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GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR TROOP CONTROL IN OPERATIONS
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I. GENERAL
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Essence and Content of Troop Control: Definition
Troop control is leadership and the special duty of the commander, staff,
chiefs of arms and services political organs, and other control organs of the
headquarters on the creation and maintenance of high combat readiness; detailed
organization of combat operations and actions; direction of operational
formations, large units, and units during operations; and application of their
force to the successful completion of the appointed missions. In the content of
troop control the following collection of missions and methods are most
important:
preserving the morale and political condition of the forces and raising their
combat readiness to accomplish missions;
constantly collecting, analyzing, and organizing situation data in order to
understand the intention and concept of the enemy; (On the basis of observing
and analyzing all indications of the situation the commander can understand the
intention and the concept of the enemy command);
making a timely decision for the operation;
issuing combat instructions to the subordinate forces;
planning the operation (combat);
establishing the troop control system including command posts and
communications system;
guiding and directing the preparation of the forces for the accomplishment of
the combat missions;
organizing and preserving timely, constant interaction;
establishing all around support of combat actions;
controlling troops during the operation;
providing monitoring of mission fulfillment and rendering assistance to the
subordinate forces.
Troop control is accomplished by the commander personally or with the staff,
deputies, and chiefs of arms and services, chiefs of special troops and
services, and in accordance with orders, directives, and instructions from the
higher commander.
The basis for troops control is the commander's decision. In accordance with
the commander's decision the staff organizes and directs all measures for
preparing troops for completion of the mission and directs them during the
course of the operation.
Principles of Troop Control
The following are the main principles for troop control:
one man command and responsibility;
centralized control of all levels with attention also to giving the maximum
possible initiative to subordinates for fulfillment of various missions;
stubborn persistence, activeness, and energy in putting the decision into
practice, ie. executing it;
agility and ability to react to changes in the situation;
continuity and secrecy;
The commander is responsible for making the decision. He answers personally for
effectively using all subordinate forces and properly achieving the results
required in the mission.
Basis and Requirements of Troop Control in Contemporary
Conditions
Troop control in contemporary conditions must be exceptionally effective to
enable the commander to control subordinate forces well in difficult conditions
of combat action. The required characteristics include the following:
vigilance and activeness of control - In contemporary conditions the high
maneuver capability of forces has increased and the combat situation quickly
changes. The rapidity shortens the time element. The struggle to gain time in
order to overtake the enemy in conduct of actions has a deciding influence on
the outcome of the battle. Therefore special attention on the part of the
control organs must be paid to the need for activeness and vigilance.
the expansion of the volume of troop control and requirement for
resourcefulness - The capabilities, qualifications, and extensive experience of
commander and staff in making rational and correct decisions, quickly issuing
missions to subordinates, and taking the best measures with the aim of all
around support of the operations (battle) are important requirements.
higher combat readiness of command-posts and troop control system at all levels
(echelons) - The timely preparation and deployment of a strong control system
starts at front and goes down to the company and platoon levels.
Higher combat readiness is required of all control points and all signal
systems and systems of data collection. They must scientifically analyze data
and issue deductions about situation data quickly and correctly.
reliability (continuity) of control of forces - This is provided by thorough
awareness and correct understanding of the situation on the part of the
commander and staff, by their capability for forecasting likely changes in the
situation; by insuring reliable and continuous communications with
subordinates; for timely relocation of control points moving forward with the
forces; and by constant exchange of data among the staff and higher and lower
forces.
firmness (strength) and strong control of forces - This is making the decision
and putting it into practice with the aim of fulfilling the given mission. This
requires great perseverance, high morale, exactitude, and strength of commander
and staff in executing the decision and a strong will in the face of
difficulties. It is shown by the constant influence of the commander and staff
over their subordinates and forces, by their rendering assistance to
subordinates for accomplishing missions, and by inspecting the execution of
missions.
flexibility of control - This is insured by the great capability of the
commander and staff in quickly influencing newly arising situations and in
their making alterations in previously made decisions or making new decisions
in answer to new situations. They also constantly inspect the execution of the
assigned mission. The commander and staff must collect new data on the
situation, analyze it, and quickly and correctly respond to the situation by
taking needed measures.
centralized troop control - This is unity of the actions of subordinate forces
and concentration of their actions according to a unified plan, in order to
achieve the general objective of the operation (battle) as defined by the
higher commander. Various types of forces and different kinds of combat
equipment participate in combat actions spread over a large region. This
demands unity and centralized control and concentration of all arms and means
with the aim of accomplishing the general mission.
initiative - One of the characteristics of contemporary combat and operations
is increased capability for rapid maneuver of forces and quick changes in the
situation. This requires great initiative of the subordinate commander to
continue the operation in the absence of communications with the higher
commander. (Don't reproach the person who can't destroy the enemy but reproach
the man who is afraid to take responsibility in the required moment and fails
to use all his forces and means and capabilities for destruction of the enemy
and fulfilling the mission.)
secrecy of troop control - Expansion of the enemy's detection and
reconnaissance means requires (demands) strong observation and attention to
taking measures for secrecy. Secrecy of troop control is achieved by the
following measures:
strictly observing security;
observing measures for maskirovka and secret location for control
points;
observing rules for protection of secrecy on the part of individuals who work
in the troop control system;
limiting the number of individuals who are called on to participate in
preparation and planning of operations (battle).
The Relationship of Staff Officer and Commander
The Soviet officer selection system looks for dedicated communists who are
aggressive, tough, stubborn, and with a personality to be a combat leader in
command positions for promotion. Senior commanders (army and above) owe their
positions to personal politicking, favoritism, cronyism and party loyalty. The
senior positions are all under the system of appointments within the
"nomenclature". Not all commanders are intellectuals but all have
attended the vigorous studies at the Voroshilov Academy.
In practice the army commander depends on his staff for the quality of his
planning. Staff officers are career specialists who are academically inclined
and well versed in Soviet terms. They too are taught to follow "the
book" and think in terms of norms and formulas.
The chief of staff is the key individual at headquarters. He advises the
commander during the initial decision process, plans the planning process,
transmits the commander's guidance to the staff, supervises the planning and
recommends the selected course of action to the commander.
The commander always has the final word on a plan. But generally he will accept
the plan proposed by the chief of staff. The commander actively supervises the
headquarters, makes personal field reconnaissance, and keeps fully informed of
all details.
The commander and chief of staff must think and act in unison. They share a
common perception of the unit mission and concept of the operation. The chief
of staff is also the principal first deputy commander and the only one
authorized to act in the commander's name. The other first deputy commander is
concerned primarily with training and combat effectiveness.
The Soviet social system stresses the importance of prerogatives associated
with each position. Thus the interpersonal relations of commander and staff
will be very formal in most cases. Soviet officers are expected to perform
according to rigorous standards.
Staff officers will be trained to perform one specific functional duty very
well but may be cross-trained into another. In addition staff officers will be
assigned specific extra topics to study, such as mountain warfare.
The Soviet system establishes close direct ties between staff counterparts at
each headquarters up and down the line. Thus, while the commanders are passing
combat orders the staff sections will be in communication discussing their
particular parts of the operation (battle).
Commander's Responsibility and Independence
The commander cannot change his mission without approval from higher
headquarters. In his various reports to headquarters he must state his decision
at the time and may make suggestions for future action, which might include
changes to the original plans. He may change things within his division such as
the allocation of his artillery. He could not change the fire plan of a
supporting army's artillery without first receiving permission from the army
chief of artillery and rocket troops, as such a change might affect the army
plans. The division commander may ask adjacent divisions for permission to send
forces through their zones in a maneuver, but this also should be cleared at
army level. The main thing is that the division commanders (all commanders)
know the CONCEPT OF THE HIGHER COMMANDER and stick to
performing their role in it. As long as he keeps in the framework of the higher
commander he can do as much as he pleases or is required. If communications are
cut, he will continue to follow this concept and be as aggressive as possible
in the situation.
Courses of action available to overcome difficulties include: (l) a call for
help; (2) request artillery or air support; (3) commit reserve; or (4) regroup
forces.
Initiative
How much initiative is allowed to the army commander and staff? The
front commander and staff will let the army commander do what he
wants...as long as the front does not know about it. If the
front staff does know about it, they will usually have an opinion on
how to do it and will say so. If the army suggests doing something the
front did not already know about or specify, the front will
generally say "fine that is the way we would like to do it"; the idea
being to preserve the appearance of the front being in charge and not
let the subordinate think he is getting away with anything.
There is massive mistrust throughout all echelons of the Soviet military just
as there is in civilian society at large. No one trusts anyone in reports;
cheating is expected. No one relies on promised support and, in fact, everyone
is admonished to do their job without expecting, relying on, or receiving
support. Commanders expect that if they do not do things themselves they might
be betrayed. The chief of the political department of each staff, while not
being able to give much advice, will be reporting and will try to ensure
reports are not falsified.
Independent Action
The question frequently raised is, "How much independent action is allowed
to Soviet commanders in making decisions involving changes to plans and would
they really take such action?" The answer lies in a consideration of the
mission. The mission must be accomplished in, by, and at a certain time. Any
initiative on the part of commanders can be supported if it will help achieve
the mission including its time element. If the change is major, and especially
if it involves a different time, the commander will send a representative to
higher headquarters to obtain authorization for the change.
If the army commander wants a change in the plan, he must obtain the permission
of the front commander; and, if the latter wants a change, he must get
TVD or general staff approval, as such a change will involve the higher
headquarters and may force changes in the overall plan. The front
commander alone cannot make such a decision. If the mission is not affected,
then he can make changes, but even then he would have to be very cautious. The
highest credit goes to people who do as ordered despite all obstacles.
There is always a psychological relationship between the commander and his
superior commander. It may be that the higher commander is so dependent on his
staff for making his plans that he cannot easily evaluate the proposal of the
lower commander. Rather than show this, he will let it become clear that he
does not appreciate proposals for changes. Some commanders will do their utmost
to avoid making changes just to appear firm and decisive. Unless the situation
is serious, and the consequences of not changing dangerous, the subordinate
commander would have to know if his boss does in fact like to hear proposals
for changes before he would offer any. Only a commander with a very strong
personality could accept suggestions from subordinates to change.
Headquarters Organization
The Soviets consider the headquarters to contain six basic elements. These are
the commander, the staff, the political section, the special
(counterintelligence) and legal sections, the sections of the chiefs of arms
and services, and the section of the chief of rear services. This organization
is shown in the following table.
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BASIC ELEMENTS OF HEADQUARTERS
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Unit |
Regiment |
Division |
Army |
Front |
Elements |
Commander |
Commander |
Commander |
Commander |
1 |
Staff |
Staff |
Staff |
Staff |
2 |
Political subsection |
Political section |
Political department |
Political directorate |
3 |
Agents of special section |
Special section |
Special section |
Special section |
4 |
Investigators |
Military Prosecutor - Tribunal |
Military Prosecutor - Tribunal |
Military Prosecutor - Tribunal |
5 |
Deputy commanders or chiefs of arms and services |
Deputy commanders or chiefs of arms and services |
Deputy commanders or chiefs of arms and services |
Deputy commanders or chiefs of arms and services |
6 |
Deputy commander for rear service |
Deputy commander for rear service |
Deputy commander for rear service |
Deputy commander for rear service |
Figure 1 Basic elements of headquarters organization
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Command and Lines of Subordination between
Headquarters
The term command is defined by the Soviets as the person or group of persons
exercising direct command control of the troop unit. There is also a secondary
command system for the various special elements of the Soviet headquarters. The
command is the element of the headquarters which not only has primary
responsibility for overall success or failure, but also for direct personal
control of troops during all phases of a combat action and for their training
prior to combat.
At various levels the organization of the command will vary. The following is a
typical command organization for the division and army headquarters. In
addition to the command chain of command there is a special functional chain of
subordination directly between the chiefs of combat arms, special troops, and
services and rear and their counterparts above and below. This dual
subordination plays a key part in the promolgation of orders and instructions
as will be shown in subsequent chapters. This complex arrangement is shown in
Figure 2.
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Figure 2 General form of command and special
subordination
Axis Officers
Axis officers are used as an auxiliary means for troops control and
communication between headquarters. There are two types of axis officer. The
first type, capped "command axis officer" is assigned from higher to
subordinate or adjacent headquarters. The second type, called "axis
officer", is assigned from subordinate or adjacent headquarters to the
liaison group in the higher headquarters.
Command axis officers usually are selected from the operations section of the
higher staff for temporary liaison to the lower headquarters. Their duties
include:
transmitting and explaining to the subordinate staff and commander the orders
and directives of the higher commander; reporting to the higher commander the
current situation and needs of the subordinate unit; observing the decisions
and actions of the subordinate commander and keeping the higher commander
informed concerning these decisions and actions; ensuring proper execution of
the orders of the higher commander by the subordinate units;
Axis officers are selected by the chief of staff from the major staff sections
including operations intelligence communications and usually work as a group
with the higher operations section. Their duties include: reporting to the
higher staff as required the current enemy situation in the subordinate unit's
sector; reporting the tactical situation of the subordinate unit and the
decisions of the unit commander, the chief of staff, and the chief of the
operations section; reporting to the subordinate staff, as directed,
information from the higher staff concerning the enemy situation, tactical
situation, and decisions of the higher commander; sending timely warning to the
axis officer's unit concerning impending missions and ensuring prompt delivery
of all orders and directives from the higher headquarters.
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Command Posts
The Soviets emphasize the extreme importance for the proper functioning of the
headquarters that it be correctly echeloned, arranged, and equipped. The site
must be carefully selected and skillfully camouflaged. Movement from one site
to the next is carefully planned by the staff and prepared for by special
engineer and signal units.
The command post is located in a place convenient for directing subordinate
units during the operation. Generally this means that it must be a convenient
location for establishing reliable wire and radio communications. Another
important feature of the command post area is that it should afford convenient
routes of approach to and from subordinate forces. The command post is located
near the concentration for the main effort. The Soviets emphasize the necessity
for taking advantage of natural camouflage and natural obstacles in locating
the CP. They warn against locating the CP in any readily identifiable area such
as conspicuous hills or crests, edges of woods or in conspicuous clearings or
groves. Often the CP is located on the reverse slope of an elevated area
covered with bushes,
The main components of the command post are the commander's command center, the
operations group, the communications center, and the service group. Depending
upon the terrain, the command post is arranged generally as indicated in figure
--. Dugouts, covered shelter trenches, open trenches, and weapons emplacements
are all used to shelter command post personnel and installations.
The command post operations group is composed of those officers and staff
sections directly concerned with the direction of combat operations. These
include: the commander, deputy commander, chief of staff, operations section,
intelligence section, topographic section, communications section,
cryptographic section, artillery commander and staff, chiefs of arms and
services and staffs, a staff officer from the rear service area, liaison
officers, and the staff duty officer.
The communications center includes the installations and units primarily
concerned with providing communications for the commander and staff with
higher, lower, and adjacent headquarters. The commander of the signal unit is
the director of the communications center. All units servicing the
communications center are subordinate to him and he in turn is subordinate to
the chief of communications at the headquarters. The communications center
includes the radio center, central telephone-telegraph station, landing strip
and air ground communications point, message center, and reserve communications
supplies and personnel.
The Command Post Guard and Defense System
The all around protection of the command post area is provided by organizing a
guard system and a defense system. In combat, the command post is located in an
area which is protected from ground attack by the troops of subordinate units
and from air attack by the unit's air defense units. However, the command post
also plans its own guard and defense systems. This planning is accomplished
mainly by the operations section, and execution of the plan is supervised by
the headquarters commandant. In addition to personnel from the headquarters
commandant unit, staff personnel also participate in the command post defense,
especially in the event of an enemy breakthrough. In this case, the guard and
defense system is often reinforced with small infantry, artillery, and engineer
units.
An important part of the command post administrative organization is the duty
officer system. In order to assure continuity of the command post work, to
provide rest for the command and staff personnel, and to facilitate the sending
and receipt of messages and documents, duty officers are appointed to vital
command post positions every 24 hours. The duty officer system includes the
operations section duty officer, the communications duty officer, and the
message center duty non commissioned officer.
Location of Command Posts
Soviet regulations provide general norms for the location of command posts
under various conditions. Commanders must locate themselves as far forward as
possible in order to exert personal control of the most important combat
actions. The following table indicates the approximate distance from the front
lines to the forward and main command posts and the rear service control point.
These distances are subject to considerable change owing to varying
circumstances in combat. The command posts are displaced in a planned, orderly
manner in order to remain within prescribed normative distances from the
advancing troops. The formula for determining how long a command post may
remain in one location in relation to the rate of advance of the front line is
given in Chapter Six.
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DISTANCE OF COMMAND POST FROM FRONT LINE
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In the attack |
In defense |
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Forward CP |
Main CP |
Rear CP |
Forward CP |
Main CP |
Rear CP |
Regiment |
-- |
4-6 |
12-15 |
2-3 OP |
5-7 |
12-15 |
Division |
4-6 |
10-12 |
30-40 |
6-8 |
12-15 |
30-40 |
Army |
10-15 |
30-50 |
40-60 |
15-20 |
40-60 |
50-70 |
Front |
35-50 |
100-150 |
120-170 |
45-65 |
100-150 |
120-170 |
Figure 3 Locations of command posts
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II. CONSIDERATIONS IN ORGANIZING AND PLANNING
OPERATIONS
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Characteristics of Modern Combat
The Nature of Offensive Battle
The essence of offensive battle is to hit the enemy with heavy fire of all
types of weapons, (including nuclear weapons when used); to attack resolutely
and relentlessly, moving continuously attacking troops into the depth of the
enemy dispositions to seize and destroy his personnel, weapons, and combat
equipment; as well as to capture important areas and lines in the depth of the
enemy defenses.
The Aim and Components of Offensive Battle
The aim of offensive battle is achieved through a combination of heavy fire of
all types of weapons; forceful blows by tank and motorized rifle formations,
units, and subunits to an extended depth in cooperation with the air forces;
use of extensive maneuver of fire, troops, and means on the battlefield; and
aggressive support by radio-electronic combat.
The aim of offensive battle for ground forces is to destroy specific enemy
groupings at a certain time and seize favorable lines and areas in the depth of
the enemy defenses.
The inherent components of offensive action consist of fire, blow, maneuver,
and radio-electronic combat.
Fire provides the possibility to insure the neutralization of the enemy and
provide favorable conditions for the enemy's destruction by a blow of tank and
motorized formations. In a nuclear war the principal element of firepower is
the nuclear strike, while in a conventional war firepower is based on artillery
and air force strikes. It must be noted that a defending enemy can also fire to
destroy the attacking forces by means of fire, therefore an intensive fire duel
ensues during the battle. In order to establish a superiority of fire over the
enemy, the attacking troops can be supported by such an amount of artillery
which will establish a favorable correlation in terms of artillery for the
attacking troops. It must also be noted that the attacking forces, when in the
depth of the enemy area, will have to relocate their artillery more frequently
that the defending troops; therefore, an appropriate superiority of artillery
over the enemy should provide conditions for the establishment of sufficient
artillery support for the attacking troops during all phases of an offensive
battle.
The blow is a combination of fire with the movement of tank and motorized rifle
subunits, which leads to the complete destruction of the enemy or his capture
and seizure of favorable lines in the enemy's defenses. The blow is actually
fire of machine guns, guns, automatic rifles, and other small arms mounted on
tanks, BMP's, APC's, and other vehicles or used during movement in direct
contact with the enemy or used by dismounted infantry during the assault. Its
nature is based on the fact that it is fire on the move in direct contact with
the enemy. In other words a blow is assault or counterassault.
Maneuver provides favorable conditions to launch blows against the enemy and
fire effectively on the enemy. Maneuver enables the troops to get into a
position from which they can effectively attack the enemy or launch a
counterattack or deliver effective fire against the enemy. Maneuver also is
conducted to move the troops quickly during the advance in depth, and to
outflank the enemy dispositions. Maneuver can be conducted by fire, troops, and
means. The principal forms of maneuver at the tactical level are envelopment,
deep envelopment, and penetration.
When the envelopment of the enemy is not feasible, its defenses are attacked
using the penetration method. The role of penetration is to create gaps in the
enemy defenses by destroying its personnel and equipment by fire, to move the
attacking forces through the entire tactical depth of the enemy defenses with
simultaneous expansion of the attack to the flanks, and further development of
the attack to the depth. The action of the troops in a penetration is of the
nature of maneuver. The troops continuously seek gaps and openings in the enemy
dispositions to conduct envelopment, and deep envelopment which will lead to
the encirclement of the enemy grouping.
On the modern battlefield radio-electronic combat constitutes a new dimension
in the basic components of offensive combat. Radio-electronic combat is aimed
at interrupting the enemy command and control and weapons control systems and
to protect friendly systems from enemy reconnaissance, jamming, and
radio-electronic suppression. The following factors contribute to success in
offensive combat: continuous and aggressive reconnaissance;
neutralization of enemy defenses by heavy fire;
swift advance through ruptures and gaps in the enemy defenses;
penetration of defensive lines and crossing of water obstacles in the depth of
the enemy from the line of march;
continuous intensification of the efforts by the second-echelon and reserves
and maneuver by forces and means;
decisive repulsion of counterattacks and relentless pursuit of the retreating
enemy;
quick negotiation or bypass of obstacles and contaminated areas;
continuous maintaining of coordination (interaction);
firm and flexible troop control;
quick restoration of the combat capability of the troops.
The principal difference in offensive combat with the use of nuclear weapons
from combat without their use is the fact that in a nuclear combat the enemy's
defenses are destroyed simultaneously and the action of the troops is
coordinated in a way to quickly exploit the impact or consequences of the use
of nuclear weapons, while in a non-nuclear situation the enemy is destroyed
successively with the action of the troops coordinated with artillery fire and
air strikes.
The Conditions and Form of Initiation of the Attack
The offensive operation is conducted under various kinds of conditions and in
different situations depending on the enemy, terrain, time, season, weather
conditions, and tactical situations. The attack can be conducted against a
deliberate defense or a hasty defense. It can be conducted in an open terrain,
mountains, deserts, etc. It can be launched during the day or at night and in
various seasons and types of weather, such as arctic conditions and tropical
climates. All these conditions will have influences in one way or the other on
the missions of the troops, combat formations and groupings of troops, and
methods of coordination and initiation of the attack.
Generally speaking, the attack can be initiated either from the line of march
or from a position in contact with the enemy. Each of these forms will have
other variations depending on the tactical and operational situation.
Each form has its advantages and disadvantages. For example, the attack from
the line of march, being the principal form for the initiation of the attack in
modern times, provides a surprise blow to the enemy by the movement of the
troops from the depth to concentrate them for a penetration. It also precludes
the concentration of large groupings of forces in close contact with the enemy
for longer periods of time and prevents the enemy's reconnaissance from
locating all targets of the attacking forces well in advance. This also cuts
the volume of engineer work to provide cover for the troops concentrated in
direct contact with the enemy.
The disadvantages are the requirement of sufficient road network for the
movement of all types of troops for the attack during the artillery preparatory
fire period, which may not be available in some mountainous terrain; absence of
conditions for the troops to study in detail the enemy's defenses sufficiently
before the attack; and requirement for strong air cover to protect the troops
during their advance to the assault against enemy air strikes.
While in WWII, when the firepower of the divisions had not sufficiently
developed, the principal part of the attack against a prepared and fortified
enemy defense was from a position in close contact with the enemy and against a
hasty enemy defense was attack from the line of march; the situation has
changed today. Now the improvement and increase in firepower in the division
and the high maneuverability of the troops makes it possible to attack a
prepared and even fortified enemy defense from the line of march. In this case
the troops move from the depth during the artillery preparatory fire to the
assault line; and, while the enemy is suppressed by artillery and air force,
the troops successively deploy into battalion, company, and platoon columns and
finally deploy for the assault and initiate the assault without pause. During
this advance, the line of deployment to battalion columns is selected to be out
of range of the main enemy artillery groupings. The preparatory fire for the
attack normally begins when the troops reach this line. In other words the
distance of this line from the enemy FEBA can be eight to ten kilometers. The
line of deployment into company columns is selected to be out of range of enemy
antitank guided rockets and tanks and guns conducting direct fire. In other
words it is currently three to four kilometers from the FEBA. The full
deployment line (combat line) is selected to be behind the last sheltering
terrain feature or one kilometer from the FEBA. This can also serve as an
assault line in an attack in mounted attack. In dismounted attack the assault
line is selected as close to the enemy as possible and also a line of
dismounting is selected. When the attack from the line of march is conducted
against a prepared defense, the attacking troops will occupy assembly areas to
prepare the attack in areas located out of range of the enemy tactical rockets
and long range artillery. In the course of the offensive operation the
preparation for the attack against a hasty defense line is conducted while the
troops are still moving toward the line, so they can launch their attack
without stopping. In cases when the attack on the move from the depth is not
successful, the attack is done after a brief preparation. This preparatory time
is 2-3 hrs for regiment, and 4-6 hrs for division, during which artillery
preparation is conducted and adjustments in groupings are made, while further
reconnaissance of the enemy is continued.
When the troops move from the depth to attack the enemy prepared defense,
artillery groups, part of the direct fire weapons, part of the air defense
troops, and control points move in advance to the starting (departure) area.
The artillery should be moved early, to be prepared to fire two to three hours
before the beginning of the attack.
The attack from a position in close contact with the enemy can be conducted
either from the defensive positions or after the relief of troops in place. In
the first case a regrouping is required as part of the preparation for the
attack, while in the second situation a relief in place is organized and
conducted prior to the attack. In either case the troops thoroughly study the
enemy defensive dispositions and organize the attack on the ground. In order to
decrease the effects of enemy fire on the troops during the preparation of the
attack, the time of concentration of the troops should be cut and shelters and
cover should be provided in the departure areas for personnel and equipment.
(The various forms for offensive actions are shown in Figure 3).
By the same token attack from the position in close contact with the enemy has
its advantages and disadvantages, which will correspond to the opposite factors
mentioned with respect to the attack from the line of march.
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Figure 4 Forms of offensive action
Terminology of Missions
A squad, platoon, and company have immediate missions and a direction of
attack. A battalion and regiment have immediate and subsequent missions and
direction of attack. A division has immediate and subsequent missions. The army
has immediate and longer range missions. The latter is the final mission of the
army operation. The front has immediate and longer range missions. The
second-echelon has only an immediate mission and a direction of attack.
Types of Support
There are three methods of support by one unit for another. These are: (1)
attachment; (2) direct support; and (3) support.
Attachment
Attachment, or under command, is the closest form of support. The attached unit
comes under the direct command of the unit to which it is assigned and is
treated like an organic unit. The senior commander has full choice on how to
utilize this unit. When a unit is attached, its commander reports to the senior
commander on the situation and capabilities of the unit. The unit is moved
according to the orders of the senior commander. Sometimes (usually not in the
operations order itself but in the coordination instructions) the units are
listed telling when they will be detached and moved to other units. This is
especially true for the commitment of the second-echelon unit. At that time a
number of supporting units will be detached from a first-echelon unit and moved
into the second-echelon with the time and place of the attachment clearly
spelled out. As the second-echelon unit approaches the line of commitment it
receives its new attachments. When a unit is in defense and a counterattack is
planned, the coordination instructions will mention which units are to be
attached. A unit that is attached still receives its rear service support from
the parent unit, but the responsibility for supplies rests with the unit to
which it is attached.
An attached unit can include artillery, tanks, engineers, signal, chemical,
antitank, antiaircraft, etc. A division could have 4 or 5 or more artillery
battalions attached from army, while a regiment in the main attack will have 2
to 3 artillery battalions attached. The headquarters of a division or army
artillery regiment may also be attached to form a headquarters for the
regimental artillery group. The regimental chief of artillery is responsible
for all artillery fire in the regiment command therefore disqualifying him as a
commander for a regimental artillery group (RAG). The RAG is then commanded by
either of the battalion commanders or a headquarters brought in for the
purpose.
Attachment is terminated only by the higher commander who ordered it. There are
certain phase lines at which changes are usual. These include when units pass
to exploitation and pursuit and when first-echelon units revert to reserve or
second-echelon. During the opening phase of a meeting engagement, the advance
guard has attached artillery. When the engagement develops into an attack and
an artillery headquarters is established to control fire, this artillery
reverts to support. During a retreat the artillery is attached until a new
defensive line is established.
Direct Support
Direct support is usually established at a lower echelon than attachment. For
instance, when one or two tank companies are attached to a rifle battalion a
tank company or tank platoons can be placed in direct support of rifle
companies and not attached. That way the battalion commander retains control of
the tank missions. When a tank company is in direct support of a rifle company,
the main decision is made by the rifle company commander, with the tank company
commander supporting him. The tank company also receives its own missions,
which must be coordinated with the rifle company. The tank company may receive
changed missions at any time.
Support
Support is the least confined form and is used more for artillery units. For
instance, out of the regimental artillery group one battalion will be in
support of a first-echelon rifle battalion. The artillery battalion commander
receives his missions from the artillery group commander for fire direction.
The supported rifle battalion can request additional tasks and, if the missions
of the artillery permit it, they will support. Placing the artillery battalion
in support of a specific infantry or tank unit facilitates coordination because
the regimental artillery group cannot coordinate the fire support. The rifle
battalion can go directly to its supporting artillery battalion. The artillery
battalion in support usually sets up its command post close to the command post
of the supported unit. During the artillery preparatory fire the artillery
battalion is tied to the total plan with specific tasks. During this time the
infantry and tanks are moving forward. After the attack commences, the
supporting artillery is free to give more support on call. When an artillery
subunit is in support of a tank or infantry unit, the artillery commander
reports to the other commander on his capabilities, location, status, and his
missions from the artillery group.
During the attack there are three phases for artillery: (1) preparatory fire;
(2) supporting fire; and (3) accompanying fire. Most support for particular
rifle units comes in phase 2 and 3. During the second phase, until the regiment
accomplishes its immediate missions, the artillery does not usually have to
displace. When the attack moves into the enemy depth, beyond the range for
support, then the artillery will move by bounds and relocate to accompany the
infantry or tanks. Being in support means to provide adequate fire during the
development of a mission.
At the battalion level a battery of artillery may support one company. The
battery commander is then in direct communication with the company commander.
The artillery battery commander sets up his own observation post from which he
directs the battery fire.
In an advance guard situation the units of artillery or tanks will be attached
to infantry rather than in support. Also in pursuit and movement to contact or
whenever the infantry unit has an independent mission it is better to attach
the supporting units. For instance, when the infantry is an enveloping force in
the mountains or desert, the artillery will be attached.
Reserves
There are several reserves including the antitank reserve and the mobile
obstacle detachment. There are special reserves such as engineer, signal, and
chemical. The engineer reserves are used for employment in engineer roles, not
for use as infantry.
Combat Dynamics
The Soviet view is that combat is a process, a two-sided dynamic process, which
takes place in a given space and time period and with given inputs. The Soviet
commander's purpose is to control the output or resolution of the process in a
way favorable to himself. The process is a series of actions, reactions, and
counterreactions extending throughout the specified space over the period of
time. The time and space variables are themselves subject to control, as are
the Soviet input and actions. In addition, the Soviet planner and commander
believe it is necessary and possible also to control the inputs and actions of
the opponents, or at the very least to anticipate them and prepare accordingly.
Soviet planners have studied the history of combat actions, conducted
experimental exercises in field maneuvers, and developed a theory which links
the time and space parameters with the forces of the two sides engaged in
combat. The theory forms the basis for structuring the Soviet forces and
deploying them with missions corresponding to their capabilities to defeat the
enemy forces to be encountered in the defined action, and to generate a
momentum in their attack which will grow rather than diminish over time, as the
Soviet force moves deeper into the defender's area.
A unit has a certain capability based on the correlation of its power versus
the opponent. The initial mission is assigned to insure that the superiority of
the force enables it to accomplish the mission in a certain time period.
Analysis is made of the defender's dispositions and possible courses of action.
Basically there are two courses for the defender for the use of the reserve.
One is to hold in place and the other is to counterattack. If the counterattack
is to succeed, then it must be launched at a certain time and place in order to
be effective and must have a certain force available to overcome the attacker.
By careful analysis of the defender's situation the Soviet attacker can predict
the most probable time and place for the potential counterattack.
In the initial attack the battalion attacks the defending company in the
first-echelon of the defending battalion. For this it uses its two
first-echelon companies, which give it a 2 to 1 ratio over the defender. The
attacking battalion can overcome this defending company and move into the depth
of the defending battalion position. Now the defender must decide on committing
the second-echelon company. In order for it to restore the situation it must
attack before the first-echelon company is overrun, otherwise it is too late.
In general the Soviets do not believe a defending battalion can launch a
counterattack with this second-echelon company because there is not enough
time, the space is to small, and the force ratio is adverse to the defender.
The defender is better off keeping this company in position in defense. In any
case the attacking battalion uses its second-echelon company plus the remainder
of the two first-echelon companies to attack the defending second-echelon
company or battalion reserve.
Meanwhile, the adjacent first-echelon battalion of the attacking regiment is
attacking the other first-echelon company of the defending battalion. Thus,
when it also moves into the depth of the battalion defense it also confronts
the same second-echelon company being confronted by the other battalion. Thus
it is clear that the attacking battalions can overcome the defending battalion
and keep up the momentum of their attack to their initial mission depth.
At this time the defender can intervene with a counterattack by the
second-echelon battalion of the defending brigade. This is actually the first
real possibility for counterattack open to the defender. This counterattack
must be launched before the first-echelon defending battalion is overrun. This
counterattack is capable of slowing the momentum of the two attacking
battalions or of stopping one of them.
Therefore, the attacking regiment determines where this counterattack would
logically come and prepares to delay it, or stop it, or overcome it with its
own second-echelon battalion. The attacking regiment plans for the commitment
of its second-echelon battalion at the time and place that will carry the
momentum of the attack further into the defender's depth, to the line of the
subsequent mission of the regiment.
The division establishes its immediate mission at the line which the
first-echelon regiments are capable of attaining unaided. In order to increase
the momentum and achieve its long-range mission, the division plans to commit
its second-echelon regiment at about the time the first-echelon regiments
attain their subsequent mission (division immediate). The division also
recognizes that it is at about this time in the combat that it will most likely
have to contend with the counterattack of the defending division reserves.
The division mission is given on a daily basis. Thus its planning is done for a
day of combat at a time. In accordance with this concept the division daily
plan provides for the full day's actions of the division as it seeks to fulfill
its immediate and long-range missions on time. The division plan gives detailed
immediate and subsequent missions to the first-echelon regiments, which start
the day's fighting, and an immediate mission to the second-echelon regiment,
which is planned for commitment part way through the day. The first-echelon
regimental plans give detailed immediate and subsequent missions for their
first-echelon battalions and an immediate mission to their second-echelon
battalions. All these plans are developed for specified time and space
dimensions within which the Soviets believe they can predict the outcome of the
combat. It should be noted, for example, that the second-echelon regiment does
not give missions to its battalions until later in the day, when the exact
dimensions of its task are more clear. Nor does the initial combat order
contain the missions which the first-echelon battalions of the first-echelon
regiments will receive later in the day, when they have accomplished their part
in the regimental initial attack.
The important concept to understand from this is that, while the division
creates a daily plan and has in this sense a daily decision and planning cycle
geared to produce a new plan for each day, it also is engaged in continuous
decision making and planning throughout the day as it constantly responds to
the requirements of the unfolding battle.
In the Soviet view the division is the highest tactical formation. Its daily
activities are in the realm of tactics. The army and front are
operational formations whose activities constitute the essence of operational
art. Operations of the army are planned and conducted on a larger scale of time
and space than those of the division, but in theory they are structured in a
similar manner. The first-echelon army is given an immediate and a long-range
mission for its first operation, which corresponds to the front
initial (immediate) mission. The missions the first-echelon army will perform
in its second operation, during the achievement of the front further
mission are not given. The second-echelon army is given an immediate mission
corresponding to its line of commitment planned for two to three days into the
front offensive, but not a subsequent mission.
Thus the scale of combat governs the time and space dimensions of the unit's
battle and the duration of its plan. A battalion battle normally lasts for two
to three hours, for which time its probable actions can be forecast. Its plan
accords with this. The regiment battle lasts for five to six hours, during
which its actions can be forecast and planned for. The division battle lasts
for a single day, as does its plan. Armies fight operations lasting 5-7 days
and fronts conduct operations lasting up to 15 days. (The following
tables summarize Soviet norms for missions and expected counterattacks).
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RELATIONSHIP OF MISSIONS
IN TIME AND SPACE
|
UNIT |
WIDTH OF ZONE -
KM |
IMMEDIATE
MISSION |
SUBSEQUENT
MISSION |
DEPTH KM |
TIME HR |
DEPTH KM |
TIME HR |
BATTALION |
1.5 - 2 |
4 - 5 |
2 - 3 |
8 - 10 |
4 - 5 |
REGIMENT |
5 - 10 |
8 - 10 |
4 - 5 |
16 - 20 |
6 - 8 |
DIVISION |
15 - 20 |
16 - 20 |
6 - 8 |
40 - 60 |
DAILY (long range) |
Figure 5 Relation of missions in time and space
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NORMS FOR EXPECTED
COUNTERATTACKS
|
DEFENDING UNIT |
LOCATION OF COUNTERATTACK IN FIRST
LINE |
TIME |
BATTALION |
COMPANY - 1 KM |
1 HR |
BRIGADE |
BATTALION - 2 - 3 KM |
3 HRS |
DIVISION |
BRIGADE - 6 - 7 KM |
4-5 HRS |
CORPS |
DIVISION - 10 - 15 KM |
7-8 HRS |
Figure 6 Counterattacks
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Correlation of Forces and Means
Frontages
The calculated breakthrough frontages for units are 1 km for battalion, 2 km
for regiment, 4 km for division, and 8-10 km for army. The breakthrough sectors
for a front may be twenty-seven to thirty kilometers. The breakthrough
for a front is not the sum of the breakthrough sectors for
first-echelon divisions, since there will be many divisions not operating on
the front's main or secondary axis, which nevertheless have their own
breakthrough sectors.
Norms
Soviet planners have norms for expected rates of advance in various conditions
and for comparing forces in the correlation of forces and means calculations.
Under usual conditions they expect the rate of advance to be 25-30 km the first
day of an offensive for the main axis in a standard defense situation and 60-70
km per day on subsequent days. If the defense is well fortified then the rate
of advance the first day would be 15-20 km and subsequent days 30-50 km. In
order to achieve this they would require a two to three times superiority over
the defender. If the ratio (correlation) of forces and means were only between
1 to 1 and 2 to 1, they would plan conservatively and expect a slower rate of
advance. If the ratio were over 3 to 1, then they might hope for a 40 km
advance on the first day. Since the rate of advance depends on the type of
defense, they might expect a higher rate of advance even at two to one against
a weak or hasty defense. The nationality and training of the forces involved
also is a factor which can be considered in the estimate. The Soviet planner
thinks about the actual situation confronting him in terms of pluses and
minuses from the standard norm for standard conditions and judges accordingly.
If too many minuses show up he becomes very careful and conservative. He would
begin to think about committing the reserves earlier or if the situation
appeared extra favorable, he would think about committing the reserves later.
Soviet planners discuss the qualitative aspect of forces and means when
considering the correlation calculation. By this they mean that correlations
should only be considered between items of like quality. They do not compare
different weapons systems having radically different quality or lump together
items of different quality.
The norms for density of artillery relate to caliber and compare equivalent
weapons. For tanks they calculate the probability of kill for comparable tanks
such as M-60 versus T-55 or how equivalent is a T-62 to a Chieftain etc. When
comparing units they take into consideration the size. If there is a great
difference in size, they multiply by a number that will bring some equivalence
into the equation. For instance they do not compare a company of 100 men with
one of 160 but multiply by a factor to bring the two into relative equality.
Calculations
The extent to which the Soviet commander and staff rely on numerical
calculations to give them a sense of impending failure is often exaggerated in
Western literature. It is true that Soviet officers perform far more numerical
calculations than Western officers would, but they are not rigidly tied to
these. They do not give up just because the numbers appear adverse. Initiative
is emphasized in the Soviet sense, which means determination to overcome
difficulties. Figures do not override judgment or cause collapse of morale. If
the correlation suggests that superiority cannot be gained on a given axis at a
given future time and place, then that is a signal to correct the plan for the
situation. The commander should consider moving in a different direction, using
a different organization or some other method to regain the balance/correlation
calculation that he desires. Even if the correlation of forces indices are not
favorable, the commander must come up with some plan to stop the enemy
counterattacks. While this plan may have to be approved at a higher level, the
Soviets believe that officers who plan in the face of difficulty or do
something even if it turns out wrong later are preferable to those who do not
try to identify any alternatives.
Definition of "Forces and Means" in "Correlation of
Forces and Means"
The term, "forces", refers to the human element in organized combat
units of organized fighting structures of combined arms. Non-combat units,
e.g., engineers, etc., are not counted in the correlation of forces. In
calculations of the correlations at the tactical level, the unit two steps
lower than the command doing the assessment is taken as the unit to be
measured. For instance a division would calculate the correlation of forces of
battalions. At the operational level and strategic level divisions are the
subject of the correlation of forces analysis. All other elements being
correlated are "means". These are the hardware or firepower
generating elements such as numbers of artillery pieces, launchers, nuclear
warheads, aircraft, tanks, etc. (Tables for recording correlation data are
given in chapter 5).
The correlation of forces alone does not show the means. Both are important. To
consider, for instance, only battalions without reference to the type of
weapons they are armed with is to obscure very significant differences. In
particular such specific means as air defense weapons and antitank weapons are
very important. But for the others, specific coefficients are attached to each
type of weapon. These coefficients are based on detailed studies and modeling
of the weapons' characteristics and their contribution to the battlefield, in
particular, the probability of hit ascribed to the weapon.
Correlations between weapon types at the tactical level are based on the
relative number of the weapon required to kill an opposing weapon. For instance
in the attack it may take three antitank weapons of ATGM type to equal one
tank, while in the defense one antitank cannon may equal three tanks.
Thus the correlation of means may be seen as a test to insure that the force
has a proper balance of weapons. The individual means are identified and shown
separately in the correlation tables to demonstrate the existence of this
balance. The correlation shows that the units possess the necessary ratio of
means in each critical category to achieve their mission.
Some examples of tactical level correlations of means are the following: A
RPG-7 has a value of .3 versus a tank. This means that three RPG-7s can stop a
tank and that three will be lost in exchange for a tank. An antitank gun is
equatable to two tanks in position. An ATGM is equal to one tank in the defense
or three tanks that are on the offense.
In this manner standard scores (SUA) for each weapon type and model of weapon
have been developed, normalized on a basic model, such as the T-72 tank. The
various models of tank in opposing forces can be compared. When it comes to
normalizing the different kinds of weapons, such as artillery and tanks, into
one numerical score system Soviet writers express reservations. The issue is
the validity of factors for comensurability. They insist as a minimum, that
such unified scores must not obscure the fact that one weapon can substitute
for another only to a limited degree. Such scores are taken as averages for the
weapons when employed in the context of an all-arms formation. However, in real
combat each battle is a unique and widely differing situation in which average
conditions may not exist.
In addition to using the scores aggregated by class of weapon, Soviet
theoreticians aggregate them for units as a whole to develop composite unit
scores. However, these scores are based on much more than a mere addition of
all the weapons scores. In fact the research data base for the score ascribed
to a U. S. division comprises a small book.
The correlations are determined in tanks, artillery, etc. and at higher levels
by divisions. The infantry and tanks are the main measures. At the tactical
level they count every weapon and use weapon correlation factors to make
comparisons. There are multipliers for each weapon and unit. Weapons in the
open have one coefficient and if dug in another. At a higher level, the
coefficient is applied to division sized units. Some of the coefficients for
quality used in the 1970s are shown in the following table.
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National Unit Coefficient
The following table shows standard Soviet coefficients for comparing NATO
divisions to the Soviet motorized rifle division taken as 1.0.
Figure 7 National unit coefficients
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The most detailed plans that use the exact weapons counts with their
coefficients are done at division level. Lower levels do not have time for such
calculations. These calculations are used when deciding on the location for
commitment of second-echelons and special units such as antitank reserves. When
calculating the ratios for periods later in the combat, previous losses are
considered. In planning the expected casualties are usually figured mostly as a
matter for rear service support questions including medical. The expected norms
vary with the echelon. Some representative estimated norms for casualties are
as follows:
An army in WWII took .1 to .8% losses per day. Now with nuclear weapons losses
will be 3.8 to 5.3% per day.
For nuclear, during the entire army operation losses will be 27 - 42%.
For conventional war losses will be 1.1 to 1.3 % per day.
For the entire operation losses will be 7.7 to 10.4%
Equipment losses in WWII were 8-9% per day, now for nuclear war losses will be
12-15% per day.
For the entire operation tank losses will be 50-80%, APC losses 30-40%, and
vehicles 40-60%.
Of the total losses in personnel the breakdown is as follows: nuclear
casualties 16-18%, conventional weapons 6-7%, chemical wpns 5-6%, biological
wpns 1.5-2%, illnesses 1.5-2%. 30% of the total casualties will be caused by
the initial nuclear strike.
General Purpose for Correlations
Correlations in general are used as a way of determining which side will have
the upper hand, broadly speaking, in the action being studied. (For nuclear
weapons it is much more important to preempt than to have a higher value in a
static correlation. One should accept a major gap in the time phasing of the
operational and strategic components of the initial strike in order to preempt.
Therefore nuclear correlations do not tell as much as conventional
correlations.)
After the correlation is made one can decide if one can accomplish the desired
level of destruction "simultaneously" - that is in a single blow. If
the correlation shows a deficiency, then one must do it
"successively", - that is in a series of sequential strikes. This
method would require careful prioritizing of targets. (One of the most noted
characteristics of the nuclear strike is that it gives the potential for
successful achievement of strategic aims by simultaneous destruction. A
successful NATO nuclear strike is expected to destroy up to 30% of WP forces.)
However, conventional combat will almost certainly require successive attacks.
This is the phenomena which forces the commander to divide the non-nuclear
operation into phases and to focus much attention on proper coordination of the
use of forces and means.
Scope of a Correlation
When correlations are performed, they are done on several variants. This
typically includes correlations for the entire width and depth of the combat
zone, for the entire width and to the depth of the immediate mission,
separately on each axis, and for the time at which major changes in the
situation are expected to occur such as during enemy counterattacks and during
the commitment of the friendly second-echelon. This requires that the commander
not only make a static correlation of the forces as they are believed to exist
prior to the battle, but also that he calculate a dynamic correlation of the
forces that are forecast to exist at the future stages during the battle. The
method for doing this is discussed below. (See correlations tables in Chapter
Five).
As mentioned above, the purpose for calculating the correlation of forces
existing between the friendly and enemy forces in the given situation is to use
this relationship as a tool in making the decision and planning combat. The
calculated correlations are therefore compared with "norms" for
correlations considered necessary in various situations to accomplish various
kinds of combat missions. An element of judgment enters into the commander's
comparison of the actual correlation with the correlations prescribed in the
norms. Some Soviet writers indicate that more analysis and modeling of
historical combat is needed in order to develop more refined norms that would
show the correlation required in various situations or, in reverse, the
capabilities that a given correlation might confer on the attacker.
In any event the Soviet commander knows that there is a definite relationship
between the correlation of forces and the scheme of maneuver and manner for
organization of the battle that will be appropriate in the given conditions. If
the particular scheme of maneuver is the critical factor and the given
correlation indicates that the forces are inadequate, then something must be
done to improve the correlation. If the correlation is fixed due to lack of
additional forces and means, then the commander must adjust his scheme of
maneuver to employ the forces in a manner appropriate to the situation. For
instance, having a very favorable force ratio would enable the attacker to
strike on multiple axes to split the defender into groups and attempt near
simultaneous destruction of all the groups, while simultaneously launching
forces into the exploitation to the full depth of the defense. With a smaller
advantage the attacker might employ only two major attack axes to conduct
converging blows to encircle as much of the defender as possible and then
conduct the further offensive as a subsequent operation. With little or no
superiority in force ratio the attacker would be limited to concentrating all
available forces in one spot in an effort to destroy the enemy piecemeal
(sequentially).
The correlation of forces is only one of the norms the commander uses as tools
during his estimate. Perhaps a more critical one is the norm for density of
artillery. (See discussion of artillery fire planning in Chapters 2 and 5).
The correlation of forces and norm for artillery per kilometer of breakthrough
frontage are applied strictly to the width of the attack zone, which does
include a zone on each side from which defending direct fire weapons may hit
the attacker. But they do not include forces further on the flanks. The
measures match the Soviet echelons against the defending forces to the depth of
the corresponding mission. The overall correlation of forces at higher levels
such as front just shows if an attack can be made. The detailed
correlations are done at lower levels for the widths of the attack sectors. The
correlation method shows the areas in which the enemy is strong and weak and is
used to help determine the form of the attack, such as penetration here or
envelopment there. The specific correlations determine the directions of the
main attack and what forces are needed to achieve the desired ratio.
Correlation of Air Defense
Air defense is a special category of combat, which requires a somewhat
different kind of correlation. For this the correlation is measured in terms of
the percentage of an enemy hypothetical mass strike which can be destroyed by
fire during that strike. Individual air defense weapons also have individual
kill probability numbers. The Strella 2m has a .3; the 57mm gun had a .25; the
ZSU 23-4 had .42. These numbers are based on field tests and experiments.
In a conventional war, air superiority for either side is critical. Without air
superiority then neither side can win. Soviet planners see that they cannot
move their second-echelon forces forward. Air superiority is also essential for
attaining air reconnaissance, rear service, etc. One can not operate in a
conventional war without air superiority. Therefore the correlation of forces
and means for air and air defense is especially vital.
Evaluation of Decision Variants
The central problem facing the commander when seeking to make a decision is
which of the seemingly infinite but actually limited number of possible methods
to employ to achieve the mission. By method we mean how to task organize and
deploy the forces and means he has and what series of actions to order them to
employ. However this problem is complicated by an underlying pre-requisite
problem, namely the commander must first decide how (with what staff
organization and deployment of decision aids and series of assessment actions)
he will go about solving his combat problem.
We do not know the decision process Epaminondes used when he developed the
revolutionary idea of massing his Theban forces 50 ranks deep on the left of
his line instead of the traditional 12 ranks deep on the right of the line, but
it is clear that he faced a very simple set of issues compared to those facing
the modern commander.
To a great extent this underlying issue has been solved for the Soviet
commander by development of a highly organized troop control system and
procedure. Indeed the purpose of this handbook is to describe what this system
is and how the Soviet officer uses it to simplify his decision making problems.
In a sense therefore, the entire focus of the organization and processes
described here is one of helping the commander make this single (but
continuously shifting) decision on how to place and employ his forces and
means. (As Clauzwitz said, "In war everything is simple, but the simple is
actually very complex".
In addition to providing a well practiced decision system, the Soviet army also
provides each commander with much assistance in the form of relatively rigid
boundary conditions and guidelines in the form of the higher commander's
concept of the operation and directives giving clear terrain limits,
objectives, timing, location for the main effort, and other requirements. The
task remaining for the lower commander then is reduced and limited to how best
to maximize the power and effect of his given forces and means to achieve the
required goals. The number of reasonable alternate solutions is limited,
usually three or four at most and the differences between these alternatives is
very small. To illustrate this we can focus on the division level.
Calculation of Probability of Mission Success
Determining the liklihood of mission success is one of the most crucial issues
facing the commander. During his decision and planning process the commander
must not only forcast the liklihood of success of one concept of battle, but
also do this using a method which will allow for objective comparisons of the
liklihood of success between different possible variants of the plan. Soviet
military theorists and writers have proposed various methods for making this
forcast. The first issue is to decide on objective criteria for just what
result of combat will be labled "success". Three separate criteria
have been proposed, which can be evaluated individually. The overall
probability of achieving one, two or all three of these measures can then be
calculated using simple mathematical rules for aggregating probabilities.
The first criteria of success is achievement of the mission, which is generally
stated in terms of seizing a specified line or area within a specified time
limit. This is considered a vital criterion, so that a low probability in this
measure is automatically considered a fatal flaw, no matter how high the
probabilities for the other criteria.
But simply seizing the required line on time is not a sufficient indicator,
because this might be accomplished at such cost that the forces could no longer
advance, or might even be extremely vulnerable to counter-attack. Therefor two
other measures are added.
To maintain a high capability to continue the attack the attacker must have
losses of less than 40% of his force, the defender must have suffered losses
sufficient to destroy his ersistance. This is considered to be greater than 50%
of his strength, and attacker must continue to have supplies. Or even if the
attacker's loss is 40%, then, if the attacker maintains superiority and remains
in good condition overall, and the enemy has lost defense capability, the
attack may continue. The commander can forcast the losses which might occur on
both sides and put this algorithm into the calculation of criteria of
effectiveness. The idea is to campare not merely the mathematical expectancy of
the size of the loss on each side, but rather the losses calculated in the
specific situation at a defined confidence level. The system for comparing
candidate variants must answer four questions:
What is the probability of accomplishing the combat mission; that is reaching a
specified line or area in the depth of the enemy position by a certain time?
What is the probability that losses can be inflicted on the enemy of no less
than ordered, usually (50%)?
What level of confidence can be assured that at the moment the troops reach
this line they will retain their capability to continue the offensive, that is
have losses less than specified (40%)?
What is the probability of accomplising a partial or entire success?
To determine these answers in the course of comparing and selecting variants of
the plan the commander may construct a simple matrix as shown. He then can
apply the formula for calculating the aggregate probability for each variant
and select from among them. This problem and the calculations going into it are
discussed in more detail in Chapter Six. In that chapter are the nomobrams used
for determining the relationships between probabilities of achieving required
rates of advance and casualties and correlations of forces.
The probability of seizing the required line=G.
The probability of inflicting required losses on enemy=Y.
The probability of having less than maximum friendly losses=B.
The probability of accomplishing the entire mission can be expressed as a
confidence level:
P total is PG x PY x PB
Result=1, if Y and G and B are all acheived. It is .5 if Y or B is not
accomplished, but G is achieved. But it is 0 if G is not achieved, even if both
Y and B are.
The value for Y (enemy losses) is determined by the ratio of destroyed units or
forces etc, to the original totals at the time of a complete halt in combat
activities of his command centers and rear area installations.
The value for G is the movement of the front line in relation to the original
and desired locations.
The value for B is the capability of the attacker to continue his advance,
which depends on the ratio of the attacker's forces to the defender's, the
nature of the enemy operations, and the state of the attacker's supplies.
In developing the plan variants the quantitative value of the depth of
penetration, the width of the sector of operations of subordinates, the time
limits of missions are all determined by higher commander, regulations and
experience. But the level of enemy calualties and the desired maintenance of
own capabiltiy are stated qualitatively.
This method requries the commander first to determine the probability and
confidence level that the enemy will suffer losses no less than specified, that
his forces will not sustain losses greater than allowable, and that the mission
line will be seized. The critical level of losses is that which will negate the
force's capability to continue organized combat. Soviet historical studies have
shown that in WW II a division was considered destroyed at 50% loss and
annihilated at 75% loss.
The troops lose their capability to advance and are forced on the defensive,
when they have great losses, or to ward off counter-attack of superior enemy
and when deficient in supplies to continue. At the tactical level sub-units
break off attack when losses relative to start reach 20-40%. Units lose
steadiness in defense at 50-60% losses. On this basis and that of various
studies a loss of 50% is considered adequate for the enemy and too much for the
friendly.
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Example Problem
The division commander receives an order which specifies the nature of the
enemy and terrain, the forces available, the location for starting, the mission
in time and space dimensions, and usually where across the width of his zone to
apply the maximum pressure with the majority of his forces. He has to decide
two main issues. The first is what combat formation to employ. That is, how
many forces to place in the first-echelon and how many in the second, and where
to locate various supporting elements. And the second is what method to employ
in destroying the enemy. That is, what kinds of maneuvers and mix of fire and
shock to employ.
The first key factor to evaluate is the enemy dispositions in relation to the
characteristics of the terrain. He must define as precisely as possible where
the enemy forces are positioned and in what strength, and what are their
capabilities to shift forces (reserves primarily) during the coming battle.
With this information in mind he can examine his alternatives.
For this illustration we have shown on the diagrams three possible variations.
These are not examples of complete Soviet plan maps, but only sketches to
illustrate the points in this discussion. A given condition is that the
division will mount its main attack in a four kilometer wide breakthrough
sector on its far left flank, in conjunction with the neighboring division, as
part of the army main attack. The division commander's first option is to make
this attack with two regiments abreast, each using two battalions in its
first-echelon; use the third regiment in a holding force attack across the
entire rest of the division sector; and keep the fourth regiment in the
second-echelon ready to follow the main attack on the left flank. His second
option is to spread his center regiment out somewhat, while still participating
in the main attack, in order to narrow the frontage for the right flank
regiment. This will enable it to conduct a secondary attack. Some the
calculations required for making the decisions discussed here are shown with
sample problems in Chapter Six.
Evaluation of the correlation of forces in the regimental sectors might show
that the first option will result in an immediate advance rate of forty-five
kilometers per day in the left sector but little advance on the right side
until the defenders there are forced to fall back out of fear of being
outflanked from their right. The result might be great progress at first, but
later the division may have to confront the enemy forces that withdrew from the
right, which could slow down the later advance rate. The second option might
create a correlation of forces in the main attack sector only sufficient to
generate an immediate rate of advance of thirty kilometers per day, but might
simultaneously be able to envelop and destroy a large part of the enemy on the
right side, thus avoiding facing them later. Another factor that the commander
would calculate is the predicted loss rates for the two variations.
So far we have just touched on the simple, initial conditions. The more complex
and crucial issue comes with the analysis of the expected time, location, and
consequences of the intervention of the defender's reserve in counterattack and
the attacker's second-echelon regiment(s). For instance, the nature of the
terrain might be favorable for the defender so that the first variant might
result in such a differential rate of advance on the left and right flanks that
the defender would have a prime opportunity to counterattack into the flank of
the main attack.
Analysis of these options might lead to consideration of a third option, namely
to start out as for number one, but as the defender begins his counterattack
into the right flank of the main attack regiments, bring the second-echelon
regiment forward through the right flank regiment instead of behind the left
ones, in order to strike the defender's counterattack in turn in the flank. So
far we have discussed only the locations and actions for the four regiments.
The division also has artillery and antitank units and others to position
correctly.
From this simple analysis it is clear that the division commander actually
faces a complex problem in making his decision and can use all the analytical
support he can obtain. For this he uses the mathematics and norms described in
this handbook. He forecasts the answers to such questions as how long will it
take for specific forces on either side to move from A to B? How long will it
take staffs and units to accomplish various preparatory actions? What will be
the ratio of combat power of the sides when they get there? What will those
ratios produce in terms of losses and further movement capabilities? What will
the contribution of artillery, antitank, antiair, engineers, and other units
be?
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Figure 9- Division attack option one
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Figure 10 Division attack option two
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Figure 11 Division attack option three
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Skip-Echelon Planning
The Soviet staff uses skip-echelon planning, in fact at the division level
plans not only take into consideration the regiments but also individual
battalions. These are shown on the planning maps. The mission given by army to
division states what enemy should be destroyed, where, and by when. When the
commander wants to see something done in a certain way he includes this,
otherwise he leaves that part of the planning for his subordinate to decide.
For instance, if the army plans for a breakthrough attack of a certain width,
say 8 kilometers, this will require that two adjacent divisions each weigh
their own attacks to have at least 4 kilometers on their interior flanks. The
divisions are not given a choice on how to organize their attacks, but told
where their regiments will be located so as to create the desired massing
effect. Directives from army to division are quite specific. Divisions must
destroy a certain enemy by a certain time and seize a certain line. There are
plans for an immediate mission, subsequent mission, and a direction of further
attack. On a rare occasion against a particularly strong defense it might be
necessary for the army to have one axis of say twelve kilometers width. This
could be created by placing one division in the center on four kilometers width
with no maneuvering room and weighing the attacks of the two flanking divisions
on the four kilometer zone to each side, but this would be very unusual.
Normally the army uses 2 - 3 divisions to create the main axis and another
division to create a secondary attack axis elsewhere.
Division Missions
Normally in conventional war the first-echelon division is given immediate and
long-range missions, which are executed in one day. The second-echelon division
is given usually only an immediate mission and a direction of attack, while it
remains in the second-echelon. It is difficult to plan a subsequent mission for
the second-echelon division before the start of hostilities.
The immediate mission of the first-echelon regiment is to push the enemy back
to a depth of 8-10 km, usually in about 4-5 hrs. The regiment's subsequent
mission and division's immediate mission is 16-20 km in 6-8 hrs. The long-range
mission of the division is to destroy the defending corps reserves, either in
position or while they are counterattacking. If the enemy is in a
counterattack, it will take longer to destroy him because he must first be
stopped, enveloped, and then destroyed. If the enemy is defending in position,
he is then attacked from the march. In that case the defending reserves will be
at a depth of sixteen to twenty kilometers, requiring some time for the
attackers to move between the first and subsequent missions. When possible,
units revert to pre-combat formations to increase speed. This means the units
two echelons lower are deployed in column formation. (i.e., a pre-combat
formation for regiment is battalion columns.)
For nuclear war everything is faster. The long-range mission of the division is
done by the end of the day, while trying to accomplish one of the following:
occupy the entire depth of the defender's division area and seize favorable
terrain features to facilitate the next day's advance; maintain a good line on
which to repel the enemy corps level counterattack; seize an area from which to
secure the commitment of the attacking second-echelon divisions; or seize a
mountain pass or river line.
There are several forms for the attack. Often tactical airborne (heliborne)
forces are utilized to accomplish the long-range mission. The tactical
desant by helicopter-born forces is usually the size of a company or
battalion. A naval amphibious landing may also be used. The idea is to
forestall the defense from using suitable terrain to establish a prepared
defense. At this point the division switches to the pursuit mode on a broad
front on parallel routes with wide use of tactical helicopters. Its mission
changes from seizing ground to destroying forces. Pockets of resistance that
are encountered are left to following forces for removal.
During the attack, timing is based on coordinating the covering artillery fire
with the movement of the combat units to the enemy FEBA positions. The combat
forces must arrive at the enemy line just as the artillery fire is completed.
If the artillery is planned to fire 40 min, then the question is where should
the combat troops be at the start of the 40 minutes in order to arrive on time.
They will move forward, gradually deploying from regimental to battalion to
company to platoon columns and then into line at predetermined calculated
areas. The final deployment is just beyond the defender's small arms range. If
there is a covered area that can be reached while the artillery is still
firing, combat forces might be able to get as close as 300 meters from the
enemy, otherwise the usual distance is about 1 kilometer. (These calculations
are in chapter 6).
Depending on the form of attack, the artillery may deploy ahead of time in
order to complete registration and begin firing before the combat troops move
forward.
Planning Horizon for Division
The division plans only consist of the depth for a one day mission. The staff
may have some general outline of the next day's plans, if the army commander
has informed the division commander, otherwise they will receive their orders
later in the day. The staff will develop plans continuously as the attack goes
on and data comes in. The combat mission has four elements: (1) Destroy a
specified group of enemy; (2) seize a line for favorable conditions; (3)
assignment of deadlines for conducting the mission; and (4) how the mission
should be executed. Elements (1) and (2) are mandatory while (3) and (4) are
usual. During a battle constant changes occur in the situation. The
requirements posed by the enemy forces, and the available means to react affect
the operations.
For example, the division should seize the line of the immediate mission in six
to eight hours. The division knows how the mission is progressing if the
first-echelon regiments commit their second-echelons when they are at 8-10 km
depth and 4-5 hrs into the battle. This gives the division a good idea at H +
4-5 hrs on how the accomplishment of its mission will be doing at H + 6-8. This
gives two to three hours for making changes as necessary based on the
evaluation of the regiment's progress. The process of acquiring information and
making the assessments is continuous and gradual. Once the first-echelon
regiments have committed their second-echelons the play of the game is in the
hands of the division commander. He has the only remaining uncommitted forces
with which to influence the outcome. He must be able to react to the situation
(he has the power to react, i.e., his second-echelon). Therefore he has two to
three hours to accomplish changes if needed. Meanwhile the division staff is
looking ahead to the rest of the day's activities. During the afternoon the
staff will begin serious study of the following day's possible missions.
Depending if the army instructions arrive early, the division can plan the next
day's mission in detail, but this is generally not the case. When first-echelon
regiments are about to finish their subsequent missions, they will then be
committed to new missions or revert to the second-echelon of the division.
Estimate of Division-Level Decision Time
An estimate of time required to make new decisions at the division-level
follows:
(1) Mission clarification - fifteen to twenty minutes;
(2) Estimate of situation - 2-3 hrs or 1 hr if necessary;
(3) Terrain reconnaissance - 2-3 hrs, visiting 2 positions;
(4) Formulating a decision - thirty minutes to one hour;
(5) Issuing orders - forty-five minutes to one hour by a conference of
commanders;
(6) Organizing coordination - could be done at same conference for issuing
orders or two hours at a second conference. This could also be done on a map or
on the ground.
(7) Changes requiring new decisions and plans will require at least two to
three hours especially if they involve a major regrouping of forces.
Commander Budgets Time
Soviet officers are trained to develop the habit of planning and budgeting time
upon receipt of a given missions. Consistent with this the commander's first
step after acquainting himself with the contents of the order is to budget his
time. Normally this is just a mental process, but, depending upon the
complexity of the missions, the commander may jot down a rough schedule of
events. Although this budgeting of time has no prescribed form to be followed,
Soviet staff literature depicts the following as typical of the commander's
time considerations:
The combat directive specifies that the attack (movement) is to be ready by ___
time and date.
Subordinate commander will need ___hours to prepare for the given operation;
My reconnaissance will take ___ hours;
The briefings will take ___hours;
My conclusions:
preliminary tactical instructions must be sent to ___(name) at ___ locations by
___ time.
briefings must be presented to me at __- location by ___ time;
I will need ___ hours to evaluate the mission, to estimate the situation, and
to prepare my preliminary tactical decision;
I will conduct my reconnaissance from ___ to ___ time;
I will issue my operation order to ___, at___ location, at ___ time;
The remaining time___ I will hold in reserve.
Decision Timeliness
Planning, like battle, is continuous. There are no identifiable separate
decision cycles, since everything needs to flow gradually. However, the
critical time in a battle is when the commander is about to commit his
second-echelon. When the troops are moving to contact the enemy, the artillery
will also be moving. The second-echelon unit is more difficult to hit, but also
more vulnerable, as it begins to deploy into subunit columns. The Soviets place
great emphasis on "securing" the commitment of the second-echelon.
The closer to the Soviet planned time of commitment the unit can be attacked by
NATO forces the worse off the attacker will be, since that will shorten the
time available for the commander to create alternate plans. Another critical
time is just prior to the launching of the attack. Again, at this time the
first-echelon units will be deploying from large columns into subunit columns.
If they are hit far back from the line of commitment, they will have time to
implement alternate plans.
Rear service targets must also be considered and protected. The regiment will
run out of ammunition and POL within a few hours into the offensive. It is
expected that the first-echelon division rear service containing the
ammunition, medical, and POL supplies will move 3 or 4 times a day, resupplying
the forward regiments every 3 or 4 hrs in normal combat. If, however, the
regiments were cut off from their rear service, division would be forced to
resupply by air.
The planned time of attack is critical. The commander must plan a preparation
fire to begin countering NATO's artillery thirty to forty minutes before the
attacking forces reach the line of commitment. The artillery will move prior to
this time in order to concentrate fire. A NATO artillery attack on the
advancing units during the final period would cause serious disruption to the
attack. The commander emphasizes a last minute concentration and then rapid
dispersion during the attack. He must employ all available means for
maskirovka. If the defender can trace the movement of the small units
and plot ahead of time their movement routes to predict the time and place of
an expected attack, then they may be hit at a very vulnerable moment.
Division EEI
The divisions, regiments, and battalions are interested in receiving
information necessary to the depth of their missions including:
Frontage of enemy elements that are in the first- and second-echelons,
dispositions, layout of the defense, boundaries, flanks, non-occupied areas,
location of firing positions of artillery, deployment of reserves (especially
tanks); and when, where, and for what purpose they can be used at their line of
deployment and directions of their counterattack.
Availability and disposition of mass-destruction weapons and the likelihood of
their employment.
Location of control points.
The details for positions down to platoon and company positions with exact
locations of individual crew served weapons. Details differ with the depth, but
most detail is for the depth of the first-echelon battalion defensive
positions, for this platoon level is needed.
Depending on the actual situation, the contents of EEI can be different,
however there are certain things that should always be looked for which
include:
indications of deployment of nuclear delivery means;
changes in enemy situation in terms of committed forces, reserves, artillery,
etc.;
any large movements (troop movements), deployments etc.;
identification of enemy units (from prisoners, insignia on dead soldiers,
documents etc.);
location of command posts and communication centers radars etc.
Sources of EEI
The division receives situation reports from its regiments every one to two
hours. At the same time there are reconnaissance troops forward of the lead
regiments. These troops come from battalions, regiments, and the division
itself. All of these units are reporting constantly as they move forward. The
division staff monitors the radio nets of subordinate units, such as the
artillery, engineers, etc. From these conversations bits of information are
constantly collected. There are four division radio net systems: (l) the
command; (2) the interaction; (3) the warning; and (4) the rear service net
systems. The staff logs in all the information received. Every report of an
event, is noted and placed on the operations maps. Staff officers keep
situation working maps on which everything is marked (by the end of the day the
map is hard to read with all the notations on it). All these reports may prompt
requests by the division staff for specific bits of information.
In addition to the regular combat situation reports from lower echelon maneuver
units, artillery, engineers, etc., there are air reconnaissance reports
(regular missions and specially requested missions). There are also combat and
long-range patrols and officer reconnaissance reports (in critical situations
the commander sends as his personal representative, a trusted staff officer,
who makes a personal reconnaissance of the critical area and reports directly
to the commander). Other sources of information include:
reports from ground observation posts;
higher echelon and adjacent units;
radio and radio electronic reconnaissance;
reconnaissance in force;
From the beginning of an operation the time needed to process the data is
continuous. When major changes occur in the situation the information is
governed by how much time is needed to implement a new decision, such as the
commitment of second-echelon to repel a counterattack, etc.
Air Reconnaissance
The division commander has no direct command over air reconnaissance or other
air missions. His request is placed with the air combat control group that is
attached to his headquarters. Prior to an operation, the front air
army will assign a combat control group to each first-echelon division, which
usually operates beside the division operations staff. These teams consists of
officers and men with appropriate communications vehicles. The division is the
lowest level to which these teams are assigned.
The team reports to the division commander with a formal report about the
support he has been assigned. This includes the reaction times for various
aircraft, their types, capabilities, location of airfields, how many of each
are operational, and other data. The report starts with a description of the
forces and their status, then continues with suggestions on their uses first in
the initial phase and then in the subsequent phases of the operation. The team
tells the division commander about reconnaissance resources and procedures for
both fixed wing and helicopters. Since the helicopters are closer to the
front, their reaction time is shorter, and probably they will be
available for direct, "real time" reporting. The division has its own
helicopters as well.
Fixed wing aircraft take longer to perform reconnaissance. Once over their
target, however, they can send direct radio messages about conditions in the
area. These reports will be followed by written and photographic reports after
the flight. The request for reconnaissance from the division commander goes
from the supporting air support group leader to the commander of the supporting
air force, with front staff monitoring. The commander of the air force
then assigns the mission to a particular unit.
Estimate of the Situation
Elements of the commander's estimate of the situation include:
enemy strength (composition, status, deployment, weak points, density per
kilometer of front, intentions);
own forces (disposition, status, losses, time to react, correlation of troops
and means);
adjacent forces (units operating on flanks, and the units and means of higher
echelons operating in the area of own forces) (situation, mission,
coordination, how do they affect the operation of own forces);
terrain;
radioactive situation;
the political situation in the area of operations.
Critical variables include:
subordinate's missions in time and space;
subordinate's capabilities in concrete terms;
means to react (second-echelons, reserves);
enemy movements;
change in enemy's estimated intentions;
changes caused by nuclear weapons or by air strikes and artillery.
Courses of action in unforeseen circumstances include:
commitment of reserves (troops, antitank and special reserves);
request for support from higher headquarters;
early commitment of second-echelon;
adjustment of subordinates' missions;
request for air support;
change of plan.
Division Plans and Orders
Division plans, like army plans etc., are kept at the command posts. Copies are
provided to higher headquarters, but are not sent down to subordinates. The
plans are not disseminated. Subordinates learn of their roles and missions
through combat orders, instructions, or by visiting headquarters and making
notes about their part in the operation directly from the plans or maps.
(Samples of all of these are in chapter 5).
Changes in Plan
The plan is based on a specific situation. Any major changes in the situation
will require changes in the plan. Once the operation commences, if a new
situation that was unexpected by the division staff occurs, then they must
review the plan and change it to coincide with the situation. For instance, the
enemy was able to mobilize more forces sooner than expected. This will change
the correlation of forces in some area and require changes in their
dispositions.
The time to process information varies also. If the enemy is moving, the staff
first calculates the time of arrival and the probable intentions of the enemy
force. It then calculates how this arrival will change the situation and what
will be necessary to defeat the enemy's action. This calculation would give the
time available for planning and execution. If there is not enough time to give
a desirable plan then some other response will be tried, however, only
adjustments that are possible will be attempted. (These calculations are shown
in chapter 6). The commander will ask the reconnaissance officer to obtain
information dependent on the time available. The reconnaissance officer will
then try to obtain the best information he can in the given time. He will then
report not only that information, but also his own assessment of the situation
based on the total of all the information he has received.
The length of time to obtain information depends on the type that is needed.
For instance it might take two hours to obtain a response to a request for
aerial reconnaissance, if the aircraft is not already in the air. However, if
the aircraft is already in flight it might take only thirty to forty minutes.
In general, requests for information are to confirm bits of intelligence that
have been received. Matching information from several sources to confirm an
enemy's rear areas might take one to two hours, but if it is beyond the
division's immediate area, it could take longer. The commander will not wait
for the information when making his decision, if there is no time. He will use
the best information he has available and make a decision at the proper time,
then continuously adjust it, if necessary, as new information comes in.
The commander will not sit by until he has "perfect" information on
which to base his decision, the initial data he receives will support a fairly
accurate decision. All data received after that is used to adjust the original
decision. The Soviets expect things to change during the course of a combat
situation. The staff continuously monitors the situation and reports the new
information as it is received. After a few hours into the situation the
commander may decide that his initial plan is no longer applicable and will
make the necessary changes to the plan. The time this may occur cannot be
specified in a single number. Specific scenarios might be developed to estimate
the length of time a Soviet staff might need to react to concrete examples of
sudden changes, such as nuclear strikes or unexpected strikes on the
second-echelon. In general, it should be realized that most changes in a combat
situation are gradual and continuous. The recognition that change is actually
necessary requires an unusual new reaction on the part of the commander and is
a gradual perception rather than a sudden revelation.
Considerations Related to Disruption, Changes, and Initiative
The original plan developed in peacetime will have attempted to foresee all
possible contingencies and to allow sufficient flexibility in execution to
accommodate unforeseeable situations. The actual plan as amended will have
accounted for some of the previously unforseen contingencies. It will allow for
the possibility of further changes during execution as the situation develops.
Disruption
Events that might disrupt a division in an attack might include a strike on the
second echelon-regiment that is moving toward its planned commitment line. If,
for instance, such a strike came two hours prior to the planned time of
commitment, then the Soviet commander would do a series of calculations based
on the dynamic nature of the battle to try and foresee what the successive and
cumulative changes would be because of the delay to his second-echelon regiment
in relation to the movement of the enemy's reserves. This analysis would hinge
on a comparison of the time and space factors for the various forces moving on
the battlefield. The echelon system is designed this way on purpose to give the
commander this flexibility.
A regiment should be able to accomplish its immediate mission of 8-10 km depth
in 4-5 hrs or a subsequent mission of 16-20 km depth in 6-8 hrs. If the
second-echelon regiment is knocked out after one hour into the battle, then
division should change the first-echelon regiments' subsequent missions, even
though the immediate mission was accomplished, due to the lack of support from
the second-echelon regiment. With no support from the second-echelon it might
take the first-echelon more than 6-8 hrs to proceed on their own, possibly
taking as much as 12 hrs to accomplish the division mission. The question will
be, what changes will occur during this time due to the projected actions of
the enemy forces moving in counterattacks from their current locations.
The time to acquire information during a battle depends on what information is
received. It takes no time to confirm the presence of a defending first-echelon
battalion, but to confirm the locations of the defenders' deeper reserves takes
a little more time. Within an hour of the start of reconnaissance the attacking
force should know the exact location of all the enemy first-echelon platoon
firing points. Locating the enemy's division reserves might require four to
five hours. Even though the FEBA is under direct observation by observation
posts, etc., deep locations such as the division reserves require aerial
reconnaissance, EW, deep patrols, or information from higher headquarters.
What triggers a decision by the division commander to change the plan during
operations? The answer lies in the recognition that the current plan will no
longer succeed because:
subordinates can no longer do their mission in the planned time and space;
subordinates capabilities have changed seriously because they are spread out or
engaged in heavy battles with strong points that should have been bypassed;
loss of a key second-echelon force;
enemy movements show the potential arrival of a major force at a time and place
not foreseen and for which current forces have not the power to cope;
change in the intentions of the enemy. He is now seen to be preparing a
different kind of response than expected; and
nuclear weapons are used or there are heavy air strikes.
The division commander and staff calculate the ratios of tanks and antitank
weapons at each location on the battlefield. These calculations (which include
the application of appropriate factors) are used to allocate forces, shift
reserves, add more ATGM weapons, etc. Everything is calculated in terms of time
and space, with the times for forces of both sides to move to the projected
areas of confrontation carefully evaluated. If the current projection shows a
lack of necessary forces within a given number of hours, then changes must be
considered. It is important to note that, if the Soviet staff is doing its job,
they will not need to make a decision in response to something that has
suddenly happened. Rather, they will make changes due to their forecast
(projection) that something previously unplanned is about to happen.
The division commander and staff are continually updating the projected
correlation of forces expected to occur at various phase lines, such as the
planned commitment of the second-echelon and the various expected lines for an
enemy counterattack. If something unfavorable is foreseen, immediate steps will
be taken to alter the correlation by changing the plan in the least disruptive
way. These new predictions will be passed to the commander. According to most
norms, a three to one ratio will be required for the attacking forces at the
critical phase lines. If this ratio is down to two to one during part of the
battle or on part of the field, it may still be acceptable. However anything
below a projected two to one ratio will trigger some sort of revision.
Calculations for smaller regions on the battlefield are also made. In a smaller
area, if the ratio becomes unfavorable, it might not cause too much concern, as
forces from an adjacent region can be maneuvered in to overcome this adverse
ratio. However, if the correlation is unfavorable within a large sector, i.e.,
within the complete sector of a regiment (from division headquarter's point of
view) then major troop shifts will be required. Some measures that are
carefully monitored include:
the correlation of forces;
the times on or off the planned mission achievement schedule (even a half hour
delay might be critical, if it allows a dynamic defense the opportunity to make
a movement that will forestall something.);
the casualties occurring have an effect in terms of the calculation of
subsequent correlations;
the limitations imposed by higher headquarters (such as how something must be
done or the posture forces are supposed to be in at a certain time and place in
order to fulfill the higher headquarters' concept of the operation).
Enemy Counterattacks
If the Soviet forces are hit by enemy counterattacks before they reach their
line of planned deployment, the situation is treated as a meeting engagement.
It is this type of situation which is greatly emphasized in Soviet training as
it is the most likely to occur. (The times and locations for expected
defender's acounter-attackes are shown in the table above.) In a meeting
engagement the advance party of the regiment will attempt to pin the enemy
force down. The main body then executes a maneuver to the flank in order to
deploy into the line of battle and attack the enemy's flank. Soviet training
stresses that the successful unit must rely on three elements:
overcome the enemy immediately by opening artillery fire first (the one who
starts artillery fire first can take the initiative);
overcome the enemy by deploying first;
overwhelm the enemy at the start of the actual attack by striking first.
Thus, the meeting engagement is a matter of speed and rapid reaction. The
defender will be at a disadvantage during this meeting engagement, between his
counterattacking forces and the attacker's second-echelon. The defender's
artillery is to far too the rear. The attacker has his artillery close and
under better control. The commander must recognize that at the moment of an
initial contact a large fraction of his artillery will be on the march and not
deployed for fire. The defender's artillery on the other hand will be deployed.
The only solution to this is for the attacker's artillery to deploy immediately
in place, regardless of the suitability of the terrain and begin fire under
decentralized command, by battery if necessary. After the situation stabilizes
the regimental and division artillery groups will be reestablished. If the
second-echelon unit is hit prior to its full deployment, it will be supported
by all available artillery from the adjacent first-echelon units.
Unexpected Contingencies
If the first-echelon units accomplish their initial missions and are advancing
when it becomes apparent that the second-echelon regiment is delayed and will
not arrive in time to take on the defender`s reserves according to plan, the
first-echelon would continue to move forward and engage the reserves while
trying to create favorable conditions for the commitment of the second-echelon
when it does arrive.
The question of tactical versus operational disruption and the methods to
counter it is very complicated and difficult to explain or compare. For
example, at the army level the scope of operations in time and space is so
large that there are reserves available to overcome local failures. If an
entire division is knocked out of combat and the army plan is disrupted, there
are reserves and special assets that the front might use to overcome
the adversity. In general, the Soviet idea is to do something to prevent the
defender from exploiting the situation with a successful counterattack. This
will usually mean delaying his counterattacking forces as they move forward.
Inserting an airborne force in front of them to cause a delay might be one way.
Large air strikes might also be used. This idea would be used to prevent an
adverse change in the correlation of forces at the front line. If one
division is hit, perhaps an adjacent division may maneuver to secure a line to
facilitate the recovery of the first division. One cannot consider one division
without considering the entire army and in turn the front as well.
Soviet units will not hesitate to call on higher headquarters for assistance.
The correlation of forces is calculated continuously during the battle for
several different sets of forces: (1) along the entire division front;
(2) for each regimental front; and (3) along projected lines for
expected counterattacks and for commitment of the second-echelon. Calculations
are made for various depths on each line, such as depth of the enemy's
first-echelon brigade, the enemy's division reserves, the entire depth of the
attacking division's mission, and regimental axes at various depths. These
calculations are used for predicting future outcomes and to alert the staff to
an impending crisis in time to take steps to overcome adversity by maneuvering
forces and fire power.
Rear Services
The relation of rear services to the unit's missions is another important
consideration. The norm is for the first-echelon of the division's rear service
to move frequently. The second-echelon of the division's rear service moves
only 1 or 2 times a day. The division's rear service can deliver supplies to
the battalions, gun positions or to the regiment's rear service. Delivery
directly to battalions occurs more frequently prior to an operation.
In general, when the first-echelon battalions have achieved their immediate
mission they are resupplied by the regiment. The regiment is then replenished
by the division. By the time the regiment achieves its immediate mission (that
is the subsequent mission of the first-echelon battalions) the process is
repeated, i.e., regiment resupplies the battalion and division replenishes the
regiment. Consumption of ammunition should decrease for the remainder of the
day but POL might increase.
When the regiment accomplishes its subsequent mission for the day only one more
resupply from division will be needed (i.e., near the end of the day). However,
during the course of day the rear service will start being used for evacuating
casualties as the division aid stations and medical battalions start to fill up
requiring evacuation to the army hospital.
Maskirovka Plan
The maskirovka (deception and concealment) plan is one of five documents under
the general heading of combat support. After the operations directorate has a
basic plan, a maskirovka plan is prepared to insure coordination of
deception measures. The maskirovka plan is strictly subordinate to the
mission and dependent on it. In addition to the operations directorate the
engineer, chemical, signal, and radio electronic warfare directorates play a
role in developing a maskirovka plan.
The instructions for a mission issued by a commander to his subordinates might
include some instruction on maskirovka along with the other support
topics. Basic measures to be taken and what forces will be employed in
executing this plan may be specified. In this respect the most critical period
is during the concentration of forces prior to the attack. In an estimate of
the situation the subject of maskirovka would most likely enter into
the study when considering the effect the terrain would have on concealment and
what conditions might enhance this. This would include decisions to move at
night and the development of engineer measures.
Assembly Areas
Important considerations for the Soviet commander are the criteria, norms, and
other factors which govern the location (distance from the FEBA) and the size
of assembly areas for his second-echelon forces
Definitions:
Assembly area is a general western term. The Soviet commander is more precise.
There are several Soviet terms relating to assembly areas of various kinds. The
most important are the following:
ISKHODNYY RAYON
The Soviet dictionary of basic military terms states that this means attack
position. "An area of terrain allocated to troops for occupation by them
prior to going over to the attack from a position of close contact with the
enemy. An attack position is prepared in accordance with the concept of the
operation and the operational formation of the attacking troops and is
organized in the engineering sense so as to conceal their presence, to
facilitate their deployment and transition to the attack, and to protect them
from all weapons at the enemy's disposal."
The term today really means a starting position, that is: the position from
which the troops move out, whatever their type of movement or march. It might
be located near or far from the enemy depending on the method for initiation of
combat. In this definition the Iskhodnyy Rayon may or may not also be
a Vyzhidatel'nyy Rayon.
VYZHIDATEL'NYY RAYON (assembly area).
The dictionary states that it is "an area of terrain occupied by troops
before going over to the offensive. All measures associated with preparation
for the offensive are taken in the assembly area. An assembly area must provide
good conditions for concealment against ground, air and radar observation by
the enemy, and must afford the troops protection against weapons of
mass-destruction."
The term refers to the "forming-up area or FUP" which is a
"waiting area" which is the final area in which troops wait prior to
commitment to combat. It is the area typically associated with the final
waiting area occupied by a first-echelon unit prior to combat, if such an area
is occupied at all. The preferred method now is for the unit to enter combat
straight from the approach march, in which case no final forming-up area is
occupied.
It may also be the final waiting area of a second-echelon company, battalion or
regiment in which the unit is formed in company columns and in which it makes
final preparations while awaiting the first-echelon unit to accomplish its
mission. However, in general this area is not always designated in any special
terms. In fact, during the course of an operation the units are generally on
the move, even second-echelon units, and therefore do not "occupy"
areas, but rather just stop periodically in their battalion or company columns.
The second-echelon regiment will be deployed into battalion columns, which may
or may not be further deployed into company columns at this stage of the
advance. The last assembly area "occupied" by the unit may be the
concentration area.
SOSREDOTOCHENIYE RAYON (concentration area)
The military dictionary does not define this term, however
sosredotocheniye means concentration.
This area is the concentration area located in the depth of the forces' own
area in which a unit concentrates while receiving a further mission. It may be
the area near the garrison to which a unit moves on alert or the area in which
a unit assembles after a rail movement.
ZAPASNYY RAYON
The dictionary defines the term as "alternate region or position"
"A zone or sector of the terrain prepared or designated for the
disposition of troops or for defense. It is used for changing the grouping of
troops with a view to withdrawing them from the area of an enemy nuclear
strike, or for attaining greater stability in a defense."
The general sequence of occupation of these areas is illustrated in Figure 3.
The sequence depends on the method for initiation of combat. The methods for
initiation of combat are shown in chart 2. It formerly was Soviet practice to
move from garrison to a concentration area, then to move forward and occupy a
forming up area. In recent years Soviet practice includes movement into combat
straight from the march from concentration areas in the deep rear or even
directly from garrison. Now the Soviet practice is to initiate combat always
from the line of march unless that is not possible. Reznichenko states that it
is now too dangerous to concentrate troops due to the much greater capabilities
of the defender for maneuver and fire. He specifically mentions not only
nuclear, but also conventional artillery and especially "smart"
weapons, which the Soviets call reconnaissance-strike complexes.
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Figure 12 Movement from Garrison
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Criteria for Location of Second-Echelon Units
The Soviet force when deployed for combat but waiting in a second-echelon for
commitment to battle attempts to remain outside the range of certain classes of
enemy weapon systems rather than enemy units per se. While the first-echelon
battalion is achieving its initial mission, the second-echelon battalion of the
first-echelon regiment will be in an area located just out of range of the
defender's antitank guided rockets, direct fire artillery, tank guns, and some
of the indirect fire artillery. While the first-echelon regiment is
accomplishing its initial mission the second-echelon regiment remains in an
area outside the defender's artillery fire. The second-echelon division will be
located outside the range of the defender's tactical nuclear artillery and
rockets. A second-echelon army could be many hundreds of kilometers from the
front line on D-Day, and will move forward in order to be 200-300 km
from the current FEBA when it is 2 days away from planned commitment.
While the first-echelon battalion is accomplishing its immediate and subsequent
missions, that is the regiment's immediate mission, the second-echelon
battalion of the first-echelon regiment will be located in an area about 30
minutes from its line of commitment. The area is 6-8 km from the FEBA and the
battalion may be there for 2-3 hrs, which is the time it takes the
first-echelon battalion to accomplish the immediate mission. (This is the time
and distance associated with the new and deeper Soviet depth of initial
mission. Of course the second-echelon battalion may shift around from one
location to another during this period. Since the battalion is already
organized into company columns it is difficult to say that it
"occupies" the area.
During the 6-8 hrs it takes the first-echelon regiment to accomplish its
immediate and subsequent missions, that is the division immediate mission, the
second-echelon regiment is waiting 10-12 km from the moving FEBA and not more
than 1 hr travel time from its planned line of commitment. It is deployed into
battalion columns and does not occupy an area.
If the method for initiation of combat is from the march, the first-echelon
division will itself be fifty to sixty kilometers away from the enemy positions
prior to the start of its final approach march. The first-echelon, like the
second, will attempt to remain outside the range of the enemy tactical nuclear
rockets, artillery, and ground reconnaissance while it is preparing for combat,
especially during the period prior to the initiation of hostilities.
The second-echelon division is located less than an overnight march away from
its line of commitment just prior to commitment. This used to be 40-60 km but
now could be as much as 120 km from the location of the current FEBA. The
distance is based on the concept of making the final approach in a twelve hour
period at night with the final six hours being needed for deployment into
combat. During preceding days it may be much further away. However the
governing consideration for the distance of the second-echelon division from
the front line will not be the time it takes to travel the intervening
distance but rather the requirement to be within the army's assigned area.
Since the army rear boundary is only 120 km from the FEBA the division would be
expected to be within this. The division could be 200-300 km away until 24 hrs
prior to commitment if it was from front or another army and was just
joining the first-echelon army. By that time (the final 24 hrs) it has moved to
within 120 km away and into an assembly area in which it has been task
organized.
There is not a single time line used in all situations. The decision is given
to the second-echelon units at the same time it is given to first-echelon.
Therefore the two echelons will have differing times between receiving orders
and commitment into combat. The second-echelon has very much more time to
prepare. As the combat situation develops decisions will be adjusted constantly
in a continuous process. Therefore some units will receive orders quite close
to their commitment times. Some units may move into waiting areas and some may
not.
The criteria for distance of waiting areas from the FEBA are given in both the
classified 1966 and the unclassified 1984 versions of Reznichenko's
Tactics.
The principal factor governing location and size of assembly areas of whatever
type is the requirements of the task to be performed by the unit. Conducting
war is a matter of taking risks, therefore whatever risks are unavoidable will
be taken to accomplish the mission. If the unit is close there is the risk that
it will be subjected to more attrition from fire strikes.
Among the other considerations which must be taken into account are the
tactical risks involved in being too far. If the unit is too far from the
combat area it has increased risk of being late to arrive. The further away it
is the longer it will be subjected to attrition producing attacks from enemy
air and artillery while on the final march.
There are norms for the size of battalion, regiment, and division assembly
areas of the FUP (see previous section on Assembly Areas) type. However there
are no such standards for concentration areas. The unit in a concentration area
is not tactically deployed but administratively deployed even in wartime.
Therefore in the concentration area the entire division may not be in a single
area. The regiment and battalion may be located along rail lines, in a long
rectangular form or it may be in a oval form concealed in a woods etc. The
point is that since it is not about to perform some tactical mission in which
readiness time is a key factor it does not need to be concentrated in a
tactically disposed manner.
The factors governing the degree of dispersion are also given by Reznichenko.
In the 1984 version on page 51 of the translation appears the following:
"While guided by this principle [concentration] it should be borne in mind
that in modern combat there exists a constant threat of the employment of
nuclear weapons by the enemy. This gives rise to the need to disperse troops
and adopt measures aimed at reducing losses when the enemy launches nuclear
strikes. For this reason, the need to disperse personnel and equipment should
be taken into consideration when massing them.
The degree of dispersion depends on the tasks to be performed, the distance
separating friendly forces from the enemy, the protective features of the
terrain, and the capabilities of command and control assets. It must provide
for the timely concentration of efforts and rapid dispersal of personnel and
equipment along the front and in depth after the combat task has been
performed."
The Soviet view is that there is a dialectical conflict between the pro's and
con's of each factor. The principle of dispersion conflicts with the
requirements for adequate command and control, the task to be performed, the
limitations on the size of unit area set by higher headquarters, the
capabilities for logistic support, the terrain requirements, and the nature of
the enemy threat.
The Soviet combat arms (motorized rifle or tank) battalion in a FUP (waiting)
area is dispersed in a rectangular area about 2 by 3 km or up to 6 sq. This
size allows the battalion to keep together so that when the battalion is
ordered to move forward it can establish the columns in thirty minutes. If the
battalion were dispersed over a greater distance, then whenever it was to move
it would take more time to reassemble and form up. This in turn would effect
the regiment's move and require regroupment prior to commitment to combat or
deployment into a meeting engagement. Such delay might allow the enemy to
outmaneuver the Soviet unit or overtake it (preempt it) in reaching critical
locations.
The Soviet battalion in this waiting area is actually formed into separate
company columns. The companies do not disperse, but remain in company column of
vehicles while the personnel disperse to some degree around their vehicles.
There is no norm for the space between the companies. The space between
vehicles is ten meters.
The internal communications means within the battalion and its other
administrative support means for tactical coordination require that the
battalion should be in an area of not more that three to four kilometers from
one flank to the other. Further dispersal would increase the time spent in
conveying messages and reduce unit cohesion.
There are four maneuver battalions, one antitank battery and one artillery
battalion in a regiment. All the remaining combat units are grouped around the
regimental headquarters. In addition the regimental rear service base will be
established in another battalion sized area in the regimental area. This makes
eight assembly areas for the regiment. With the battalions each in 6 sq km and
with 3 km between each battalion sized unit the regiment occupies an area of
90-150 sq km.
At the division level there are four maneuver regiments plus the artillery
regiment, rocket battalion, antitank battalion, reconnaissance battalion, and
independent tank battalion. The signal battalion, engineer battalion and other
combat support units are generally dispersed and attached into the combat
units. The division rear also has several battalion sized installations for
medical, transport, supply, maintenance and support activities. The division
occupies an area of 500-600 sq km when in a forward FUP or waiting area or when
deployed in the first-echelon on a frontage of 20 km by depth of 30 km.
The degree of dispersion between unit assembly areas is established by the
senior commander and depends on the same factors that govern the dispersion
within the assembly area. These are given by Reznichenko as follows:
task to be performed;
terrain considerations;
engineer preparation of the area;
troop control capabilities.
The Soviet main effort for unit dispersal for protection against enemy weapons
is the space between battalions. This distance is now three to kw to five
kilometers. Formerly it was two to three kilometers. This is the security
measure against enemy tactical nuclear rockets and is established on the basis
of enemy five and ten ks warheads. The idea is that one warhead can destroy no
more than one Soviet battalion. The same three to five kilometer space is
established between battalions on the march. This is also the standard norm for
distance between battalions in defensive positions.
There is no norm governing the amount of occupied versus unoccupied areas
within unit assembly areas. However, mathematical calculations can be made. If
we take the battalion area to be 6 sq km and the minimum distance on any side
between battalion areas to be 2-3 km, then it appears that the battalions
occupy about 35% of the total space required for deployment of the entire
division and 65% of the area is taken by the spaces between the battalions.
This is for a division that is located in a true "waiting area"
within 120 km of the FEBA. (By this we mean a division in the first-echelon
army.)
It must be recognized that division concentration areas in which they form
either directly from garrison or after moving forward into the theater of
operations, but which are still deep in the rear, can be very large, perhaps
1,000-2,000 sq km if one counts the area of the spaces between the regiments.
It would be most likely that the division's regiments would be located in
entirely separate areas, since they are moving from separated garrison
locations. It is not until the division moves forward into the combat zone that
it is concentrated into its tactically organized structure. There is no
standard size for the division when so far to the rear. Some divisions may be
concentrated in areas no larger than when at the front, 500-600 sq km.
The battalion area has already expanded to the maximum feasible for current
technical signal means and tactical concepts. Therefore it will be difficult to
expand it in response to the advent of smart, deep attack weapons, in the NATO
arsenal. With improved communications means the battalion possibly might be
expanded by 1 km to 3 by 4. The distances between battalions might be expanded
somewhat, say to four to five kilometers. However at those distances the
regiment would have a frontage of 10 km and the division would occupy an area
of 25 by 30. This would require an additional one hour for the regiment and two
hours for the division to concentrate to move forward. This might be acceptable
during the initial phase of war, prior to the actual start of hostilities, but
during combat even 30 minutes can be crucial. With the division assembly areas
spread over the entire width of the division sector concentration for a
breakthrough would be more time consuming as well.
A better possible solution would be to keep the distances the same and provide
additional preparation of the positions to protect the troops. Soviet theory
insists on and stresses protection for the troops from enemy weapons of
mass-destruction in assembly areas. The deep attack weapons are classified by
the Soviets as mass-destruction weapons. Soviet engineers might manage to
create prefabricated materials for use as rapidly constructed shelters in these
areas. Another option would be to occupy the areas earlier and stay longer in
order to have time to create adequate protection. Soviet norms give six hours
as the time needed to prepare adequate protection. Or the areas might be
occupied later and for shorter times with periodic shifts in area to reduce the
likelihood of detection and targeting.
Use of Second-Echelons and Reserves
The difference between a second-echelon and a reserve is a second-echelon unit
receives its specific mission from the initial plan, knows its objective, line
of commitment, direction of attack, and timing. The reserve does not receive
such a mission from the initial plan. The second-echelon mission can be used to
continue the attack, to reinforce a mission, to prevent a counterattack, etc.
The reserve is used for unforseen missions. The second-echelon is usually
one-quarter or one-third of a force, while a reserve is one ninth or perhaps
one sixth of a force. Generally there cannot be a second-echelon and a
combined-arms reserve at the same time except under certain circumstances. The
second-echelon follows the first-echelon closely and is ready for commitment at
a designated line. It moves in pre-combat formation. The reserve moves from
assembly area to assembly area, not in pre-combat formation.
According to the latest tactics, a battalion now attacks in one echelon with a
reserve of one platoon. For formations (up to a division) during an operation a
second-echelon can be committed however, a new second-echelon cannot be
recreated. For those circumstances a reserve is often established. A regiment
can have one company in reserve while a division reserve will consist of one or
two battalions. A reserve receives its mission just before commitment. A unit
may have a second-echelon and reserve such as in mountains where the
second-echelon is on the main axis and a reserve is on the supporting axis. A
reserve may also be provided for rear area security and to keep LOC open.
During the planning phase of an offensive, variations are studied and compared
using mathematical methods. These variations are based on forecasting different
likely enemy reactions to a plan of attack. The study of these variations are
given priorities according to the following:
different enemy counterpreparation fire possibilities;
different counterattacks - according to various courses open for enemy reserves
at each echelon;
movement of the enemy reserve - variations from the planned amount of delay
that is to be accomplished, such as destruction of bridges and routes.
The variations examine different situations that will occur if the reserve
arrives at different times. For instance, it may be planned to hit a reserve en
route with fighter bomber strikes and inflict a 10-15% casualty creating a
delay of 30 minutes (this is the standard norm for the effect of a fighter
bomber squadron against a battalion on the march). Just in case the flights may
not succeed and the enemy arrives first at the original line of commitment, a
plan must be established for a second line of commitment to be used.
The effect of enemy scattered mines, nuclear weapons, rockets, and chemical
weapons are all variations to be evaluated.
Use of airborne landing and air assault landing forces by the enemy at
different places and times must be considered.
If the line of communication is destroyed by an enemy action and a reserve
cannot arrive at its line of commitment on time (for instance on the second day
of the offensive when it might be planned for a division to have moved from 400
km in the rear), what would the consequences be?
What would happen if the local population took up arms or if they jammed the
roads?
Timing the Commitment of the Second-Echelon
The second-echelon is committed at a certain time and place according to how
the commander expects the battle will develop. Changing the commitment time
from early to late depends on the following capabilities:
The first-echelon's and the enemy's reactions.
If the first-echelon is successful and is advancing better and/or faster than
planned then the division will hold the second-echelon and commit it at a later
time. There would be no reason to endanger the second-echelon to casualties or
giving up the flexibility in holding it uncommitted if the first-echelon can
run the gambit alone.
If the first-echelon is moving fast and has opened up a new axis, then it might
be advisable to commit the second-echelon to this new area.
If the first-echelon is unsuccessful, then division might have to commit the
second-echelon early to retrieve the situation.
If the enemy defenses are weaker, then commitment of the second-echelon would
be at a later time.
If the results of artillery and air are more devastating to the defender than
expected, then commitment of the second-echelon will be later.
If a nuclear strike destroys the enemy, keep the second-echelon uncommitted but
kept moving forward in columns.
Commitment of the First- and Second-Echelon Armies
Essential Character of the Decision
One of the most fundamental issues resolved by the front commander in
his decision for offensive action is the deployment of his armies into
echelons. He must decide whether to deploy the front into two echelons
of armies or one. (While three echelons is a theoretical possibility, it is not
a practical likelihood within the Western TVD's current first-echelon
fronts. However, when one considers the manner in which the Soviet
strategic second-echelon of armies coming from the USSR will arrive in East
Germany, one could consider that some of these could be reassigned to a
first-echelon front in effect giving it a third-echelon army.)
Before describing the issues and factors included in the front
commander's decision on deployment into echelons it is well to review the
Soviet concept of echeloning to examine the purpose Soviet theoreticians and
commanders have in mind in structuring a force into multiple echelons.
In essence the purpose is to create a combat troop deployment structure which
will enable the attacker to bring fresh forces to bear against the defender's
fresh reserves as they are encountered throughout the depth of his country
while always maintaining an increasingly favorable correlation of forces. The
intended result is to increase the tempo and momentum of attack and achieve a
high rate of advance. This achievement is a necessary part of the Soviet
concept of the "Deep operation" which was first enunciated in the
1920's and developed in the 1930's. The deep operation is defined in the Soviet
Military Encyclopedia {vol 2, p. 574} as
"the simultaneous suppression of the enemy defense by attrition throughout
its whole depth, by breakthrough of the tactical zone of defense on selected
axes, with the subsequent rapid development of tactical success into
operational success by means of committing to the engagement exploitation
echelons and the landing of air assaults for the most rapid attainment of the
set aim."
The group of decisions on how, when, and where to commit the first- and
second-echelon armies is actually the essence of the decision for the operation
itself. Commitment of the first-echelon is the basic action which initiates the
operation as a whole. It is designed to accomplish the initial mission which
itself is the critically important phase of the action.
The use of a second-echelon army is related to the enemy defense. It is
expected to counter and overcome enemy strategic reserves found in his deep
rear areas about the 6th day of the operation. Changes on the enemy disposition
or introduction of fresh strategic reserves would alter the specifics of its
actions but not the role of the second-echelon.
The Soviet concept of the second-echelon is that it is a force created and
committed to increase the momentum of attack in its subsequent phases. The use
of second-echelons is entirely related to the structure of the enemy defense.
Summary of Soviet Thinking
The basis for the commander's decision is found in the directive his
headquarters receives from its higher headquarters and in the information on
enemy and friendly forces and environmental conditions contained in the
headquarters staff's data bank. (See Chapter 4 for further discussion of
front planning). The directive from higher headquarters establishes
the following parameters:
Space width - the front zone of responsibility;
depth - the location of immediate and subsequent missions;
Time starting time of the operation;
date for completion of the mission;
Enemy general assessment of enemy capability and intentions;
Friendly front composition, attachments and support, adjacent units
etc.
Additional information on the enemy and friendly resources and the
environmental conditions is available in the headquarters database.
On the basis of this information the commander first "Clarifies the
mission", the Soviet term for the thought process in which the commander
gains a full understanding and appreciation of the overall situation and his
place in it. In this process the commander thoroughly analyzes the senior
commander's "Concept of the operation". This gives him a clear idea
of what must be done. He determines two things: the role that the
front will play in achieving this concept and the scope of the mission
in depth, width and timing. From this he makes a deduction in which he
determines the best way to accomplish the mission, in other words HOW it must
be done. This determination includes deciding on the direction of the main and
other attacks, (the general direction of the main attack will be specified in
the received directive), the operational echelonment to employ and the
groupings of the armies.
The decision on operational echelonment and grouping establishes first of all
how many echelons are required and then how many and which armies will be in
the first-echelon and how many and which in the second-echelon. The basis for
this decision is the commander's calculation of the depth and width of the
front mission, the time to achieve these and the required rate of
advance, (all of which are specified in the received directive). This
information is matched against the general layout and nature of the enemy's
defense system and his intentions and capabilities. From these calculations he
derives his general idea of the number of armies required and their echelonment
and formation.
It is clear that the front commander's "decision" is
actually preordained in large measure by the content of the directive he
receives from his superior. The higher commander and staff are planning the
overall strategic operation on the basis of the same information and conception
of the nature of combat as held by the front commander. In their
calculations they will have already determined that the front has the
necessary resources to accomplish the mission and will in fact have designed
and assigned it on that basis. The front commander's major influence
is felt in his development of details such as the selection of which armies
will be in each echelon and where exactly their army boundaries will be and
when exactly they will accomplish the many steps required to initiate combat.
Issues Addressed in the Decision
In making his decision about the proper echeloning of his armies the
front commander will reach conclusions on the following component
issues:
A. Need The requirement for structuring the force into echelons is the first
issue. The basic issue is should the force be deployed in one or two echelons.
This means in practice, "is a second-echelon needed or not?"
Otherwise the forces will all be deployed in the first and only echelon. The
nature of the combat grouping is a fundamental consideration which in turn
affects all other issues.
B. Size The size of the first-echelon, that is the number of armies that will
be required to accomplish the mission is the next issue to be addressed. How
large the first- and second-echelons should be to accomplish their missions is
fundamental. This inevitably results in an assessment of trade offs since
ideally both echelons should be as large as possible. A study of this question
will have been done in peacetime by the general staff when it determined the
number of armies to assign to the front. The decision involves a
number of mathematical calculations. (Discussed in Chapter 4).
C. Composition The allocation of front assets in terms of the number
of divisions and other units assigned to each army and the distribution of
artillery and air to each army must be addressed. Which actual units will be
assigned to each army is also decided. Mathematical calculations and analysis
are required for all of these issues.
D. Location The armies must be assigned specific sectors in accordance with an
overall scheme of maneuver designed to achieve the objectives set for the
front operation. The locations for assembly areas, starting areas,
lines of commitment, lines for intermediate and subsequent missions and other
actions must be established. These too require calculations.
E. Timing The exact time for starting and accomplishing each mission and for
occupying each location must be specified.
F. Security The entire force must be secured against enemy air and ground
attack at each stage of its activities, especially when in assembly areas, on
the march and at the time of commitment into combat.
G. Deception The organization and movement of first-echelon units should be
done in such a way as to enhance the effectiveness of the overall deception
plan.
H. Support The Soviet conception of support is very specific. It includes
protection against weapons of mass-destruction, engineer, chemical,
reconnaissance, deception, hydrometeorological and topogeodetic support; all of
which must be carefully coordinated.
I. Coordination The requirement for coordinating the combat actions of all
elements to insure maximum total effectiveness must be considered in making the
decision on establishing echelons.
Factors Considered when Making the Decision
When the commander considers these issues in reaching his decision on
establishing echelons he is influenced by the following factors:
A. Nature of the war The war will be conducted under the threat of the use of
nuclear weapons in any case, but if it is planned to begin with an
"initial nuclear strike" rather than with the use only of
conventional weapons the use of first- and second-echelon armies will be quite
different. Changes in roles will affect the specific responses given to each of
the issues listed above.
B. Timing of the war - Mobilization versus surprise If the war will begin
suddenly with relatively little prior buildup instead of after a long period of
increasing tension will make a major difference in the requirement for first-
and second-echelon forces. It may be that the necessity for exploiting surprise
in a sudden war dictates that all available forces be committed in the
first-echelon, with none either available or needed for a second-echelon.
C. The aim and concept of the strategic operation This will be the governing
consideration for the front commander as he "clarifies his
mission" and then makes his decisions. Of course the higher commander will
have already considered the nature and timing of the war in his own decision
which is passed to front in terms of a directive.
D. The role and place of the front This governs the specific content
of the front plan, which in turn establishes the tasks to be assigned
to first- and second-echelons. It too will be prescribed by the higher
commander.
E. The front missions The commitment of first- and second-echelon
armies are tied to the immediate and subsequent missions given the
front in the directive from higher headquarters. Hence this factor
will determine the location and timing of these commitments.
F. The nature of the enemy defense The offensive plan is closely related to the
nature of the defense. If the enemy is planned to be engaged in a meeting
engagement the formation will be quite different from that required for a
breakthrough operation of prepared positions. Furthermore the size and strength
of the enemy force influences the location and structure of the attacker's
forces. The depth of defense and size of reserves is a critical element
influencing the creation of a second-echelon.
G. Location, dimensions of assigned area, and nature of terrain All these
factors influence the decision on organizing the first- and second-echelons.
H. The status of the enemy and friendly forces The correlation of forces is an
important tool used in deciding on the nature of the offensive plan.
Discussion of Nuclear Planning
The view the Soviets have for war in the future includes the potential dangers
and possible problems the Warsaw Pact could create. These problems are so great
they feel they must win a war quickly or things might go from bad to worse.
They need a quick solution as they are not assured of the loyalty of the Warsaw
Pact peoples. If they cannot win a non-nuclear war quickly they expect to use
nuclear weapons.
The Soviets do discuss a conventional war, but even in this case they insist
that a plan for nuclear war be ready because the war could become nuclear at
any time. During a conventional phase the forces must not only be constantly
ready to go nuclear but also be deployed in a posture capable of absorbing a
nuclear strike.
A nuclear war if started initially, or whenever launched, would have a
strategic strike conducted by strategic forces, not the fronts, which
means it will come from submarines, long-range aviation, strategic rocket
forces and space weapons. This will be followed by an operational/tactical
strike conducted by the fronts. The operational strike will be as
close to being simultaneous as possible, but a strategic strike will inevitably
come first. This is because the strategic weapons are always at a higher state
of readiness and can be launched quicker. Because of the need to preserve
secrecy, the fronts will not be notified ahead of time. Moreover, if
they did notify front headquarters, the operational weapons would have
to be setup for firing, which may be seen easily, giving away secrecy. Also,
the targets of the strategic strike are deeper and more fixed. The targets of
operational weapons are mobile and the weapons used would need time to setup.
Therefore operational weapons would follow trying to minimize the gap. The
demarcation line between strategic and operational targets was about 250 km
deep in the 1970s and is most likely deeper now.
The Soviet authorities define activities of divisions and below as tactics, of
armies and fronts as operations, and above the front as
strategic. The theater is controlled by the general staff. The strategic forces
may be allocated in part to the theater and military districts. The plan of war
is made at the general staff level and only a few selected people participate
in it. They plan all the strategic operations. Even the Warsaw Pact countries
do not know the entire plan. The general staff decides on contingencies and
makes plans for them ahead of time. The concept of preparation of a TVD for war
includes the provisions that all economic plans must be coordinated and
approved by the military to insure that all economic activity furthers this
preparation.
For nuclear planning the front generally has 400-500 aircraft plus
rockets available which gives it about 250-300 nuclear delivery means for an
initial strike. This is enough fire power to knock out 10 divisions, all
command posts within the division, air headquarters, all nuclear delivery
means, and tactical aircraft, etc. No matter how the war may start it is
planned as if nuclear weapons will be used. During peacetime weapons are
preselected and areas are planned for concentration of these weapons. The
missions for different units and the targets to be hit are also selected. They
assume the areas of concentration for the NATO units. These target plans are
made and sealed and already in the safe.
For the operational weapons the targets are nearer than 250 km from the
front. Plans are based on the targets actually in existence. There are
four categories:
nuclear delivery means, airfields, rockets and nuclear storage;
command posts and communications links and the civilian control system
(political decision making system);
industrial base targets serving military;
garrisons of troops.
For mobile targets specific categories and priorities are planned, but the
details are worked out after the envelope is opened. There are two types of
envelopes passed down to the regiment level. One has a red ribbon and one a
blue. On declaration of combat readiness # 2 they open the blue envelope, and
at full combat readiness #1 they open the red. These envelopes contain other
envelopes for later reading on signal. The front envelope is not at
army headquarters. It is worked out with the army's help and sealed elsewhere.
How does the front develop the nuclear fire plan? The plan of combat
readiness is part of the operational plan. The units leave the garrison to go
to a specified area for the plan of operation. All nuclear weapons disperse.
There are two assumptions available:
the plan of operation for prewar;
the plan of operation during actual war.
Reconnaissance has wide direction. Whatever information anyone has is sent to
higher and lower headquarters. Each commander has an EEI and a directive on
reconnaissance that specifies times to report. Reconnaissance assets are
allocated by priority, with most of the higher categories of targets being in
the enemy command and control area.
The nuclear fire plan is drawn up by the operations directorate, the chief of
rocket troops and artillery, and the chief of staff of the air army, under the
direct supervision of the front chief of staff. According to
calculations, all aircraft should be in the air during a nuclear strike period.
Once the aircraft leave their airfields the element of surprise is gone.
Launching the fighter aircraft may create a problem, since they are needed to
repel the enemy massive air strike. This requires much careful planning. In a
nuclear strike the critical priority on the first strike is speed, on the
second strike the priority is accuracy, so detailed reconnaissance is not as
important for the initial strike.
The strategic strike may be launched before or after the front has
deployed. If the decision to strike is made at this stage, the gap between the
strategic and operational strikes may be closed easily. However the
front also has a deadline to use its weapons in the given plan as they
become ready and as targets are located. In this case the front does
not launch one massive strike, but follows the strategic strike with a series
of weapons being fired. If the front is deployed, it can use all its
weapons at once. The role of the front strike is secondary to the
strategic strike in any case. If the front does not have one part in
support of the strategic strike, then they use their weapons when they are
ready.
Control of escalation is a major problem. The manuals reject all ideas of
limited use of nuclear weapons.
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