SOVIET VOROSHILOV ACADEMY LECTURES

preserving the morale and political condition of the forces and raising their combat readiness to accomplish missions;

constantly collecting, analyzing, and organizing situation data in order to understand the intention and concept of the enemy; (on the basis of observing and analyzing all indications of the situation the commander can understand the intention and the concept of the enemy command);

making a timely decision for the operation;

issuing combat instructions to the subordinate forces;

planning the operation (combat);

establishing the troop control system including command posts and communications system;

guiding and directing the preparation of the forces for the accomplishment of the combat missions;

organizing and preserving timely, constant interaction;

establishing all-around support of combat actions;

controlling troops during the operation;

providing monitoring of mission fulfillment and rendering assistance to the subordinate forces.

one man command and responsibility;

centralized control of all levels with attention also to giving the maximum possible initiative to subordinates for fulfillment of various missions;

stubborn persistence, activeness, and energy in putting the decision into practice, ie. executing it;

agility and ability to react to changes in the situation;

continuity and secrecy.

Vigilance and activeness of control - In contemporary conditions the high maneuver capability of forces has increased and the combat situation quickly changes. The rapidity shortens the time element. The struggle to gain time in order to overtake the enemy in conduct of actions has a deciding influence on the outcome of the battle. Therefore special attention on the part of the control organs must be paid to the need for activeness and vigilance.
The expansion of the volume of troop control and requirement for resourcefulness - The capabilities, qualifications, and extensive experience of commander and staff in making rational and correct decisions, quickly issuing missions to subordinates, and taking the best measures with the aim of all around support of the operations (battle) are important requirements.

Higher combat readiness of command-posts and troop control system at all levels (echelons) - The timely preparation and deployment of a strong control system starts at front and goes down to the company and platoon levels. Higher combat readiness is required of all control points and all signal systems and systems of data collection. They must scientifically analyze data and issue deductions about situation data quickly and correctly.

Reliability (continuity) of control of forces - This is provided by thorough awareness and correct understanding of the situation on the part of the commander and staff, by their capability for forecasting likely changes in the situation; by insuring reliable and continuous communications with subordinates; for timely relocation of control points moving forward with the forces; and by constant exchange of data among the staff and higher and lower forces.

Firmness (strength) and strong control of forces - This is making the decision and putting it into practice with the aim of fulfilling the given mission. This requires great perseverance, high morale, exactitude, and strength of commander and staff in executing the decision and a strong will in the face of difficulties. It is shown by the constant influence of the commander and staff over their subordinates and forces, by their rendering assistance to subordinates for accomplishing missions, and by inspecting the execution of missions.

Flexibility of control - This is insured by the great capability of the commander and staff in quickly influencing newly arising situations and in their making alterations in previously made decisions or making new decisions in answer to new situations. They also constantly inspect the execution of the assigned mission. The commander and staff must collect new data on the situation, analyze it, and quickly and correctly respond to the situation by taking needed measures.

Centralized troop control - This is unity of the actions of subordinate forces and concentration of their actions according to a unified plan, in order to achieve the general objective of the operation (battle) as defined by the higher commander. Various types of forces and different kinds of combat equipment participate in combat actions spread over a large region. This demands unity and centralized control and concentration of all arms and means with the aim of accomplishing the general mission.

Initiative - One of the characteristics of contemporary combat and operations is increased capability for rapid maneuver of forces and quick changes in the situation. This requires great initiative of the subordinate commander to continue the operation in the absence of communications with the higher commander. (Don't reproach the person who can't destroy the enemy but reproach the man who is afraid to take responsibility in the required moment and fails to use all his forces and means and capabilities for destruction of the enemy and fulfilling the mission.)

Secrecy of troop control - Expansion of the enemy's detection and reconnaissance means requires (demands) strong observation and attention to taking measures for secrecy. Secrecy of troop control is achieved by the following measures:
----- Strictly observing security.
maskirovka----- Observing measures for and secret location for control points.
----- Observing rules for protection of secrecy on the part of individuals who work in the troop control system.
----- Limiting the number of individuals who are called on to participate in preparation and planning of operations (battle).

transmitting and explaining to the subordinate staff and commander the orders and directives of the higher commander;

reporting to the higher commander the current situation and needs of the subordinate unit;

observing the decisions and actions of the subordinate commander and keeping the higher commander informed concerning these decisions and actions;

insuring proper execution of the orders of the higher commander by the subordinate units.

reporting to the higher staff as required the current enemy situation in the subordinate unit's sector;

reporting the tactical situation of the subordinate unit and the decisions of the unit commander, the chief of staff, and the chief of the operations section;

reporting to the subordinate staff, as directed, information from the higher staff concerning the enemy situation, tactical situation, and decisions of the higher commander;

sending timely warning to the axis officer's unit concerning impending missions and insuring prompt delivery of all orders and directives from the higher headquarters.

continuous and aggressive reconnaissance;

neutralization of enemy defenses by heavy fire;

swift advance through ruptures and gaps in the enemy defenses;

penetration of defensive lines and crossing of water obstacles in the depth of the enemy from the line of march;

continuous intensification of the efforts by the second-echelon and reserves and maneuver by forces and means;

decisive repulsion of counterattacks and relentless pursuit of the retreating enemy;

quick negotiation or bypass of obstacles and contaminated areas;

continuous maintaining of coordination (interaction);

firm and flexible troop control;

quick restoration of the combat capability of the troops.

attachment;

direct support;

support.

preparatory fire;

supporting fire;

accompanying fire.

The calculated breakthrough frontages for units are 1 km for battalion, 2 km for regiment, 4 km for division, and 8-10 km for army.

The breakthrough sectors for a front may be twenty-seven to thirty kilometers.

The breakthrough for a front is not the sum of the breakthrough sectors for first-echelon divisions, since there will be many divisions not operating on the front's main or secondary axis, which nevertheless have their own breakthrough sectors.

An army in WWII took .1 to .8% losses per day. Now with nuclear weapons losses will be 3.8 to 5.3% per day.

For nuclear, during the entire army operation losses will be 27 - 42%.

For conventional war losses will be 1.1 to 1.3 % per day.

For the entire operation losses will be 7.7 to 10.4%

Equipment losses in WWII were 8-9% per day, now for nuclear war losses will be 12-15% per day.

For the entire operation tank losses will be 50-80%, APC losses 30-40%, and vehicles 40-60%.

Of the total losses in personnel the breakdown is as follows: nuclear casualties 16-18%, conventional weapons 6-7%, chemical weapons 5-6%, biological weapons 1.5-2%, illnesses 1.5-2%. 30% of the total casualties will be caused by the initial nuclear strike.

What is the probability of accomplishing the combat mission; that is reaching a specified line or area in the depth of the enemy position by a certain time?

What is the probability that losses can be inflicted on the enemy of no less than ordered, usually (fifty percent)?

What level of confidence can be assured that at the moment the troops reach this line they will retain their capability to continue the offensive, that is have losses less than specified (forty percent)?

What is the probability of accomplishing a partial or entire success?

destroy a specified group of enemy;

seize a line for favorable conditions;

assignment of deadlines for conducting the mission;

how the mission should be executed.

The first two elements are mandatory while the third and fourth are usual.

Mission clarification - fifteen to twenty minutes.

Estimate of situation - 2-3 hr or 1 hr if necessary.

Terrain reconnaissance - 2-3 hr, visiting 2 positions.

Formulating a decision - thirty minutes to one hour.

Issuing orders - forty-five minutes to one hour by a conference of commanders.

Organizing coordination - could be done at same conference for issuing orders or two hours at a second conference. This could also be done on a map or on the ground.

Changes requiring new decisions and plans will require at least two to three hours especially if they involve a major regrouping of forces.

the combat directive specifies that the attack (movement) is to be ready by ___ time and date;

subordinate commander will need ___hours to prepare for the given operation;

my reconnaissance will take ___ hours;

the briefings will take ___hours;

my conclusions:

preliminary tactical instructions must be sent to ___(name) at ___ locations by ___ time;

briefings must be presented to me at __- location by ___ time;

I will need ___ hours to evaluate the mission, to estimate the situation, and to prepare my preliminary tactical decision;

I will conduct my reconnaissance from ___ to ___ time;

I will issue my operation order to ___, at___ location, at ___ time;

the remaining time___ I will hold in reserve.

Frontage of enemy elements that are in the first- and second-echelons, dispositions, layout of the defense, boundaries, flanks, non-occupied areas, location of firing positions of artillery, deployment of reserves (especially tanks); and when, where, and for what purpose they can be used at their line of deployment and directions of their counterattack.

Availability and disposition of mass-destruction weapons and the likelihood of their employment.

Location of control points.

The details for positions down to platoon and company positions with exact locations of individual crew served weapons. Details differ with the depth, but most detail is for the depth of the first-echelon battalion defensive positions, for this platoon level is needed.

indications of deployment of nuclear delivery means;

changes in enemy situation in terms of committed forces, reserves, artillery, etc.;

any large movements (troop movements), deployments etc.;

identification of enemy units (from prisoners, insignia on dead soldiers, documents etc.);

location of command posts and communication centers radars etc.

the command;

the interaction;

the warning;

the rear service net systems.

reports from ground observation posts;

higher echelon and adjacent units;

radio and radio electronic reconnaissance;

reconnaissance in force.

enemy strength (composition, status, deployment, weak points, density per kilometer of front, intentions);

own forces (disposition, status, losses, time to react, correlation of troops and means);

adjacent forces (units operating on flanks, and the units and means of higher echelons operating in the area of own forces) (situation, mission, coordination, how do they affect the operation of own forces);

terrain;

radio active situation;

the political situation in the area of operations.

subordinate's missions in time and space;

subordinate's capabilities in concrete terms;

means to react (second-echelons, reserves);

enemy movements;

change in enemy's estimated intentions;

changes caused by nuclear weapons or by air strikes and artillery.

commitment of reserves (troops, antitank and special reserves);

request for support from higher headquarters;

early commitment of second-echelon;

adjustment of subordinates' missions;

request for air support;

change of plan.

Division plans, like army plans etc., are kept at the command posts.

Copies are provided to higher headquarters, but are not sent down to subordinates. The plans are not disseminated.

Subordinates learn of their roles and missions through combat orders, instructions, or by visiting headquarters and making notes about their part in the operation directly from the plans or maps.

The original plan developed in peacetime will have attempted to foresee all possible contingencies and to allow sufficient flexibility in execution to accommodate unforeseeable situations.

The actual plan as amended will have accounted for some of the previously unforseen contingencies.

It will allow for the possibility of further changes during execution as the situation develops.

subordinates can no longer do their mission in the planned time and space;

subordinates capabilities have changed seriously because they are spread out or engaged in heavy battles with strong points that should have been bypassed;

loss of a key second-echelon force;

enemy movements show the potential arrival of a major force at a time and place not foreseen and for which current forces have not the power to cope;

change in the intentions of the enemy (he is now seen to be preparing a different kind of response than expected);

nuclear weapons are used or there are heavy air strikes.

the correlation of forces;

the times on or off the planned mission achievement schedule (even a half hour delay might be critical, if it allows a dynamic defense the opportunity to make a movement that will forestall something);

the casualties occurring have an effect in terms of the calculation of subsequent correlations;

the limitations imposed by higher headquarters (such as how something must be done or the posture forces are supposed to be in at a certain time and place in order to fulfill the higher headquarters' concept of the operation).

overcome the enemy immediately by opening artillery fire first (the one who starts artillery fire first can take the initiative);

overcome the enemy by deploying first;

overwhelm the enemy at the start of the actual attack by striking first.

along the entire division front;

for each regimental front;

along projected lines for expected counterattacks and for commitment of the second-echelon.

The Soviet dictionary of basic military terms states that this means attack position. "An area of terrain allocated to troops for occupation by them prior to going over to the attack from a position of close contact with the enemy. An attack position is prepared in accordance with the concept of the operation and the operational formation of the attacking troops and is organized in the engineering sense so as to conceal their presence, to facilitate their deployment and transition to the attack, and to protect them from all weapons at the enemy's disposal."

The term today really means a starting position, that is: the position from which the troops move out, whatever their type of movement or march. It might be located near or far from the enemy depending on the method for initiation of combat. In this definition the Iskhodnyy Rayon may or may not also be a Vyzhidatel'nyy Rayon.

The dictionary states that it is "an area of terrain occupied by troops before going over to the offensive. All measures associated with preparation for the offensive are taken in the assembly area. An assembly area must provide good conditions for concealment against ground, air and radar observation by the enemy, and must afford the troops protection against weapons of mass-destruction."

The term refers to the "forming-up area or FUP" which is a "waiting area" which is the final area in which troops wait prior to commitment to combat. It is the area typically associated with the final waiting area occupied by a first-echelon unit prior to combat, if such an area is occupied at all. The preferred method now is for the unit to enter combat straight from the approach march, in which case no final forming-up area is occupied.

It may also be the final waiting area of a second-echelon company, battalion or regiment in which the unit is formed in company columns and in which it makes final preparations while awaiting the first-echelon unit to accomplish its mission. However, in general this area is not always designated in any special terms. In fact, during the course of an operation the units are generally on the move, even second-echelon units, and therefore do not "occupy" areas, but rather just stop periodically in their battalion or company columns. The second-echelon regiment will be deployed into battalion columns, which may or may not be further deployed into company columns at this stage of the advance. The last assembly area "occupied" by the unit may be the concentration area.

The military dictionary does not define this term, however sosredotocheniye means concentration.

This area is the concentration area located in the depth of the forces' own area in which a unit concentrates while receiving a further mission. It may be the area near the garrison to which a unit moves on alert or the area in which a unit assembles after a rail movement.

The dictionary defines the term as "alternate region or position" "A zone or sector of the terrain prepared or designated for the disposition of troops or for defense. It is used for changing the grouping of troops with a view to withdrawing them from the area of an enemy nuclear strike, or for attaining greater stability in a defense."

The general sequence of occupation of these areas is illustrated in Figure 3. The sequence depends on the method for initiation of combat. The methods for initiation of combat are shown in chart 2. It formerly was Soviet practice to move from garrison to a concentration area, then to move forward and occupy a forming up area. In recent years Soviet practice includes movement into combat straight from the march from concentration areas in the deep rear or even directly from garrison. Now the Soviet practice is to initiate combat always from the line of march unless that is not possible. Reznichenko states that it is now too dangerous to concentrate troops due to the much greater capabilities of the defender for maneuver and fire. He specifically mentions not only nuclear, but also conventional artillery and especially "smart" weapons, which the Soviets call reconnaissance-strike complexes.

"While guided by this principle [concentration] it should be borne in mind that in modern combat there exists a constant threat of the employment of nuclear weapons by the enemy. This gives rise to the need to disperse troops and adopt measures aimed at reducing losses when the enemy launches nuclear strikes. For this reason, the need to disperse personnel and equipment should be taken into consideration when massing them.

The degree of dispersion depends on the tasks to be performed, the distance separating friendly forces from the enemy, the protective features of the terrain, and the capabilities of command and control assets. It must provide for the timely concentration of efforts and rapid dispersal of personnel and equipment along the front and in depth after the combat task has been performed."

task to be performed;

terrain considerations;

engineer preparation of the area;

troop control capabilities.

The first-echelon's and the enemy's reactions.

If the first-echelon is successful and is advancing better and/or faster than planned then the division will hold the second-echelon and commit it at a later time. There would be no reason to endanger the second-echelon to casualties or giving up the flexibility in holding it uncommitted if the first-echelon can run the gambit alone.

If the first-echelon is moving fast and has opened up a new axis, then it might be advisable to commit the second-echelon to this new area.

If the first-echelon is unsuccessful, then division might have to commit the second-echelon early to retrieve the situation.

If the enemy defenses are weaker, then commitment of the second-echelon would be at a later time.

If the results of artillery and air are more devastating to the defender than expected, then commitment of the second-echelon will be later.

If a nuclear strike destroys the enemy, keep the second-echelon uncommitted but kept moving forward in columns.

"The simultaneous suppression of the enemy defense by attrition throughout its whole depth, by breakthrough of the tactical zone of defense on selected axes, with the subsequent rapid development of tactical success into operational success by means of committing to the engagement exploitation echelons and the landing of air assaults for the most rapid attainment of the set aim."

Space width - the front zone of responsibility; depth - the location of immediate and subsequent missions;

Time starting time of the operation;

date for completion of the mission;

Enemy general assessment of enemy capability and intentions;

Friendly front composition, attachments and support, adjacent units etc.

A. Need
The requirement for structuring the force into echelons is the first issue. The basic issue is should the force be deployed in one or two echelons. This means in practice, "is a second-echelon needed or not?" Otherwise the forces will all be deployed in the first and only echelon. The nature of the combat grouping is a fundamental consideration which in turn affects all other issues.


B. Size
The size of the first-echelon, that is the number of armies that will be required to accomplish the mission is the next issue to be addressed. How large the first- and second-echelons should be to accomplish their missions is fundamental. This inevitably results in an assessment of trade offs since ideally both echelons should be as large as possible. A study of this question will have been done in peacetime by the general staff when it determined the number of armies to assign to the front. The decision involves a number of mathematical calculations. (Discussed in Chapter 4).


C. Composition
The allocation of front assets in terms of the number of divisions and other units assigned to each army and the distribution of artillery and air to each army must be addressed. Which actual units will be assigned to each army is also decided. Mathematical calculations and analysis are required for all of these issues.


D. Location
The armies must be assigned specific sectors in accordance with an overall scheme of maneuver designed to achieve the objectives set for the front operation. The locations for assembly areas, starting areas, lines of commitment, lines for intermediate and subsequent missions and other actions must be established. These too require calculations.

E. Timing
The exact time for starting and accomplishing each mission and for occupying each location must be specified.


F. Security
The entire force must be secured against enemy air and ground attack at each stage of its activities, especially when in assembly areas, on the march and at the time of commitment into combat.


G. Deception
The organization and movement of first-echelon units should be done in such a way as to enhance the effectiveness of the overall deception plan.


H. Support
The Soviet conception of support is very specific. It includes protection against weapons of mass-destruction, engineer, chemical, reconnaissance, deception, hydrometeorological and topogeodetic support; all of which must be carefully coordinated.


I. Coordination
The requirement for coordinating the combat actions of all elements to insure maximum total effectiveness must be considered in making the decision on establishing echelons.

A. Nature of the war
The war will be conducted under the threat of the use of nuclear weapons in any case, but if it is planned to begin with an "initial nuclear strike" rather than with the use only of conventional weapons the use of first- and second-echelon armies will be quite different. Changes in roles will affect the specific responses given to each of the issues listed above.


B. Timing of the war - Mobilization versus surprise
If the war will begin suddenly with relatively little prior buildup instead of after a long period of increasing tension will make a major difference in the requirement for first- and second-echelon forces. It may be that the necessity for exploiting surprise in a sudden war dictates that all available forces be committed in the first-echelon, with none either available or needed for a second-echelon.


C. The aim and concept of the strategic operation
This will be the governing consideration for the front commander as he "clarifies his mission" and then makes his decisions. Of course the higher commander will have already considered the nature and timing of the war in his own decision which is passed to front in terms of a directive.


D. The role and place of the front
This governs the specific content of the front plan, which in turn establishes the tasks to be assigned to first- and second-echelons. It too will be prescribed by the higher commander.


E. The front missions
The commitment of first- and second-echelon armies are tied to the immediate and subsequent missions given the front in the directive from higher headquarters. Hence this factor will determine the location and timing of these commitments.


F. The nature of the enemy defense
The offensive plan is closely related to the nature of the defense. If the enemy is planned to be engaged in a meeting engagement the formation will be quite different from that required for a breakthrough operation of prepared positions. Furthermore the size and strength of the enemy force influences the location and structure of the attacker's forces. The depth of defense and size of reserves is a critical element influencing the creation of a second-echelon.


G. Location, dimensions of assigned area, and nature of terrain
All these factors influence the decision on organizing the first- and second-echelons.


H. The status of the enemy and friendly forces.

nuclear delivery means, airfields, rockets and nuclear storage;

command posts and communications links and the civilian control system (political decision making system);

industrial base targets serving military;

garrisons of troops.