and approval by the army commander, are illustrated. The time allocation preparing the operation is prepared in tabular forms.

The prepared plan of the army's initial offensive operation, depending on the situation, requirements, and instructions of the general staff, could be kept at the front headquarters, or in sealed envelopes at the army's headquarters. As the situation develops and new information is received and the probabilities of war increase, the necessary modifications and changes are made to bring the plan up to date.

Subsequent offensive operations are planned at the army's headquarters during the course of the termination of the initial offensive operation.

The organization of planning the operation should be effected while safeguarding the secrecy of the concept of operation. Only a limited number of high-ranking personnel of the army's headquarters are employed to prepare the operation plan.

The main parts and basic documents of the army's offensive operations planning are shown in the following table.

Serial Document Preparer Format
Number Name

1. Plan of offensive operation for preparing the operation
Army staff together with the chiefs of the combat arms and services plus thesupport arms and services
Graphically on 1:200,000 or 1:100,000 maps, with written (combat instructions ) calendar plan (graphics)

2. Plan of the army's participation in the initial nuclear strikes
Army staff together with the chief of rocket and artillery troops of the front
Graphically on 1:200,000 or 1:100,000 maps, with written instructions or in written form with map annex

_____________________________________________________________________

3. Plan of preparation and occupying the attack assembly (FUP) areas
Army staff
Graphically on 1:100,000 maps, with written instructions on the map

____________________________________________________________________

4. Plan of employment of airborne assault units
Army staff and the representatives of the front air army
Graphically on the 1:100,000 map, with written instructions on the map

____________________________________________________________________

5. Plan for the employment of the Army's rocket and artillery troops
The staff of rocket and artillery troops
Graphically on 1:200,000 or 1:100,000 maps with written instructions

____________________________________________________________________

6. Army's air defense plan plus the alert scheme of the enemy's aircraft
Chief of army's air defense
Graphically on 1:200,000 map, with instructions on the map,

_____________________________________________________________________

7. Reconnaissance plan
Reconnaissance department
Graphically on maps with written instructions on the map or in written form with the map annex

______________________________________________________________________

8. Plan of effecting operational concealment maskirovka
Army staff
In written form

----------------------------------------------------

9. Plan of troop protection from mass destruction weapons, and for eliminating the impact of the enemy's nuclear strikes
Army staff with the chiefs of combat arms and services
In written form with map annex

______________________________________________________________________

10. Plan of engineer support
Chief of army's engineer troops
Graphically on 1:200,000 map with written instructions on the map.
Special engineer tasks are illustrated on a large-scale map

_______________________________________________________________________

11. Plan of chemical supporting measures
Chief of army's chemical troops
Graphically on 1:100,000 map with written instructions on the map

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12. Plan of radio- electronic combat
Chief of army's radio-electronic warfare
Graphically on 1:200,000 map, with written instructions on the map

______________________________________________________________________

13. Logistics Plan
Army's rear service staff
Graphically on map with written instructions on the map

___________________________________________________________________

14. Plan for preparation, deployment and movement of command posts
Army staff
Graphically on map with written instructions on the map

________________________________________________________________

15. Communications plan with calculations of the number of radios radio relay diagram, wire communication diagram, the calculation of signal troops
Chief of signals
Radio diagram on the map.
The graphic of mobile means of communication

________________________________________________________________

16. Plan of political affairs
Army's political department
In written form

________________________________________________________________

The Preparation of the Troops and the Assembly (FUP) Areas For the Offensive

Once the army commander's decision is made, many actions requiring considerable time are taken by the commander, the staff, and other army field troop control elements to prepare the troops and the assembly (FUP) areas for the offensive operation. These actions include:
----- - issuing missions to the troops and organizing coordination (interaction) among them;
----- - training and preparing the generals and officers and effecting combat and political training of the troops;
----- - carrying out reconnaissance;
----- - engineer construction of the troops' attack assembly (FUP) areas;
----- - preparation and deployment of the army's rear services;
----- - measures concerning the preparation of troop control;
----- - providing all types of combat support measures for the operation.

When preparing the initial army operation, the missions of the army's large units and other units are specified in advance during peacetime, and the method of assigning missions to subordinates is determined by the army commander in compliance with the instructions of the general staff. In order to insure the secrecy of the concept of the future operation, only a limited number of the army's staff are allowed to become familiar with the specific missions of army units (i.e., the army commander and members of the army's war council, chief of political affairs, chief of staff, chief of operations, and others).

The missions of the army's large units and independent units are not normally revealed to them during peacetime. Operational orders depicting the units' missions are kept in sealed envelopes, bearing the army or front headquarters' official seals, in the personal safes of related commanders, and are opened only at the signal (instruction) of the army commander, based on the front headquarters' instructions.

In case of great changes developing in the situation, the modification of missions specified in previously prepared documents, and in some instances, the determination of new missions for army units may become a necessity. Preparing the commanders and staffs to accomplish such a task effectively, in a short period of time, has a vital practical importance.

When planning subsequent operations, missions are assigned to the units directly after the decisions have been made, by written operational orders (operational instructions) or orally over the communications means, with subsequent confirmation by written documents.

The first priority is that the missions should be assigned to those large units and units conducting the most important tasks or beginning the execution prior to others, or that require more time to prepare for the execution of their assigned missions. The method of issuing missions to subordinates should allow sufficient time for subordinates to prepare and execute their combat missions.

In command and staff procedures the issuance of warning orders is widely practiced in order to alert (warn) commanders and staffs of large units about forthcoming combat operations and to provide sufficient time for the troops to prepare to execute assigned combat missions. One of the important requirements in issuing missions to subordinates is the timeliness, brevity, and clarity of the contents of combat documents (except coded documents).

One of the most important measures in ensuring the preparation of the troops for the execution of their missions in offensive operations is the planning of coordination (interaction). Coordination is planned in greater detail for the phase of participation in the initial nuclear strikes of the front, for the first day of the operation, and for the purpose of repelling possible enemy attacks. It is planned in lesser detail, due to difficulties in assessing the situation, for subsequent days of the operation and for the accomplishment of army's immediate mission. Coordination is organized in estimated form for the phase of accomplishing the army's subsequent mission.

The main points of coordination are specified in the commander's decision, and their detailed and exact illustration is portrayed in the plan of coordination, plan of offensive operation, plans of the employment of the combat arms and in the plans of combat support measures.

Coordination among army elements is achieved by assigning clear missions to subordinate large units and by mutual understanding regarding the execution of assigned missions. It is always required that in planning coordination, first priority should be given to providing a correct and objectively-oriented understanding to the large unit and unit commanders about their missions and the missions of other units and elements with whom they are cooperating in favor of the accomplishment of the army's missions.

The army commander, in compliance with the instructions of the front commander, and in support of the coordinated employment of troops and means in the initial nuclear strikes of the front, specifies the targets, time, and yields of the nuclear weapons to be delivered by the army's rocket brigade and the rocket battalions of the divisions participating in the initial nuclear strikes of the front. He also informs concerned units about the level of command having the authority to order the delivery of nuclear strikes and which motorized and tank divisions are to exploit those strikes. The exact time of firing for the army rocket brigade and the rocket battalions of the divisions are calculated and coordinated in accordance with the launching time of front's rockets and the flight time of the first sorties of the front's air forces. The army commander also specifies which targets, in what sequence, are to be engaged by artillery and supporting air force strikes using chemical and conventional munitions.

When organizing coordination between rocket units and supporting air forces, the army commander, in conformity with the instructions of the front commander, specifies the targets to be destroyed by each element, the sequence of the strikes, and the type of burst. He also determines the limits (boundaries) of aircraft overflights of combat formations, the signals to be employed for the purpose of cease-fire, and the launching of rocket and tactical air support sorties.

The combat actions of motorized and tank divisions are coordinated with nuclear strikes delivered in their attack sectors. Their operations are also coordinated with each other when accomplishing common missions and/or attacking along adjacent axes. Their combat actions are further coordinated with the operations of air forces and airborne landing units. The safety (security) lines of the friendly forces are indicated when using nuclear weapons.

When operating without the employment of nuclear weapons, the most important questions of coordination are: to determine the methods and sequences of neutralizing by artillery and tactical air support the enemy forces positioned in the security zone and in the main defense positions, passing the state boundaries, and the commitment of advanced detachments and the main bodies of first-echelon divisions into combat, and the form of destruction of the enemy's first-echelon main forces. To coordinate the operations of the attacking and the airborne units, the following are specified:
----- - drop zones, orientation of insertion, and the method of operation in landing areas;
----- - method of supporting the flight of airborne units over the drop zones by neutralizing the enemy's air defense means;
----- - missions of air force units inserting the airborne units, and subsequently, the combat operations of the airborne units;
----- - missions executed by army units attacking in the direction of inserted airborne units;
----- - targets and the time of their engagement by rocket units and supporting air forces, in the direction of the inserted airborne unit;
----- - operations of airborne units after linking up with the attacking units;
----- - methods of mutual identification, target definition, and signal communication.

When coordinating combat operations of army units with air defense troops and means, specify when and what air defense troops and means are to be employed to cover the army rocket brigade, strike groupings of forces, army command posts, and the mobile base of rockets (missiles) during their arrival in the attack assembly (FUP) areas and in the course of their offensive operations. The time and method of relocation of positions of SAM units, antiaircraft artillery, and radio technical subunits (units) are also specified. In addition, the operations of air defense troops and means are coordinated with operations of adjacent armies' air defense forces and with the operations of fighter aircraft.

When attacking along coastlines, the operations of army units should be coordinated with operations of naval forces concerning: delivery of nuclear strikes and seizing coastline objectives; support of landing seaborne units and their operations; the seizure of straits; and joint operations to destroy the enemy's seaborne landing units.

When preparing the plan (diagram, table) of coordination, the following should be shown: missions of army elements and other cooperating large units at the beginning and during the course of offensive operations; the method of their accomplishment; and signals for coordination, identification of targets, mutual identification, and mutual alert (warning). For coordination, a special signal communications network (coordination communications network) is established and liaison officers are exchanged between cooperating large units.

Based on the nature and specifications of future missions, specified methods of coordination in the operation, and combat and political readiness, tactical and operational training of the unit and staffs are planned and carried out in peacetime and just before the outbreak of hostilities.

Nowadays more attention is paid to the preparation of attack assembly (FUP) areas [iskhodnyye rayony dlya nastupleniya] specified for the deployment and dispersion of army units, the establishment of groupings of forces in accordance with the concept of the operation, for initiating the attack (for movement to contact and for repelling surprise attacks of superior enemy forces).

Such areas should facilitate simultaneous and organized passage of army units into the offensive and must also provide for their protection against mass destruction weapons if hostilities commence with the mass employment of nuclear weapons. If the enemy initiates the attack, the attack starting areas should provide the capability of conducting a strong defense against the enemy's superior forces.

Engineer constructions in preparing the attack starting areas have particular importance, since they facilitate the organized and timely passage of units into attack, and the repulse of attacks of large enemy forces. The early construction of engineer works and fortifications helps the activeness of the troops and provides favorable conditions for repelling possible enemy attacks and the passage of units into attack under any conditions once hostilities commence.

It is recommended that the attack assembly (FUP) areas for the first-echelon divisions be prepared 20-40 km from the state boundary, providing protection for friendly forces against the enemy's artillery fires and reducing the enemy's capabilities in the employment of its tactical nuclear weapons.

To facilitate the organized passage of units into the attack, frontal routes (lines of communications), and "rokads" (routes parallel to the frontlines), column routes, starting lines, initial lines, movement regulating lines, and the lines of deployment of large units to pre-combat and combat formations, are specified well in advance.

Positions for covering troops, reinforced with engineer obstacles, are constructed one to five km from the state boundary. These positions constitute the security zone. In this zone, firing positions for artillery and divisional rocket battalions, which should engage the enemy during the passage of friendly units into attack and also during the repulse of the enemy's attack, are prepared. Second-echelon (reserve) divisions occupy assembly (FUP) areas. These areas should provide adequate space for the dispersed deployment of units, the maneuver of second-echelon units to follow up the attacking columns, and the destruction of attacking enemy formations.

In the attack assembly (FUP) areas main and reserve (alternate) firing positions for army and divisional rocket units, firing positions for air defense units, positions for radio technical units, and emplacements for special forces (combat support units), command posts, and signal centers are prepared and telephone lines are installed. Additionally, in attack assembly (FUP) areas adequate positions are constructed for other units and all weapons, including covered trenches, bunkers, shelter for personnel, and trenches for all vehicles and supplies. Maneuver routes, supply and evacuation routes, and obstacle areas are prepared across the entire zone and operational depth of the army forces. Preparation of attack assembly (FUP) areas is carried out by troops and means of the units in close conformity to concealment requirements.

The advance of units to, and the occupation of, attack assembly (FUP) areas is executed only by special order of the front commander. The units may arrive at these areas either simultaneously or consecutively from garrison locations' assembly (FUP) areas, or from field exercise areas. If the occupation of attack assembly (FUP) areas is executed consecutively, the first units to occupy them will be first- echelon large units, reserves, air defense units, army command posts, and then the second-echelon large units and the army's rear services occupy the attack assembly (FUP) areas. Two nights is sufficient for the army occupy the attack starting areas with considerable concealment.

The army rocket brigade, covering troops, reconnaissance, and radio-electronic warfare units, and the army's rocket and technical base may proceed and occupy their positions in the attack starting areas before the other army elements, by special order of the front commander.

Organization of the Support of Combat Activities (Obespecheniye Boyevykh Deystvyi)

Combat support measures, calculated in detail and organized well in advance, are important factors in achieving success in the army's operations. Types of combat support measures are the following:
----- - reconnaissance;
----- - operational concealment;
----- - protection of forces and rear service installations against mass destructive weapons;
----- - engineer measures;
----- - radio-electronic warfare;
----- - chemical, hydrometeorologic and topographical measures.

The measures for combat support in support of army offensive operations, are organized in accordance with the army commander's decision and his instructions. The measures taken in support of combat activities are planned and executed under the direct supervision of the chief of staff.

The army staff plans and directs measures concerning reconnaissance, protection of forces and rear services installations against mass destructive weapons, radio-electronic warfare, hydrometeorology, and topogeodetic measures. The remaining support measures of combat activities are organized and executed by the related chiefs of combat support arms and services. Plans are developed for each type of measure for combat support and are issued to the units in the form of combat instructions signed by the chief of staff.

The army staff controls and coordinates all actions concerning all types of measures of combat support. Special attention is paid to support of combat activities of the army's troops and means participating in the initial nuclear strikes of the front, and in support of repelling the enemy's attack, and the quick deployment of the units for rapid passage into attack, with or without the employment of nuclear weapons.

In offensive operations conducted along a coastline, the support of the combat activities of army units is coordinated with the parallel supporting measures planned in support of cooperating naval forces.

Maskirovka (Operational Concealment)

The aim of operational concealment is to insure surprise strikes on the enemy, to confuse the enemy about the targets, place, and time of these strikes, to maintain the secrecy of real intentions, and to show deceptive groupings of friendly forces to the enemy. The basic organizer of operational concealment is the front staff. The army is normally the executor of tasks specified in the front's plan of operational concealment. In some situations, however, the army may independently plan some measures to develop and expand the front's plan.

The basic forms of achieving the aim of operational concealment are secrecy, showing deceptive actions, and spreading disinformation. Effective integration of these forms (deception measures) in close compliance with the actual situation should deceive the enemy on matters concerning the composition of army forces and means, their locations, their status and capabilities, the concept of future operations, preparations to deliver nuclear strikes, time and place of unit deployment, and the method by which they will initiate the attack. Special effort must be made to deceive the enemy about the location of rocket and artillery positions, the location of the main striking grouping of friendly forces, and the location of command posts.

In the front's plan of operational concealment, the army would be assigned tasks to show deceptive concentrations of forces and other deceptive targets to the enemy in the army's area of disposition (operation), in support of front offensive operations. Exact stereotype actions and forms must be avoided in the organization and execution of operational concealment; otherwise the enemy will easily identify the real target from deceptive ones, and consequently the aim of the concealment would not be achieved.

Organization of Troop Control

The organization of vigorous and continuous troop control of the units is one of the most important elements in preparing the army operation. Steadiness and continuity of troop control are dependent to a large degree on planned and finely calculated preparations of the command posts, their timely deployment in the starting area, their organized relocation during the course of the operation, early establishment of an effective communications system, and the maintenance of permanent high standards of readiness of staffs for troop control. The command posts and signal communications must insure a steady troop control of the units during the phase of bringing them to a state of full combat readiness, during their advance and deployment in the attack starting areas, during their participation in the initial nuclear strikes, during the repulse of a possible enemy attack, as well as during the initiation of attack by army forces.

To exercise troop control in the army's offensive operation the following system of command posts is established and deployed: main command post, forward command post, rear command post, and in some cases, an auxiliary command post. In some instances the command post of one of the divisions, reinforced in advance by the necessary means of troop control, could be used as an auxiliary command post for the army.

Officers of the forward command post and the rear command post (auxiliary command post) must constantly know the situation in the army and adjacent areas and must be prepared to facilitate the commander's decision-making and issuing instructions to subordinate units, and should have the necessary documents (references) of troop control in their possession. All command posts must be secured against the impact of the enemy's nuclear and other mass destructive weapons, should be safe against the enemy's radio jamming, and must be concealed thoroughly and dispersed properly. The command posts must be equipped with the necessary means of troop control (particularly communication means) in such a way that they can insure the steady, continuous troop control of army large units and units, and, in critical situations, could be interchangeable.

To increase the activity and viability of the army's troop control, an air command post is established.

The field elements of troop control are distributed at the command posts and are prepared to occupy specified positions on short notice and conduct troop control from the command posts.

In case of the sudden commencement of combat action, the army commander, with the group of staff officers, goes to a field command post, that has been prepared in advance to insure troop control.

As the threat of war increases, it is recommended that the operational group, consisting of the officers who will exercise troop control in the field must proceed well in advance to the prepared command post with the necessary communication means and documents. This group must be able to assist the army commander in troop control during their transition to full combat readiness and during the delivery of initial nuclear strikes and the repulse of the enemy's surprise attack.

The method of the displacement of command posts in the course of the operation and measures to insure the firmness and continuity of signal communication are organized in advance.

The army's signal communication system is an expanded network of all signal lines and the main and auxiliary signal centers established in the permanent garrison location and prepared field command posts of the army and divisions to insure continuous communications with the troops. The communication system must insure the warning of the troops, communication with forces and means participating in the initial nuclear strikes, in repelling the enemy's attacks, as well as with the grouping of forces as it passes into the attack.

When planning the relocation of the command post, an important consideration will be that the army commander and other key personnel of the army's field troop control should not become isolated from unit troop control at any time. When displacing, command posts are brought close to the units to insure continuous troop control and to reduce the threat of enemy raids on the command posts. The displacement of the command posts is initiated by authority of the higher-echelon commander when the future location of the command post is prepared and equipped with engineer works and signal communications are established. The command group consists of a few officers and communication means and is organized for the army commander. The duty of this group is to provide the commander's communication and command of the units in the situations when he visits his subordinate units.

Maintaining High Troop Combat Readiness

The high standard of the units' combat readiness is the status of the units that provides them with the capabilities to get ready on time and organize to begin the execution of their missions at the commencement of hostilities and to protect themselves from the enemy. The high standard of troop combat readiness to carry out combat missions is one of the important requirements and basic preconditions for launching surprise blows on the enemy, as well as for the successful repulse of possible enemy surprise attacks. At present, the following steps of combat readiness are established in the armed forces: constant combat readiness, higher combat readiness, and full combat readiness.

Constant Combat Readiness

Constant combat readiness is the state in which army and air force units conduct their planned and routine activities and are in constant readiness to execute combat missions by large units, units, and installations, with incomplete organization (cadre personnel shortages) after they are brought to full strength. In this state of readiness, individual units and subunits conduct stand-by duties (on-call units) and can execute combat missions according to plan.

In order to reduce the time of transition of the troops from routine to full combat readiness, a state of higher combat readiness has been instituted (defined).


Higher Combat Readiness

Higher combat readiness of forces and staffs is the state from which they can be brought up to full combat readiness in the shortest possible time. In this state of readiness all large units and units take necessary measures to bring up their combat and mobilization readiness to a higher level. Stand-by units and combat means are reinforced and carry out their on-call services with full combat readiness. The officers are called back from vacations and rest, full combat equipment is issued to them, and they are ordered to live on post. Twenty-four hour duty services, guarding and defending vital installations, are reinforced, and post patrolling is established.

Protection of troops against mass destructive weapons is organized. In the unit staffs, twenty-four hour duty services of responsible officers and their relief system is reinforced, that is, the number of duty officers is increased, and they are assigned to work in the command posts. Operational groups with signal communication means are detached to the field command posts.

By the directives of the minister of defense and chief of the general staff, a number of other measures are taken that pertain to enhancing the combat readiness of rocket units and other large units, and units having incomplete strength, military commissaries, military bases, military stockpiles and other installations.

All measures taken in favor of combat readiness should provide for secret preparation of the forces for the execution of combat missions.

The shift of troops to the state of higher combat readiness is normally conducted while they are in their permanent locations (military garrisons). However, in this state of readiness some units may be moved to other specified areas.


Full Combat Readiness

Full combat readiness is the highest state of readiness, insuring rapid commitment of troops to carry out combat missions. Bringing the forces up to full combat readiness is normally initiated by combat alert (warning) and pulling them out of their military posts. In this state of readiness the units and large units are brought up to full combat strength.

Units having cadre (incomplete) organization, and units with lower strength are hastily supplied by appropriate means from the mobilization reserves until they are brought to full strength at the specified time in accordance with preplanned calculations. The personnel of units and large units, and troops posted near the border are issued ammunition, hand grenades, antigas protective masks, steel helmets, individual first aid packages, and antichemical packages. Groupings of forces and garrisons located near the state boundaries (borders) and the covering forces are moved to specified areas and take defensive measures in accordance with the plans and carry out aerial and ground reconnaissance from within the limits of their respective zone of operations. The aircraft are dispersed, and the staffs take position in prepared command posts to control the execution of the instructions issued by the respective command levels.

The transition of units from the state of routine combat readiness directly to full combat readiness can be effected without going through the intermediate state of higher combat readiness. In operational formations, large units' and units' specified plans for bringing the forces to the state of full combat readiness, including the instructions about the actions to be taken and their timing, are organized.

In modern conditions, the execution of all planned actions, to bring the forces to the state of full combat readiness, is not necessarily conducted exclusively with the assumption that the outbreak of war will be preceded by a period of tension, but it must be noted that in carrying out of these actions the sudden initiation of war by the enemy should also be taken in consideration. Basic actions concerning the increase of the forces' combat readiness to a higher state are the following:
----- - establishing a well-calculated system of unit warning;
----- - specifying the areas to be occupied by the units, in case of combat warning (alarm), to carry out the tasks concerning their mobilization, and the method of moving the troops to such areas;
----- - maintaining the forces' state of higher combat readiness when going out for field exercises, moving to training areas, encampments and other off-post areas;
----- - preparing the weapons, combat equipment, vehicles, and other material and technical reserves for combat actions;
----- - organizing of mobilization measures;
----- - controlling and inspecting continuously the troops' state of combat readiness.

Special attention is paid to the political and psychological status of the personnel. The high morale standard is an important factor in troop combat readiness and their combat capabilities.

All actions concerning the promotion of the units to the states of higher and full combat readiness must be planned in detail and should be carried out subject to all concealment requirements.

III. Conduct of an Army Offensive

Operations With the Employment of Nuclear Weapons

Participation of the Army in the Initial Nuclear Strikes of the front and the Restoration of Units' Combat Capabilities


The army's offensive operation with the employment of nuclear weapons begins by the participation of the army's rocket brigade and part of the divisions' rocket battalions in the initial nuclear strikes of the front, by which decisive casualties should be inflicted on the enemy in all of its forces' dispositions and favorable conditions must be achieved for the decisive attack of friendly forces.

The initial nuclear strike, delivered in accordance with prepared plans, is the launching of all prepared rockets (missiles) and mass sorties of front air forces to inflict heavy losses on enemy targets.

It is advisable that the initial nuclear strike be delivered simultaneously with the initial strategic nuclear strikes. In this case the launching of operational-tactical and tactical rockets and the first sorties of frontal air forces supplements the initial strikes of strategic nuclear forces. However, this method should be employed only under exclusively favorable conditions, when the nuclear delivery means of the army and front have been brought to the state of full combat readiness simultaneously with the preparation of strategic nuclear forces, so they can start actions immediately after receiving the proper signal from the general staff. Generally speaking, the readiness (preparation) of operational-tactical and tactical-nuclear delivery means lags behind the preparation of strategic rocket forces, but the subordination of the launch time of strategic weapons to the launch time of operational-tactical means does not seem rational. Consequently, the initial nuclear strike of the front is often delivered after the strikes of strategic nuclear forces. The lapse of time between the strikes of strategic rocket forces and the nuclear strikes of the front and army should be minimized, as much as possible, by the improvement of the readiness of rocket units and front air forces, and by taking timely measures to get the rockets prepared for action at short notice. Moreover, the time of rocket units' deployment in the attack starting area should be minimized.

During the initial nuclear strikes of the front, the army's rocket brigade basically engages the enemy's tactical--sometimes operational-nuclear delivery means; corps and division command posts; the forward air control centers directing aircraft on targets; and the main grouping of the enemy first-echelon forces confronting the army.

The tactical rocket battalions will destroy enemy targets located within their ranges, which would usually be the enemy's first-echelon divisions and their nuclear delivery means.

The method and sequence of employment of army nuclear delivery means during the initial nuclear strikes of the front are determined in compliance with the conditions of their preparation. The rockets of the army rocket brigade and divisional rocket battalions can be launched simultaneously, or only the stand-by nuclear delivery means--normally a third of the whole means allocated to participate in the initial nuclear strikes--will begin launching their rockets. The targets engaged by these weapons are normally the enemy's operational--tactical nuclear delivery means and troop control system. The main part of rocket forces are employed, as they get ready for action, to inflict casualties on the enemy's first-echelon main forces, command posts, and other important targets.

The employment of nuclear weapons on enemy targets should be effected after insuring the security of friendly forces and their timely warning about the delivery of nuclear strikes.

In the course of the initial nuclear strike the enemy should be neutralized to such a degree to insure the decisive superiority, in troops and means, of friendly forces on the enemy to conduct the attack with a high rate of speed.
At the time of delivering the initial nuclear strikes and following the strikes, the army units might become engaged in repelling enemy air attacks and possibly in repelling its ground forces' blows.

The repelling of mass sorties of the enemy's aircraft and pilotless flying means in the army's area is conducted in cooperation with the front's fighter aircraft and air defense rockets.

In instances of mutual nuclear strikes the situation may drastically change: great destruction, radioactive contamination, flooding, and fires in woods and built-up areas might be created. Suffering from casualties as a result of the enemy's nuclear strikes cannot be avoided, consequently some of the army's large units and units would be greatly weakened or lose their combat capabilities.

All the above considerations require that appropriate measures should be taken to restore the troops' combat capabilities for the accomplishment of assigned missions. The organization and execution of actions necessary to restore the combat capabilities of the units and to remove (eliminate) the effects of nuclear strikes requires great efforts to be made, by the army commander, the staff and rear services, and the chiefs of army's combat arms and services, as well as by the units themselves. First of all, it is imperative that troop control (if interrupted or lost) should be restored; information about the situation of the army forces, the nature of enemy activities, as well as information about the radioactive situation should be collected; repeated nuclear strikes on the enemy's important groupings remaining intact must be organized and delivered; and the volume of casualties and the degrees of the units' readiness should be assessed and the combat mission must be carried out. Based on information collected about the situation and their assessments the army commander can make rational and situation-oriented decisions about the future actions of the army' units. In such a difficult situation the army commander, the commanders of lower-echelon units, and all staff should exert maximum initiative in carrying out appropriate actions to eliminate the impacts of the enemy's nuclear strike in favor of the accomplishment of assigned missions.

After the initial nuclear strikes, groupings of forces remaining intact should rapidly initiate the attack from the march to complete the destruction of surviving enemy forces.

When the first-echelon divisions have suffered greatly as a result of the enemy's nuclear strikes, the basic attention of the army commander and staff should be concentrated on the assessment of large units and units still having combat capabilities and assigning them combat missions to attack; and/or organization of repulse of enemy attacks, if he initiates the offensive. At the same time actions are taken to restore the combat capabilities of the units and eliminate the impact of the enemy's nuclear strikes.

The restoration of the combat capabilities of all combat arms units and large units requires that a series of actions taken, such as conducting large maneuvers by the troops, moving material and technical reserves, rescuing (salvage) operations, creating favorable conditions to insure the accomplishment of combat missions as well as the replenishment of units with personnel and combat equipment, and carrying out repairs and evacuation.

The basic measures to be taken to restore the combat capabilities of units and large units that have suffered from the enemy's nuclear strikes are:
----- - restoration of interrupted command and control of large units (units);
----- - removal of large units (units) from the (nuclear impact zones) in order to continue the execution of combat missions;
----- - rescue operations in the nuclear impact zone and the evacuation of personnel;
----- - special decontamination of personnel, weapons and materials;
----- - opening lanes and routes from the impact zone;
----- - delimitating and marking the impact zone.

In case of heavy casualties and loss of divisional integrity (destruction of its several regiment-sized units), all of its surviving personnel and equipment are integrated into regiments, battalions, and sometimes, detachments. It is recommended that, in some situations, the surviving units and subunits of more than one division (having lost their combat capabilities) are integrated into one or two divisions.

The method of initiating the attack will be dependent on the results of the initial nuclear strikes, the situation and status of army units, and the nature of the enemy's actions.

The army can initiate the attack from the march or from positions in close contact with the enemy. Attack from the march, following nuclear strikes, can be conducted from the attack assembly (FUP) areas (waiting areas), assembly (FUP) areas, or from concentration areas occupied by units on combat warning (alarm).

Initiating the attack by army units from positions in close contact with the enemy is usually effected when the blows of superior enemy forces have been repelled by defensive actions and prior to the commencement of offensive operations.

Destruction of Confronting Enemy Groupings

After the delivery of initial nuclear strikes, the main task of the army forces is the destruction of surviving groupings of confronting enemy in a short time and rapid advance to the depth of the enemy's dispositions. This task would be carried out in a most difficult situation, since the enemy would also endeavor to inflict heavy casualties during his nuclear attack on friendly forces, particularly during his initial mass nuclear strikes.

Undoubtedly, the methods of the destruction of enemy forces in each direction and the forms of operations of army units will be determined by the amount of enemy losses caused by our initial nuclear strikes, the combat capabilities of the army forces, and the relative balance of opposing forces.

In situations in which decisive casualties have been inflicted on the enemy across the entire zone of the army, and consequently, the enemy has no more than individual, disintegrated groupings without combat capabilities in the border areas, the combat operations of the army will assume the form of a quick advance of its main grouping in pre-combat formations and even marching formations with a high rate of advance to the depth of the enemy. In this case just a part of the forces will be sufficient to mop up the surviving groups of the enemy.

When both sides suffer heavy casualties in more than one direction or across the entire zone of their operations, preempting (overtaking) the enemy in delivering repeated nuclear strikes on surviving enemy groupings, in initiating the attack by units that have maintained their combat capabilities, as well as eliminating the impact of the enemy nuclear strike and rapidly restoring the combat capabilities of unit suffering from the enemy's nuclear fires, have a vital importance in developing the attack.

When some individual groupings of the army forces lose their combat capabilities, and the enemy exploits by initiating an attack against them by employing its forces that have not lost their combat capabilities it is required that repeated nuclear strikes be delivered on the most dangerous grouping of the enemy, and the army's reserve and second-echelon forces should be committed to combat.

It is also possible to assume that the enemy may suffer heavy casualties on one axis, while on another axis its groupings maintain their combat capabilities and are able to launch attacks along the axis. In such cases the army should concentrate its efforts on rapid delivery of repeated nuclear strikes, on the enemy grouping which has maintained its combat capability and on conducting rapid attack (advance) in the enemy's territory. After the repeated nuclear strikes by employing units still capable of combat operations friendly forces organize defensive actions on the axes of enemy attacks.

Therefore, the conditions and forms of actions to complete the destruction of confronting enemy groupings, after the initial nuclear strike of both sides, might differ and vary, as discussed earlier.

In all cases the situation will be extraordinarily difficult and critical for both sides. This requires the army commander to have determination and resolution in organizing and carrying out the subsequent actions. The units are required to display high firmness, morale, and decisiveness for the accomplishment of assigned missions by all means. And, finally, the staff is to work to maintain order and organized actions in favor of the accomplishment of the army's missions.

Along the offensive axes the army forces may have to conduct meeting engagements, passing through the enemy's hasty defenses, repelling the enemy's counterblows, and then initiating the attack.

The Meeting Engagement

The meeting engagement is a difficult form of combat action, in the course of which both sides try to accomplish their assigned missions by offensive actions. Meeting engagement usually occurs along the axis of the army's main attack, when both sides have maintained their combat capabilities and initiate the attack after the initial nuclear strikes.

To destroy successfully the enemy's grouping in a meeting engagement, it is required that the decision is rapidly modified or a new decision made, and units are assigned combat missions, repeated nuclear strikes are delivered on the enemy by all ready launchers of the rocket brigade and the divisions' rocket battalions deployed on that axis, and the results of artillery fire and air force strikes are fully exploited. The main bodies (columns) of first-echelon divisions are employed for launching strikes at the flanks and rear of deploying enemy groupings. In such situations achieving and maintaining the initiative until the complete defeat of the enemy is especially important. In order to isolate the enemy's groupings and to assist the attacking forces, tactical airborne units are landed in the rear of the enemy. In a meeting engagement the tank divisions and the tank regiment organic to motorized rifle divisions are employed in the main attack of the army (division) to strike at the flanks and rear of the main enemy groupings and subsequently to develop the attack to the depth and destroy the enemy's second-echelon forces and reserves. Frontal blows are launched against the enemy when the enemy's groupings are weakened (neutralized) by our nuclear strikes or when the terrain does not favor maneuver to the enemy's flanks and rear.

In the course of offensive operations individual and smaller meeting engagements with the enemy reserves are possible. Success in such instances may be achieved by overtaking (anticipating) the enemy in the delivery of nuclear strikes and conventional fires and coordination of rapid actions of friendly forces attacking the enemy. To complete the destruction of strong enemy reserves and the exploitation of the attack to the depth, the second-echelon divisions or the army's reserves are committed into combat.

At the beginning of offensive operations the army forces may have to fight the enemy occupying defensive lines. The destruction of such enemy groupings is accomplished by breakthrough and the exploitation of gains achieved in breakthrough by the attacking forces to the depth and flanks of the main enemy grouping having still maintained its combat capabilities. The nature of the enemy's defenses in these cases will be a prepared defense or a hasty defense, with or without engineer constructions and fortifications.

In the army's offensive operation with the employment of nuclear weapons the army will often confront a hasty enemy defense, having individual, dispersed strongpoints and defensive areas without sufficient density of units' combat formations across the front and fewer echelonments of forces in depth. A hasty defense would be organized by enemy large units and units moved up to the front from the rear, or by forces withdrawn from the front and occupying a delaying position. This type of defense should be penetrated from the march, on a wide front (frontal attack), without prolonged preparatory fires. When attacking a hasty defense the gaps in the enemy's defensive disposition and ruptures created by the employment of nuclear weapons during the initial strikes should be exploited fully. Repeated nuclear strikes must be delivered on the enemy's still intact defensive center on the axis of advance prior to the arrival of attacking forces to such areas.

The actions of army forces during the breakthrough of the enemy defenses must assume the nature of quick actions combined with maneuvers. The first-echelon should not become decisively engaged with enemy units still in defensive positions, but should make every effort to reach the enemy rear quickly, occupy or destroy the enemy's nuclear delivery means and other targets left intact, in order to deprive the enemy of the opportunity of delivering repeated nuclear strikes and to avoid the organized commitment of the enemy's reserves into combat.

The destruction of the enemy forces left behind the army's attacking elements is accomplished by the second-echelon or reserves of the divisions and sometimes by the army's second-echelon and reserves.

Neutralizing the Enemy's Nuclear Delivery Means and Reserves During the Conduct of the Operation

Although the enemy's nuclear delivery means constitute the prime targets of the initial nuclear strikes, it is likely that the enemy may keep certain units for future employment and will try to hit the attacking forces with nuclear strikes. Consequently the struggle with the enemy's nuclear delivery means should be conducted continuously in the course of accomplishing the entire mission of the offensive operation. The greater the losses inflicted on them, the more the enemy's nuclear strikes capabilities are reduced, and, finally, the success of friendly units is dependent to a large degree on the neutralization of the enemy's nuclear delivery means.

Locating and destroying the enemy's nuclear delivery means in a timely manner is an important task of the army commander and staff in commanding and controlling the units in the course of the offensive operation. Achieving success in fighting the enemy's nuclear delivery means is ensured by:
----- - timely location of the enemy's nuclear delivery means and finding the exact coordinates of their dispositions;
----- - making quick decisions and assigning missions concerning their destruction;
----- - constant readiness of appropriate units and means to ensure their quick destruction;
----- - rapid advance of first-echelon divisions, combined with wide employment of tactical airborne landing units and forward detachments and special detachments.

The enemy's tactical nuclear delivery means, not having more than 50-70 km range, might be positioned, at the time of employment, 5-8 km from the FEBA. Sergeant and Pershing missiles may be emplaced in firing positions about 30-60 and 80-l60 km, or more from the FEBA, respectively. The army has organic tactical and tactical-operational rockets (missiles) that can successfully fight the above-mentioned enemy's nuclear delivery means.

For the purpose of neutralizing the enemy's nuclear delivery means the following army units and means can be employed: army rocket brigade and divisions' rocket battalions employing chemical and nuclear weapons, and supporting air forces, artillery, tactical airborne landing units, and reconnaissance and saboteur groups. During the rapid development of the attack (exploitation) the struggle with the enemy's nuclear delivery means can be conducted successfully by tank and motorized divisions. For this purpose, forward detachments and special detachments are designated.

The successful development of the attack cannot be achieved without the destruction of the enemy's reserves. The struggle with the enemy's reserves in the army's offensive operation is begun by inflicting casualties on them during the initial nuclear strikes. But, since the enemy would echelon its combat grouping, and would deploy his reserves well dispersed across the front and in depth, he may succeed in keeping a part of his reserves intact. He also will have the capabilities to replenish and resupply them from mobilization resources or by moving in forces from other axes. The enemy's reserves might be employed for the following purposes:
----- - to reinforce or relieve weak groupings or groupings that have lost their combat capabilities;
----- - to cover gaps created in the operational dispositions of the enemy's forces;
----- - to occupy vital defensive lines in the rear;
----- - to repel the attack of friendly forces;
----- - to launch counterattacks and counterblows against attacking forces.

The army commander and staff must watch constantly (survey) the situation and status of the enemy reserves, should make timely assessments of their maneuvers, and should determine the nature of their possible actions and the best form of their destruction.

The enemy reserves can be neutralized by delivering mass nuclear strikes on them by rocket units and supporting air forces while they are located in assembly (FUP) areas, and during their movement and deployment to be committed into combat. This is the most effective technique to inflict decisive casualties on the enemy in a short time. But the use of this method requires the availability of a sufficient number of nuclear and chemical weapons and their delivery means.

The destruction of the enemy's reserves is usually achieved by nuclear and chemical strikes combined with rapid advances and decisive strikes by motorized and tank divisions.

The fiercest (heaviest) struggle with the enemy reserves is conducted when the enemy succeeds in delivery of its planned nuclear strikes followed by launching blows on friendly forces by his reserves. To defeat such an enemy counterblow, timely strikes are required on the enemy's nuclear delivery means and his grouping of forces preparing for the counterblow. To inflict maximum casualties on the enemy, it is necessary to hit him with massive strikes by all available and prepared nuclear, chemical, and conventional delivery means, followed by quick actions of motorized and tank divisions to accomplish the destruction of the enemy's counterattacking groupings. Friendly forces must widely employ maneuvers to outflank the enemy grouping deploying for counterattack.

When the enemy succeeds in launching counterattacks (counterblows) the destruction of his counterattacking forces is achieved by delivering nuclear strikes, followed by meeting engagements by the army's main forces, or by temporarily assuming defense by part of the army forces on the axis of the enemy's main attack, combined with the development of the attack on other axes trying to outflank the enemy's counterattack groupings.

Commitment Army Second-Echelon (Reserves) into Combat and Developing the Attack

The army's second-echelon (combined arms reserve) is normally committed into combat to develop the attack in the direction of the army's main attack. The meaning of developing the attack is to expand the efforts of first-echelon forces, to increase the rate of advance in order to accomplish rapidly the destruction of confronting enemy forces and reserves, and quickly to reach and occupy the areas by which the aim of the operation is achieved.

The expansion of efforts on the axis of the army's main attack is achieved by delivering repeated nuclear and chemical strikes and by commitment of additional forces, i.e. the second-echelon (combined arms reserves), into combat.

The army's second-echelon can be committed at the end of the accomplishment of the immediate mission or for the accomplishment of the army's subsequent mission. The army's second-echelon forces may be employed to reinforce the striking power of first-echelon forces during the destruction of the enemy's reserves. They could also be employed for shifting the army's main effort from one axis to another, and to reinforce first- echelon forces, that have suffered maximum casualties from the enemy's nuclear strikes.

When the army has two divisions in its second-echelon, their commitment into combat may be effected piecemeal or simultaneously on one or two axes.

The commitment of the army's second-echelon into combat is usually effected by its advance from the depth, subsequently deploying into combat formations from the march, in close consideration of the composition and nature of the enemy's actions and the degrees of his neutralization by nuclear strikes.

It is better to commit the army's second echelon (combined arms reserves) on the axis that favors its rapid advance in the depth and its arrival at the flanks and rear of the enemy's groupings to accomplish their destruction. In this case it is required that, to facilitate the higher rate of advance, the gaps and boundaries in the enemy's dispositions and the areas weakly (thinly) covered, are exploited to a great extent.
Prior to the commitment of the second-echelon (combined arms reserves) into combat, the army commander reconfirms the previously assigned combat mission, the axis area (line) of commitment into combat, attachments, targets, and the time of striking them by army means. Additionally, the army commander must specify the following:
----- - the number of nuclear rounds, their yields and time of supply;
----- - the method of advance and deployment of second-echelon troops to be committed into combat;
----- - coordination with the first-echelon divisions, supporting air forces, airborne landing units on the related axis (if any), and the measures to support the commitment into combat.

Advance of the second-echelon (reserve) division to the line of commitment into combat is conducted on several routes, prepared in advance by army units. If necessary, prior to the commitment of the second-echelon (reserves) into combat, nuclear strikes are delivered on the enemy by the army's rocket units and supporting air forces, and sometimes even preparatory fires are carried out.

The targets for nuclear strikes to be destroyed in this phase are the enemy's nuclear delivery means, command posts, and the main enemy groupings maintaining their combat capabilities on the axis of commitment of the second-echelon into combat.

Following the nuclear strikes the first-echelon regiments of divisions may operate in march columns, pre-combat formations, or combat formations. Exploiting the gaps created by nuclear strikes, intervals, and boundaries in the enemy's dispositions, the regiments accomplish the destruction of the enemy's surviving troops by decisive and quick actions and move with high speed to the rear of the enemy and occupy the assigned areas (objectives).

If during the commitment of the second-echelon into combat or during subsequent combat operations, the enemy begins withdrawal or passes over to delaying action, the division units rapidly begin pursuit of the enemy and, together with other first-echelon divisions, accomplish the destruction of the enemy. Pursuit of the retreating enemy is conducted by the army forces at high speed, continuously in day and night until the complete destruction or surrender of the enemy. Pursuit of the enemy may begin in different phases of offensive operations with the attackers at different depths, simultaneously across the entire zone of the army or at different times along different axes of attack. The basic form of pursuit is following the enemy along parallel routes (axes) combined with enveloping the retreating enemy from one or both flanks. In any case the army forces should continue the frontal pursuit and maintain contact with the enemy. The rate of advance of army forces in the pursuit phase must be higher than the rate of retreat of the enemy. This will facilitate overtaking the enemy's march columns and will prevent the enemy from establishing new defensive lines and showing organized resistance.

In the course of developing the attack the army, particularly the tank army, might be forced in some situations to change the axis of the main attack as a result of rapid changes in the situation. The shift of the army's main attack to another axis must be accomplished in the shortest possible time, secretly, surprisingly, and without decreasing the units' rate of advance on the axis. This could be achieved by mass employment of nuclear weapons and the commitment of the second-echelon (combined arms reserves) into combat on the new direction of main attack. In this case the first-echelon divisions may be oriented to the axis of the main attack and parts of them can be allocated to re-establish the second-echelon or combined arms reserves of the army. In all situations, after the commitment of the second-echelon (reserve), new second-echelon (reserve) forces must be established by withdrawing some divisions operating on other axes, or by employing divisions newly attached to the army by higher echelons (front).

Passing Through Nuclear Mining Obstacles, Contaminated and Destroyed Areas

In the course of offensive operations, the army units would be forced to pass through the enemy's nuclear mining obstacles and also through radioactive and chemically contaminated areas, and other great destruction and obstacles.

The enemy may lay nuclear minefields near its borders as well as in depth around its positions. The army is required first to locate quickly the areas prepared for nuclear mining or actually established nuclear minefields, controlling devices of their detonation, and the depots (stockpile) of nuclear mines (munitions demolitions). Based on this information, specific measures should be determined for the occupying them or avoidance of the detonation of the enemy's nuclear demolitions.

By the commencement of the operations the enemy's nuclear mines (demolition) stockpiles (depots), as well as the areas where they are laid can be destroyed by rocket units and supporting air force strikes. They can also be occupied by airborne landing units, advance detachments, and special detachments detached by the first-echelon divisions.

If the enemy succeeds in detonating the nuclear munitions demolitions, large contaminated areas and destruction would be created across the army's zone of operation, which need to be passed through in the course of offensive operations. Contaminated areas and destruction may be created as a result of the enemy's surface nuclear bursts and chemical strikes, as well. The success of units' actions in passing through the contaminated terrain areas and large-scale destruction is achieved by:
----- - continuous radiation, chemical, and bacteriological reconnaissance and forecasts of the radioactive situation, in consideration of their impact on the troops;
----- - timely informing of subordinate units about the radioactive, chemical, and bacteriological situation;
----- - quick action of units along axes having lower levels of terrain contamination;
----- - assessment of personnel radioactive doses and taking measures to maintain their combat capabilities;
----- - selection of safer axes for passing through the contaminated areas and destruction;
----- - timely employment of individual protective equipment and antiradiation materials by personnel;
----- - special importance is related, in this case, to engineer measures for carrying out partial or full decontamination of personnel, weapons, and combat equipment, as well as the strict organization of the traffic regulating services.

Under all conditions the passage through contaminated and destruction areas is organized in such a way that it does not decrease the rate of the units' advance, so that the army forces get minimum doses of radiation, and have the capability to continue the attack with high rate of speed, after passing through the same areas.

The forms of passing through such areas are specified (determined) in relation to the operational and meteorological situation, the degree of radiation or the density of contaminated materials, the degree and characteristics of destruction on the routes (axes) of advance, the created obstacles, fires, residual contamination in the air, the nature of the terrain, and the activities of the enemy in the contaminated areas.

When organizing the passage of units through contaminated areas, the general external doses of personal radioactive contamination, which may not decrease their combat capabilities, must be considered. These are as follows: one occasion (in the course of four days) - l00 roentgens; in three months - 200 roentgens; in one year - 300 roentgens.

Army units may pass through the contaminated areas on the march, without waiting for a decrease of radiation; bypass areas with high radiation density; or may combine both forms, passing through and bypassing such areas.

When passing through contaminated areas, it is recommended that tank regiments and tank divisions move along axes with a higher density of radiation, since the personnel of such units are better protected than those of motorized units. The troops should move in the contaminated areas at high speed, with large intervals between units and vehicles. The personnel should wear their personal protective equipment at this time. Some independent subunits and units, command posts, rocket pads, and nuclear weapons (rounds) are moved by air transport means.

The Employment of Tactical Airborne Landing Units and Airborne Assault Large Units

In the army's offensive operations, in order to exploit the results of nuclear strikes on the enemy in a complete, and timely form, the use of tactical airborne landing units and assault airborne large units is widely employed in modern times.

The tactical airborne landing units, composed of a reinforced motorized rifle company up to motorized rifle regiment, are employed to destroy the enemy's nuclear delivery means, command posts, and small surviving groupings of the enemy; to avoid the maneuvers of enemy units and means still maintaining their combat capabilities; to assist the first-echelon divisions in the occupation of communication centers (road junctions) and river crossings (water obstacles), as well as for passing through radioactive contaminated areas and obstacles in first priority through the enemy's nuclear minefields.

Special importance is given to the employment of airborne assault brigades that are landed following nuclear strikes for the purpose of destroying the enemy's nuclear delivery means and his nuclear and chemical stockpiles (depots), destroying the enemy's command posts and air defense means, as well as for the purpose of occupying bridges, mountain passes, and other important objectives. In some situations large airborne assault units are employed to accomplish missions in occupying and holding vital areas and lines in the rear of the enemy, covering the exposed (open) flanks of the army's groupings, fighting enemy reserves, airmobile units, and airborne/seaborne landing troops.

The high mobility of airborne assault brigades helps them to conduct combat operations from the air and on the ground in close coordination with motorized and tank divisions, airborne units, rocket and artillery troops, and air forces; and to deliver rapid surprise strikes on the enemy in required areas, and quickly be reoriented to accomplish missions on other axes and areas. It is recommended that such units are to be employed, following nuclear strikes, as independent units or at most, in a large unit.

Operations Without the Employment of Nuclear Weapons

Success in conducting army offensive operations employing conventional weapons is largely dependent on ensuring surprise air strikes; and initiating surprise attacks, by friendly forces; and on active and decisive actions of the army's large units and units. Since the enemy possesses strong groupings of air and land forces with high standards of combat readiness, efforts to defeat the enemy's surprise invasion are of vital importance in offensive operations without the employment of nuclear weapons.

Repelling the Enemy's Invasion and Defeating his Attack

Repelling the enemy's invasion (initiation of attack by the enemy) and defeating his attack without employing nuclear weapons is a difficult task. This can be accomplished successfully by the coordinated efforts of combined arms and tank armies, front air forces, and front air defense and rocket forces. The basic mission of the army in this case is to repel the enemy's invasion, to defeat the attack of his armed forces, and to damage his air force groupings, in close cooperation with front air forces and front air defense troops.

The forms of repelling the enemy's invasion and defeating his attack can be different, and will depend on the situation at the outset of hostilities, the relative balance of opposing forces, the status of combat readiness, and the disposition of friendly and the enemy forces.

According to the experience of recent wars and operational training exercises, the repulse of the enemy's invasion and the defeat of his attack can be achieved, by first of all, preempting (overtaking) the enemy with surprise strikes and by destroying his forces before they are fully prepared for combat operations. This can be achieved by massive air strikes on the enemy's command posts, airfields, and groupings of land forces. By employing artillery fires and rapid actions of tank and motorized divisions, the resistance of the enemy's covering force can be broken by forces attacking from the march, favorable terrain features (lines) can be seized, and, finally, the enemy's main groupings of forces can be destroyed by blows to their flanks and rear.

When the enemy succeeds in initiating an attack without superiority in forces and means, his destruction can be achieved in a meeting engagement. To do so, it is necessary to force the enemy to deploy at a disadvantage by the actions of advance detachments, to disrupt his combat formations by air strikes and artillery fires, and finally to destroy him in a meeting engagement.

When the enemy initiates the invasion with large forces the repulse and eventual defeat of his attack is achieved by defensive actions. In this case it is required to stop the enemy in front of prepared defensive lines by stubborn defensive actions, to inflict heavy casualties, to change the relative balance of forces in favor of the friendly force, and finally, by committing the reserves, to initiate a decisive counteroffensive.

Initiating the Attack by Army Units

Initiating the attack by army forces, without the employment of nuclear weapons, is often conducted from an assembly (FUP) area that provides the possibilities for large units to organize and assume combat formations for the attack. In this case the main forces of the army will initiate the attack from positions not in contact with the enemy. It is also possible that the attack may be initiated by army forces from positions in contact, following the successful repulse of the enemy's invasion of our territory.

The method of deployment of army units for the attack is specified, and artillery and air force strikes on the enemy are organized on the basis of the above-mentioned situations. The preparatory fires normally precede the attack. The basis of preparatory fires are artillery fires and air strikes.

The main target to be neutralized or destroyed by artillery fires are the enemy's tactical nuclear delivery means, artillery and mortar batteries, tanks, antitank weapons, the enemy's personnel and weapons located on the attack axes of the army's units, as well as command posts and radio-technical (radar) means.

The targets to be destroyed by the supporting air forces are the enemy's nuclear delivery means, artillery batteries, command posts, reserves, and other targets, preferably those located beyond the range of artillery.

The enemy's covering forces, possessing fewer troops, are destroyed by forward detachments of first-echelon divisions, supported by artillery fires and air strikes. The size of a division's advance detachment may vary from a reinforced tank or motorized battalion up to a reinforced tank or motorized regiment.

The main forces of first-echelon divisions move in march columns in this situation, and are ready to develop the actions of the forward detachments and exploit their success by rapid advance in depth. The deployment of division main forces into pre-combat and combat formations is dependent on the extent of (combat requirements) and the composition and degree of the enemy's resistance. In situations in which the border (frontier) areas are covered by strong enemy forces, it is required that not only forward detachments, but all units in main bodies of first-echelon divisions, deploy to destroy the enemy covering forces.

While passing through the enemy covering zone the actions of forward detachments and first-echelon regiments must develop in such a way that they can be further integrated into appropriate groupings once they come in contact with main enemy forces, in order successfully to accomplish missions to destroy them.

The destruction of the enemy's first-echelon main forces is accomplished by meeting engagement (if the enemy initiate the attack in army's area) from the march or by breaking through the enemy defense. In determining the method of initiating the offensive by army forces from positions in contact, once the enemy's strikes have been repelled through defensive actions, it must be noted that the organization of the attack and the formulation of required combat groupings of army forces for the attack are to be anticipated and conducted in the course of defensive combat. The attack should be initiated from defensive positions only when the enemy has suffered heavy casualties, has lost his capability to continue the attack, and has not yet succeeded in establishing the required groupings of his forces to be able to repel the coming attack of friendly forces.

Attack from positions in contact with the enemy is initiated by delivering heavy air strikes on the enemy's most vital targets and by bringing preparatory fires on the enemy in the directions of the army's attacks (strikes). In this case the strikes are usually launched against the most sensitive points in the enemy's combat formations.

Destruction of the Enemy in Meeting Engagement

The characteristics of a meeting engagement are:
----- - continuous and strong efforts to gain time and to seize and retain the initiative;
----- - limited time available for the organization (planning) of combat action;
----- - rapid and drastic situation changes;
----- - development of combat actions with higher rates of speed;
----- - deployment into combat from the march column and wide use of maneuvers.

The decisive factor insuring success in a meeting engagement is to overtake the enemy (preempt the enemy or seize the initiative) in delivering air strikes, in opening artillery fires, and in deploying the main forces of the first-echelon division in favorable lines (areas).

Preceding the attack of the divisions' main forces in the meeting engagement, preparatory fires should be conducted to neutralize the enemy's artillery, command posts, antitank guided missiles, tanks, personnel, and other targets located on the axis of friendly forces' actions. The preparatory fires are not usually lengthy, because the enemy will not be in covered positions but in march formations. Even if the enemy takes up the defense, his fire system and engineer defensive fortifications still will not be prepared; thus it is required that short but strong fire strikes (lasting l0-l5 minutes) should be brought on the enemy. During this period of time the battalions are able to accomplish their deployment for the assault.

In the meeting engagement efforts must be made to establish decisive superiority in troops and means against the enemy on the main attack axis and other attack axes, in order to ensure rapid and bold maneuvers, particularly by tank divisions and regiments on such axes, and to achieve their rapid arrival on the flanks and in the rear of the enemy, for launching decisive strikes against him from different axes. The attack axes of first-echelon divisions should be selected to ensure wide maneuver of troops and means and to provide conditions to exploit the open flanks and gaps in the enemy's combat formations.

The best method for destroying the enemy in a meeting engagement is to launch heavy strikes by entire tank divisions and regiments on the weak flanks of the main enemy groupings, before they manage to deploy for action, combined with timely holding (fixing) of the enemy and striking him from the front as well.

Units launching meeting strikes should penetrate from the march into the intervals (gaps) between the enemy columns, divide them into pieces, and destroy them. Units attacking on other axes must attempt to outflank the enemy's main forces, as deeply as possible, by employing flanking maneuver and envelopment and finally destroy them by striking them on their flanks. This form of destroying the enemy in a meeting engagement is effective only when his groupings are moving on a broad front and the situation of friendly units and the terrain allow the maneuver to the flanks of the enemy's groupings.

In situations in which the position of the army's attacking forces or the terrain conditions do not allow flanking maneuver and envelopment on both flanks of the enemy, the army's main forces may strike the enemy on one flank, combined with containing (holding) the enemy's main grouping from the front by a part of the army's forces.

When striking the enemy groupings on the flanks and rear is not possible, their destruction in a meeting engagement can be achieved by frontal strikes to divide the enemy into pieces and destroy them piecemeal. In all cases attempts are made to prevent the enemy from taking up the defensive.

In the course of a meeting engagement with the enemy's first-echelon forces, fighting his reserves and forces on other axes, and regrouping for combat must be conducted simultaneously. Preventing their approach to the combat area is achieved by supporting air force strikes, actions of airborne landing units, and by rapid advance of first-echelon divisions to separate the enemy's first-echelon main forces from their approaching reserves.

If, by the time operations begin, the enemy passes into the defensive in the army's area, the army forces would have to break through the enemy defense and destroy his confronting forces.

Destruction of the Enemy Grouping Taking up Defense Action

In offensive operations, the army forces may confront the enemy defense both in the border areas as well as deep inside the enemy's territory; therefore, the destruction of the enemy's defending groupings might be accomplished both at the beginning as well as in the course of the offensive operation.

Breaking through the enemy's defense, without the employment of nuclear weapons, is a very difficult task and requires detailed preparations and great concentration (density of artillery, tanks, and motorized units in the penetration areas).

At the start of war the enemy's defense will have different (various) degrees of preparation, including defensive positions prepared in advance. Therefore, the enemy's defense will have different natures and characteristics concerning the density of forces and means, various engineer defensive works, defensive positions, and defensive areas, and sometimes will have an incomplete fire system. The possibility that the enemy will have prepared defenses on important and vital axes is likely.

The enemy may determine, in peacetime, the lines to be occupied, and fire and obstacle systems and can rapidly fortify his positions with engineer works. Moreover, modern forces are capable of rapidly moving to defensive areas and establishing defensive positions with a high density of antitank weapons and strong fire systems. This means that the attacking forces of the army may confront strong and well-prepared enemy defenses, which will have considerable resistance against massive strikes of tank and motorized units. The destruction of such enemy forces requires the execution of preparatory fires and the mass employment of forces and combat means. Success in breaking through the enemy defenses is insured by the following:
----- - proper selection of penetration areas;
----- - detailed organization of reconnaissance to learn about the enemy and terrain on the axes chosen for main strikes by friendly forces;
----- - establishment of the required superiority of forces and means and rapid creation of the necessary groupings of troops and means;
----- - sufficient neutralization of the enemy forces in penetration areas and on their flanks, by fires of artillery, tanks, and infantry fighting vehicles;
----- - neutralizing the enemy's tactical reserves and command posts by artillery and air strikes;
----- - rapid attack by first-echelon tank and motorized units;
----- - continuous support of attacking forces by supporting fires;
----- - timely reinforcement of troops.

The penetration areas are specified (selected) on the axis of the army's main attack, based on the concept of operation.  Such areas must insure the effective employment of all arms, particularly tanks, artillery, and air forces; the establishment of necessary forces' groupings in short times; the possibilities of committing large second-echelon units into combat to exploit the attack; limitations and difficulties on the part of the enemy's immediate tactical reserves.

The army commander, when assessing the divisions' attacking axes, and the frontages of penetration areas, must consider the combat and maneuver capabilities of each large unit, capabilities to reinforce them, the establishment of the required density (concentration) of forces for penetrating through enemy defenses, and the threat of enemy employment of nuclear weapons.

The duration of preparatory fires depends on the nature and characteristics of the enemy's defense, the availability of artillery assets, and the time required for sufficient neutralization of the enemy. In preparatory fire tanks and antitank guided missiles are employed to destroy enemy individual targets and inflict damage on the enemy's weapons by direct fire.

During artillery preparatory fires the enemy's basic resistance points (platoon and company defensive positions) located on the FEBA and immediate vicinity (depth), as well as the enemy's artillery and mortar batteries, must be neutralized, and the enemy's nuclear delivery means, immediate reserves, artillery, and command posts must be destroyed.

In situations in which the enemy, defending in the forward defensive area, is located l5-50 km from the frontier, the army forces are required initially to pass through the enemy's covering zone under air cover and artillery fire support.  In this phase the difficulties confronting the army will be the following:  the enemy artillery can deliver fire strikes on marching columns of army forces to a depth of 20 km with his l75 mm guns, and to a depth of l2 km with his l55 mm howitzers from the FEBA of the forward defensive area.

The basic means of neutralizing the enemy's artillery in this phase is the supporting air forces. To neutralize enemy artillery located in the forward defensive area it is recommended that long-range artillery units be attached to the divisions attacking in the first-echelon. In this case the divisions are reinforced by the long-range artillery organic to the army artillery brigade and supreme high command artillery division, if available.

Assault on the enemy must begin simultaneously and at specified (H) hours; in all conditions, tank and motorized units are to penetrate rapidly through the enemy FEBA, destroy surviving enemy personnel and weapons, and rapidly break through the depth of the enemy defenses, exploiting gaps in the enemy's combat formations and areas thinly occupied by enemy forces.

The speed of breaking through the enemy defenses depends largely on the degrees of its neutralization. To insure a high rate of speed in breakthrough, it is required that the enemy defense must be sufficiently neutralized in its entire tactical depth, both prior to the assault and in the course of conducting the attack. Since the enemy is widely equipped with antitank weapons, their neutralization is of prime importance. In order to achieve this, it is required that the enemy company defensive strongpoints, which contain numerous short range antitank weapons, must be neutralized, and the enemy's battalion and brigade antitank weapons, positioned out of the companies' strongpoints, should be destroyed.

The destruction of the defending enemy must be done in detail (conducted in pieces). For this purpose, mass air strikes and artillery fires are employed, as well as rapid actions of army forces; the enemy's defensive lines must be isolated from one another, and possibilities should not be given to them in the course of the combat to reinforce their effort on the vital axes. Therefore, in the course of breaking through the enemy defense, the units' main efforts must be concentrated for the rapid development of the attack to the depth of the enemy's dispositions.

The supporting air force must strike the enemy's reserves in depth and prevent their movement to the areas of combat operations. To accomplish this task, an important role can be played by multi-rocket artillery, which has great capabilities for conducting fire attacks on the enemy reserves. The attack must be developed along the specified axes, bypassing enemy resistance centers and strongpoints. In the course of conducting the attack, all measures must be taken to prevent the enemy from organized occupation of defensive lines in his depth. The enemy's attempt to block or impede the advance of friendly forces in order to gain time to take up defense in prepared defensive positions (lines) must be neutralized by employing air strikes and artillery fires, by landing airborne units and by rapid and bold actions of tank and motorized divisions and regiments. In such cases, it is required that artillery and air strikes must be delivered on the enemy's defensive lines prior to the arrival and deployment of friendly forces at such lines to ensure the passage of units through the enemy defenses from the march, and to facilitate rapid destruction of the enemy groupings defending such lines.

After penetration through the enemy defense, the attacking forces should rapidly develop the attack to the depth, expand the penetration to the flanks, conduct the pursuit of the enemy, and destroy the enemy's retreating forces and approaching reserves.

Destroying Enemy Reserves and Repelling Enemy Counterblows

In modern times the enemy is far more capable than in previous wars of concentrating forces from the depth and maneuvering reserves to the front. The enemy may employ his tactical and operational reserves to accomplish different missions.  In favorable conditions the reserves are employed for counterattacks and counterblows.  Under unfavorable conditions the reserves are employed for the occupation of intermediate defensive lines, at the rear of retreating forces of its first-echelon, or for the reinforcement of first-echelon units on critical axes.

Depending on the composition and the nature of the employment of the enemy reserves, the form of their destruction in the course of conducting the army's offensive operation is determined. The most difficult form of the destruction of the enemy reserves is confronted when the enemy launches a counterblow. It must be noted that the enemy's counterblows will be combined with strong air force strikes and the mass employment of artillery. Therefore, one of the most important tasks in the course of conducting the operation will be inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy reserves and foiling the success of the enemy's preplanned counterblow. To fulfill this task vital roles are played by: mass strikes of the supporting air force on approaching enemy reserves advancing from the rear; inflicting heavy damage on deploying units by artillery fires, as well as by the rapid advance of attacking forces, particularly tank divisions and regiments; and finally by overtaking the enemy in seizing favorable lines.

When the enemy's counterblow cannot be avoided, the destruction of his counterattacking forces is attempted by meeting blows by friendly attacking forces, or the taking up of defensive action by a part of forces, on the axis of the enemy's counterblow, in order to inflict heavy casualties on the enemy from defensive positions and, subsequently, resuming the attack. Simultaneous with the repulse of the enemy counterblow, it is required to develop the attack on other axes to the depth. To destroy the enemy's counterattacking grouping and for the development of the attack, the army's second-echelon division can be committed into combat.

Assault River Crossing During the Offensive Operation

In the course of conducting offensive operations, army units may be forced to cross a large number of rivers and canals having different widths, depths, current velocities, and other characteristics. Undoubtedly the enemy will exploit such obstacles in defensive actions as strong natural barriers on advance axes of attacking forces. An assault river crossing must be conducted by surprise, on a wide front, and at a high rate of speed from the march as the units approach the water obstacles. The crossing unit must be capable of continuing the development of the attack at the far bank.

The important task of army forces is to destroy the enemy prior to arriving at water obstacles, so that the enemy is not allowed to withdraw to the water obstacle. Army forces should also destroy the enemy reserves, located to the rear of a water obstacle or approaching toward the water obstacle from positions in depth.

In order to inflict heavy damage on retreating enemy forces and its reserves approaching toward the river, air strikes of supporting air forces are employed. The air force strikes neutralize the enemy nuclear delivery systems and his main withdrawing grouping, especially when they are concentrating on the crossing sites at the river. Airborne landing units may be employed to stop the approach of enemy reserves. They also seize and hold existing bridges and crossing sites and also seek to avoid the destruction of hydrotechnical installations, which, once destroyed, may cause flooding and make the river crossing very difficult.

Success in assault river crossing from the march is insured by advance preparations, made during the approach of the attacking forces to the water obstacle (river). To serve this purpose, the crossing areas of each division and the form of their approach to the river are specified in advance; assault crossing means are moved forward; maneuver of pontoon vehicles and their rapid advance toward the crossing zones is ensured; traffic control services are established along the axes of advance and at the crossing sites; and the crossing areas and approaches leading to them are sufficiently covered by air defense units and fighter aircraft.

The army commander makes the decision for assault river crossing well before arrival at the river, and combat missions are assigned in such a way that subordinates have sufficient time for the accomplishment of all preparatory actions.

Advance seizure of intact bridges and crossing sites over the river is of special importance in successful river crossing. This task may be assigned to airborne landing units as well as to forward detachments or special detachments organized by first-echelon divisions. If on one of the axes, the units do not succeed in the assault river crossing from the march, the river crossing of these particular units is reorganized with brief preparations. In the latter case, preparatory fire is carried out before the units begin crossing the river. At the beginning of an assault river crossing, the enemy's fire systems on the far bank should be sufficiently neutralized. The crossing units of first-echelon divisions accomplish the destruction of the enemy forces on the far bank and continue to develop the attack to the depth of the enemy dispositions.

Characteristics of Night Attacks

The attack of army forces in offensive operations must be of a continuous nature, carried out day and night. The experiences of the Great Patriotic War indicate that the active action of attacking forces at night would not allow the enemy to take advantage of the night in order to restore his defenses, to consolidate and fortify defensive lines and to take other measures concerning the reinforcement of his units' powers of resistance against attacking forces. Night combat operations increase the depth of twenty-four hour missions and enhance the average rate of attacking units' speed in offensive operations.

Night vision devices, which the units' combat vehicles are equipped with, insure the observation of the battlefield and the accuracy of fire by all types of weapons during darkness. The presence of night vision devices in units favors tanks, APCs, and motor vehicles driving at night and insure their unimpeded march and rapid maneuver in darkness.

The army commander must specify in a timely manner what missions by which forces and means are to be accomplished at night, and what measures, insuring the night activities of the troops, should be taken by the troops. It must be also noted that, despite the presence of technical devices, insuring the units' night actions has a number of characteristics and difficulties (problems) of its own. The darkness makes the mass employment of air force and terrain navigation by the units very difficult. The successful execution of combat operations at night requires detailed organization and coordination, higher preparation of units, high morale, and great physical endurance of the personnel. Combat operations of first-echelon units and large units should preferably be carried out in turns, and they must be relieved alternately to provide them with possibilities of rest and preparation of combat vehicles for night actions. When specifying the axes of units' attack at night, the execution of complicated maneuvers must be avoided and favorable terrain and land routes should be exploited to the maximum extent.

The night actions of army forces should have the character of decisiveness and initiative.  The units and large units, exploiting the gaps and boundaries of the enemy's combat formations, should penetrate, as fast as possible to the depth of the enemy disposition, destroy its command, control, and fire systems, and seize key terrain by dawn, so as to provide favorable conditions for the rapid development of the attack on the next day.  During night combat operations signal flares and radar devices are widely employed.

The transition of units from day action to night attack and vice-versa must be effected without pause and without decreasing the speed of attack.  To exploit success gained at night, the army's second-echelon division or combined arms reserve can be committed into combat by next morning.

Reinforcement of Success

Success in developing the attack without the employment of nuclear weapons is meaningless without the expansion (reinforcement) of efforts on the decisive axes. The expansion of efforts on the decisive axes is achieved by commitment of the second-echelon division or combined arms reserves and by regrouping the forces (shifting forces to the decisive axes from less favorable axes). Therefore, situations may arise in the course of conducting offensive operations which require, due to the rapid changes in the combat situation, that the main efforts of the army must be shifted to another axis, or the striking (attacking) forces on another axis should be expanded (reinforced), this can facilitate fast destruction of enemy forces and favors quicker arrival of units in areas whose seizure leads to the achievement of the aim of the operation. Thus the necessity of committing additional forces from the second-echelon (reserve) or regrouping of forces on other axes arises.
The decision to shift the main effort of the army to new axes is made by instruction or permission of the front commander. In the decision of the army commander, the following must be specified:
----- - enemy groupings on new axes, the destruction of which can ensure the success of the operation;
----- - tasks and targets of artillery and air strikes;
----- - composition of unit groupings to operate on new axes;
----- - missions of adjacent large units and method of coordination with them;
----- - method and time of regrouping, if regrouping is to be carried out;
----- - mission of air defense troops;
----- - organization of support of combat activities and troop control.

Concentration of the forces' efforts on the new axes should be effected in a short time, secretly and surprisingly for the enemy, and without decreasing the speed of the attack on other axes.

Transition of Army Forces to Combat Action With the Employment of Nuclear Weapons

Transition from combat operations with conventional weapons to actions with the employment of nuclear weapons is more likely to be effected in situations in which the enemy's first-echelon main grouping is destroyed and the attacking forces penetrate into important and vital areas inside enemy territory or seize them, while the enemy cannot stop the subsequent attacks of friendly forces by conventional weapons. Transition to the employment of nuclear weapons, by nature, marks a new phase in the development of the operation, during which both opposing sides attempt to change the situation to their favor profoundly and drastically and inflict decisive losses on the enemy.  The important task of the units' command and control elements at this stage is the organization and execution of first (initial) mass nuclear strikes on the enemy, reinforcement of actions and measures in favor of maintaining the combat capabilities of the units, and insuring their rapid action following the initial nuclear strikes.

The organization and delivery of initial nuclear strikes in the course of conducting combat operations, without the employment of nuclear weapons at the outset, will be profoundly different from the organization and execution of initial nuclear strikes delivered at the beginning of the war. The reason behind this difference is the fact that in the former case rapid changes in the situation and the status of targets to be destroyed and the nuclear delivery means would be expected. At this stage both sides' forces would have deployed, having close contact with each other. It means that in addition to the deployment of operational-tactical nuclear delivery means, tactical nuclear delivery means would have deployed as well. This will require that the latter must also participate in the delivery of initial nuclear strikes.

At the phase of the enemy's direct preparation for the employment of nuclear weapons the important task to be conducted by reconnaissance is locating the enemy nuclear delivery means and determination of the probable time of their being prepared for the delivery of nuclear strikes. Gaining exact information about these matters at the earliest offers the possibility that timely strikes of conventional weapons may be delivered on the enemy's nuclear delivery means, which could, by itself, much weaken the power of the enemy's preparation for the employment of nuclear strikes. Moreover, timely determination of the enemy preparations for the employment of nuclear weapons favor opportunities to preempt the enemy in delivering nuclear strikes. To overtake the enemy in hitting with nuclear strikes, friendly forces should initiate nuclear strikes on the first indications of enemy preparations for striking by nuclear weapons.

The army commander and staff must constantly follow the changes in the targets of initial nuclear strikes and in the preparation of army's rocket brigade units and first-echelon divisions' rocket battalions for the employment of nuclear weapons. In accordance with the decision and instructions of the front commander, the army commander will have to issue rapidly appropriate instructions to the rocket units concerning the raising of their combat readiness.

Depending on the disposition of units in close contact with the enemy, special importance is given to the modifications of the yields and forms of burst of nuclear weapons and to the specification of security lines and distances of first-echelon units from the targets to be destroyed by nuclear weapons. For the destruction of targets near friendly units, it is better to employ smaller yield nuclear weapons (three to ten kilotons). Complications and rapid changes in the situation, particularly in the situation of targets to be destroyed and the status of nuclear delivery means, will not always require that the army commander specify targets for all nuclear delivery means when participating in initial nuclear strikes. Therefore, the necessity may arise to authorize the division commanders to select the targets for their rocket units, in accordance with their assigned missions and the instructions of the army commander.

Timely issuing of instructions to first-echelon divisions, airborne landing units, air defense units, and reserves, as well as to rear services installations, concerning their actions in the preparation and execution phase of initial nuclear strikes and about the axes of the units to exploit the results of the employment of nuclear weapons, and the modification of coordination of attacking units, will be vitally important at this stage of combat operations. Special measures are to be taken to protect the units, command posts, and rear services installations from the impact of the enemy's mass destruction weapons. All these tasks must be carried out in the shortest possible time and require coordination and great exactness in actions on the part of the army commander, as well as on the part of commanders and staffs at all echelons.

At the initiation of nuclear weapons employment, the combat operations of army forces will develop in accordance with the conditions and requirements of the nuclear environment, as discussed earlier.